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🔧🧑‍💻 - Define and test the trusted ref policy for credential health workflow dispatch #979

Description

@efraespada

Is there an existing issue for this?

  • I have searched the existing issues.

What area does this task affect?

CI/CD

Task description

Define and test the trusted-ref policy for credential-health workflow dispatch. Deliver one independently reviewable result at the operator trust review, parallel stage.

Scope and acceptance criteria

  • Document the actual authorized actors, refs, runner-group/environment controls and credential scopes. Separate accidental branch selection, a fork actor and an actor who can edit the workflow; mark unavailable organization-policy evidence explicitly.
  • Choose and document the maintainer-approved trusted-ref policy before claiming hardened dispatch. A mutable if-condition in the attacker-editable workflow is not independent protection; do not advertise it as one.
  • At least eight deterministic contracts cover authorized/denied actors, allowed/disallowed refs, altered workflow identity, fork exclusion, missing credentials and provider failure, using fake endpoints and no real secrets.
  • Preserve the mandatory vypdev self-hosted policy and existing hosted exceptions only for event admission/npm OIDC. Do not change consumer installation templates or deploy/activate Bugbot.

Current issues or inefficiencies

The final review raised branch-controlled credential-health dispatch on persistent self-hosted runners. Manual dispatch requires repository write access, so no unauthorized event path was demonstrated; that is not proof that arbitrary workflow-editing collaborators or branch revisions are safe.

Observed baseline: unreleased develop ccefb27627cd627ccdb7d5666fd174c2ac1da07b from merged PR #951.

Expected impact

Make this one pending result independently inspectable and reproducible, with its actual passed, failed or unavailable evidence.
Completion does not authorize release, producer trust, profile qualification from partial measurements, or production activation.

Additional context or comments

Priority and dependencies

Documentation and implementation boundary

Documentation: docs/security-operations/security/trust-boundaries.mdx, docs/security-operations/security/self-hosted-runners.mdx.
Keep Clean Architecture and current coverage/contract gates. When a later implementation changes a public contract, update its catalogued SDD, tests and docs together and validate specifications; update Graphify after code changes.
Read the effective #950 contract in the owning SDD and its current reconciliation amendments; historical pilot deadlines are not current investigation limits.

Fixed invariants and planning state

Backlog only: no in-progress, branch creation, model execution, deployment or activation requested by this planning step.
Keep BUGBOT_VERIFICATION_MODE=disabled. Evaluated PRs must have zero write attempts; retain frozen pilots and independent evaluator/oracle evidence.
Token usage is optional telemetry and cannot stop investigation or reject a supported verdict. Elapsed time and turn count do not impose research cutoffs; explicit cancellation and evidence/SHA integrity remain mandatory. Post-run latency qualification criteria remain distinct from session deadlines.

Activity

  1. moved this to Todo in vypdevon Nov 19, 2026
  2. changed the title [-]Define and test the trusted-ref policy for credential-health workflow dispatch[/-] [+]🔧 - Define and test the trusted ref policy for credential health workflow dispatch[/+] on Nov 19, 2026
  3. vypbot commented on Nov 19, 2026

    @vypbot
    Contributor

    Hi! I’m @vypbot, the Copilot assistant for this repository.

    I can answer questions, explain the codebase, propose implementation and test plans, review issues and pull requests for potential bugs or security problems, and help authorized maintainers apply changes.

    Try /copilot help to see the available commands, or mention @vypbot with your question.

  4. moved this from Todo to In Progress in vypdevon Nov 19, 2026
  5. added
    branchedIndicates that a branch has been created for this issue.
    on Nov 19, 2026
  6. changed the title [-]🔧 - Define and test the trusted ref policy for credential health workflow dispatch[/-] [+]🔧🧑‍💻 - Define and test the trusted ref policy for credential health workflow dispatch[/+] on Nov 19, 2026
  7. added
    state:workingWork can proceed on the verified branch or without a branch.
    on Nov 19, 2026
  8. vypbot commented on Nov 19, 2026

    @vypbot
    Contributor

    Implementation plan

    Current status: Ready to start. No action is required from maintainers before implementation.

    1. Record the current trust boundary
      • Inspect the credential-health workflow and security documentation; document authorized dispatch actors, refs, runner-group and environment controls, and credential scopes.
      • Separate accidental branch selection, fork actors, and collaborators who can edit the workflow; mark organization-policy evidence unavailable unless verified.
    2. Choose the trusted-ref policy
      • Document the maintainer-approved ref policy and the independent control that enforces it before describing dispatch as hardened.
      • Treat a mutable workflow condition as insufficient protection when the workflow can be edited by the actor it is meant to constrain.
    3. Implement the approved boundary
      • Apply the approved ref and workflow-identity checks at the appropriate independent enforcement point, preserving mandatory vypdev self-hosted policy.
      • Retain hosted exceptions only for event admission and npm OIDC; leave consumer installation templates and Bugbot activation unchanged.
    4. Add deterministic policy contracts
      • Cover at least eight cases for authorized and denied actors, allowed and disallowed refs, altered workflow identity, fork exclusion, missing credentials, and provider failure.
      • Use fake endpoints and no real secrets; report passed, failed, or unavailable evidence.
    5. Update and validate project records
      • Update trust-boundaries.mdx and self-hosted-runners.mdx; update the owning SDD, catalog evidence, tests, and related docs if the public contract changes.
      • Run the applicable contract, coverage, architecture, and specification gates; keep the result independently reviewable without release or activation.

    Acceptance: The operator trust review contains the approved trusted-ref policy, documented actor/ref/runner/environment/credential boundaries and explicit unavailable organization evidence; at least eight deterministic fake-endpoint contracts cover the required cases with no real secrets, and all applicable project gates pass without release or activation.

    Need something else? Mention the bot with a question or use /copilot help.

  9. vypbot commented on Nov 19, 2026

    @vypbot
    Contributor

    Progress · 65% estimated

    Assessed head f0655e7f · 2/7 supported
    1 need implementation · 4 need verification or clarification

    Implementation still needed

    • R16 · - [ ] Choose and document the maintainer-approved trusted-ref policy before claiming hardened dispatch. A mutable if-condition in the attacker-editable workflow is not independent — Record maintainer approval of the trusted-ref policy before claiming hardened dispatch. Requirement source · Evidence at assessed head

    Verification or clarification needed

    • R15 · - [ ] Document the actual authorized actors, refs, runner-group/environment controls and credential scopes. Separate accidental branch selection, a fork actor and an actor who can — Verify or explicitly preserve as unavailable the actual PAT/provider grants and effective organization controls. Requirement source · Evidence at assessed head
    • R17 · - [ ] At least eight deterministic contracts cover authorized/denied actors, allowed/disallowed refs, altered workflow identity, fork exclusion, missing credentials and provider fa — Verify source contracts for missing credentials and provider failure, plus fake-endpoint execution without real secrets. Requirement source · Evidence at assessed head
    • R32 · Make this one pending result independently inspectable and reproducible, with its actual passed, failed or unavailable evidence. — Independently verify reported execution; compressed-log metadata does not attest test outcomes. Requirement source · Evidence at assessed head
    • R47 · Keep Clean Architecture and current coverage/contract gates. When a later implementation changes a public contract, update its catalogued SDD, tests and docs together and validate — Verify applicable architecture, coverage, and specification gates and the required Graphify refresh on this head. Requirement source · Evidence at assessed head

    Issue · Linked pull request · Full assessment

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65%Progress: 65%branchedIndicates that a branch has been created for this issue.chorein-progressStart work on an admitted issue.maintenancepriority: mediumImportant but not urgent, should be addressed soon.size: XLIndicates that the issue or task is extra large in scope and complexity.state:awaiting-maintainerstate:blocked

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