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Security: ved-cmpt/offshoot

Security

docs/SECURITY.md

Security

Offshoot is a portfolio project that runs untrusted code (legacy COBOL and model-written C#) and untrusted text (source comments, model output). This page lists what protects what, where it is enforced, and what is not covered. Blueprint Section 11 is the specification; the ADRs hold the details.

Reporting

Open a private security advisory on the GitHub repository (Security, then Report a vulnerability). Please do not open a public issue for a vulnerability. All data in the project and the demo is synthetic.

Code execution

Control Where Evidence
Generated and legacy code run only in sandbox containers, never on the host or in the API process compose.yaml, ADR-009, ADR-030 tests/legacy/test_runner_isolation.py, tests/modules/test_sandbox_security.py
No network: cobol-runner sits on an internal network and executes under the nonet seccomp wrapper; dotnet-builder has no network interface but loopback and serves a Unix socket runners/, ADR-009, ADR-030 the same tests
Non-root, read-only root file system, no capabilities, no-new-privileges, CPU, memory, PID and time limits, read-only source mounts, tmpfs work directories compose.yaml SANDBOX_TIMEOUT and SANDBOX_MEMORY_LIMIT tests
Banned APIs fail the build: processes, network, file system, environment, reflection emit, type lookup by name, native calls, unsafe code runners/dotnet-builder/template/BannedSymbols.txt, ADR-031 9 hostile fixtures, each POLICY_VIOLATION
Runner APIs need a shared secret, compared in constant time, never passed to executed code ADR-032 runner auth tests
The public demo runs no code at all. The image has no compiler, no SDK and no runner; EXECUTION_ENABLED=false makes every code-running endpoint answer 403 EXECUTION_DISABLED Dockerfile, ADR-047 tests/test_production.py, the smoke suite
Uploads are never compiled or run, and are off in demo mode ADR-043 tests/test_uploads.py

AI

Control Where
Source, comments and documents are delimited and treated as untrusted data; the deliberate injection comment in RATECALC.cbl is a test fixture services/agent/prompts.py, ADR-025
The model cannot approve, verify or write anything: strict contracts with extra="forbid", no field for a state; services validate and store ADR-026, services/agent/contracts.py
Every cited span and data name is checked; a flagged rule cannot be verified until edited services/agent/validation.py
Equivalence is decided by the harness, and approval needs a passing verification under today's thresholds ADR-033, ADR-040
The answer key never reaches an agent context or a container ADR-025, tests/agent/test_answer_key_isolation.py
Live calls are bounded per project and by a hard cap for the whole database; error text from the provider never leaves the adapter ADR-046
The public demo runs mock AI only and holds no key render.yaml

Live Gemini held against the injection comment in the Run 05 sample; the defence never depended on that (docs/EVALUATION.md).

Authentication and sessions

Control Where
Argon2id password hashes core/security.py
Short-lived access token in memory only; rotating refresh token in an HttpOnly, Secure (production), SameSite=Strict cookie scoped to /api/v1/auth, with reuse detection ADR-018
Role read from the database on every request; explicit role sets ADR-014
CSRF: a custom header on cookie endpoints, plus an Origin check; behind a TLS proxy the service's own https origin is accepted ADR-018, ADR-047
Login rate limit per address and account, and per address ADR-015
Production refuses placeholder secrets and insecure cookies at start core/config.py
Sign-in by username or email; the demo accounts share the published password demo1234, and in demo mode no account can be created, have its password set, or (for a demo account) be changed or disabled (403 DEMO_ACCOUNTS_LOCKED) ADR-050, tests/test_users.py
Users are never deleted, only deactivated; an admin cannot deactivate or demote themselves ADR-014, ADR-050

HTTP

Control Value
API responses Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none', Cache-Control: no-store
The app (production) default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'nonce-<per request>'; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; upgrade-insecure-requests. No unsafe-inline (ADR-047)
Every response X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: no-referrer, Permissions-Policy denying geolocation, microphone and camera, Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin, a request id
HTTPS Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains when cookies are secure; Render terminates TLS
CORS Same origin in production (CORS_ORIGINS empty); the local dev server's origin only in development
Error bodies A fixed envelope with a code and a request id; validation errors carry locations and types, never input values

Abuse of the public demo

Control Value (Render)
Mutating API requests per client address 60 a minute (429 RATE_LIMITED)
Request body size 2 MB, counted on bytes received (413)
Jobs in any 24 hours, all projects 200 (429 DEMO_CAP_REACHED)
Client address CF-Connecting-IP, which Cloudflare sets and refuses to accept from a client; otherwise the third X-Forwarded-For entry from the right. Both measured on the live service (ADR-048)
Daily reset The demo project is restored from a stored snapshot every 24 hours; users, approvals and the audit log are kept
Banner "Public demo — synthetic COBOL app, simulated AI responses", and that no code is compiled or run

Data and secrets

  • All data is synthetic. No secret appears in prompts, logs, fixtures or tracked files; .env and .env.* are git-ignored, and .env.example holds placeholders only.
  • The API connects as the least-privilege role offshoot_app: no DDL, no role or database creation, SELECT and INSERT only on the audit log. Migrations run as the owner through a separate URL that the deployed service does not have (ADR-014, ADR-047).
  • The audit log is append-only by grants and by triggers that reject UPDATE, DELETE and TRUNCATE. On Neon the owner role is not a superuser, so it cannot disable those triggers either; locally the owner is the container's superuser, which could (ADR-014).
  • gitleaks runs over the full history on every push, and the attribution scan too (ADR-049).

Dependencies

CI audits the locked Python runtime dependencies (pip-audit), the frontend's production dependencies (npm audit) and every NuGet package of the .NET solution and of the sandbox template, on every push. Container images are pinned by digest. Dependabot proposes updates monthly. The sandbox restores NuGet packages only from its offline cache (ADR-031).

Not covered

  • A determined attacker with many addresses can still spread load past the per-address limits; the job cap and the daily reset bound the damage.
  • The limiters are in memory and per process, and reset on restart (ADR-015).
  • Equivalence is proven only over the tested input space (Blueprint Section 16).
  • The local stack is for one developer on 127.0.0.1; its placeholder secrets must be changed before exposing it anywhere.
  • No penetration test has been done.

There aren't any published security advisories