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Security: spiritledsoftware/t3flare

SECURITY.md

Security policy

t3flare is published by Spirit-Led Software LLC and maintained by one person, on a best-effort basis.

Supported versions

Only the tip of main is supported. t3flare has no releases: main follows t3code's nightly tags and deploys continuously, so a fix lands on main and nowhere else.

Reporting a vulnerability

Report it privately, through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: Security → Report a vulnerability. If you cannot use GitHub, email social@spiritledsoftware.com.

Please do not open a public issue, discussion or pull request for a vulnerability.

Include what you can of:

  • the affected route, component or file, and the commit of main you tested;
  • the steps to reproduce it, against a Deployment of your own;
  • what an attacker gains, and what they need first (a paired client, a Workspace, Access, nothing).

Test only against a Deployment you own. Never test against the Maintainer's Deployment or anyone else's.

What to expect

  • We aim to acknowledge a report within 7 days.
  • Disclosure is coordinated, with a 90-day default from the report: we publish a GitHub security advisory once a fix is on main, or when the 90 days end, whichever comes first, unless we agree another date with you.
  • We credit you in the advisory if you want to be credited.
  • There is no bug bounty.

Scope

In scope, as t3flare builds and configures them:

  • the public endpoint and the t3 auth routes t3flare mounts (ADR-0010);
  • the Access-guarded /_t3flare routes: the admin routes, the Harness panel and the Settings server;
  • Container isolation, and the rule that no vendor credential enters a Container (ADR-0016);
  • the GitHub App's tokens and their scoping (ADR-0013);
  • the Credential broker, Model endpoints and the Model relay;
  • t3flare's Patches and Shadows of t3code;
  • the CI chain that proves and lands an Update (ADR-0037).

Out of scope:

  • unmodified t3code and the stock T3 Code clients: report those to pingdotgg/t3code;
  • the CLI agents themselves (Codex, Claude Code, OpenCode, pi) and Cloudflare's platform: report those to their publishers;
  • a Deployment's own misconfiguration;
  • anything that first needs Owner-equivalent access, including the residual ADR-0037 §6 records for a Workspace opted in to changing CI;
  • volumetric or cost denial of service.

Known limits

  • Ruleset main on the Canonical repository requires no approving review, so a Container token for it (contents and pull requests write), held by a Workspace of the Maintainer's Deployment, could likely open and merge its own pull request once check passes. This is tracked as SPI-1262.

There aren't any published security advisories