- The object store is trusted for durability, not for authorization. The manifest is the only authority for refs and the live pack set; retired objects remain downloadable but never become live again without a CAS.
- Git clients are untrusted. Smart HTTP authorizes before git runs, bounds the body, times out, and never hands an unparseable receive head to git.
- The local mirror and worktrees are caches; a hostile local file must never become a ref or an object key without validation.
- Hooks are the application boundary:
authorizereturns a role or a refusal; policy is evaluated before git mutates refs.
validate_refnamerejects empty, control, space, backslash,..,//, leading/trailing/,.lock, and names outsiderefs/(orHEAD).RepoIdrejects.., leading., empty segments, and path separators beyond oneowner/segment; local paths are rebuilt from validated parts.- Bundle/pack/log/checkpoint/lease keys come from
Layout, never raw input. delete_prefixrefuses empty prefixes and prefixes without a trailing/.- Store credentials are the operator's: never log access keys, session tokens, or signed URLs.
- Webhooks: HMAC-SHA256 over the exact body; constant-time compare; delivery id for dedup; cursor advances only after 2xx.
- Limits are fail-closed: body/push/bundle/repo/ref counts are checked before reading or publishing. A zero where a bound is required is a config error.
- Anonymous read is opt-in. Every write requires a role with write access; policy cannot be bypassed by having a write bit. Groups resolve at eval; an unresolvable group denies.
TLS termination, OIDC, browser sessions, CSRF, and multi-tenant billing belong to the host application. The library supplies hooks and token/Basic helpers so the host can implement them without reimplementing git.