Open an issue on node-q/hbench titled "Security report" that says only that you have one, with no details, and a maintainer replies with a private way to send it. Please keep the details out of public issues. Include, once asked: what you found, how to reproduce it, and the hbench version (hbench --version) and platform.

Fixes go into the next release; there are no backports to older ones. The newest release is on this repository's Releases page, and scripts/install.sh installs it.

hbench runs tasks and agents in Docker containers on your machine. A container shares the host's kernel and is not a boundary against hostile code: run tasks and agents you trust, or put hbench in a VM you can throw away.

• Egress. With enforce_allowlist, the agent phase reaches only the allowed hosts (README, "Task format"), but DNS to the configured resolvers and ICMP stay open, and setup and the verifier keep the task's own network.
• Secrets. Values of environment variables named like keys are redacted from a trial's files, raw and in the common encodings. A secret an agent hashes, encrypts or splits is not recognised.
• Resources. Tasks get the CPU and memory limits they declare; disk is not limited.
• The viewer. hbench view binds 127.0.0.1. Bound to any other address it serves read-only: the routes that start runs and delete jobs answer 403 there.

Reports about any of these are welcome; they are the known limits, not the whole list.