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feat: TLS fingerprint on sessions, hashed; change audited (1.3.0) - #8
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login and refresh take tlsFingerprint (JA4/JA3 from the server's trusted TLS proxy). Only its SHA-256 is stored (Session.tlsFingerprintHash). A change on refresh is audited as auth.tls_fingerprint_changed and never blocks; auth.device_mismatch records whether the TLS fingerprint matched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VT1kmGY9yJ2fLxetUn2D5c
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…NT_HEADER) (#9) <!-- claude-projects-attribution: {"github_login":"BackStacked"} --> _Requested by **Himanshu** · [project thread](https://claude.ai/code/project/chan_016JXeBZ2UxSi4N5VU2C26fQ?thread=cmsg_016JXeBZ2UxSi4N5VU2C26fQXQfucx3itZeBWpxHXi3jWG)_ Before: login and refresh bound a session to the client's device signals only. After: with `TLS_FINGERPRINT_HEADER=x-ja4` (and `TRUST_PROXY` ≥ 1), the JA4/JA3 TLS fingerprint the proxy computed is passed to auth-kit at `login` and `refreshSession`, stored as a SHA-256 hash on the session, and a change on refresh is audited as `auth.tls_fingerprint_changed`. `auth.device_mismatch` also records whether the TLS fingerprint matched. Nothing changes in the GraphQL schema or the client. A TLS fingerprint comes from the ClientHello, so only the TLS terminator can compute it. The header is read with security-kit's trusted-proxy rule, the same as X-Forwarded-For, and the api refuses to start with the header set but no trusted proxy. A missing fingerprint is never an error, and a change never blocks (browser updates and TLS-inspecting networks change it). How: `src/config/env.ts` (new variable and its check), `src/server.ts` (`fastifySecurity({ tlsFingerprintHeader })` → context), `ctx.tlsFingerprint` passed by the auth controller and service. Docs in 06 (proxy setup table), 09, 12, `.env.example`. 4 new end-to-end checks (hash only stored, change audited, header ignored without the setting, startup refusal); `TEST_BACKENDS=pg npm test` passes locally with the kits built from source (112 checks). **Draft until the kits are published:** needs security-kit 0.3.0 (mgpl-diagnostics/security-kit#3) and auth-kit 1.3.0 (mgpl-diagnostics/auth-kit#8), both merged. After publishing them, run `npm install` here to update `package-lock.json` and push; CI will then go green. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) https://claude.ai/code/session_01VT1kmGY9yJ2fLxetUn2D5c --- _Generated by [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code/session_01VT1kmGY9yJ2fLxetUn2D5c)_ --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Requested by Himanshu · project thread
Before: sessions were bound to the client's device signals only.
After:
loginandrefreshalso taketlsFingerprint(JA4/JA3, supplied by the server from security-kit'sreadTlsFingerprint, never by the client). Only its SHA-256 is stored, asSession.tlsFingerprintHash. On refresh, a different fingerprint is audited asauth.tls_fingerprint_changed(both hashes) and the latest is kept;auth.device_mismatchnow recordstls: "same" | "changed" | null.It never blocks a refresh: browser updates and TLS-inspecting networks change the fingerprint, the same reasoning as the client fingerprint. A refresh without one keeps the stored hash; a session without one is bound by the first refresh that has one.
How:
hashTlsFingerprint(validated, SHA-256 base64url) insrc/auth.ts, a new optionalSessionfield, 8 new checks run on memory and Redis stores (126 total); the Redis "no raw token" check also covers the fingerprint. No error codes changed. Version 1.3.0.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01VT1kmGY9yJ2fLxetUn2D5c
Generated by Claude Code