Only the latest minor release is actively supported.

Older tags remain pullable, but fixes are only backported on a case-by-case basis and only for severe issues.

Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

Email: h.patel686r@gmail.com

Include:

• A description of the issue and its impact.
• Steps to reproduce (or a minimal PoC).
• The affected image tag(s).
• Relevant versions of the host environment (Docker, NVIDIA driver, kernel).

Acknowledgement within 72 hours. Fixes are developed privately; once a fix ships, a public advisory will be published via GitHub Security Advisories.

This image is a development environment, not a hardened runtime. The trade-offs below are deliberate — understand them before exposing the image:

• code-server with a weak password on the public internet is effectively remote code execution. Use a strong, random password. Strongly prefer placing the service behind a VPN, an IP allowlist, or an auth-aware reverse proxy (Traefik + Authelia, Cloudflare Tunnel with Access, tailscale serve, etc.) rather than exposing it directly.
• Mounting the Docker socket (/var/run/docker.sock) makes the container effectively root on the host. The socket mount is documented as optional in the deployment examples; enable it only if you trust every user with access to the code-server instance.
• Passwordless sudo inside the container is intentional. A user who has already authenticated to code-server has a shell as coder; passwordless sudo just saves them a step. The real security boundary is the container, not the user inside it.

Planned for later minor releases:

• Signed images via cosign.
• SBOM publishing alongside images.
• Trivy / Grype vulnerability scans in CI (non-blocking, informational).

These are tracked in CHANGELOG.md under the Roadmap notes.