🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix incomplete taint propagation for third-party deserializers

[tachyon-beep]

🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: Third-party deserialization functions (dill.load, jsonpickle.decode, etc.) were missing from core taint propagation mappings, causing untrusted data flows through these functions to not be properly tracked as UNKNOWN_RAW.
🎯 Impact: This could lead to false negatives where the analyzer fails to detect unsafe data reaching sensitive sinks after passing through these deserialization routines.
🔧 Fix: Added the missing unconditional deserialization sinks (dill.load, dill.loads, jsonpickle.decode, joblib.load, shelve.open) to _SERIALISATION_SINKS in src/wardline/scanner/taint/variable_level.py.
✅ Verification: Ran make test and verified the core propagation mapping correctly includes the new sinks.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 11520902516335630282 started by @tachyon-beep

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[Copilot]

Pull request overview

This PR strengthens Wardline’s taint propagation model by ensuring outputs from additional third-party deserialization entrypoints are conservatively treated as UNKNOWN_RAW, preventing false negatives when untrusted data flows through these routines.

Changes:

• Added dill.load, dill.loads, jsonpickle.decode, joblib.load, and shelve.open to _SERIALISATION_SINKS so their return values shed provenance to UNKNOWN_RAW.
• Recorded the incident/learning in .jules/sentinel.md for future prevention.

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 2 out of 2 changed files in this pull request and generated no comments.

File	Description
src/wardline/scanner/taint/variable_level.py	Expands _SERIALISATION_SINKS to include missing third-party deserializers so taint propagation fail-closes to UNKNOWN_RAW.
.jules/sentinel.md	Documents the taint propagation gap and the preventative guidance for future sink additions.

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