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ci: run the surface checker and publish receiver on Node 24.22.3 - #17

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Nov 16, 2026
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Moves this repo's two workflows onto Node 24.22.3, the Node 24 release from the Node.js November 11 2026 security releases. That release fixes 16 CVEs, 7 of them High: CVE-2026-123863, CVE-2026-123864, CVE-2026-123865, CVE-2026-123866, CVE-2026-123872, CVE-2026-123874 and CVE-2026-126051.

This is a checker-only change. It brings .github/workflows/ in line with the current scaffold from the private working repo, where the same pins have already landed.

What changes

  • .github/workflows/verify-surface.yml: node-version goes from '20' to '24.22.3'. Node 20 is end-of-life.
  • .github/workflows/publish.yml: a new actions/setup-node step pinned to '24.22.3', placed before the steps that run verify-surface.mjs and update-changelog.mjs. Until now the receiver ran them on whatever Node the ubuntu-latest image shipped.

Both files use the actions/setup-node commit SHA this repo already pins (v4.4.0), so no new action is introduced.

Not changed

  • verify-surface.mjs and update-changelog.mjs: identical to the scaffold already.
  • The runtime surface, manifests and version.

Testing

  • node .github/workflows/verify-surface.mjs on Node 24.22.3: OK, all gates clean.
  • Both workflow files parse as valid YAML.
  • This PR's own verify-surface run exercises the new pin. publish.yml runs only on repository_dispatch, so its pin takes effect on the next promotion.

Node 24.22.3 is the Node 24 release from the Node.js November 11 2026
security releases. verify-surface.yml moves from Node 20 to it. publish.yml
gains a pinned setup-node step, so its verify-surface.mjs and
update-changelog.mjs runs no longer use the runner image's default Node.
Both files match the current scaffold; the checker logic is unchanged.

https://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/november-2026-security-releases
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Dependency Review

✅ No vulnerabilities or license issues or OpenSSF Scorecard issues found.

OpenSSF Scorecard

PackageVersionScoreDetails
actions/actions/setup-node 49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 🟢 6.4
Details
CheckScoreReason
Maintained🟢 1015 commit(s) and 0 issue activity found in the last 90 days -- score normalized to 10
Code-Review🟢 10all changesets reviewed
Binary-Artifacts🟢 9binaries present in source code
Packaging⚠️ -1packaging workflow not detected
Dangerous-Workflow🟢 10no dangerous workflow patterns detected
Token-Permissions⚠️ 0detected GitHub workflow tokens with excessive permissions
CII-Best-Practices⚠️ 0no effort to earn an OpenSSF best practices badge detected
Pinned-Dependencies🟢 5dependency not pinned by hash detected -- score normalized to 5
Fuzzing⚠️ 0project is not fuzzed
License🟢 10license file detected
Signed-Releases⚠️ -1no releases found
Security-Policy🟢 9security policy file detected
Branch-Protection⚠️ 0branch protection not enabled on development/release branches
SAST🟢 10SAST tool is run on all commits

Scanned Manifest Files

.github/workflows/publish.yml

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Automated review

✅ Approve — 4 nits

This is a small, correct CI change. Both workflows now run on Node 24.22.3 through the setup-node SHA the repo already pins. In publish.yml the new step runs before both node calls (lines 144 and 199). There are no blocking or important findings: the four bug-pass findings are all nits about how durable and how complete the pin is. Before merging, please confirm that the private scaffold's publish.yml carries the same step, because line 175 overwrites this file on every promotion.

Bugs

  • Pin survives only if the private scaffold's publish.yml has it too .github/workflows/publish.yml:95 (nit)
    Every promotion overwrites this file with the artifact's copy (publish.yml:175: cp _staged/.github/workflows/publish.yml .github/workflows/publish.yml). Failure scenario: the private scaffold lacks this step or pins another version, for example because its change merges after the next release. The next surface_release_ready run then silently replaces publish.yml, and later receiver runs go back to the runner image's default Node. Nothing fails, and verify-surface.mjs does not compare publish.yml's Node version with verify-surface.yml's. The PR says the scaffold already has the pin, but nothing in this repo enforces that.
    Suggestion: Confirm that the scaffold's publish.yml contains this exact step (same SHA and version) before merging. Optionally, have verify-surface.mjs assert that both workflows declare the same node-version.
  • Exact Node patch version is hand-copied into two workflows .github/workflows/verify-surface.yml:47 (nit)
    '24.22.3' is duplicated in verify-surface.yml and publish.yml (and the private scaffold), with nothing keeping them in step. The two files already drifted once: Node 20 in one, no pin in the other. Failure scenario: the next Node security release bumps one file but not the other, or not the scaffold, which then reverts publish.yml on the next promotion. CI and the receiver then run the same checker on different Node versions again.
    Suggestion: Keep the version once in .github/.node-version and use node-version-file in both workflows. Alternatively, use node-version: '24' with check-latest: true.
  • Exact patch pin adds a Node download step to every promotion .github/workflows/publish.yml:97 (nit)
    The runner tool cache is unlikely to hold 24.22.3, so setup-node will download it on every publish run. Failure scenario: during a GitHub or nodejs.org outage or rate limit, or before actions/node-versions publishes a newly pinned patch, setup-node fails. The promotion then aborts before the artifact is downloaded and files a ci-failure issue unrelated to the surface. Before this change the scripts ran on the runner's preinstalled Node with no download.
    Suggestion: Accept the trade-off knowingly. Alternatively, pin a major version with check-latest: true so the cached version is used when it is current.
  • The SHA-pinned actions still run on the EOL Node 20 action runtime .github/workflows/publish.yml:95 (nit)
    The PR is motivated by Node security fixes, but setup-node v4.4.0 (newly added here), checkout v4.4.0 and create-github-app-token v2.0.2 declare the node20 runtime, which reached EOL in April 2026. Failure scenario: the action code that handles the App private key and installation token still runs on an EOL runtime, or on whatever runtime GitHub forces once node20 is removed. The security goal is therefore met for the two scripts but not for the actions. checkout and create-github-app-token are unchanged, so for them this is a pre-existing follow-up.
    Suggestion: In a follow-up, move to the node24-runtime majors (setup-node v5+, checkout v5+, a current create-github-app-token), SHA-pinned.

Live docs

No developers.deriv.com page is followed by this PR. It cites only a nodejs.org security-release blog post, which I could not fetch and did not need, so I could not verify the CVE IDs or the existence of 24.22.3 from here. This PR's own verify-surface run will fail if 24.22.3 does not resolve.

Bug pass report (/review high)

Four findings. None is a crash or a logic error: the diff only adds or changes two setup-node steps. The two .mjs scripts use no API that behaves differently on Node 24, and the new comment doesn't trip INTERNAL_REF_PATTERNS. No repo CLAUDE.md exists, and the user-level CLAUDE.md has no code rules, so the conventions angle found nothing. I could not confirm that 24.22.3 is a real Node release, because shell and network access were denied.

[
  {
    "file": ".github/workflows/publish.yml",
    "line": 95,
    "summary": "The new setup-node pin in the public publish.yml lasts only as long as the private scaffold's publish.yml carries the same step, because every promotion overwrites this file with the artifact's copy (line 175: cp _staged/.github/workflows/publish.yml .github/workflows/publish.yml).",
    "failure_scenario": "The private repo's promotion scaffold lacks this step or pins another version, for example if its change is not merged before the next release. The next surface_release_ready run then silently replaces publish.yml, and later receiver runs go back to running verify-surface.mjs and update-changelog.mjs on the runner image's default Node. Nothing fails, and verify-surface.mjs never checks publish.yml's Node version against verify-surface.yml's. The commit message says the files 'match the current scaffold', but nothing enforces that."
  },
  {
    "file": ".github/workflows/verify-surface.yml",
    "line": 47,
    "summary": "The exact patch version '24.22.3' is copied by hand into two workflows (and the private scaffold) with nothing keeping them in step, which is how they drifted before (Node 20 here, no pin at all in publish.yml).",
    "failure_scenario": "Node ships its next security release. Someone bumps verify-surface.yml but not publish.yml, or the reverse, or forgets the private scaffold, which then reverts publish.yml on the next promotion. CI and the publish receiver then run the same checker on different Node versions again. Fix: keep the version once in `.github/.node-version` (under .github/, so the surface allowlist accepts it and the publish rsync leaves it alone) and use `node-version-file` in both workflows. Or use `node-version: '24'` with `check-latest: true` so security patches are picked up without an edit."
  },
  {
    "file": ".github/workflows/publish.yml",
    "line": 97,
    "summary": "Pinning an exact patch makes the release path download Node on every run, since the runner tool cache is unlikely to hold 24.22.3. That adds a network step and a new way for a promotion to fail.",
    "failure_scenario": "During a GitHub/nodejs.org outage or rate-limit, or before actions/node-versions has published a newly pinned patch, setup-node fails. The promotion run then aborts before the artifact is even downloaded, and a ci-failure issue is filed for a reason that has nothing to do with the surface. Before this change, update-changelog.mjs and verify-surface.mjs ran on the Node already on the runner with no download."
  },
  {
    "file": ".github/workflows/publish.yml",
    "line": 95,
    "summary": "The change is motivated by Node security fixes, but the SHA-pinned actions still declare the Node 20 runtime, which reached end-of-life in April 2026: setup-node v4.4.0 (added here), checkout v4.4.0 and create-github-app-token v2.0.2.",
    "failure_scenario": "Mint token, checkout and setup-node itself still run on an EOL Node runtime, or on whatever runtime GitHub forces when it removes node20. So the 'security release' goal is only met for the two scripts and not for the action code that handles the App private key and installation token. Moving to the node24-runtime major versions (setup-node v5+, checkout v5+, a current create-github-app-token) would fix the root cause."
  }
]

Dropped or lowered by the main review: I kept all four bug-pass findings as nits. None has a failure that happens with the code as merged; each depends on a later event (scaffold drift, a network outage, a future Node release). I checked finding 1 against publish.yml:170-175, which copies only publish.yml out of the artifact, and it is accurate. Per G-005, finding 4 is partly pre-existing (checkout and create-github-app-token are unchanged); it stays a nit because setup-node v4.4.0 is newly added to publish.yml.

Standards report

No hard violations.

  • SHA pinning: the new actions/setup-node@49933ea5… # v4.4.0 step in publish.yml is SHA-pinned with the same SHA as verify-surface.yml, so the "every action SHA-pinned" non-negotiable holds.
  • Workflow settings: permissions: {}, concurrency and timeout-minutes are untouched.
  • Pinned security rule: the diff adds no run: interpolation, no pull_request_target and no secret output.
  • CONTRIBUTING.md: the PR is focused on one change and matches the existing step style.
  • Out of scope: rules/deriv-api-conventions.md(.mdc) covers Deriv API usage, not CI, so it does not apply.
  • K-003: the verify-surface.yml header lists checks 1–6 and does not mention a Node version, so it is still accurate. verify-surface.mjs is unchanged.
  • Stale docs: none. A grep for Node, nodejs and node-version finds only the two new '24.22.3' lines. No README, SECURITY.md or header mentions Node 20.

The sub-agent raised one judgement call: the new publish.yml comment says automated promotion "does not copy" verify-surface.yml, while the verify-surface.yml header says it is "Staged into the public repo by the private repo's promotion bundle build". I dropped this. The two statements are consistent: the file travels in the artifact (it is staged), but publish.yml:170-175 copies only publish.yml out of the artifact's .github/. The new comment matches that code.

Spec report

Every stated change is present and correct.

  • verify-surface.yml: node-version goes from '20' to '24.22.3' (line 47).
  • publish.yml: the new setup-node step is at line 95. It comes after checkout (line 86) and before the first node .github/workflows/verify-surface.mjs (line 144) and update-changelog.mjs (line 199). There is no earlier node call.
  • SHA: the pin is identical to the existing verify-surface.yml pin, so no new action is introduced.
  • "Not changed" claims: they hold. Neither .mjs file nor any manifest is in the diff. Whether the scripts are "identical to the scaffold" cannot be checked from this repo.

Scope:

  • The only addition beyond the spec is a 5-line explanatory comment above the new step. It is documentation only, and it agrees with publish.yml:170-175.

Wording notes (no finding):

  • "Checker-only change" is loose wording: publish.yml is the promotion receiver, not a checker.
  • "Takes effect on the next promotion" holds only if the scaffold's publish.yml carries the same step, because line 175 overwrites this file. The Bugs section already covers that point, so it is not repeated here.

Claude Code (claude-opus-5-5) · /review high bug pass · spec-review skill (Matt Pocock) · 9 learned review notes · reviewed 1dd5e71 against master · 3 min · $1.14 ($0.38 bug pass + $0.76 review) · triggered from Slack (message)

# the same pin, but automated promotion does not copy that file, so it
# reaches public in a manual promotion PR or a separate reviewed checker
# change.
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4.4.0

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nit · Pin survives only if the private scaffold's publish.yml has it too

Every promotion overwrites this file with the artifact's copy (publish.yml:175: cp _staged/.github/workflows/publish.yml .github/workflows/publish.yml). Failure scenario: the private scaffold lacks this step or pins another version, for example because its change merges after the next release. The next surface_release_ready run then silently replaces publish.yml, and later receiver runs go back to the runner image's default Node. Nothing fails, and verify-surface.mjs does not compare publish.yml's Node version with verify-surface.yml's. The PR says the scaffold already has the pin, but nothing in this repo enforces that.

Suggestion: Confirm that the scaffold's publish.yml contains this exact step (same SHA and version) before merging. Optionally, have verify-surface.mjs assert that both workflows declare the same node-version.

- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4.4.0
with:
node-version: '20'
node-version: '24.22.3'

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nit · Exact Node patch version is hand-copied into two workflows

'24.22.3' is duplicated in verify-surface.yml and publish.yml (and the private scaffold), with nothing keeping them in step. The two files already drifted once: Node 20 in one, no pin in the other. Failure scenario: the next Node security release bumps one file but not the other, or not the scaffold, which then reverts publish.yml on the next promotion. CI and the receiver then run the same checker on different Node versions again.

Suggestion: Keep the version once in .github/.node-version and use node-version-file in both workflows. Alternatively, use node-version: '24' with check-latest: true.

# change.
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4.4.0
with:
node-version: '24.22.3'

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nit · Exact patch pin adds a Node download step to every promotion

The runner tool cache is unlikely to hold 24.22.3, so setup-node will download it on every publish run. Failure scenario: during a GitHub or nodejs.org outage or rate limit, or before actions/node-versions publishes a newly pinned patch, setup-node fails. The promotion then aborts before the artifact is downloaded and files a ci-failure issue unrelated to the surface. Before this change the scripts ran on the runner's preinstalled Node with no download.

Suggestion: Accept the trade-off knowingly. Alternatively, pin a major version with check-latest: true so the cached version is used when it is current.

# the same pin, but automated promotion does not copy that file, so it
# reaches public in a manual promotion PR or a separate reviewed checker
# change.
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4.4.0

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nit · The SHA-pinned actions still run on the EOL Node 20 action runtime

The PR is motivated by Node security fixes, but setup-node v4.4.0 (newly added here), checkout v4.4.0 and create-github-app-token v2.0.2 declare the node20 runtime, which reached EOL in April 2026. Failure scenario: the action code that handles the App private key and installation token still runs on an EOL runtime, or on whatever runtime GitHub forces once node20 is removed. The security goal is therefore met for the two scripts but not for the actions. checkout and create-github-app-token are unchanged, so for them this is a pre-existing follow-up.

Suggestion: In a follow-up, move to the node24-runtime majors (setup-node v5+, checkout v5+, a current create-github-app-token), SHA-pinned.

@sparsh-deriv
sparsh-deriv merged commit d3044f2 into master Nov 16, 2026
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