Secret values (API keys, tokens, .env files) while they move between devices
that belong to one person, and while they sit in each device's OS keychain.
| Party | Trusted with | Not trusted with |
|---|---|---|
| Your devices and OS keychains | the values | — |
The relay (relay.1pass.dev) |
delivering bytes, keeping them only briefly | reading or changing values; it can drop or delay messages |
| The network | nothing | everything (TLS plus end-to-end encryption) |
| A paired sync device | proposing items and sending changes within the approved scope | authorizing an overwrite on the receiving device |
The relay sees client IPs, timing and message sizes. It stores no account, no long-term data, and only ciphertext: channel messages for at most 10 minutes, inbox envelopes for at most 72 hours.
Pairing does not enable sync: each item must be explicitly enrolled. A compromised paired device can propose items and send changes, but cannot overwrite a sync item's value without a human on the receiving device. Phase 1 holds every remote overwrite for review or conflict resolution. Local OS confirmation (L) uses Touch ID (or the OS password fallback), Windows Hello, or polkit; agents cannot supply this confirmation.
- Code pairing: SPAKE2 with explicit key confirmation.
- A passive relay learns nothing.
- An active attacker gets one guess per code: 1 in 65,536 for a transfer code, 1 in 16.7 million for a pairing code.
- A failed guess is visible to both people and burns the code.
- Remembered devices: inbox messages use HPKE auth mode (RFC 9180), which authenticates the sender's device key.
- Envelopes carry an id and an expiry, and replays are dropped.
- Each message uses a fresh ephemeral key, so a sender's leaked device key can't open its past messages. A leaked recipient key can open messages still waiting in that recipient's inbox. If a device is lost, rotate its key (
kc device rotate) and re-pair the others.
- Local handling:
- kc never reads values from command-line arguments or its own environment.
kc exec --envhands a value to a child process's environment on purpose. Only the same user (and root) can read a process environment, unlike argv, which every local user can read. - Buffers are zeroized.
kc getrefuses to print to a terminal without--reveal.
- kc never reads values from command-line arguments or its own environment.
- Sync storage: persisted values stay in OS keychain slots, including held
proposals, conflict candidates, outgoing snapshots and recovery checkpoints.
Values never go into
sync.jsonorsync.log; they are read into zeroizing memory for processing and end-to-end encrypted transport. Sync value fingerprints use HMAC-SHA256 with a device-local key kept in the keychain. They are not sent to peers or stored in public metadata; displayed sync fingerprints compare values on one device, not across devices. - Locked keychains: kc reports an error instead of waiting on an OS unlock prompt, so unattended agents don't hang.
- Unaudited PAKE crate: the
spake2crate has not had an independent audit. kc uses fixed roles (start_a/start_b), explicit key confirmation before anything else is sent, and direction-separated keys, so a reflected message fails. - No per-app access control on Linux and Windows: any process running as the same user can read the user's keychain there. macOS restricts each item to the app that created it.
- Linux keyring: on some Linux setups the default keyring has no password (for example with auto-login). Values are then protected only by file permissions and disk encryption.
- macOS prompts: macOS can ask "allow access" when the
kcbinary changes. Release builds are code-signed so updates keep the same identity. - Changes outside kc: an external keychain change from A to B and back to A between syncs cannot be detected.
- Originating device lost: devices send only changes they originate. If the originating device disappears, a human must re-send unreceived changes as a new local publication from a remaining copy.
- Linux sync confirmation: L currently uses polkit's
org.freedesktop.policykit.execaction, which may ask for an administrator password. polkit only shows that action's generic text ("run a program as another user"), so kc prints what is being confirmed on the terminal first. The OS policy controls authentication and caching. A kc-specific policy is planned with the later sync installer; neither ships in Phase 1. - No signed sync approvals yet: A/A+ and FIDO2 are Phase 1b work; the 1pass.dev phone approver is Phase 2b work. They cannot authorize overwrites in this release.
- Planned approval lock (phase 2): selected items will need an authenticator code or a passkey before they can be read.
Email support@1pass.dev. Please don't open a public issue for security reports.