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fix(edge,tls,docs): SEC2-07 hardening quick wins and wording sweep - #647
Hardening quick wins and a documentation sweep from the security-hardening-tier-2 epic (PLAN-SEC2-07): the passthrough audit record now carries the matched SNI key, the management listener has a 32 KiB request-body bound, a new boot warning covers two configuration combinations behind the SNI front, and every restated statement in documents and Javadoc that disagreed with the code was corrected in one commit.
Intent
Problem. A re-review of the epic's open observations found a handful of small, low-risk gaps on main: the passthrough relay logged the raw client-supplied server name although the route had matched on the normalized key; the management listener buffered request bodies up to the 10 MiB default although no management route takes a body; two configuration combinations behind the SNI front change what source detection and the trusted-proxy judgement see, with no warning at boot; and a number of statements in documents, ADRs and Javadoc no longer matched the code.
Approach. Each behaviour change is the smallest fix, test-first, with a matched control: the normalized key is passed to the relay; the management body bound is a fixed 32K with its reason stated beside the key; the boot rule only warns and adds no configuration key. The wording corrections were listed first, read against the code, and applied together in one commit so a statement restated in several documents changed everywhere at once.
Non-goals. No change to the front's connection cap or the existing per-source shares, no new refusal reason, and no behaviour change beyond the three named above. The optional per-source bound on a passthrough target's dial budget was dropped at outline because it needs more than a constant and a map.
Changes
Passthrough audit record (SniFrontListener, PassthroughRelay, SniFrontListenerTest): the route passes the normalized matched key to the relay, so the INFO record names the configured host and not the raw client-supplied name.
Management listener body bound (application.properties, EdgeHardeningOptions, ManagementListenerTransportTest, ShippedApplicationPropertiesTest, ManagementBodyBoundIT, LocalStackTls): quarkus.management.limits.max-body-size=32K, shown on a live listener (413 one byte past the bound, 200 at the bound, every probe route still answers) and on the native image.
Boot warning ApiSheriff-152 (EdgeRules, ConfigValidator, ConfigLogMessages, EdgeRulesTest, doc/LogMessages.adoc, doc/configuration/security-and-edge-hardening.adoc, doc/development/boot-validation-rules.adoc): a warning when tls.passthrough_sni is combined with an acting enumeration_detection.action or a loopback forwarded.trusted_proxies entry; silent otherwise, no new configuration key.
One wording sweep (documents, ADR-0003, ADR-0043, ADR-0076, ADR-0078, threat model, SealedSessionCookieCodec, CsrfDefence, ConnectionCapAudit, ApiSheriffLogMessages, the compose sample idp.yaml): each statement was read against the code it describes and corrected where they disagreed; the sweep is a single commit.
Test Plan
verify -Ppre-commit (quality gate) and the whole-tree test run green on the final tree
verify -Pintegration-tests -Dit.test=ManagementBodyBoundIT,TlsPassthroughIT green on the native image (4 and 6 tests)
Each behaviour change started with a test that failed against the unfixed code (padded SNI names, body above the bound, the boot warning rule with matched controls)
Related Issues
None.
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Startup now warns when TLS passthrough is combined with detection actions or trusted-proxy settings that can cause clients to share a source identity.
Bug Fixes
Passthrough routing and audit labels now consistently use the normalized hostname.
Refusal logs now identify whether a connection was refused at acceptance or during route selection.
The management interface now limits request bodies to 32 KiB.
…llo value
SniFrontListener now normalizes the ClientHello server name once and hands
that key - the passthrough_sni host as configured, lower-cased - to the relay
as its audit label, so a client can no longer write its own whitespace or
line breaks into the INFO PASSTHROUGH_RELAY_ESTABLISHED record. The
PassthroughRelay Javadoc states the label contract.
SniFrontListenerTest proves it: a server name padded with whitespace
including CR and LF still routes to the passthrough backend and is audited
under the configured host, with an exact host as the matched control.
Co-Authored-By: plan-marshall <noreply@cuioss.de>
No management route reads a request body, yet the body handler on every
management route buffered up to the 10 MiB Quarkus default. The shipped
application.properties now sets quarkus.management.limits.max-body-size=32K:
the smallest power of two above every body the form limits (2 KiB attribute,
1 KiB buffered bytes) and the 8 KiB chunk bound (observed with a 16 KiB
chunk) must see to answer on their own terms, so it pre-empts none of their
400s. The bound is fixed, not configurable.
ManagementListenerTransportTest refuses a declared body one byte past 32 KiB
with 413, serves exactly 32 KiB, and serves a body-less GET on every probe
route; ShippedApplicationPropertiesTest pins the key. The EdgeHardeningOptions
Javadoc, the threat model and the TLS architecture document state the
shipped bound.
Co-Authored-By: plan-marshall <noreply@cuioss.de>
…t onto the relay leg
Behind the SNI front every terminated connection reaches the edge from the
loopback relay leg, so source detection and the trusted-proxy judgement see
every terminated client as one loopback peer. The new boot rule
EdgeRules.validatePassthroughSourceCollapse, registered in
ConfigValidator.DEFAULT_RULES, emits WARN ApiSheriff-152 once per present
combination under a non-empty tls.passthrough_sni: enumeration_detection
enabled with block or delay (the action then acts on every terminated client
at once), and a forwarded.trusted_proxies range overlapping 127.0.0.0/8 or
containing ::1 (every client's forwarded headers are then trusted). The record
names the combination by a fixed token, never a range or address; it never
refuses the boot.
EdgeRulesTest proves each combination warns and all six matched controls stay
silent. LogMessages.adoc, the edge-hardening configuration reference and the
boot-validation concern map describe the rule.
Co-Authored-By: plan-marshall <noreply@cuioss.de>
…their restatements
Correct every listed statement the code contradicts, with its restatements,
in one sweep:
- connection cap: counted only once a connection is established (after its
TLS handshake on the HTTPS listener), one counter for the redirect and
HTTPS listeners, no per-source share, not bounded by the SNI front
- internal HTTPS port: binds 0.0.0.0 per Dockerfile.native, with the
container-network consequence
- unresolvable forwarded chain: one unresolved-via source per proxy, shared
by every client behind it (ADR-0003, ADR-0076, threat model, ADR-0078)
- BFF-02: the pending-authorization record is server-held and single-use in
both session modes
- ApiSheriff-146: the template places a dial_budget refusal at the route
decision, not at accept
- ADR-0043 / SealedSessionCookieCodec: only the access token is always
fresh, the ID token can repeat, the active scope set is replaced, and the
scope names are those the identity provider returns
- mTLS revocation removes every certificate of the chain; idp.yaml routes
are segment-prefix routes; the logout proof's Sec-Fetch-Site: none
statement carries the no-Origin qualifier; BFF-09 lists every
speculative-load marker
Co-Authored-By: plan-marshall <noreply@cuioss.de>
ManagementBodyBoundIT exchanges raw HTTP/1.1 over TLS with the compose
stack's management port: a declared body one byte past 32 KiB to the
liveness probe is refused 413, a body of exactly 32 KiB is served, and
every probe route answers a body-less GET with 200. LocalStackTls now
exposes its trust-all context so the raw-socket IT reuses it.
Co-Authored-By: plan-marshall <noreply@cuioss.de>
…r-free and gate-formatted
The quality gate flagged the string concatenation inside the ApiSheriff-152 warn call; build the token in a local first. Also accept the formatter's indentation of two continuation lines in files this branch authored.
Co-Authored-By: plan-marshall <noreply@cuioss.de>
The changes add boot warnings for passthrough source-collapse configurations, set the management request-body limit to 32 KiB, and use normalized SNI values for passthrough routing labels. They also update refusal logging and document connection-cap, session, TLS, and endpoint behavior.
Boot validation warns when passthrough SNI is combined with an acting detection action or a trusted-proxy range that overlaps loopback. Tests cover qualifying and control cases.
The documentation describes canonical proxy source keys, IPv4 and IPv6 keying, and enforcement by source and folded host.
Management listener body limit
Layer / File(s)
Summary
Configure and verify the body limit api-sheriff/src/main/java/de/cuioss/sheriff/gateway/edge/admission/EdgeHardeningOptions.java, api-sheriff/src/main/resources/application.properties, api-sheriff/src/test/java/de/cuioss/sheriff/gateway/quarkus/*, doc/architecture/tls-and-inbound-security.adoc, doc/security-threat-model.adoc, integration-tests/src/test/java/de/cuioss/sheriff/gateway/integration/*
The management listener uses a 32 KiB body limit. Tests check the configured property, the size boundary, body-less probe routes, and listener responses.
Comments and documentation state that HTTPS connections count after the TLS handshake and hold a slot until closure. They describe the shared cap and the passthrough front’s separate scope.
SNI routing and refusal logs
Layer / File(s)
Summary
Refusal stages and warning records api-sheriff/src/main/java/de/cuioss/sheriff/gateway/ApiSheriffLogMessages.java, api-sheriff/src/main/java/de/cuioss/sheriff/gateway/tls/SniFrontListener.java, api-sheriff/src/test/java/de/cuioss/sheriff/gateway/tls/SniFrontListenerTest.java, doc/LogMessages.adoc, doc/development/tls-edge.adoc
Refusal records include a stage. Tests and documentation distinguish accept-time cap and source-share refusals from route-decision dial-budget refusals.
Passthrough lookup and relay labeling use the normalized SNI key. Tests check audit labels for padded and exact SNI values.
Security and session documentation
Layer / File(s)
Summary
Session and navigation behavior api-sheriff/src/main/java/de/cuioss/sheriff/gateway/bff/cookie/SealedSessionCookieCodec.java, api-sheriff/src/main/java/de/cuioss/sheriff/gateway/bff/csrf/CsrfDefence.java, doc/adr/0043-Compress-then-encrypt_in_the_sealed_session_cookie_and_the_CRIME_BREACH_discriminator.adoc, doc/security-threat-model.adoc, doc/variants/03-bff-cookie.adoc, doc/LogMessages.adoc
The documentation describes refresh scope replacement, possible repeated ID tokens, navigation and prefetch signals, pending authorization storage, and logout revocation behavior.
Security and TLS documentation doc/development/tls-edge.adoc, doc/user/tls-edge.adoc, doc/user/environment-variable-overrides.adoc, doc/LogMessages.adoc
The documentation describes internal listener reachability, certificate trust-bundle guidance, and additional warning and error records.
The code changes look sound, but several documents misstate port configuration, delay enforcement and forwarded-chain behavior, and a few earlier minor concerns remain open. Fix the documentation before merging; there is no runtime risk from these items.
Pre-merge checks: 2
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Explanation
Description Check
Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check
The title names the three areas the PR touches (edge, tls, docs) and the SEC2-07 tag, but it does not name the main behavior changes. Those are the passthrough audit key now using the normalized confi…
Full details: Title check
Explanation
The title names the three areas the PR touches (edge, tls, docs) and the SEC2-07 tag, but it does not name the main behavior changes. Those are the passthrough audit key now using the normalized configured SNI host, the management body limit lowered to 32K, and the new ApiSheriff-152 boot warning. The title is broad and partly generic. It is related to the changeset, so it is not a fail.
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Minor · Functional Correctness · Quick win
Derive the probe cases from the registered routes.
This list already omits health/group and health/well, which SmallRyeHealthProcessor.defineHealthRoutes registers from SmallRyeHealthBuildTimeConfig. The native test repeats the same incomplete list at Line 88. Both tests can therefore pass without checking every probe route. (raw.githubusercontent.com)
Derive the concrete probe inventory from the route registrations at build or test runtime. Use that inventory in both tests instead of extending two manual lists.
As per path instructions, “Treat a hardcoded list that must mirror a set defined elsewhere … as a defect unless it is derived from that source at build or run time.”
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Minor · Security & Privacy · Quick win
The emergency cut-off text does not say how to handle a cross-certificate that a remaining root issues for the removed root's intermediate.
The bundle is a trust-anchor set, and each anchor is trusted directly. The text at doc/user/tls-edge.adoc:386-395 explains that a remaining intermediate or cross-certificate can keep a path to the removed root. It tells operators to check the file, and then to test with a certificate issued under the removed root. The check covers certificates present in the file. It does not cover a cross-certificate that a client presents and that is not in the file.
Add a step to the cut-off procedure. Operators must identify every certificate from a remaining root that cross-signs the removed root or one of its intermediates. They must then confirm that a client presenting such a certificate is rejected. Test with a leaf issued by each affected intermediate, not only with a leaf issued directly by the removed root.
…nd state review conditions exactly
PR #647 review fixes.
- SniFrontListener.Refusal carries its stage beside its token, and
WARN.FRONT_CONNECTION_REFUSED logs that stage as its own parameter
instead of enumerating every reason in the template. SniFrontListenerTest
asserts each reason's stage and that the template names no reason or
stage of its own.
- LogMessages.adoc, the developer and operator TLS-edge topics describe the
new parameter.
- ADR-0003 and ADR-0076 state the unresolved-via- source per IPv4 proxy
and per IPv6 /64, and that detection acts on the source and folded host.
- security-and-edge-hardening.adoc qualifies the passthrough single-source
statement by the loopback trusted-proxy case.
- tls-edge.adoc aligns the emergency trust-root cut-off check with
cross-certificates a client presents.
- 03-bff-cookie.adoc states the logout proof as refusing a request that
identifies itself through Fetch Metadata or a speculative-load marker.
Co-Authored-By: plan-marshall <noreply@cuioss.de>
…lth/well
PR #647 review fixes.
- ManagementBodyBoundIT creates its SSLSocket unconnected and connects it
with EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT_MILLIS, so a management port that drops the connect
attempt fails the exchange in time; SO_TIMEOUT, the HTTP/1.1 ALPN pin and
the explicit handshake are unchanged.
- ManagementListenerTransportTest and ManagementBodyBoundIT add health/group
and health/well to their body-less GET probe-route lists, and their
DisplayNames and Javadoc name the listed default SmallRye Health and
metrics routes instead of claiming every probe route.
Co-Authored-By: plan-marshall <noreply@cuioss.de>
The pre-commit quality gate re-indented the two @valuesource arrays that
gained health/group and health/well.
Co-Authored-By: plan-marshall <noreply@cuioss.de>
The environment-variable reference still called the internal HTTPS port a
loopback port, restating the sentence the wording sweep corrected in
doc/development/tls-edge.adoc. State the actual bind there and drop
"loopback" from the two sibling restatements.
Co-Authored-By: plan-marshall <noreply@cuioss.de>
Drop "loopback" from the remaining restatements of the terminated
listener's internal port (shipped properties comments, TlsEdgeProducer
Javadoc, a test comment), correct the management body comment that
called the body the only bound below its default, and qualify the
ApiSheriff-152 cause row with the loopback trusted proxy case.
Comment and documentation text only.
Co-Authored-By: plan-marshall <noreply@cuioss.de>
…listener loopback
The dial-budget row in the user guide and the matching bullet in the threat
model said the dial goes to the gateway's own loopback port/listener. The
front dials the internal listener through localhost; the listener itself
binds every interface of the container. Say what the dial does and nothing
about how the listener is bound.
Co-Authored-By: plan-marshall <noreply@cuioss.de>
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Minor · Functional Correctness · Quick win
Limit the stated effect of delay on keyed requests.
A block that the source and folded host earn applies to every request keyed on both. delay does not. While the tripped source's held-answer share has room, delay holds only that source's rejection answers. Other requests from the source proceed without delay. When the share is used up, delay refuses that source's requests with 429 until a held answer is released.
Correct the sentence at lines 101-103, and the equivalent sentence in ADR-0076, so that they state this difference.
Suggested fix
-block or a delay the pair earns acts on every request keyed on both that unresolved source and that-folded host. Only a request carrying no such+block the pair earns acts on every request keyed on both that unresolved source and that+folded host. A delay the pair earns holds rejection answers while the share of held answers has room, and refuses requests with 429 once that share is used up. Only a request carrying no such
Committable suggestion
IMPORTANT
Review the replacement and indentation, then test before committing.
Suggested change
request's folded host, like on any source, because a client can always produce such a header: a
block or a delay the pair earns acts on every request keyed on both that unresolved source and that
folded host. Only a request carrying no such
request's folded host, like on any source, because a client can always produce such a header: a
block the pair earns acts on every request keyed on both that unresolved source and that
folded host. A delay the pair earns holds rejection answers while the share of held answers has room, and refuses requests with 429 once that share is used up. Only a request carrying no such
* A trusted proxy that does not manage `X-Forwarded-*` is unsupported, and no setting covers that deployment. Passing a client's `X-Forwarded-For` through unchanged hands the spoofed chain the win. Appending only to `Forwarded` makes a client-sent `X-Forwarded-For` contest the chain: no client resolves, and every such request through that proxy shares the proxy's unresolved source.
* A trusted proxy that does not manage `X-Forwarded-*` is unsupported, and no setting covers that deployment. Passing a client's `X-Forwarded-For` through unchanged hands the spoofed chain the win. Appending only to `Forwarded` makes a client-sent `X-Forwarded-For` contest the chain: no client resolves, and every such request shares the proxy's unresolved source -- its own for an IPv4 proxy, the one of its /64 for an IPv6 proxy, shared with every trusted proxy in that /64.
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Minor · Functional Correctness · Quick win
Limit the unresolved-chain claim to disagreeing chains.
The sentence states that any client-sent X-Forwarded-For produces no client and a shared unresolved source. That is true only when the client-sent value disagrees with the proxy-added Forwardedfor= value. When the two values agree, the client resolves. ForwardedClientResolutionTest asserts this for the agreeing pair, with X-Forwarded-For and Forwarded: for= both set to 203.0.113.7.
Rewrite the sentence so that it names the disagreement as the condition.
Suggested ADR wording
--- "a/doc/adr/0003-forwarded-headers.adoc"+++ "b/doc/adr/0003-forwarded-headers.adoc"@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@
=== Accepted costs
-* A trusted proxy that does not manage `X-Forwarded-*` is unsupported, and no setting covers that deployment. Passing a client's `X-Forwarded-For` through unchanged hands the spoofed chain the win. Appending only to `Forwarded` makes a client-sent `X-Forwarded-For` contest the chain: no client resolves, and every such request shares the proxy's unresolved source -- its own for an IPv4 proxy, the one of its /64 for an IPv6 proxy, shared with every trusted proxy in that /64.+* A trusted proxy that does not manage `X-Forwarded-*` is unsupported, and no setting covers that deployment. Passing a client's `X-Forwarded-For` through unchanged hands the spoofed chain the win. Appending only to `Forwarded` makes a client-sent `X-Forwarded-For` contest the chain only when it disagrees with the proxy-added `Forwarded` `for=` value. A disagreeing pair resolves no client, and every such request shares the proxy's unresolved source -- its own for an IPv4 proxy, the one of its /64 for an IPv6 proxy, shared with every trusted proxy in that /64. An agreeing pair resolves its client.
== Links
Committable suggestion
IMPORTANT
Review the replacement and indentation, then test before committing.
Suggested change
* A trusted proxy that does not manage `X-Forwarded-*` is unsupported, and no setting covers that deployment. Passing a client's `X-Forwarded-For` through unchanged hands the spoofed chain the win. Appending only to `Forwarded` makes a client-sent `X-Forwarded-For` contest the chain: no client resolves, and every such request shares the proxy's unresolved source -- its own for an IPv4 proxy, the one of its /64 for an IPv6 proxy, shared with every trusted proxy in that /64.
* A trusted proxy that does not manage `X-Forwarded-*` is unsupported, and no setting covers that deployment. Passing a client's `X-Forwarded-For` through unchanged hands the spoofed chain the win. Appending only to `Forwarded` makes a client-sent `X-Forwarded-For` contest the chain only when it disagrees with the proxy-added `Forwarded``for=` value. A disagreeing pair resolves no client, and every such request shares the proxy's unresolved source -- its own for an IPv4 proxy, the one of its /64 for an IPv6 proxy, shared with every trusted proxy in that /64. An agreeing pair resolves its client.
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Minor · Functional Correctness · Quick win
State that the two port settings must match under passthrough.
SHERIFF_TLS_INTERNAL_HTTPS_PORT sets only the port the SNI front listener dials. It does not move the terminated listener. QUARKUS_HTTP_SSL_PORT sets the port the terminated listener binds. Nothing in the code derives one value from the other. If the two values differ, the front dials a port where no listener runs, and passthrough connections fail.
Suggested documentation fix
--- "a/doc/user/environment-variable-overrides.adoc"+++ "b/doc/user/environment-variable-overrides.adoc"@@ -110,9 +110,10 @@
| `SHERIFF_TLS_INTERNAL_HTTPS_PORT`
| `8444`
-| The internal port the terminated listener moves to under the passthrough topology. The listener- binds `quarkus.http.host`, which the image sets to `0.0.0.0`, so it listens on every interface of- the container, not on loopback alone; keep this port unpublished.+| The port the SNI front listener dials to reach the terminated listener. It must equal the+ `QUARKUS_HTTP_SSL_PORT` value (`8444`) in a passthrough deployment. The front does not move the+ terminated listener. The terminated listener binds `quarkus.http.host`, which the image sets to+ `0.0.0.0`, so it listens on every interface of the container; keep this port unpublished.
|===
=== Certificate, key and trust material
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Minor · Security & Privacy · Quick win
Add the container-network restriction to the internal port row.
Keeping 8444 unpublished does not block peers on the container network. Any container on the same Compose or pod network can connect to the listener directly and skip the front listener's SNI split, ClientHello deadline, and per-source limits. Add a sentence to this row that tells operators to restrict the container network to the peers that must reach the gateway. Refer to the TLS edge documentation for the full bypass description.
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Summary
Hardening quick wins and a documentation sweep from the security-hardening-tier-2 epic (PLAN-SEC2-07): the passthrough audit record now carries the matched SNI key, the management listener has a 32 KiB request-body bound, a new boot warning covers two configuration combinations behind the SNI front, and every restated statement in documents and Javadoc that disagreed with the code was corrected in one commit.
Intent
Problem. A re-review of the epic's open observations found a handful of small, low-risk gaps on
main: the passthrough relay logged the raw client-supplied server name although the route had matched on the normalized key; the management listener buffered request bodies up to the 10 MiB default although no management route takes a body; two configuration combinations behind the SNI front change what source detection and the trusted-proxy judgement see, with no warning at boot; and a number of statements in documents, ADRs and Javadoc no longer matched the code.Approach. Each behaviour change is the smallest fix, test-first, with a matched control: the normalized key is passed to the relay; the management body bound is a fixed
32Kwith its reason stated beside the key; the boot rule only warns and adds no configuration key. The wording corrections were listed first, read against the code, and applied together in one commit so a statement restated in several documents changed everywhere at once.Non-goals. No change to the front's connection cap or the existing per-source shares, no new refusal reason, and no behaviour change beyond the three named above. The optional per-source bound on a passthrough target's dial budget was dropped at outline because it needs more than a constant and a map.
Changes
SniFrontListener,PassthroughRelay,SniFrontListenerTest): the route passes the normalized matched key to the relay, so the INFO record names the configured host and not the raw client-supplied name.application.properties,EdgeHardeningOptions,ManagementListenerTransportTest,ShippedApplicationPropertiesTest,ManagementBodyBoundIT,LocalStackTls):quarkus.management.limits.max-body-size=32K, shown on a live listener (413 one byte past the bound, 200 at the bound, every probe route still answers) and on the native image.ApiSheriff-152(EdgeRules,ConfigValidator,ConfigLogMessages,EdgeRulesTest,doc/LogMessages.adoc,doc/configuration/security-and-edge-hardening.adoc,doc/development/boot-validation-rules.adoc): a warning whentls.passthrough_sniis combined with an actingenumeration_detection.actionor a loopbackforwarded.trusted_proxiesentry; silent otherwise, no new configuration key.SealedSessionCookieCodec,CsrfDefence,ConnectionCapAudit,ApiSheriffLogMessages, the compose sampleidp.yaml): each statement was read against the code it describes and corrected where they disagreed; the sweep is a single commit.Test Plan
verify -Ppre-commit(quality gate) and the whole-treetestrun green on the final treeverify -Pintegration-tests -Dit.test=ManagementBodyBoundIT,TlsPassthroughITgreen on the native image (4 and 6 tests)Related Issues
None.
Summary by CodeRabbit