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A security-first fork of WordPress. The plugin system is rewritten deny-by-default: no manifest, no signature, no capabilities, no execution.

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WordPress Secure Fork

A security-first fork of WordPress. The plugin system is rewritten deny-by-default: no manifest, no signature, no capabilities, no execution. The upstream contributor documentation now lives in README.upstream.md.

What changed

Runtime floor (no exceptions)

  • PHP 8.5+ only ($required_php_version = '8.5', composer.json requires >=8.5).
  • MySQL >= 8.4 LTS, MariaDB >= 11.4 (recommended: 9.7 / 11.8 LTS).
  • Dead version branches removed (PHP_VERSION_ID gates, the 5.5.5- MariaDB prefix workaround, my-hacks.php auto-include, EOL CI matrices).

Deny-by-default plugin system

  • Every plugin ships a signed plugin.json manifest (schema v1: slug, entry, versioned capability list, RSA/SHA-256 signature). No valid manifest means no install, activation, or runtime authority.
  • Signatures verify against the fork CA (src/wp-includes/certificates/fork-ca.crt). Unsigned or foreign-signed packages are refused — there is no acknowledgment bypass. Sign with tools/plugin-sign.php.
  • Activation statically scans every PHP file in the plugin for eval(), create_function(), backtick execution, and string-code assert(). Hits refuse activation unless an admin explicitly allowlists the plugin (fork_allow_unsafe_plugin_code, logged).
  • At runtime, host APIs check the calling plugin's manifest capabilities via call-stack attribution: options, network (HTTP + mail), filesystem, uploads-php, database-write, users (users-table reads), cron. REST routes without permission_callback are refused at registration.
  • A plugin that declares nothing can compute and render — and nothing else.
  • Every plugin install or update is verified after unpacking and before any file is copied (upgrader_source_selection): no manifest, bad signature, missing entry file, or blocked code patterns aborts the install with nothing written. Core packages are refused outright; theme packages are announced for the audit trail until the theme manifest spec lands.

Core updates disabled

This fork never contacts api.wordpress.org for core version information, never offers upstream upgrades, and never auto-updates core: upstream packages would overwrite fork changes. The version check records an empty update set, WP_Automatic_Updater always declines the core type, Core_Upgrader refuses every upgrade, and the update-core screen is blocked. Database migrations for fork releases still run through the normal wp-admin/upgrade.php path, which is untouched.

What breaks

  • Third-party plugins and themes without a manifest, a valid signature, or declared capabilities stop working. Authors must update (see below) or go unsupported. This is intentional: plugins are the source of nearly every WordPress exploit.
  • Core subsystems (Gutenberg, REST API, media, users, multisite, WP-CLI, updates) keep working and comply via first-party manifests.

For plugin authors

Read PLUGIN-AUTHORS.md: manifest schema, the capability list, how to sign, the activation code rules, and what to change for each refusal error. House rules for working in this tree: AGENTS.md.

Verification

php -l clean and WPCS 0 errors on all touched files. PHPUnit on PHP 8.5 against ephemeral MySQL 8.4 and MariaDB 11.8 containers:

  • Fork suites: Tests_Plugins_Security, Tests_Plugins_Manifest, Tests_Plugins_SecurityActivation, Tests_Plugins_SecurityRuntime — OK (25 tests, 57 assertions) on both databases.
  • Core regressions: admin plugin suite OK (64/258), REST API OK (527/1057), REST server OK (195/518), DB OK (660), options (407), HTTP (295), pluggable (107), cron (76), functions (1393), file utils (181) — all green.
  • Test fixtures use ephemeral CAs injected through fork_plugin_ca_cert; the real CA private key is never committed.

Honest scope

This is deny-by-default least privilege with named residual risks (host kernel, side channels, trusted-admin actions) — not a literal "100% secure" claim. Open follow-ups: signature verification in the upgrader, a wp_ajax_nopriv handler heuristic, and server-level PHP lockdown (disable_functions, open_basedir), documented in PLUGIN-AUTHORS.md.

About

A security-first fork of WordPress. The plugin system is rewritten deny-by-default: no manifest, no signature, no capabilities, no execution.

Resources

Contributing

Security policy

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