A security-first fork of WordPress. The plugin system is rewritten deny-by-default: no manifest, no signature, no capabilities, no execution. The upstream contributor documentation now lives in README.upstream.md.
Runtime floor (no exceptions)
- PHP 8.5+ only (
$required_php_version = '8.5',composer.jsonrequires>=8.5). - MySQL
>= 8.4LTS, MariaDB>= 11.4(recommended: 9.7 / 11.8 LTS). - Dead version branches removed (
PHP_VERSION_IDgates, the5.5.5-MariaDB prefix workaround,my-hacks.phpauto-include, EOL CI matrices).
Deny-by-default plugin system
- Every plugin ships a signed
plugin.jsonmanifest (schema v1: slug, entry, versioned capability list, RSA/SHA-256 signature). No valid manifest means no install, activation, or runtime authority. - Signatures verify against the fork CA (
src/wp-includes/certificates/fork-ca.crt). Unsigned or foreign-signed packages are refused — there is no acknowledgment bypass. Sign withtools/plugin-sign.php. - Activation statically scans every PHP file in the plugin for
eval(),create_function(), backtick execution, and string-codeassert(). Hits refuse activation unless an admin explicitly allowlists the plugin (fork_allow_unsafe_plugin_code, logged). - At runtime, host APIs check the calling plugin's manifest capabilities via
call-stack attribution:
options,network(HTTP + mail),filesystem,uploads-php,database-write,users(users-table reads),cron. REST routes withoutpermission_callbackare refused at registration. - A plugin that declares nothing can compute and render — and nothing else.
- Every plugin install or update is verified after unpacking and before any
file is copied (
upgrader_source_selection): no manifest, bad signature, missing entry file, or blocked code patterns aborts the install with nothing written. Core packages are refused outright; theme packages are announced for the audit trail until the theme manifest spec lands.
Core updates disabled
This fork never contacts api.wordpress.org for core version information,
never offers upstream upgrades, and never auto-updates core: upstream packages
would overwrite fork changes. The version check records an empty update set,
WP_Automatic_Updater always declines the core type, Core_Upgrader refuses
every upgrade, and the update-core screen is blocked. Database migrations for
fork releases still run through the normal wp-admin/upgrade.php path, which
is untouched.
What breaks
- Third-party plugins and themes without a manifest, a valid signature, or declared capabilities stop working. Authors must update (see below) or go unsupported. This is intentional: plugins are the source of nearly every WordPress exploit.
- Core subsystems (Gutenberg, REST API, media, users, multisite, WP-CLI, updates) keep working and comply via first-party manifests.
Read PLUGIN-AUTHORS.md: manifest schema, the capability list, how to sign, the activation code rules, and what to change for each refusal error. House rules for working in this tree: AGENTS.md.
php -l clean and WPCS 0 errors on all touched files. PHPUnit on PHP 8.5
against ephemeral MySQL 8.4 and MariaDB 11.8 containers:
- Fork suites:
Tests_Plugins_Security,Tests_Plugins_Manifest,Tests_Plugins_SecurityActivation,Tests_Plugins_SecurityRuntime—OK (25 tests, 57 assertions)on both databases. - Core regressions: admin plugin suite
OK (64/258), REST APIOK (527/1057), REST serverOK (195/518), DBOK (660), options (407), HTTP (295), pluggable (107), cron (76), functions (1393), file utils (181) — all green. - Test fixtures use ephemeral CAs injected through
fork_plugin_ca_cert; the real CA private key is never committed.
This is deny-by-default least privilege with named residual risks (host kernel,
side channels, trusted-admin actions) — not a literal "100% secure" claim.
Open follow-ups: signature verification in the upgrader, a wp_ajax_nopriv
handler heuristic, and server-level PHP lockdown (disable_functions,
open_basedir), documented in PLUGIN-AUTHORS.md.