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docs(security): re-baseline the threat model on S2-070..S2-074 - #1852

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docs(security): re-baseline the threat model on S2-070..S2-074#1852
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@lukaszlenart lukaszlenart commented Aug 15, 2026

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THREAT_MODEL.md is a v0 draft written in June, before the five bulletins published on 2026-08-14. Read against them it does not describe the framework the PMC has actually been defending: three of the five would have been closed as non-findings, and the remaining two had no security property to violate.

Bulletin Class v0 disposition
S2-070 (CVE-2026-73631) shared parse state, JSON plugin no §8 property — MODEL-GAP
S2-071 (CVE-2026-73632) shared serialization state, JSON plugin no §8 property — MODEL-GAP
S2-072 (CVE-2026-73633) unbounded JSON body read §11a "I streamed a huge body"
S2-073 (CVE-2026-73634) unbounded CSP report read §11a, same bullet
S2-074 (CVE-2026-73635) unbounded localized-text cache growth §3 super-linear-only rule

The substantive error: the DoS boundary

SECURITY.md says two separate things — a disclaimer about generic attacks against any networked server, and a design philosophy about avoiding consumption non-linear in the size of inputs. The v0 model fused them into a triage threshold and excluded everything linear. The growth in all three DoS bulletins is linear; all three carry CVEs.

The line is restated as boundedness, not curve shape across §3/§9/§11a, and SECURITY.md gets the matching paragraph so the model is no longer paraphrasing that document into a rule it does not state. That is the one change here outside the threat model, and it is the reason for it.

Two new §8 properties

  • §8.6 per-request state isolation — from S2-070/071. Note S2-070's impact line includes bypass of a configured limit: one defect voiding another control, not merely leaking.
  • §8.7 bounded consumption of request-derived input — from S2-072/073/074. Covers bounded body reads, bounded framework-managed state, and the S2-072 wrinkle that an advertised limit must bound the read it names.

§7 gains the two client capabilities these imply (concurrency, repetition); §6 gains the request body as its own surface, plus a note that a request value used as a cache key is an input class of its own.

Optional feature ≠ non-default configuration

Four of the five bulletins concern surfaces that are inert until an application enables them (JSON body population, enableSMD, a mapped CSP-report endpoint). As written, §13 let a triager close every one as OUT-OF-MODEL: non-default-config. §2 and §13 now reserve that disposition for settings the project documents as unsafe.

Also

  • §5a records the 7.3.0 / 6.11.0 hardening — struts.i18n.cacheMaxSize, struts.csp.report.maxSize, and the opt-in struts.locale.validateRequestLocale — as a second envelope change after 7.0.
  • Q-dos and Q-plugins move to answered: the PMC settled both by issuing CVEs, so only the wording is still open. Q-concurrency, Q-bounds and Q-optional replace them.
  • §12 gains the trigger that would have caught this earlier: a published bulletin whose class is not already a §8 property — a release-time check rather than a next-report-triage one.
  • §16 maps each bulletin to the sections it drives.
  • §1 and §9 stop implying every real finding is OGNL-shaped. OGNL is still the highest-severity class; it is no longer the highest-volume one.

Disclosure discipline

Everything in these two files is sourced from the published bulletins. The bulletins are deliberately terse about mechanism, and the threat model holds that line: it names the classes of defect and what they mean for triage, not where the framework was weak or how the weakness was reached. Reviewers should hold it to that standard — if a line here says more than the corresponding bulletin does, it should come out.

Notes for review

No ticket — process-doc change, per the SECURITY.md/AGENTS.md/THREAT_MODEL.md convention. All five bulletins were confirmed unrestricted on the cwiki before being cited. The document stays a DRAFT: the corrections are drawn from the published bulletins, not from a PMC position on the model itself, and the §14 questions are still open.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

The v0 threat model predates the five bulletins published on 2026-08-14,
and read against them it does not describe the framework the PMC has been
defending. Three of the five would have been closed as non-findings, and
the other two had no security property to violate.

The DoS boundary is the substantive error. SECURITY.md says two separate
things: a disclaimer about generic attacks against any networked server,
and a design philosophy about avoiding resource consumption non-linear in
the size of inputs. The model fused them into a triage threshold and put
everything linear out of scope - so S2-072 landed squarely on §11a's "I
streamed a huge body", and the growth in all three DoS bulletins is
linear. All three carry CVEs. Restate the line as boundedness rather than
curve shape, in §3/§9/§11a, and add the matching paragraph to SECURITY.md
so the model stops paraphrasing that document into a rule it does not
state.

Add the two properties the bulletins show the framework actually owes:
§8.6 per-request state isolation (S2-070/071 - shared parse and
serialization state across concurrent requests, which in S2-070 also
defeated a configured limit) and §8.7 bounded consumption of
request-derived input (S2-072/073/074 - bounded body reads, bounded
framework-managed state, and a limit that must bound the read it names).
§7 gains the two client capabilities these imply, concurrency and
repetition; §6 gains the request body as its own surface and a note that
a value used as a cache key is an input class of its own.

Separate "optional feature" from "non-default configuration" in §2 and
§13. Four of the five bulletins concern surfaces that are off until an
application enables them, and as written the model let a triager close
every one as OUT-OF-MODEL: non-default-config. That disposition is for
settings documented as unsafe, not for features documented as available.

Record the 7.3.0/6.11.0 hardening in §5a - struts.i18n.cacheMaxSize,
struts.csp.report.maxSize, and the opt-in
struts.locale.validateRequestLocale - as a second envelope change after
7.0. Q-dos and Q-plugins move to answered, since the PMC settled both by
issuing CVEs; Q-concurrency, Q-bounds and Q-optional take their place.
§12 gains the trigger that would have caught this earlier: a published
bulletin whose class is not already a §8 property. §16 maps each bulletin
to the sections it drives.

Everything here is sourced from the published bulletins. The bulletins
are deliberately terse about mechanism, and this document holds that
line: it describes the classes of defect and what they mean for triage,
not where the framework was weak or how to reach it.

Still a draft, still unratified - the corrections are drawn from the
published bulletins, not from a PMC position on the model itself.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@lukaszlenart
lukaszlenart force-pushed the docs/threat-model-s2-070-074 branch from ae261a1 to 8a44a5c Compare August 15, 2026 05:37
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lukaszlenart merged commit 80278c1 into main Aug 15, 2026
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lukaszlenart deleted the docs/threat-model-s2-070-074 branch August 15, 2026 06:05
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