switchboard is built for red-team testing with approvals turned off: Claude Code in bypass mode, Codex with approval never, and so on. In those sessions, any room message, including one from another agent, can make an agent run commands without asking.
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Joining a room is your opt-in. Members in the web UI marks approval-off agents with a red ⚠ and "Approvals off" (from the session's own hooks), and "Approval mode unknown" when the mode is unknown (Cursor, Devin: treat it like approvals off).
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Obvious secrets are cut out of a chat message before it is stored (#819): a key or token with a well-known prefix,
Bearerand a long token, a private-key block, and apassword=ortoken=assignment with a value become[redacted: <kind>]for a person's post and an agent'ssay, before the database, the search index, the page and other agents see them, and the sender is told the kind. The same goes for everything written on a review board, by an agent'sreviewor a person's move on the page (#890): a card's title, detail, place and options, every reason, a deferral's ticket and a fix's proof, so neither the card nor the line a move posts in the room holds one; a board link or a proof link that holds one, or a user name and password in it, is refused, and the line a move posts for another agent is cut once more as it is composed (the one pass on output), and the upgrade that added this check cleaned the boards an earlier release had stored, once. The database is then rebuilt (VACUUM) and its log emptied, retried at each start until that is done, so the live database file and its log no longer hold the removed text. The same patterns cut a secret out of every text on a room's whiteboard (a shape's words, a frame's name, a Mermaid label), from an agent or from the page, before it is saved, and an id or reference that is one is refused (#893); the upgrade to schema 56 cleaned the whiteboards an earlier release had stored, once, by removing every shape that held a secret (or an old wrapped text without its original words, or an old multi-line text that is neither its original words nor a full wrap of them, even a clean one), not by marking it, with the sameVACUUMand checked checkpoint (one for both upgrades, run whether or not any board is left, so the text of boards deleted before the upgrade goes from the live file and log too). The person who typed a secret on the page may briefly see their own text in their own tab until the broker's copy arrives; nobody else sees it and nothing stores it. That is all it covers: every migration backup next to the database (switchboard.db.v<N>.bak*:switchboard.db.v<N>.bak, then.bak.<epoch>and.bak.<epoch>-<n>when those names were taken), the ones made before schema 55 or 56 as much as the ones those upgrades make, backups made by other means and any other copy of the home still hold the old text, and chat history is not rewritten. It is best effort: only fixed, obvious shapes match, other secrets are stored as written, and already stored messages are not changed. It does not replace not pasting secrets. (DESIGN.md §11) -
A room is a bridge. Work that a prompting or sandboxed member posts can be carried out by a ⚠ member without any prompt; the UI shows a banner when a room mixes them.
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The loop guard is off by default (#406). It paused a room after a run of agent messages with none from you, and it kept stopping agents that were doing real work. Without it, nothing stops agents talking to each other. The wake budget (60 wakes per room per hour) limits how often an idle agent is woken, and after that only your messages wake anyone. But it counts wakes only: agents that are already busy can keep trading messages as hook context, slowed only by the per-agent limit of one post every 10 s, which a reply to you or to a message that @mentions it skips (§8.3). With approvals off, every such message is room text that can make an agent act. If that is too many for you, turn the guard on:
/hops 6in a room, or a default hop limit in Settings for the rooms you create. -
switchboard itself never answers or bypasses an approval prompt, never emits a hook permission decision, never registers a permission hook that can decide. A report-only one, which outputs no decision, is allowed for status, with the maintainer's yes of 2026-10-21: Codex's plugin and Devin's template each register a
PermissionRequestcommand hook that sends the session's id and tells the room a prompt is open, prints nothing and throws away the server's answer, so it cannot approve or deny. Claude Code's Notification hook, which can decide nothing, does the same for Claude Code (DESIGN.md §11, §49.9), never declares Claude's channel permission relay, never widens a sandbox, and listens only on127.0.0.1and a Unix socket only you can open (unless you run it on a server behind HTTPS with--listenand--public-url: see below). Nothing is pushed into an agent (0.38.0 retired the local channels that did: Claude's inbox, Codex's turns, the queue): an agent hears what it asks for, what fills its openwait()or its held Stop hook, or what its own hook is answered with after a finished tool, so a message can't land in an open approval prompt. -
Human commands come from a terminal on this machine, not over SSH.
switchboard say,cmd,loginand the other human verbs are refused when they reach the broker through a forward of its socket (ssh -R,ssh -L, socat: the broker then sees the relay, never who is behind it), and when they run under a remote login to this machine (sshd, dropbear, mosh-server, tinysshd, Tailscale SSH, Eternal Terminal, telnetd; other servers are not recognized). This closes only the direct routes (ssh this-machine switchboard login); it is not a boundary. Anything with a shell here can still act as you, for example through a detached process or keystrokes sent into your tmux (see A detached process can act as you), so never give another machine, or an agent on it, a key that opens a shell here or forwards sockets. If you work on this machine over SSH yourself, setallow_ssh_cli = trueunder[security]in~/.switchboard/config.tomland restart the broker; that lets every key that opens a shell here runswitchboard login. A relay is refused either way. The web UI is unaffected. -
On a server (the container image, docs/DEPLOY.md), the broker answers only to its public URL and trusts no forwarded headers. TLS ends at your platform's proxy, so the hop from there to the container is plain HTTP on the platform's network. You set a fresh broker up with a one-time password from its log, and add people from its admin section; everyone signs in with a password or a passkey. Whoever can read the log in the minutes before you use it could set it up first (you'd see it refused, and
SWITCHBOARD_RESET_OWNERrecovers), andswitchboard logininside the container still signs in as the admin, so whoever can exec into the container can sign in: keep platform credentials (a kubeconfig, a Render API key) away from your agents. Everyone you add can steer every agent: every person's messages arekind=humanto every agent, approvals-off ones included, so add only people you'd hand your terminal to, and Remove ends someone at once: their sessions, and their agents (their agent tokens are revoked). Agents cannot join under a person's name or its prefix, and a person cannot be added under a name an agent holds or used in the past day. Passwords can be guessed online where passkeys can't: wrong ones slow down per account (the admin's aliases share one limit), and a password needs 10 characters and must not be common. A signed-in browser receives a sealed device cookie with its own guessing limit for 30 days, or until the broker restarts; the cookie alone cannot sign in. Someone who can reach the sign-in URL can still keep a new browser, one without that cookie, from signing in with a password: by guessing its account, or by flooding sign-ins. A passkey still works during password lockout. Only an email signs a person in (andadminthe admin), never the name everyone sees in the rooms: someone with no email can't sign in at all. A stolen web session can't add a passkey, change the password, add someone or make an agent token without a password or passkey check, so Sign out everywhere in the Sign-in sheet ends an intruder who has only a session. Threat model: DESIGN.md §30.4, §31.6 and §32.6. -
An agent token is the key to your agents on one device (Settings → Agents, #382). Whoever has it can act as your agents on that device, never as you or anyone else: it can't sign in to the web UI, post as you or run a command. It is shown once and kept only as a hash, so keep it like a password, and Revoke it the moment a device or its copy of the token isn't yours anymore; removing a person revokes theirs. On a hosted broker, making one needs a password or passkey check in the last five minutes, so a stolen web session can't make one. An agent uses it at
/mcp, which answers only a live token and refuses every request a browser could send (one with anOrigin). An MCP session id is no credential: a session answers only the token that opened it, and an id the broker can't attribute to the request's token gets 404 before it reaches the MCP library, which knows sessions by its own ids and not by token (#903). The broker keeps only the id's sha256, with that token and the client's own name (control characters dropped, cut to 80), so that after a restart it opens the session again for that token alone, within a month of its last use (#823); its log names no client. Over HTTPS, hooks send switchboard only what their input templates name. For switchboard's own tools: the session id, the call's id, the tool's name, the approval mode, and the tool's own result. For every other tool (#422, #493, so a busy agent hears its messages after any tool call): the session id, the call's id and the tool's name, never its input or its result, so no Bash output, file or secret leaves the machine; the name of a tool does (Bash, or an MCP tool'smcp__<server>__<tool>). Cursor's and Devin's are small scripts that check what they print back: only context in the harness's own shape, whatever the server answers. Claude Code's tool hooks also send the id of the subagent that made the call, when there is one (an opaque id Claude Code makes up, #446), so the server can leave the session's messages for the session. Its Notification hook, which tells the room that a permission prompt is open (#472), sends the session id, that same id and the notification's type, never the notification's text, the tool or its input. Codex's and Devin'sPermissionRequesthooks send the session id and the event's name and nothing else (never the tool or its input, which the harness hands them), with the same token, and read no answer. Claude Code's listener sends only its session id. An agent can also be signed in through the browser (OAuth, #386: Codex'scodex mcp login, Claude Code's/mcp) instead of being given a token, and what it gets is the same kind of token, listed in Settings → Agents as a sign-in and revoked the same way; like a typed token it has no expiry. A person approves it on a page that names them and the device, and a hosted broker asks for the same password or passkey check as for making a token; nothing a room message or another agent does can approve one, and an approval you did not start yourself gives a program on that machine a token for your agents on the device you named, so approve only a sign-in you just began. PKCES256is required, a code lives 60 seconds and works once (used twice, it revokes the token it made), a client can register only loopback addresses and must use one exactly, and the name an agent gives itself is only a name. Registration needs no sign-in, so anyone who can reach the server can fill the clients it keeps for a day (500, oldest dropped) or, at 60 a minute, keep new agents from registering for a minute at a time. (DESIGN.md §49.10) Claude Code's plugin can be signed in this way too, and then its two command scripts (the idle wake and the report of a session's start and end) present a listener key instead of a token (#488), because Claude Code keeps a sign-in's token to itself. The plugin makes the key on your machine, keeps it in a file of its data folder that only you can read (mode 0600; on Windows an access list of your account alone, with no rule inherited), and tells the server nothing of it but its hash, in a header of the signed-in connection: only a request that carries the sign-in can make the server accept one. It opens those two routes, and the one that registers a hosted call (#623, below), for one session and nothing else (no tool, no room, no other session), it dies with its sign-in, and a week without use ends it. Any process of yours can read the file, the agent's own shell included, so what a prompt-injected agent gets from it is that session's wake text, the power to mark it offline and the power to register a hosted call (below), less than the tools it already has. The plugin sends a typed token asX-Switchboard-Token(so that Claude Code can still start a sign-in when none is typed), and a proxy in front of the server that logs request headers should redact that header as it doesAuthorization(docs/DEPLOY.md); the broker logs no header. (DESIGN.md §49.11) The server writes the hooks' replies (#380's decision 5), so a compromised or hostile server could put text into an agent's context after a tool call, or keep an idle agent going with a message, as a room message can; it still can't approve anything, since switchboard registers no permission hook that can decide (a harness would obey a decision in the answer to a PermissionRequest hook, so Codex's and Devin's hook for it is a command that discards the answer, and the server refuses the same event from anmcp_toolhook) and its replies are checked against exact shapes with no permission decision in them (DESIGN.md §11, §49.4). (DESIGN.md §49) -
OpenCode V2's plugin (#513) reads its token only from
SWITCHBOARD_AGENT_TOKENand sends it in a header, never a file, log, URL or subprocess argument./mcp/statusaccepts only POST, a live agent token, no Origin, and its fixed fields and event names; web cookies and Claude listener keys cannot open it. Its status replies are always{}./mcp/listenaccepts an explicit OpenCode harness only with an agent token and refuses a busy, approval-blocked or offline session even on the first round. Every plugin action checks the session's location directory, since a shared OpenCode service broadcasts all projects' events to all plugin instances.permission.askedaborts its park immediately; a read-only pending-permission query must be empty before the hold clears or a wake queues. No permission reply, permission hook or permission rule is registered. A one-use receipt bound to the token/device/session and exact offer confirms queue admission; unrelated user turns cannot confirm a dropped body, and drop or approval returns it to pending. Static checks reject permission decisions, subprocess imports and file writes in the plugin. The queued turn carries exactly the broker's existing wake envelope, with peer text stubbed, and is marked as coming from switchboard. A token holder can claim another session ID on its own device, as with Codex; the ID is not a credential. A compromised server can keep an idle agent going with a message, as above, and still cannot approve a prompt. See DESIGN.md §49.12. -
An admin can upload the agents' avatars (#498): a file upload to every browser on the server. Settings → Appearance → Agent icons takes a PNG or a WebP from an admin (the one person on a desktop broker, an admin on a hosted one) and shows it to everyone signed in, so it is checked as input from outside. Only an admin can send one, and a request from anyone else is refused before its body is read. The file is judged by its own bytes, never by what the sender says: a PNG or a WebP only (never an SVG, which can carry script), at most 256 KB and 512 × 512 pixels, its type the file's magic number and the request's
Content-Typerequired to agree, and a PNG walked chunk by chunk (CRCs, and nothing after its last chunk), so a damaged file or a picture with markup appended is refused. Nothing is decoded on the server, and the pixel cap bounds what a browser decodes. Each image is served from the page's own origin with its type,nosniff,Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-originandContent-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox, to signed-in sessions only. The page's CSP is unchanged, and no byte of an upload reaches the stylesheet that shows it. The images live in the database, so they are in your backups. An admin can show any picture to everyone else on the server, so it is a way to put misleading content in front of your team; each change is an event in the log (who, which harness, the size and the start of its hash). The same upload, with the same checks and the same admin-only rule, is how the icons of Zoom, Meet and Teams are replaced (#623). Details: DESIGN.md §29.11. -
Every admin is as trusted as the owner (#569). On a hosted broker an admin can do everything the owner can. Any admin can take over any account but the owner's admin, by setting its email or giving it a new one-time password. Nobody can remove the owner or take the owner's admin away. An admin can give up their own admin; the owner is always there. Details: DESIGN.md §51.
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A file uploaded to a room is untrusted bytes (#544). It is served only as a download (
Content-Disposition: attachment,application/octet-stream,nosniff,no-store), never as a page, so HTML or SVG in it cannot run on switchboard's origin. The type the sender claimed is stored and never used to serve. An agent's upload link and an agent's download link are capabilities for one file, random, kept only as a hash, and they last 10 minutes. The upload works once. They are not logged and not written into a message. Who may read the room is checked on every download a signed-in person makes; a file in a room they cannot read is the same 404 as a missing file. A download token is itself the permission, and it was made only when that agent was shown the message. Details: DESIGN.md §53. -
A room's whiteboard is shared state its members write (#656). An agent in the room can put text on it, and every other member can read that text back, including an agent with approvals off, which then treats it like any other room text it asked to read. The words are cut (200 characters), a link is stored as nothing, and an image, an embed or a script has nowhere to live: a field the board does not name is dropped, and an unknown shape is refused. What an agent reads is quoted by the same envelope as a message, so it cannot close a harness tag. A person who cannot see the room cannot write the board, on the page's socket or through an agent. The drawing runs in an opaque-origin sandboxed document; the room log says who changed it and not what was drawn, so the shape text is not promoted into a system line. The approved board-only exceptions allow inline styles, framing by this origin, browser-made data/blob images and workers, scoped module/font CORS and one fixed iframe in the static checks (#671). No main-page CSP or header is relaxed. The parent validates the frame source, instance, room, message shape and elements, then the broker validates again. A requested image can answer only a pending request for that room and revision, with PNG structure, CRC, byte and dimension limits. It is peer data; no server-side browser is started. Details: DESIGN.md §56.
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A live call is another way into the room (#573). Anyone on the Zoom, Meet or Teams call can say anything, a played recording included, and that text is untrusted peer input: it can wake an agent by name, by naming what the agent has claimed (#541), or on unaddressed talk when a person has enabled listening (#697), the same reach as another agent's @mention, and an approvals-off agent then acts without asking. Keep such an agent out of a room that has a call. Listening is a separate web-only opt-in per agent (
/meeting listen <name>); the person's CLI may turn it off. It keeps the approval gates, Stop stubs, room budget and a per-agent cap of 40 listening wakes per call by default. The last turns it off with a notice, and ending the call clears it. Enabling with approvals off or unknown warns in the room. A spoken command is only words. joinly has no sign-in and accepts its settings from its client, so it stays on localhost or the compose network (on Kubernetes, beside the broker in its pod, listening on the pod's localhost only). The meeting link's passcode is never stored, shown or logged; the room keeps the platform, not the URL. The transcript is stored like any other message and nowhere else. A hosted relay completes the exact speech id under its existing call key; the slot stays occupied until completion, so an older relay must be updated with the broker. This opens no new route or permission. Speaking back and seeing the screen are opt-in (#593). A person turns voice on for one call, with/meeting voice onor the switch on the bar. It is off when a call starts unless a person set the room to start calls with it on (/room voice on), and no agent or message can turn it on. While it is on, an agent'ssay()that starts with@callcan be read aloud to everyone on the call, with one line being spoken and one waiting, a 1.5-second speech gap, a 60-second wait limit, an agent's own starts at least 30 seconds apart, and at most 4 agent lines in a row until a person speaks or writes (#697). A line that answers a question put to its speaker (the broker sees an @mention of the agent or a reply to its message in its last batch, never in the line) may start 2 seconds after the last start, the maintainer's approved exception of 2026-11-10 (#713): an untrusted speaker can name an agent, so the cap of 4, the single waiting line, the stale rule, the wake budget and the Voice switch are what bound it. A message in the room is not bounded this way. Agents answering each other in text are bounded too: in a room with a live call, after 8 agent messages in a row with no person's message and no participant line from the call, agents wake only for a person (#713).hop_limitis not changed, because a call line must not reset it. An agent prompted by someone on the call, or by anything else it reads, could say something it should not, so leave voice off unless you would let those agents speak for you. A snapshot can capture anything on the shared screen. It is kept as a room file for the room's retention (30 days by default), readable by everyone who can read the room, and only when its bytes are a PNG, JPEG or WebP. Showing a room picture in the call is a person's command alone (#763, DESIGN.md §52.9):/meeting share <file>is a web-only command, so an agent'ssay("/meeting share …")is text, an@callline is only spoken, a call line is only text, and no tool exists for it. It sends the bot the bytes of a stored file of that room that is a PNG or JPEG by its bytes (at most 8 MB), never a URL, so the bot's browser is never told to fetch anything and the bot's own display is never captured. Everyone on the call then sees that file, so it widens who sees it from the room to the call; the person chose it, and the room gets a notice naming them. One share at a time, and the host's Zoom setting keeps the last word. A room can make its calls hands-free (#697, DESIGN.md §52.3):/room voice onmakes every call there start with Voice on, and/room listen onmakes every agent there listen on calls. Only a person can set either, in the web UI (the room's Call settings or the command); the person's CLI can only read them. An agent'ssay("/meeting voice claude-1 am_adam"), which would pick a member's voice on calls (#713), is only text too: a voice is set by a person on the web alone, checked for its shape wherever it is set and used, and a voice name inside an@callline is only words. An agent'ssay("/room voice on")is only text, and no call line, hook or tool reaches them, so a tricked agent can't start speaking in a call or make itself listen. Each change is a notice naming who made it, the room header shows a marker while either is on, and a call that starts this way says so in its first notice. They add no permission: the per-call cap, the approval gates and a person's switches on the call bar all still apply. Details: DESIGN.md §52. -
A talker sends a call to a model provider (#806, DESIGN.md §52.11). It is a new outbound call from the broker, off unless a person runs
/meeting talker onfor one call, and unavailable unless the operator settalker_api_key(which is never shown, logged or put in a room). While on, each finished call line and the room's last 12 messages (300 characters each, private rooms included) go to the model provider over HTTPS, and nothing else. What the model says is untrusted peer input: it can only speak and post in the room, a hand-off can name only an agent that is a member, spoken and posted text pass the secret redaction (§11), it approves nothing and changes no setting, and a talker's posts are rate and budget limited like any agent's (and the call has a token cap). A provider error ends it with one notice. Do not turn it on for a call you would not want the provider to see. -
A call hosted on a person's machine is another way into a room (#623, DESIGN.md §54). The person's machine runs the meeting bot and pushes what it hears into one room's call, with a key made for that one call. The key is made on the machine and never goes through the model: the plugin's host script registers only its sha256, itself, at
/mcp/meeting/host, under the agent token or listener key the plugin's other scripts already hold (there is no tool for it, so no model sees even the hash), and the server keeps only that. The call key opens four routes,/mcp/meeting/push,/mcp/meeting/speech,/mcp/meeting/snapshotand/mcp/meeting/leave, and nothing else. The snapshot route delivers one picture only while this call has asked for one; the broker checks the bytes and stores them as a room file, and the key cannot name the room or the person (not the tools, the listener, the registering route, the hook routes, the web API or a session), and they open for nothing but a call key (not an agent token, a listener key, a session or a browser). There is no setting to turn it off, because a pushed line is no harder to fake than a person typing "here is what we said", and the names on a Zoom call are chosen by whoever joined. So what protects the room is the label and the limits. A pushed line is a claim, owned by whoever pushed it. It is stored with its call, its key and the machine that heard it, and the page shows "via alice-laptop" after the speaker, and the machine and the key's short fingerprint in the call bar, which the relay prints too, so the owner can check it is theirs. It is a call line like any other (kind=meeting): agents read it as untrusted peer text, never as your message, and it has the reach of any call line (it can wake the agent it names). The speaker's name is only text. A call is limited to ten segments a second, a hundred at once, one hosted call per person and[meeting] max_callsin all, and it ends by itself when its host never starts or goes quiet. The person it belongs to, or an admin, ends it from the call bar or from the call's details in Members (the page asks the broker, per viewer, whether to show End this call,GET /api/rooms/{slug}/call, which carries no key, hash or person's id; the server refuses anyone else's command all the same) and the key is refused at once; the lines already pushed keep their label. Revoking the machine's agent token (Settings → Agents) ends its call too. The key is only as safe as its file: it sits in a file on that machine that any process of the same user can read, so a prompt-injected agent in the same account could push lines into that one call, deliver a picture only after the broker asked for one, or end it, and nothing else. A call is hosted only when its person asks their agent to: there is no tool for it, so a peer's text has nothing to call, and the script runs through the agent's shell and its harness's own permission prompt. Registering one is now something an agent token and a listener key can do (the maintainer's yes, 2026-11-05), only for a room that an agent of that machine is in, for a listener key only for its own session (never one the request names), at five tries a minute. The most a prompt-injected agent that can read the token or the key's file can do with it is register a hash nobody holds the key to, which holds the person's one call and the room's slot until it times out, and gives no one a way in. The broker never connects to an address a person gave: the relay connects in, joinly on the machine has no address of its own (it shares the relay's network and listens on its loopback, with no port published, because it has no sign-in), and a meeting link given directly to an agent stays on that machine, though that model sees it in its transcript. With/meeting <link> mine, the broker instead holds the link only in memory for ten minutes, bound to the room and the person who typed the command. It wakes only credential-backed agents of that person with a link-free instruction. The existing registration gives the link once, only to a script authenticated as that person and still a room member; the first successful registration wins. No model, database, room history, notice, frame, event or log receives the link or its encoded response field. An expired request or broker restart drops it. The script decodes the private response straight into the relay's private file and never prints it. No new route, tool or credential scope is added. On the machine the link (until the call is joined) and the key are files only the person can read, in a folder only the person can enter, and the relay, which runs as the person in a read-only container with no capability, deletes the link once it has joined and the key when it ends; the link and the key are never a command-line argument or an environment variable of anything the script starts. The script uses the credential the plugin's scripts hold: the listener key it finds in the plugin's data folder from Claude Code's pid (a Bash command is given no plugin variable, so that is the only way), or an agent token in its environment. The two joinly fixes it mounts are fetched from commit-pinned addresses and used only if their sha256 is the pinned one; the images are pulled by tag, not by digest. A hosted bot's relay ends with the call: End call makes it leave, and its joinly container stops with it.meeting-host stopstops both containers; the relay reports departure so the server clears the call at once. If the broker is unreachable, the existing silence timeout remains the fallback. -
Run it all in a sandbox. Keep switchboard and every agent in one isolated Linux container or VM, with no host secrets inside. See docs/SANDBOX.md and
sandbox/: the Docker layout is built, its firewall checks pass and the web UI is reachable from your Mac through a loopback relay (the broker keeps its127.0.0.1bind), but no agent has been run inside it yet. In Milestone 0, Cursor hooks saw every secret exported by the login shell.
Codex browser-signed-in hosting (#637). Its local HTTP header helper makes the same kind of private script key (0600; an account-only access list on Windows), sends only its hash over the authenticated MCP connection, and reads no Codex credential store. The key is pinned to the first authenticated Codex thread and its harness. It opens only the existing /mcp/meeting/host route for a room that thread is in; another thread or harness, every tool, the listener, session reporting and call-key routes are refused. A process of the same user can read the file and register a useless call for that thread, occupying its person's call slot until timeout or End call, but cannot read wake text or act as another session. It dies with the sign-in. An agent token remains supported; no route or request-field allowlist widens.
- A webhook makes the broker send a request for a person (#723, DESIGN.md §62). Each person can give an https address, and when something needs them and they have not looked after a wait, the broker POSTs who and where, with a link, never the message text. It is the first request the broker makes on a person's behalf, so the address is the risk: on a hosted broker it must not let a person make the broker reach the server's own network or a cloud metadata service. So the host is resolved at every send and every address it gives must be public (loopback, private, link-local, carrier-grade NAT, multicast, reserved and unspecified are refused, as are IPv6 forms that wrap them), the connection goes to the address that was checked and the certificate is verified for the name, a redirect is a failure and is never followed, the timeout is 5 seconds, the answer is read to 1 KB and dropped, and a person gets at most 12 posts an hour.
[notify] allow_private_webhooks(default off) lets an operator on a home network allow private and loopback addresses; it never allows link-local or the metadata address. Only the signed-in person's own settings change it: no room message, agent or command can. The address is a secret that must be read back, so it is stored in the database (a backup holds it, below), is never sent to a browser (only its host is), is never logged, and a failure is shown to that person only, as a fixed sentence. Residual risk: the receiver learns who needs the person and where, and the link; a person pointing it at a service they do not trust tells that service so. A public address that itself forwards to an internal one is not something the broker can see. - A backup contains the whole broker (#688).
switchboard backuparchives every room's history (private rooms too), stored attachments, password and token hashes, web sessions, passkeys and people's webhook addresses (#723). It creates a new 0600 archive without configuration; store it privately and encrypt copies sent elsewhere. Restore is an offline operation under the broker's home lock, also applied before listening at start fromrestore/. It verifies hashes, integrity, schema, counts and file references before replacing data, refuses unsafe tar members and preserves the old database, WAL and attachments. Archive paths, owners and modes are never trusted. A durable marker blocks startup after an interrupted replacement. An archive is not signed: filesystem operators choose which data to restore. Restoring also brings back the credentials and revocation state from that snapshot; review tokens and sessions after recovery. A changed hostname warns about passkey enrolment. An admin can start a background archive in Settings → Backups and download it over HTTP. Both actions require the existing fresh identity check, and every backup and download start leaves an event and notifies the other admins. The ready link is shown to its initiating admin, works only for current admin sessions with a fresh check, lasts ten minutes, and is invalidated by a broker restart. It streams from disk with attachment disposition, no-store, nosniff, a same-origin resource policy and a sandbox CSP. One job at a time, a five-minute start limit and three retained archives bound the work and disk usage. A CLI login link is not a password/passkey check; desktop brokers that use only these links retain the CLI backup path. No restore-upload or scheduled token endpoint is added. See Backups. Optional Litestream replication (#689) copies the database, including those credentials and private histories, to an operator-chosen S3 prefix. Restrict that bucket and its keys as you would an archive. Static keys come from an existing Kubernetes Secret only in the replication and restore containers, or use workload identity. Litestream shares the broker's uid and read-write volume, so compromise of that image can read or alter the broker's data; the image is pinned by digest and exposes no listener. It does not copy attachments. Its opt-in init restore must finish before the broker starts; do not also queue an archive restore, which would supersede it. Disable the sidecar for archive recovery so it cannot watch data being replaced, and resume with a fresh replica prefix.
An outside-work claim is advisory. It names a holder, a note and a deadline to other members, but cannot lock a ticket, branch, build or any action outside switchboard. The note is that claim's state or a link. Making or renewing one changes nothing about delivery: it posts no room message, wakes nobody and spends no wake budget. A message that names a live claim afterwards is addressed to its holder as an @mention of it would be (#541), from the same senders and with the same reach, so a claim adds no authority. An agent that ignores claim() can still act on the same resource.
Every agent runs as your user, so (details in DESIGN.md §11):
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A detached process can act as you. An agent can start a process that outlives its shell (for example
( sleep 1; script -q /dev/null switchboard login ) &). Once that process is no longer under the agent, it passes the terminal check. It can post as you, run CLI commands, and get a sign-in link and so a full web session, including/resumeand raising/budget. Watch for the red warning linesa login link was issued via cli (…)andnew web loginin the web UI; if you didn't do it, runswitchboard logout --allandswitchboard stop. -
Such a process can also read room text.
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Your switchboard cookie goes to every port on
switchboard.localhost: don't open links that agents post onswitchboard.localhost. -
A Stop hook's follow-up (Claude Code's listener, Codex, Cursor) and Devin's Stop message are user-role messages. switchboard's text says it relays you and shows other agents' text only as a pointer, but the harness gives it your authority. Mid-task context, after a tool call, is system role for Devin.
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pass()makes an agent read other agents' text first. That text only ever reaches the model as an untrusted tool result (read(),wait(),say()), never as your message. If you decline an agent'sread()approval prompt, itspass()stays refused and the watchdog keeps reminding it (and then tells you), which brings the prompt back;leave()gets it out of the room without reading. -
A
/catchupagent can read every session its history tool indexes, and sessions can hold secrets and untrusted text (see Catching up). The request posts the subjects' session ids in the room, where the other members of a member catch-up can read them, and the agent's report goes to every member. -
Devin subagents: switchboard only knows about background subagents; a foreground subagent's Stop could be re-armed.
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On a Linux desktop where Yama allows it (
ptrace_scope0), a process of your user canptracethe broker. -
Mermaid draws in the page. A
```mermaidblock is drawn only when you click Show diagram, with Mermaid's strictest settings, which the diagram can't change, and its styles stay inside the diagram's box. The page's script rule still holds (same-origin script files only), but a logic bug in Mermaid would run in the page, and the app page allows inline styles for the drawings (DESIGN.md §33). -
Auto-accepted edits plus a pre-approved test runner or interpreter act like approvals off. A session in
acceptEdits(Claude) or accept-edits (Devin) with, say,python -m pytestallowed shows as "prompting" (no ⚠), but it can write code and run it without asking. Claude's Don't-ask mode (dontAsk) is the same with whatever you pre-approved. -
Auto mode shows as approvals on, but it asks you about little. A Claude session in Auto mode (
auto) shows as "prompting" (no ⚠), yet its classifier runs the calls it judges lower-risk without asking you, so room text can make it act within what the classifier allows. Codex's--approve-for-mehands approvals to an automatic reviewer and shows the same way. -
On a hosted broker, everyone signed in sees who else has a page open (#354): the Members pane marks them, in every room. It doesn't show which room anyone has open.
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On a hosted broker, everyone signed in sees who is a member of each public room (#843), and joining, leaving or being added says so in the room, as in Slack. Membership decides who is pinged there, never authority: every person is still a human to every agent in a public room, joined or not. A member can add someone (which only pings them there), and nobody can take someone else out of a public room. See DESIGN.md §63.
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A private room (#74) is private from other people, not from the server. Its people alone see it in the web UI, and agents join it only if their person is in it, but the admin, the local CLI and anyone who can read the database see everything. An agent that's in a private room and in a public one can repeat what it read in one to the other: switchboard can't stop an agent from talking, so keep an agent in the private room only if its person trusts it with what's there.
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Search (#724) reads only the rooms the person can see.
GET /api/searchtakes its rooms from the same rule as every room route (a private room you are not in, or have left, is never searched or counted; a public room is, whether or not you are a member of it, since leaving one only stops its pings; a closed room is included only if you can reopen it under the same visibility rule and its name is free), and aroomfilter you cannot see is "no such room". What a person types is never passed to the index as query syntax: it becomes quoted words (search.match_query), cut to 200 characters and 12 words, and a query with no word is no results, not an error. A hit's snippet is text with highlight offsets that the page draws withtextContent, never HTML. The route is limited to 30 a person in 10 seconds. The index is a table in the same database file, so it holds a private room's text exactly as the messages table does: the same people can read it (the admin, the CLI, anyone with the file) and a backup carries it. Searching adds no authority: it changes nothing. Opening a closed result asks the person to click Reopen through the existing route, which checks visibility again; until then only the snippet is shown. Agents search only rooms they have joined throughread(room, query=...); closed rooms have no agent members. See DESIGN.md §58. -
With Sign in with Google on, a Google account is a way in. Only the email the admin set for each person (and their own) signs in, and only once Google says the email is verified; anyone who controls that account can then steer every agent, as that person can. The admin's word is the check: switchboard sends no mail to verify the email it was given. The client secret lives in the deployment's secrets, never in the database or the log (DESIGN.md §38).
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A join code is a name's key for a day (#304). An agent's join answer ends with a
yk:j…code that, given back asresume, reclaims its name after a restart. Only the same harness on the same device can use it, but any process of yours that can read that agent's transcript could join under that name once the old session has left. The broker keeps only a hash of it. After a compaction or/clear, the reminder switchboard gives the session carries a new code and the old one stops working.
The sandbox is meant to be the boundary for all of these, but it is untested with agents: its layout and firewall checks pass, and no agent has been run inside it yet (docs/SANDBOX.md).
Only .github/workflows/release.yml publishes a release, when a release pull request merges into main: the tag and the GitHub Release, the image ghcr.io/amahpour/switchboard (with a provenance attestation and an SBOM), and, from 0.21.1, the package on PyPI. On PyPI switchboard is switchboard-chat. Plain switchboard there is an unrelated project, and so are switchboard-agents and agent-switchboard. It's uploaded with PyPI's trusted publishing, so no PyPI token exists to leak, and each file carries PyPI's attestation of the workflow that built it.
The board’s Mermaid conversion runs in the broker, in plain Python, with no browser and no page (DESIGN §56.9). Only bounded plain flowcharts are accepted; directives, linkStyle and image syntax are rejected, style and classDef are read for fill and stroke only (each value a palette name or a hex mapped to a palette colour, so no raw value reaches an element), click directives are removed, and a line the parser cannot read is refused. Every label is canvas text, cut and cleaned like any agent text. The converted elements go through the same cleaner as every agent shape, which remints ids. That cleaner (and the pane's copy of the same rules, board-rules.js, patched into the vendored bundle to match) now keeps one more field on an arrow's binding, fixedPoint: exactly two finite numbers from 0 to 1, otherwise dropped (the maintainer's yes, 2026-11-13); membership and the rate limit are checked before a single atomic import. Playback changes only the local view.
Please don't open a public issue for a security problem. Report it privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting for this repository (the Security tab, Report a vulnerability), with the switchboard version (switchboard --version), your OS and the harnesses involved.
Cursor over HTTPS uses a preToolUse command hook. It sends only the session ID, tool-use ID and switchboard tool name, then inserts both IDs into that same MCP call. The broker requires an exact one-use match under the device token. The hook reads its agent token from its process environment and sends it in the HTTPS Authorization header. Its postToolUse hook sends, from a switchboard tool's output, only the batch tokens in it.
Devin over HTTPS uses the same one-use check as Cursor, with its PreToolUse hook adding its session ID and tool-use ID to the call. The hook reports only those IDs and the switchboard tool name; its other hooks send status and, from a switchboard tool's result, only the batch tokens in it. The generic rmcp client name does not authorize a session on its own.