Fix claude-code-review.yml trust gate: check PR author, not head repo owner - #38
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Fix claude-code-review.yml trust gate: check PR author, not head repo owner#38jnasbyupgrade wants to merge 1 commit into
jnasbyupgrade wants to merge 1 commit into
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… owner head.repo.owner.login only identifies the fork owner for fork-headed PRs. For an upstream-branch-headed PR (base and head both in this repo, as required by gh stack or produced by a plain gh pr create without a fork), it's always this repo's own org, never the actual PR author -- so the gate silently skipped review on every such PR regardless of who opened it. Switch to github.event.pull_request.user.login, which is the PR's actual author and can't be spoofed any more than head repo owner can, and covers both fork-headed and upstream-branch-headed PRs correctly.
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jnasbyupgrade
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PR #38 (Postgres-Extensions/test_factory, part of a 7-repo sweep for this same trust-gate bug) independently landed the identical user.login fix targeting master directly. Closing #38 in favor of this stack's copy since it'll reach master when the stack merges anyway -- but its phrasing on why user.login can't be spoofed ("by PR content" specifically) is worth folding in here, since PR content is untrusted input in this exact threat model.
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jnasbyupgrade
added a commit
that referenced
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Aug 7, 2026
PR #38 (Postgres-Extensions/test_factory, part of a 7-repo sweep for this same trust-gate bug) independently landed the identical user.login fix targeting master directly. Closing #38 in favor of this stack's copy since it'll reach master when the stack merges anyway -- but its phrasing on why user.login can't be spoofed ("by PR content" specifically) is worth folding in here, since PR content is untrusted input in this exact threat model.
jnasbyupgrade
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 7, 2026
PR #38 (Postgres-Extensions/test_factory, part of a 7-repo sweep for this same trust-gate bug) independently landed the identical user.login fix targeting master directly. Closing #38 in favor of this stack's copy since it'll reach master when the stack merges anyway -- but its phrasing on why user.login can't be spoofed ("by PR content" specifically) is worth folding in here, since PR content is untrusted input in this exact threat model.
jnasbyupgrade
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Aug 7, 2026
PR #38 (Postgres-Extensions/test_factory, part of a 7-repo sweep for this same trust-gate bug) independently landed the identical user.login fix targeting master directly. Closing #38 in favor of this stack's copy since it'll reach master when the stack merges anyway -- but its phrasing on why user.login can't be spoofed ("by PR content" specifically) is worth folding in here, since PR content is untrusted input in this exact threat model.
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The `claude-review` job's trust gate checked:
```yaml
github.event.pull_request.head.repo.owner.login == 'jnasbyupgrade'
```
`head.repo.owner.login` only distinguishes "who owns the fork" for fork-headed PRs. For an upstream-branch-headed PR (base and head both live in this repo -- required by `gh stack`, and also just what you get from `gh pr create` without a fork), `head.repo.owner.login` is always this repo's own org, never the actual PR author. The gate silently skipped review on every such PR regardless of who opened it.
Confirmed via a real case where `claude-review` showed `conclusion: "skipped"` on a whole PR stack that was legitimately jnasbyupgrade's own work, opened as upstream-branch PRs (needed for `gh stack` to link them).
Fix: check PR author instead:
```yaml
github.event.pull_request.user.login == 'jnasbyupgrade'
```
PR author can't be spoofed by a third party any more than head repo owner can, and it's the more direct question for this gate's purpose (trusting the person asking for review, not the repository their branch happens to live in). Works for both fork-headed and upstream-branch-headed PRs.
Postgres-Extensions/pg_count_nulls already uses this correct pattern.