Report vulnerabilities in @operatornest/convex-web-push through the package repository’s Security tab (Report a vulnerability) or operatornest+security@gmail.com. Include the affected version, operation, code path, redacted reproduction and impact. Remove credentials, keys, endpoints, payloads, customer data and personal information. Keep exploit details private until maintainers coordinate disclosure.
The app authenticates and authorizes callers before invoking WebPush. Report paths that bypass those boundaries or disclose component credentials prefixed WEB_PUSH_.
- The deployed VAPID private key is read from component env, never from arguments, and never stored, logged or returned.
config.getreturns the configured public key;generateVapidKeysreturns a newly generated pair.config.verifyreturns configuration problems and fixed check error messages without key material. - Endpoints and subscription keys are sensitive. Removal requires a matching
userId; notification and delivery reads require the notification owner. Batch IDs must not be exposed to end users. Public app functions derive user IDs from authenticatedtokenIdentifier; the component trusts app authorization. - Recording and sending require an allowed HTTPS host without credentials, custom ports, IP literals or trailing hostname dots. Sending rejects redirects.
allowedPushHostsextends the outbound trust boundary. - RFC 8291 encryption uses a fresh ephemeral P-256 key and salt per message. Push errors contain fixed messages and optional HTTP status, never response bodies or endpoint URLs.
- Rotating the VAPID public key makes subscriptions registered with the old key ineligible. Browsers must subscribe and record again. An old attempt cannot update a refreshed subscription revision.