Research: malicious content in an index without a server - #70
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Automated mod screening for the KSA content index.pdf I did some research with Claude into a possible way to do automated security screening (without any costs) |
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@LaurensDeV thanks a lot for the proposal, I finally got to read it properly. I think we are closer than the two documents look. And we both end up at the same idea to show what changed between two releases. The research wanted to do that in Borea, but you are right that the index is the better place, because then the information exists before the download and every client sees the same thing. You also answer one of the research's main objections without saying so. A real example from my own mod is that AFC 0.8.0 added native libraries ( but to be honest who would care if i added an native libarary to my mod? I think we should make it even less strict. There are three things I would change:
I merged #70 as research and updated its numbers to today. As a next step I would do your shadow run over all current listings first, so we know how often each rule actually fires, and then one RFC that combines the disclosure from #70 with your per-release facts and the diff, without Would you like to write that RFC and do the test? :) |
Closes #69
The page reports what CKAN, Thunderstore, Modrinth, CurseForge and Factorio do about malicious code, what a free automated check could reach, and what belongs to the client instead.
It concludes that the gap is a disclosure problem and not a tooling problem, and recommends a narrow RFC that states what a green check proves and what it does not, with no change to the merge rule.
Most of this was done using LLMs.