Update dependency litellm to v1.94.3 [SECURITY] - #606
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This PR contains the following updates:
==1.94.0→==1.94.3LiteLLM: Authenticated SSRF and provider-credential exfiltration via unvalidated request-body routing parameters
CVE-2026-84377 / GHSA-3cv6-jpf6-8222
More information
Details
Impact
Any authenticated LiteLLM proxy user could redirect an outbound provider call to a destination they control and cause the proxy to send its own configured provider credentials to that destination. The proxy's request-body validation was a denylist that did not cover every sensitive parameter and did not inspect parameters nested inside other request fields, so a caller could supply a routing or credential value that the proxy applied without clearing the operator's stored key. Any authenticated user could therefore exfiltrate the operator's upstream provider credentials and other configured secrets, and perform Server-Side Request Forgery against internal services reachable from the proxy.
Patches
Fixed in 1.96.2, 1.95.1, 1.94.3, 1.93.2, 1.92.2, 1.91.5, 1.90.7, 1.89.7, and 1.88.6.
Workarounds
Set
general_settings.allow_client_side_credentialstofalseso callers cannot override connection parameters, restrict proxy keys to trusted callers, and block the affected parameters (api_base,base_url,model_list,fallbacks, provider credential fields) at a reverse proxy or API gateway.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
BerriAI/litellm (litellm)
v1.94.3Compare Source
Verify Docker Image Signature
All LiteLLM Docker images are signed with cosign. Every release is signed with the same key introduced in commit
0112e53.Verify using the pinned commit hash (recommended):
A commit hash is cryptographically immutable, so this is the strongest way to ensure you are using the original signing key:
Verify using the release tag (convenience):
Tags are protected in this repository and resolve to the same key. This option is easier to read but relies on tag protection rules:
Expected output:
What's Changed
Full Changelog: BerriAI/litellm@v1.94.2...v1.94.3
v1.94.2Compare Source
Verify Docker Image Signature
All LiteLLM Docker images are signed with cosign. Every release is signed with the same key introduced in commit
0112e53.Verify using the pinned commit hash (recommended):
A commit hash is cryptographically immutable, so this is the strongest way to ensure you are using the original signing key:
Verify using the release tag (convenience):
Tags are protected in this repository and resolve to the same key. This option is easier to read but relies on tag protection rules:
Expected output:
What's Changed
Full Changelog: BerriAI/litellm@v1.94.1...v1.94.2
v1.94.1Compare Source
Verify Docker Image Signature
All LiteLLM Docker images are signed with cosign. Every release is signed with the same key introduced in commit
0112e53.Verify using the pinned commit hash (recommended):
A commit hash is cryptographically immutable, so this is the strongest way to ensure you are using the original signing key:
Verify using the release tag (convenience):
Tags are protected in this repository and resolve to the same key. This option is easier to read but relies on tag protection rules:
Expected output:
What's Changed
Full Changelog: BerriAI/litellm@v1.94.0...v1.94.1
Configuration
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