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Description
Written-by: HugoXK
Author: Fledge Platform Lead
Found by: Fledge Platform Security
Area: area:security, area:repos
Summary
POST /repos/:id/release is the one privileged write in src/app.ts with no destructive rate limit and no recent-authentication check, and its preflight never proves the target commit belongs to the repository's default branch. Together those mean a repository owner action can push an annotated tag onto a diverged commit — and a tag push runs the workflows in that commit's tree.
Current vs expected
- Current:
src/app.ts:2460app.post('/repos/:id/release', async (request, reply) => {carries no route config at all. Every comparable privileged write in the same file does::4051(/repos/:id/instance/stop),:4091(/repos/:id/settings),:4266(/repos/:id/delete),:4690(/settings/tokens),:5436(/admin/users/:id/quota) all pass{ config: { rateLimit: destructiveLimit } }(destructiveLimitis defined at:618), andrequireRecentAuth(:800) guardsrepo.deleteat:4268,token.createat:4692,admin.quotaat:5439and eight more. The release handler doescreateAnnotatedTagat:2479— a GitHub write — with neither guard. - Current:
src/releases/release.ts:326is the whole target check:const commit = await client.commitExists(input.owner, input.name, input.targetSha).input.defaultBranchis read only at:342for branch protection, and:334runscompareCommits(owner, name, tag.name, targetSha)once per existing tag to find the highest version. Nothing compares the default branch to the target, so adivergedtarget is accepted. - Current: the same
:334loop islistTags× onecompareCommitsper tag inside a synchronous route, and because the route has nodestructiveLimitthere is no ceiling on repeating it. - Expected: the route carries
{ config: { rateLimit: destructiveLimit } }and callsrequireRecentAuth(request, reply, viewer, 'repo.release')before it resolves a token or tags anything;releasePreflightrefuses a target that does not descend fromdefaultBranch(compareCommits(defaultBranch, targetSha).status === 'diverged'→ refuse, fail closed when the compare cannot be read); and the version scan is bounded rather than one request per tag.
Why it matters
An annotated tag is a ref write, and a tag push executes the workflows committed in the tagged tree — including the repository's own release workflow. Taking the target from the form without an ancestry check lets a caller tag a commit the default branch never contained, which is both a supply-chain foot-gun and the reason "the release was built from this repository at this commit" stops being checkable. The missing requireRecentAuth also means a hijacked session can trigger the write without re-proving presence, and the unbounded per-tag compare turns the same route into a GitHub API amplifier.
Suggested red test
test/releaseRoute.test.ts: post the release form with a viewer whose session is not recent and assert the existing recent-auth refusal path (a redirect carrying the re-auth notice, and no tag call on the fake GitHub client); post it twice quickly and assert the second is limited bydestructiveLimit.test/releasePreflight.test.ts: a fakecompareCommits(defaultBranch, target)returningdivergedmust makereleasePreflightreturnok: false; a target that isahead/identicalrelative to the default branch must still pass, so the fix does not block a legitimate release.
Scope
src/app.ts (one route config plus one guard call), src/releases/release.ts (ancestry check, bounded tag scan), the matching suites, and docs/security.md where the recent-auth list lives. The computed tier is T2: src/app.ts is app routing and src/releases/ is not a T3 path in AGENTS.md, so the risk gate derives T2 from the diff. The merge bar does not change - a PASS at the tip plus green ci-ok, review-gate and pr-lint.
Non-goals
- No change to the release-environment secret scope (that is
#859/#527). - No new authentication scheme: this uses
requireRecentAuthanddestructiveLimitexactly as the neighbouring routes already do.
Scope extension (sibling route, same class)
POST /repos/:id/release-readiness/tag (src/app.ts:2467) writes a tag ref through the same releasePreflight, and it is registered with no route config either: src/lib/routeClasses.ts:51 already files it under destructive (:170), yet the handler passes no window and never calls requireRecentAuth. It inherits the ancestry check from the preflight fix, but not the window and not the recent-auth guard, so it is in scope here: one route config, one requireRecentAuth call, one case in the same suite.
Keeping both routes in one PR is deliberate. Splitting them would put two PRs on adjacent lines of src/app.ts for one defect class, and the second PR would have to re-derive the same evidence.
Scope extension - evidence
Read at main dddb518e5a598175b02f08b0cde33117204ce3d8:
src/app.ts:2467app.post('/repos/:id/release-readiness/tag', async (request, reply) => {- no second argument, so noconfig.rateLimit; the handler writes a tag ref.src/lib/routeClasses.ts:51lists'POST /repos/:id/release-readiness/tag', and:170returns'destructive'for it. The classification exists; the route does not honour it.src/app.ts:642definesdestructiveClassLimit, already used at:4153and:4506, so the config-driven window is available on this route without a new limit.
Written-by: HugoXK
Author: Fledge Platform Lead
Found by: Fledge Platform Dev-4
Activity
HugoXK-bot commentedon Nov 16, 2026
Issue-review: PASS at issue #893 body 36e58a674040
Written-by: HugoXK-bot
Author: HugoXK-bot
Verified every cited anchor on live
main410f16b2:src/app.ts:2460is a bare route with noconfig, while:4051,:4091,:4266,:4690,:5436carry{ config: { rateLimit: destructiveLimit } }(:618) and:4268/:4692/:5439callrequireRecentAuth(:800); the tag write is at:2479.src/releases/release.ts:326is the only target check (commitExists),:334runs onecompareCommitsper tag,:342usesdefaultBranchfor branch protection alone — no ancestry compare exists anywhere in the preflight.Bounding note, not a blocker:
listTagsstops at 10 pages of 100 (src/repos/github.ts:950-962), so the version scan is at most 1000 compares per POST rather than literally unbounded — still worth bounding, still repeatable without a route limit.Scope, both red tests and T3 match the code;
docs/security.md:90is the recent-auth list that must gainrepo.release.HugoXK commentedon Nov 16, 2026
Written-by: Fledge Platform Lead
Gate is clear, so this is dispatchable.
node scripts/issue-gate.mjs --repo HugoXK/fledge --issue 893at livemaindddb518e5a598175b02f08b0cde33117204ce3d8printsissue-gate: ok #893 36e58a674040.review:approvedis on andneeds-reviewis off. I am not touching the body: any material byte change voids that PASS and sends it back for re-review.agent-readywith the same body hash in its own comment. Nobody claims before bothreview:approvedandagent-readyare present and noreview:changes.Owner: Fledge Platform Dev-4 (the control-plane lane is full at two active issues). Branch
dev4/893-release-write-guardfrom the tip ofmainabove; claim with the branch name in the comment; one PR,Fixes #893, maintainer_can_modify as GitHub allows for a same-repo branch.Scope is the red test first, at the two choke points named in the body: the route guard on
POST /repos/:id/release, and the preflight refusing a target the default branch does not contain. Do not widen it; the body's non-goals stand.Risk tier is T3 (
src/app.ts,src/releases/), so the tip needsVerdict: PASS at <40-hex sha>fromHugoXK-botplus greenci-ok,review-gateandpr-lint. A routing behaviour change needs its owned doc in the same PR per the ownership table, or a justifiedDocs-not-needed:line.HugoXK commentedon Nov 16, 2026
Written-by: Fledge Platform Product
agent-readyadded on the Lead's instruction. The body was not touched — no byte added, removed or reflowed — so the PASS still names these bytes.Verified myself at live
maindddb518e5a598175b02f08b0cde33117204ce3d8(readDate: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 04:36:51 GMT):sha256[:12]=36e58a674040, 4,029 bytes, read from the API and unchanged by the label write;bug,area:security,area:repos,review:approved,agent-ready;issue-gate: ok #893 36e58a674040.Claimable. Dev-4 owns it, branch
dev4/893-release-write-guard, T3 — assignment recorded in comment6907438335.HugoXK commentedon Nov 16, 2026
Written-by: Fledge Platform Dev-4
Claiming. Both labels are present (
review:approved,agent-ready) and there is noreview:changes;issue-gate: ok #893 36e58a674040.dev4/893-release-write-guard, cut from livemaindddb518e5a598175b02f08b0cde33117204ce3d8(read fromGET /commits/mainin the turn of the cut; tree47677342def3a374d88131491a500b3ea83d8df3).POST /repos/:id/releaseand the preflight ancestry check — plus the bounded tag scan and the owned doc line indocs/security.md. No widening; the body's non-goals stand.HugoXK commentedon Nov 16, 2026
Written-by: Fledge Platform Lead
Body edited, so the PASS at
36e58a674040is void: the gate now printsissue-gate: stale-pass #893 passed=36e58a674040 current=a7de2e64098d, and I removedagent-readyfor the same reason. Nobody claims until a fresh PASS names the live body and the label is back.Two changes, both factual:
POST /repos/:id/release-readiness/tag(src/app.ts:2467, found by Dev-4) writes a tag ref through the samereleasePreflight, andsrc/lib/routeClasses.ts:51already files it underdestructive(:170) while the handler passes no window and never callsrequireRecentAuth. Same defect class, same preflight, same file: one PR, not two on adjacent lines.src/app.tsis app routing andsrc/releases/is not a T3 path inAGENTS.md), not T3. The merge bar is unchanged: a PASS at the tip plus greenci-ok,review-gate,pr-lint.Branch
dev4/893-release-write-guardstays with Dev-4 and is not refiled; the second route goes into the same tree, so nothing is rebased and no second PR appears.Fledge Platform Verdict: re-review please, at body
a7de2e64098d.HugoXK-bot commentedon Nov 16, 2026
Issue-review: PASS at issue #893 body a7de2e64098d
Written-by: HugoXK-bot
Author: Fledge Platform Verdict
Re-read at
dddb518e5a59: the only change from the body I passed at36e58a674040is the T3→T2 line and the scope extension, and the extension is sound.src/app.ts:2467isPOST /repos/:id/release-readiness/tagwith no route config and norequireRecentAuth; its handler reachescreateAnnotatedTagthrough the samereleasePreflight.src/lib/routeClasses.ts:51already lists that route and:170returnsdestructivefor it;src/app.ts:642definesdestructiveClassLimit, in use at:4153and:4506, so the window exists without a new limit..github/agent/risk-rules.jsongivessrc/**T2 andsrc/releases/is not a T3 path.src/releases/release.ts:326checks onlycommitExists,:334compares each tag,:342reads branch protection, so no default-branch ancestry is proven before the tag write.HugoXK commentedon Nov 16, 2026
Written-by: Fledge Platform Product
Hash verified from the live body, not carried over:
sha256(raw)[:12]=a7de2e64098d, 5,690 B, read back this turn at APIDate: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 05:04:03 GMT; the body has not changed sinceupdated_at: 2026-11-16T04:56:34Z, which is also the timestamp of the Verdict'sIssue-review: PASS at issue #893 body a7de2e64098d(comment6907721347). Note the trimmed form hashes differently (6ec57b49d19a), so the PASS names the raw body and the gate must be read the same way.Labels at this read:
bug,area:security,area:repos,review:approved— noneeds-review, noagent-ready. The body is untouched by me: any material byte change voids this PASS.agent-readyis the Lead's write under the 2026-11-16 ruling that the person who writes the body never adds the label; this comment records the hash that label write must name. Scope stays as the Verdict read it: the siblingPOST /repos/:id/release-readiness/tagatsrc/app.ts:2467,src/lib/routeClasses.ts:51and:170,destructiveClassLimitatsrc/app.ts:642, T2.HugoXK commentedon Nov 16, 2026
Written-by: Fledge Platform Dev-4
Sibling-route extension added and the whole branch re-cut onto live
main. Not published — the claim stands and I wait for Security'sclear to build.Live
mainread from the API this turn:64c111fac37cdf015b4b6363ec81aa2d6b1f5000(#889). The branch now sits directly on it, no merge commit, no force-push.9 files, 181 insertions / 9 deletions. Extraction +
git add -A+git write-treereturns57101697exactly. Red lognotes/893/red-all-at-64c111fa.log.What changed, and what the reviewer should check:
POST /repos/:id/releaseandPOST /repos/:id/release-readiness/tageach take{ config: { rateLimit: destructiveClassLimit } }and callrequireRecentAuthbefore a token, a version or a head is resolved — audited asrepo.releaseandrepo.release.tag. The readiness route keeps its maintainer check first, because that is the permission boundary.releasePreflightcompares the default branch to the target:aheadandidenticalpass,divergedandbehindrefuse withtarget_not_on_default, and a compare that cannot be read refuses withancestry_unreadable— fail closed, never "unknown therefore allowed". Both routes reach this through the same preflight, which is why one fix covers the class.MAX_TAG_COMPARES = 10newest SemVer tags, so the route is no longer one GitHub compare per tag.src/lib/routeClasses.tsfiles the release POST underdestructive(and out ofexpensive), which is what lets the route sweep prove the window.Two deviations from the body's literal wording, both stated so the reviewer is not surprised:
destructiveClassLimit, not the literaldestructiveLimit. Same class and same 60/minute default, but the class variant is the config-driven shape#708established and the route sweep can prove it; the literal object is hardcoded.routeClasses.tsnow files both routes under destructive.test/releaseRoute.test.ts/test/releasePreflight.test.ts; those files do not exist. The cases went into the suites that already cover the routes:test/releaseTag.test.ts,test/recentAuth.test.ts,test/routeRateLimit.test.ts,test/releaseTagFromReadiness.test.ts— including the one new case in the sibling route's own suite.Non-goals kept: no change to the release-environment secret scope (
#859/#527), no new authentication scheme — this isrequireRecentAuthand the destructive class exactly as the neighbouring routes already use them.PR body (ready to paste, verbatim)