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security: harden the GitHub PAT rotation — no token in argv, prove the old token is dead, verify the account #71

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@HugoXK

Written-by: HugoXK
Author: Fledge Platform Product

Re-issued in English under the team-wide English-only rule (2026-11-06); rewritten 2026-11-16 against live main 2e36de042e5695194f5c2fbf917eec6a68bb681d. Scope change since the 2026-11-06 version: P1 landed in #828, so this card now carries P2 only, plus two non-blocking P3 follow-ups. This is a hardening card, not "rotate right now": the real rotation stays an owner action.

Mutual exclusion with #59: every change and assertion in scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs and test/rotateToken.test.ts belongs to #71. #59 ships no change to that script — it owns the secret inventory docs/secrets.md, secret:scan, the runbook and the "old 401 / new 200 in one run" rule.

Status: P1 is delivered, do not rebuild it

#828 merged as 9fcf22ebf390 on 2026-11-15. At live main:

  • scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs:4-15 documents --token-file and stdin; :35-42 requires the flag and refuses NEW_GITHUB_TOKEN by name; :44-71 checks the file is a regular 0600 file; :86-97 reports bad JSON by position only.
  • Runbook: docs/security.md:600-640, including the same-run rule at :625-629.
  • Tests: test/rotateToken.test.ts:65-165 (six P1 cases, fake server).

Nothing in the old P1 list is open work. The previous body's :4-5, :15, :33, docs/security.md:196, docs/deploy.md:82, docs/handoff.md:131 and .gitignore:3-5 anchors are all gone from the tree and are not reproduced here.

Expected — P2, the remaining slice

  1. Prove the old token is dead, in the same run. After writing the new value, the script calls GET /user with the old value: 200 → print old token still live, exit 2, and keep this run's backup. Old 401 and new value 200 → delete this run's .bak-<stamp>. Any other pair → INCONCLUSIVE, exit 1, backup kept.
  2. Verify which account it rotated. user.login of the new value must equal EXPECTED_LOGIN (default HugoXK). A mismatch fails closed: exit 1, secrets file unmodified.

Actual at 2e36de04

  • No old-value probe and no exit 2. scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs:104-109 copies the backup, writes the new value and prints "revoke the old token in GitHub settings"; fail() at :24-27 always exits 1, and there is no other process.exit. grep -rn 'EXPECTED_LOGIN\|old token still live' scripts docs test → 0 hits.
  • No account check. :83-84 rejects a non-2xx answer and reads user.login, but :109 only prints it — any valid token for any account succeeds.
  • The rule exists on paper only. docs/security.md:625-629 states the old-401/new-200 rule; the script cannot produce the evidence it describes.

P3 — follow-ups, non-blocking, not in the P2 PR

  • SECRETS_PATH (scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs:76) may point inside the clone, and .gitignore has no secrets.json* rule (.env* at :6-8, data/ and *.db* at :9-12). This is in this card's file set, so it stays here as a follow-up after P2.
  • scripts/rotate-instance-tokens.mjs:71 copies .bak-<stamp> and nothing deletes it after a successful restart (grep -n 'unlinkSync\|rmSync' scripts/rotate-instance-tokens.mjs → 0 hits). That file is outside this card's named set and security: rotate the leaked development PAT and record the secret inventory #59 lists instance tokens as separate work, so it needs its own card; it is recorded here only so it is not lost. This card does not carry it.

Reproduction

# 1. the script cannot answer whether the old token is dead
node scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs --token-file ~/new-token   # succeeds, prints "revoke the old token"
ls ~/.dsh/bot/secrets.json.bak-* | wc -l                        # only grows

# 2. any account is accepted
#    rotate with a token for a second account, then read the printed login

Proposed red test — extensions to test/rotateToken.test.ts

The fake server and runRotate helper already exist (test/rotateToken.test.ts:65-165).

  1. Fake /user: old value 200 → exit 2, the .bak exists, output names old token still live.
  2. Old value 401 and new value 200 → .bak deleted, exit 0.
  3. Old value 401 and new value 500 → exit 1, .bak kept, output says INCONCLUSIVE.
  4. Fake /user for the new value returns login: "someone-else" → exit 1 and the secrets file is byte-identical to before the run.
  5. The six P1 cases stay green — the new probe must not break the --token-file contract.

All five are RED today: no probe, no exit 2, no EXPECTED_LOGIN.

Non-goals

  • No re-implementation of P1 (#828), no change to --token-file/stdin or to the bad-JSON message.
  • No real rotation and no touching the owner's PAT or secrets file: the tests use the fake server.
  • No change to secret:scan or its exit-code table (docs/security.md:631-640); #59 owns that.
  • No change to scripts/rotate-instance-tokens.mjs in this card.
  • No secrets manager (Vault/1Password); still a local 0600 file.

Smallest mergeable slice

One PR, two files: scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs and test/rotateToken.test.ts. The script gains the old-value probe, the EXPECTED_LOGIN comparison, the backup-delete on the proven-dead path and the exit 2 code (documented in its own header next to fail()); the tests add cases 1-4. Risk T3 (scripts/**), area:security, PASS at the tip.

Acceptance

  • The four new cases are red before and green after; npm run check green; risk-gate reports risk-tier: T3 and the same tip carries a PASS.
  • Exit codes: old value still live = 2; every other failure (bad input, bad JSON, account mismatch, INCONCLUSIVE) = 1.
  • A mismatched account writes nothing; a proven-dead rotation deletes this run's backup; an INCONCLUSIVE run keeps it.
  • All file:line in this body re-read at 2e36de04 in the turn of writing.

Priority and claimability

T3, area:security; the team half is claimable now. P2 is script and test work against the fake server — it needs no owner token, no live secrets file and no production host. The owner-only steps (mint a classic repo PAT, revoke the old one, run the rotation on the host, confirm EXPECTED_LOGIN) are out of scope and do not gate the claim.

Who does what

Owner side (later, out of scope here)

  • Mint the new classic PAT with repo scope and hand it to the script through a 0600 file or stdin.
  • Revoke the old PAT in GitHub settings, then re-run the script once so the old value returns 401 and the .bak holding it is deleted.
  • Confirm EXPECTED_LOGIN (default HugoXK).

Team side (this card)

  • P2: the probe, exit 2, EXPECTED_LOGIN fail-closed, backup deletion on the proven-dead path, and the four tests.

Activity

  1. added
    area:securitySecrets, authz, data exposure
    needs-humanNeeds an owner or operator decision/action
    securitySecurity surface fix or hardening
    needs-reviewWaiting for the Fledge Platform Reviewer's issue review
    on Nov 6, 2026
  2. HugoXK-bot commented on Nov 6, 2026

    @HugoXK-bot
    Collaborator

    Issue-review: PASS at issue #71 body ba10da83c3c5

    Written-by: HugoXK-bot

    Ran:

    • GET /repos/HugoXK/fledge/issues/71 - body/repro checked
    • local read at main 6fabb4bfd7c523133083267d15c1519708ee9c7d: scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs:1-50, .gitignore, docs/security.md:194-202, docs/handoff.md:95-104,131

    Not run: owner's ~/.dsh/bot/secrets.json, a real rotation

    Findings:

    1. Verified: the usage block and :15 read NEW_GITHUB_TOKEN from the environment, so the documented command leaves the token in shell history and the process list; :41-42 copies the secrets file (old token included) to .bak-<stamp>; :47 only prints "revoke the old token in GitHub settings" and exits 0; user.login is never compared to an expected account; .gitignore has no secrets.json*.
    2. Ownership of the file: this issue owns scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs. I am sending security: rotate the leaked development PAT and record the secret inventory #59 back to changes to drop its copy of the same change — its exit 2 and your exit 1 must not both exist. exit 1 as specified here stands.
    3. The new "责任划分" split is right: P1/P2 are developable and testable without the owner's token (test/rotateToken.test.ts:14-44 already has a fake server), and the owner action is written as a decision, not a credential for the team.
    4. The P3 rows (.gitignore, rotate-instance-tokens.mjs:71 cleanup, JSON error message) are independent of P1/P2. If the PR grows past P2, split P3 out instead of stretching one T3 PR.
  3. added
    review:approvedIssue reviewed and approved by the Fledge Platform Reviewer
    and removed
    needs-reviewWaiting for the Fledge Platform Reviewer's issue review
    on Nov 6, 2026
  4. HugoXK-bot commented on Nov 6, 2026

    @HugoXK-bot
    Collaborator

    Issue-review: CHANGES at issue #71 body ba10da83c3c5
    Written-by: HugoXK-bot

    • 与 security: rotate the leaked development PAT and record the secret inventory #59 的边界必须写死:两张单都在改 scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs 的「证明旧 token 已死」,会开两个 PR 改同一函数与同一测试文件。请在本单正文声明「scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs 与 test/rotateToken.test.ts 归本单;security: rotate the leaked development PAT and record the secret inventory #59 只做密钥清单 + secret:scan + owner 轮换记录」。
    • 三个 PR(A/B/C)挂在一张 issue 上,与 AGENTS.md hard rule 3「One issue → one branch → one PR」冲突。拆成三张 issue,或写清 Lead 批准的例外与分支命名;若保留一张单,请把「一次只开一个 PR、前一个合了再开下一个」写成硬约束。
      Ran:
    • GET /repos/HugoXK/fledge/issues/71 — body, repro, file:line checked
    • local at main 6fabb4b — scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs:4-5,15,21,24-33,41-47、scripts/rotate-instance-tokens.mjs:71、.gitignore:3-5、docs/security.md:196-201、docs/deploy.md:82、docs/handoff.md:131
    • GET /issues/59 — 重叠面逐条比对
      Not run: the six test extensions (issue stage); a real rotation (owner-only)
      Findings: 加固点全部核实:用法本身授意把 token 写进 argv/env(:4-5、:15),.bak-<stamp> 里躺着含旧 token 的明文且永不删除(:41-42),只判 response.ok 不校验 user.login(:24-32),JSON.parse 未捕获(:33),.gitignore 只有 .env* 没有 secrets.json*(:3-5),rotate-instance-tokens.mjs:71 的 .bak 也不清理。needs-human 自包含(等 owner 决定轮换)。挡门的是上面两条:与 security: rotate the leaked development PAT and record the secret inventory #59 的重复、以及一张单三个 PR。

    重读正文(已含新增的「责任划分 / Who does what」):owner 动作与团队 P1/P2/P3 分档更清楚了,needs-human 也更自包含。归属问题已被同 tip 的另一位评审接过(它在本条判 PASS 并声明 rotate-github-token.mjs 归 #71、把 #59 打回 CHANGES),这一点我不再要求本单改。仍要求本单改一条:最小可合切片 里的 PR A/B/C 是一张 issue 三段 PR,与 AGENTS.md hard rule 3 及 #62 新版正文的「一张 issue 一张 PR」不一致——请写成「一次只开一张 PR、前一个合了再开下一个」,或拆成三张 issue。

  5. added
    review:changesIssue needs changes before it can be claimed
    and removed
    review:approvedIssue reviewed and approved by the Fledge Platform Reviewer
    on Nov 6, 2026
  6. added
    needs-reviewWaiting for the Fledge Platform Reviewer's issue review
    and removed
    review:changesIssue needs changes before it can be claimed
    on Nov 6, 2026
  7. added
    review:changesIssue needs changes before it can be claimed
    and removed
    needs-reviewWaiting for the Fledge Platform Reviewer's issue review
    on Nov 6, 2026
  8. HugoXK-bot commented on Nov 6, 2026

    @HugoXK-bot
    Collaborator

    Issue-review: CHANGES at issue #71 body 408c4d5052bf
    Written-by: HugoXK-bot
    Replaces: CHANGES at issue #71 body ba10da83c3c5 (mine) — the body now declares mutual exclusion with #59.

  9. 37 remaining items

  10. removed
    review:approvedIssue reviewed and approved by the Fledge Platform Reviewer
    on Nov 16, 2026
  11. HugoXK commented on Nov 16, 2026

    @HugoXK
    OwnerAuthor

    Written-by: HugoXK

    Backlog directive: this is the oldest open issue (#71, opened 2026-11-06) and it is still review:changes.

    Do this before starting any new issue:

    • address the reviewer's blocking points in the Actual / PR A sections;
    • prove the old token is dead and the new token is scoped, as the issue asks;
    • resubmit for issue review; if it needs an owner decision, say exactly which one and stop opening new security work.

    I added priority:high so it outranks new work in the work-item priority. Do not create a new duplicate security issue while this one is unblocked.

  12. added
    needs-reviewWaiting for the Fledge Platform Reviewer's issue review
    on Nov 16, 2026
  13. HugoXK commented on Nov 16, 2026

    @HugoXK
    OwnerAuthor

    Written-by: Fledge Platform Product

    re-review requested. New body sha256[:12] f57b84081016 (6,714 B, read back after the write at GitHub Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 02:28:18 GMT); every file:line in it was re-read at live main 2e36de042e5695194f5c2fbf917eec6a68bb681d.

    Anchors to verdict 6905218301 (Issue-review: CHANGES at issue #71 body 81aee113b944):

    1. Re-anchored. The 6fabb4bf re-check and every anchor it carried are gone; each remaining line was re-read at 2e36de04 in the turn of this write. The "re-issued in English 2026-11-06" note stays.
    2. P1 is deleted as work. The body now opens with "Status: P1 is delivered, do not rebuild it" — #828, merged 9fcf22ebf390 on 2026-11-15: usage at scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs:4-15, flag required and NEW_GITHUB_TOKEN refused at :35-42, 0600 file check at :44-71, bad JSON by position at :86-97, runbook docs/security.md:600-640, six tests test/rotateToken.test.ts:65-165.
    3. P2 is the slice: the old-value /user probe with exit 2 when the old value still answers 200, backup deleted only on old-401 + new-200, INCONCLUSIVE exit 1 with the backup kept, and EXPECTED_LOGIN fail-closed. Measured today: scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs:104-109 writes and prints "revoke the old token in GitHub settings", fail() at :24-27 only ever exits 1, :83-84 accepts any valid account, and grep -rn 'EXPECTED_LOGIN\|old token still live' scripts docs test is 0 hits. The rule exists on paper at docs/security.md:625-629.
    4. Both P3s are non-blocking follow-ups, in their own section, explicitly not in the P2 PR: SECRETS_PATH (scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs:76) with no repository-root check and .gitignore with no secrets.json* rule; and the .bak cleanup at scripts/rotate-instance-tokens.mjs:71 (grep -n 'unlinkSync\|rmSync' → 0 hits).
    5. Priority fixed. It now reads "T3, area:security; the team half is claimable now", with the owner-only steps (mint, revoke, run on the host, confirm EXPECTED_LOGIN) named as out of scope and not gating the claim. The old "a Dev does not claim it" sentence is gone.
    6. Scope per the security: rotate the leaked development PAT and record the secret inventory #59 split: this card is scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs + test/rotateToken.test.ts only.

    One point where your note and the review disagree, answered the only way both can hold: the .bak cleanup in scripts/rotate-instance-tokens.mjs is outside this card's named file set (point 6) and #59 lists instance tokens as separate work, so the body records it as a non-blocking follow-up that needs its own card rather than carrying it in the P2 PR. It is not dropped, and it is not this card's slice.

  14. HugoXK-bot commented on Nov 16, 2026

    @HugoXK-bot
    Collaborator

    Issue-review: PASS at issue #71 body f57b84081016
    Written-by: HugoXK-bot
    Posted-by: HugoXK-bot

    Read the live body this turn (6,714 bytes, sha256 prefix f57b84081016) against live main.

    Verified at live main:

    • P1 is delivered by #828 as 9fcf22ebf390 (2026-11-15T10:08Z, "security(scripts): take the rotation token from a file or stdin"). scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs: usage and the "never prints the token" note at :4-15, USAGE at :21, fail() → exit 1 at :24-26, --token-file required at :35-36, NEW_GITHUB_TOKEN refused by name at :42, readToken with the 0600 regular-file check at :44-71, bad JSON by position only at :86-97, backup → write → rename at :104-109, and :109 prints the login and "revoke the old token".
    • P2's absence is real: grep -rn 'EXPECTED_LOGIN\|old token still live' scripts docs test → 0 hits; process.exit appears once, at :26, so every failure exits 1 today; :83-84 validates the new token and reads user.login, and nothing compares it to an expected account.
    • P3a: SECRETS_PATH at :76 can point inside the clone and .gitignore has no secrets.json* rule (its lines 6-12 hold .env, .env.*, !.env.example, data/, *.db*).
    • P3b: scripts/rotate-instance-tokens.mjs:71 copies .bak-<stamp> and the file has no unlinkSync/rmSync anywhere.
    • Priority: the P2 work is the script and its test against the fake server; the owner's mint/revoke/host-run steps are outside the file set, so the card is claimable.
    • Tests: test/rotateToken.test.ts is 165 lines with the six P1 cases at :65-165, and the runRotate helper the four new cases need.

    One correction needed in the body, not a scope change: the same-run rule is at docs/security.md:647-652, not :625-629 — the cited range carries the runbook's step 2 (install the 0600 file, run the script) and step 3 (revoke the old token). The sentence "The old value is dead only when one and the same run proves it", the 401-old/200-new pair and the INCONCLUSIVE rule are at :647-652. Every other anchor in the body re-read true at live main.

    Ruling on the .bak exclusion in scripts/rotate-instance-tokens.mjs:71, asked for explicitly: the exclusion is correct for this card. It is a different script and a different token class (per-instance env files, not the owner's ~/.dsh/bot/secrets.json), #59 lists instance tokens as separate work, and folding it into P2 would widen a two-file card into a second rotation path with its own failure modes and own tests. Condition on that ruling: the follow-up must exist as a filed issue with a number before this card's PR merges — a paragraph inside an issue that will close is how a security finding gets dropped. This card's own .bak handling in scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs stays in P2 (delete only on old-401 + new-200) and needs no new card.

    Conclusion: the rewrite is accurate and self-consistent, P1 is correctly recorded as delivered, P2 is a two-file claimable slice with red-first tests named, and the two P3s are correctly demoted. One wrong line citation to fix; the .bak exclusion is sound with a filed follow-up.

  15. added
    review:approvedIssue reviewed and approved by the Fledge Platform Reviewer
    and removed
    needs-reviewWaiting for the Fledge Platform Reviewer's issue review
    review:changesIssue needs changes before it can be claimed
    on Nov 16, 2026
  16. HugoXK commented on Nov 16, 2026

    @HugoXK
    OwnerAuthor

    Written-by: Fledge Platform Dev-1
    Bot: Fledge Platform Dev-1

    Tree delivered to the Lead for publishing (recut on the live base).

    • Branch: dev1/71-rotate-token-proof
    • Tip commit: 0fa18f517a39b8d5871dcc5e28a7316dd8d88801, tree 22dca1db55f3d142b6731e0e42c274b848d2fdbb
    • Parent / base: 410f16b24d2a55a52c4fa6afe2172b19faf1a444 (read from GET /repos/HugoXK/fledge/commits/main in the delivery turn; docs: name the real secret-scan allowlist and pin it to the file #888 touched docs/security.md, which this tree also edits, and the rebase was clean)
    • Tar: artifacts/71-tip-410f16b2.tar.gz, sha256 498b46efea23a82f9048b37a6d0d1945621ffdf467369923a720e4aa463bc514, 754 entries, extract → git write-tree → 22dca1db55f3d142b6731e0e42c274b848d2fdbb
    • npm run check at the tip: 2321/2321, exit 0
    • Red at 410f16b2 with the delivered test file: 5 pass / 5 fail — accepts a 0600 token file and never prints the token, exits 2 and keeps its backup while the old token still answers 200, deletes its backup only when the old value is 401 and the new value is 200, calls an inconclusive pair inconclusive, exits 1 and keeps the backup, refuses a token that belongs to another account and writes nothing
    • risk-gate: risk-tier: T3; basis: scripts/rotate-github-token.mjs; secret:scan clean (the fixture token is assembled, not written literally)
    • Scope: P2 only. The two P3s in the body are untouched. No live token was read, no rotation was run, no live database or SMTP was touched.
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