feat(auth): personal API tokens (#356); 1.61.0 - #384
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…ite scopes and a name (migration 0051); TenantMiddleware accepts Authorization: Bearer atk_… when there is no session, read tokens the GET routes, write tokens every method, and no token reaches /api/account/tokens, /api/account/sessions, /api/calendar/feed or DELETE /api/account; a disabled account's tokens stop; GET/POST/DELETE /api/account/tokens and Settings · Account · API tokens, the secret shown once and stored by sha256, at most 25 per account; 120 requests a minute per token, chained onto the per-tenant limiter; last_used_at written at most once a minute; cookie auth and its CSRF defense unchanged (#356); 1.61.0 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SXYffreKMhXLNgc2wdhsiw
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Navigate logical layers of code changes, visualize relationships, and explore their blast radius. 📝 SummarySummary by CodeRabbit
WalkthroughThe change adds personal bearer-token authentication with read and write scopes, token management endpoints, and Account settings controls. It stores token hashes, applies per-token rate limits, and documents token access rules and restrictions. ChangesPersonal API tokens
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Change: Feature Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Client
participant TenantMiddleware
participant ApiTokenRepo
participant TenantContext
participant AccountEndpoints
Client->>TenantMiddleware: Send bearer-token request
TenantMiddleware->>ApiTokenRepo: Resolve bearer token
ApiTokenRepo-->>TenantMiddleware: Return token identity and scope
TenantMiddleware->>TenantContext: Set tenant user, token ID, and scope
TenantMiddleware->>AccountEndpoints: Continue authorized request
AccountEndpoints-->>Client: Return API response
Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to A write API token can change the account's LLM endpoint, notification credentials, and job-board credentials. That lets a leaked token redirect résumé and prompt data or alter stored secrets. Separately, simultaneous token creation can exceed the 25-token limit. Restrict token access to these settings routes before merging. Security Architecture ReviewSecurity architecture risk: 🟠 High · up to A stolen write token can do more than edit ordinary application data: it can change integration credentials and agent settings, including a setting that can queue real actions. The impact is limited to the token owner’s account, but these capabilities warrant design-level review. Retained concerns
Security review detailsSecurity Blast Radius
Security Findings and Attack Paths
Trust Boundaries and Controls
Resilience and Maintainability Implications
Hardening Proposals
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 3 | ❌ 2❌ Failed checks (2 warnings)
✅ Passed checks (3 passed)
Full details: Linked Issues checkExplanation Issue Resolution Implement end-to-end Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 27.27% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 33 functions across 9 files. (5 skipped: 5 unsupported.)
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Inline comments:
In @api/ApplyTrack.Api/Auth/TenantMiddleware.cs:
- Around line 79-88: Update TokenMayReach to deny API-token access to the
/api/llm-settings, /api/notifications, and /api/board-accounts routes, alongside
the existing calendar-feed restriction; keep the account-route exceptions and
remaining scope checks unchanged.
In @api/ApplyTrack.Api/Data/ApiTokenRepo.cs:
- Around line 129-138: Update CreateAsync in ApiTokenRepo to serialize token
creation per tenant: begin a transaction, lock the tenant’s users row in a
separate statement before counting and inserting, pass the transaction to both
database commands, and commit after a successful insert. Preserve the existing
token-cap validation behavior.
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⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)
uv.lockis excluded by!**/*.lock
📒 Files selected for processing (14)
BACKLOG.mdREADME.mdapi/ApplyTrack.Api.Tests/ApiTokenTests.csapi/ApplyTrack.Api/ApplyTrack.Api.csprojapi/ApplyTrack.Api/Auth/TenantContext.csapi/ApplyTrack.Api/Auth/TenantMiddleware.csapi/ApplyTrack.Api/Data/ApiTokenRepo.csapi/ApplyTrack.Api/Endpoints/AccountEndpoints.csapi/ApplyTrack.Api/Migrations/0051_personal_api_tokens.sqlapi/ApplyTrack.Api/Program.csapi/ApplyTrack.Api/wwwroot/app.jspyproject.tomlsrc/applytrack/__init__.pytests/web/accessibility.spec.js
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- GitHub Check: .NET — test + audit
- GitHub Check: Web — WCAG checks
- GitHub Check: Python — lint + test + audit
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📓 Path-based instructions (2)
Source excerpt: **Core API: .NET 10** — ASP.NET Core Minimal APIs on Kestrel.
📄 CodeRabbit inference engine (CLAUDE.md)
Files:
api/ApplyTrack.Api/Program.cs
Source excerpt: `api/` — the .NET solution (`ApplyTrack.Api`), with the SPA in `wwwroot/`.
📄 CodeRabbit inference engine (CLAUDE.md)
Files:
api/ApplyTrack.Api/wwwroot/app.js
🪛 ast-grep (0.45.3)
tests/web/accessibility.spec.js
[warning] 745-745: Avoid SQL injections
Context: r.method() === "DELETE"
Note: [CWE-89] Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'). Security best practice.
(variable-sql-statement-injection)
api/ApplyTrack.Api/wwwroot/app.js
[warning] 3962-4046: Avoid assigning untrusted data to innerHTML/outerHTML or document.write
Context: body.innerHTML = `
Your data, portable
<div class="mt-5">
<div class="field-label">Export — private migration snapshot</div>
<p class="field-help">
Everything: applications, criteria, blacklist. Import it on another instance to move home.
</p>
<div class="mt-3 flex flex-wrap items-center gap-2">
<button class="btn btn-ghost" data-act="export" type="button">⤓ Export my data</button>
<button class="btn btn-ghost" data-act="import" type="button">⤒ Import a file</button>
</div>
</div>
<div class="mt-5 border-t border-rule pt-4">
<div class="field-label">Share — anonymized opportunity list</div>
<p class="field-help">
Company, role, link, location, source only — no status, notes, contacts, dates, or score.
A peer imports it and every entry lands as a fresh lead.
</p>
<div class="mt-3">
<button class="btn btn-ghost" data-act="share" type="button">⤴ Share an opportunity list</button>
</div>
</div>
<div class="mt-5 border-t border-rule pt-4">
<div class="field-label" id="sessions-heading">Where you're signed in</div>
<p class="field-help">
Sessions end after 30 days unused, and 90 days after sign-in at the latest. Signing out everywhere else ends every session but this one.
</p>
<ul id="account-sessions" class="agent-log" aria-labelledby="sessions-heading" aria-live="polite">
<li class="mt-2 text-sm text-ink-faint">Loading…</li>
</ul>
<div class="mt-3 flex flex-wrap items-center gap-2">
<button class="btn btn-ghost" data-act="logout" type="button">Sign out</button>
<button class="btn btn-ghost" data-act="logout-others" type="button">Sign out everywhere else</button>
</div>
</div>
<div class="mt-5 border-t border-rule pt-4">
<h3 class="field-label" id="tokens-heading">API tokens</h3>
<p class="field-help" id="tokens-help">
For scripts and clippers: send one as <code>Authorization: Bearer <token></code>.
Read tokens can only look; write tokens can change your applications too. No token can
manage tokens, sessions or the calendar link, or delete the account.
</p>
<form id="token-form" class="mt-3 flex flex-wrap items-end gap-2" aria-labelledby="tokens-heading">
<div>
<label class="field-label" for="token-name">Name</label>
<input id="token-name" class="field-input" maxlength="80" autocomplete="off" required placeholder="Laptop CLI" />
</div>
<div>
<label class="field-label" for="token-scope">Access</label>
<select id="token-scope" class="field-input">
<option value="read">Read only</option>
<option value="write">Read and write</option>
</select>
</div>
<button class="btn btn-ghost" type="submit">Make a token</button>
</form>
<p id="token-status" class="mt-3" role="status"></p>
<div id="token-new-wrap" class="mt-3" hidden>
<label class="field-label" for="token-new">Your new token — copy it now, it is shown only once</label>
<input id="token-new" class="field-input mono" readonly aria-describedby="tokens-help" />
<div class="mt-2">
<button class="btn btn-ghost" data-act="token-copy" type="button">Copy token</button>
</div>
</div>
<ul id="account-tokens" class="agent-log" aria-labelledby="tokens-heading">
<li class="mt-2 text-sm text-ink-faint">Loading…</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="mt-5 border-t border-rule pt-4">
<div class="field-label">Danger zone</div>
<p class="field-help">
Deletes your account and every application, setting, and session with it. Immediate and unrecoverable.
</p>
<div class="mt-3">
<button class="btn btn-danger" data-act="delete-account" type="button">DELETE MY DATA</button>
</div>
</div>
</article>`
Note: [CWE-79] Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting').
(inner-outer-html)
[warning] 4119-4126: Avoid assigning untrusted data to innerHTML/outerHTML or document.write
Context: list.innerHTML = tokens.map((k) => <li class="mt-2 text-sm"> <span>${escapeHtml(k.name)}</span> · <span>${escapeHtml(scopeLabel[k.scope] || k.scope)}</span> <div class="field-help">Made ${escapeHtml(new Date(k.created_at).toLocaleString())} · ${k.last_used_at ?last used ${escapeHtml(new Date(k.last_used_at).toLocaleString())} : "never used"}</div> <button class="btn btn-ghost mt-1" type="button" data-token-id="${Number(k.id)}" aria-label="Revoke the token ${escapeHtml(k.name)}">Revoke</button> </li>).join("") || <li class="mt-2 text-sm">No API tokens.</li>
Note: [CWE-79] Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting').
(inner-outer-html)
[warning] 4128-4128: Avoid assigning untrusted data to innerHTML/outerHTML or document.write
Context: list.innerHTML = <li class="mt-2 text-sm">${escapeHtml(e.message)}</li>
Note: [CWE-79] Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting').
(inner-outer-html)
🪛 OpenGrep (1.30.0)
api/ApplyTrack.Api/wwwroot/app.js
[WARNING] 4120-4127: Setting innerHTML with dynamic content can lead to XSS. Use textContent or createElement with proper escaping instead.
(coderabbit.xss.innerhtml-assignment)
[WARNING] 4129-4129: Setting innerHTML with dynamic content can lead to XSS. Use textContent or createElement with proper escaping instead.
(coderabbit.xss.innerhtml-assignment)
🪛 Squawk (2.64.0)
api/ApplyTrack.Api/Migrations/0051_personal_api_tokens.sql
[warning] 12-12: By default new constraints require a table scan and block writes to the table while that scan occurs. Use NOT VALID with a later VALIDATE CONSTRAINT call.
(constraint-missing-not-valid)
[warning] 14-14: During normal index creation, table updates are blocked, but reads are still allowed. Use concurrently to avoid blocking writes.
(require-concurrent-index-creation)
🔇 Additional comments (12)
api/ApplyTrack.Api/Migrations/0051_personal_api_tokens.sql (1)
9-14: LGTM!api/ApplyTrack.Api.Tests/ApiTokenTests.cs (1)
1-273: LGTM!api/ApplyTrack.Api/Auth/TenantContext.cs (1)
8-8: LGTM!Also applies to: 20-26
api/ApplyTrack.Api/Endpoints/AccountEndpoints.cs (1)
215-231: LGTM!api/ApplyTrack.Api/Program.cs (1)
253-253: LGTM!Also applies to: 295-295, 305-312
api/ApplyTrack.Api/wwwroot/app.js (1)
4004-4037: LGTM!Also applies to: 4088-4088, 4108-4175
tests/web/accessibility.spec.js (1)
171-173: LGTM!Also applies to: 734-775
README.md (1)
272-273: LGTM!Also applies to: 342-366
BACKLOG.md (1)
68-68: LGTM!api/ApplyTrack.Api/ApplyTrack.Api.csproj (1)
8-8: LGTM!pyproject.toml (1)
7-7: LGTM!src/applytrack/__init__.py (1)
5-5: LGTM!
…— /api/llm-settings, /api/notifications, /api/board-accounts — so a leaked one can't redirect prompts, codes or messages; making a token takes a per-tenant advisory lock first, so racing makers can't slip past the cap of 25 (CodeRabbit on #384) (#356) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SXYffreKMhXLNgc2wdhsiw
1 participant
What
Personal API tokens for scripts, clippers and other callers that can't carry the session cookie. Extends the
api_tokenstable from #354 rather than adding a parallel mechanism.api_tokensgains anameand the scopesread/write(alongsidecalendar), plus a(tenant_id, created_at)index. The migration is idempotent.TenantMiddleware: when no session cookie resolves, it acceptsAuthorization: Bearer atk_…. Areadtoken gets GET/HEAD only. Awritetoken gets every method. No token can reach/api/account/tokens,/api/account/sessions,/api/calendar/feedorDELETE /api/account; those return 403. Tokens can still export and import. When a request carries both, the session cookie wins. Cookie auth and its CSRF defense (SameSite=Lax plus JSON-only mutations) are unchanged. Bearer requests need no CSRF defense because the API grants no CORS./api/llm-settings,/api/notificationsand/api/board-accountsalso return 403 to tokens, so a leaked token can't redirect prompts, codes or messages (CodeRabbit).activeuser, so disabling a user stops their tokens too ([SEC] Hardening grab-bag: hash session IDs, honour users.status, sign-out-everywhere, per-tenant LLM rate limit, board-slug validation, userinfo in logged LLM URL #346). A calendar token can't be used as a bearer token. Tokens are stored by sha256 only, and the secret appears only in the create response.GET/POST/DELETE /api/account/tokens, scoped to the tenant. Each account can hold at most 25 tokens; token creation takes a per-tenant advisory lock first, so concurrent requests can't get past the cap (CodeRabbit).last_used_at: written at most once a minute per token.Tests
ApiTokenTests(.NET), covering:last_used_atgranularitydotnet test(1079 passed),npm run test:web, ruff, mypy, bandit, pytest.Closes #356
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