diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md index 0101fa1..a955901 100644 --- a/AGENTS.md +++ b/AGENTS.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ src/stores.ts storage interfaces (UserStore, OrgStore, RoleStore, AuditSink, src/memory.ts in-process stores (tests, single server) src/redis.ts Redis stores ("/redis" entry): sessions, single-use values, sliding-window limiter src/auth.ts createAuth(): login, refresh (JWT mode), authenticate, context, require, logout, sessions, password change/reset -scripts/test.ts 98 checks; session and JWT flows run on both memory and Redis (ioredis-mock) stores +scripts/test.ts 110 checks; session, JWT and device-binding flows run on both memory and Redis (ioredis-mock) stores ``` ## Rules @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ scripts/test.ts 98 checks; session and JWT flows run on both memory and Redis ( 6. **JWT mode keeps rules 1 and 3.** Access JWTs carry the session id and every request still checks the session and re-reads the user; refresh tokens are opaque, single-use and stored as hashes. Never accept `alg` from the token (HS256 only), never sign with a secret under 32 characters. + Device signals from clients are untrusted: always pass them through `cleanDeviceSignals`; a refresh + from another `deviceId` ends the session unless `deviceBinding` says otherwise. 7. Error codes are a public contract (`AuthError.code`). Add new ones; never rename existing ones. ## Commands diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 733a916..4a38b13 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ **Authentication and permissions for the MGPL Diagnostics backend, as an internal API.** There is no HTTP server here. Your backend (GraphQL resolvers, REST handlers, jobs) calls these functions. -![tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/checks-98-14264A) ![deps](https://img.shields.io/badge/runtime%20dependencies-0-E9A23B) +![tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/checks-110-14264A) ![deps](https://img.shields.io/badge/runtime%20dependencies-0-E9A23B) ## What it does @@ -94,12 +94,27 @@ sequenceDiagram all verify. - `logout` accepts the access token (even expired), the refresh token, or an opaque session token. +### Device binding + +Clients can send security signals with `login` and `refresh` (`device: DeviceSignals`). They are cleaned +(`cleanDeviceSignals`: ids 8–128 safe characters, at most 20 short `info` values) and stored on the session. + +| Signal | What it is | On refresh | +| --- | --- | --- | +| `deviceId` | random id the client keeps per browser profile or app install | must match the login's, else (`deviceBinding: "enforce"`, default) `INVALID_TOKEN` and the session ends; `"flag"` only audits; `"off"` ignores | +| `fingerprint` | client-side hash of stable device attributes | a change is audited (`auth.fingerprint_changed`); browsers update, so it never blocks | +| `clientSessionId` | random id per tab or app run | recorded (latest) | +| `info` | platform, language, timezone, screen… | recorded (latest) | + +A session that signed in without a `deviceId` is bound by the first refresh that sends one. +`sessionsOf` returns `device`, so a "your devices" page can show it. + ## API | Call | Returns / throws | | --- | --- | -| `login({ email, password, orgCode?, ip?, userAgent? })` | `{ token, expiresAt, user }`, plus `refreshToken, refreshExpiresAt` in JWT mode (`token` is then the access JWT) · `INVALID_CREDENTIALS` `ACCOUNT_DISABLED` `INVITE_PENDING` `ORG_REQUIRED` `RATE_LIMITED` | -| `refresh({ refreshToken, ip? })` | JWT mode: `{ accessToken, accessExpiresAt, refreshToken, refreshExpiresAt, user }` · `INVALID_TOKEN` | +| `login({ email, password, orgCode?, ip?, userAgent?, device? })` | `{ token, expiresAt, user }`, plus `refreshToken, refreshExpiresAt` in JWT mode (`token` is then the access JWT) · `INVALID_CREDENTIALS` `ACCOUNT_DISABLED` `INVITE_PENDING` `ORG_REQUIRED` `RATE_LIMITED` | +| `refresh({ refreshToken, ip?, userAgent?, device? })` | JWT mode: `{ accessToken, accessExpiresAt, refreshToken, refreshExpiresAt, user }` · `INVALID_TOKEN` (also: another device) | | `verifyAccessToken(token)` | JWT mode: claims `{ sub, org, sid, iat, exp }` or null, no storage read | | `authenticate(token)` | `Viewer \| null` (slides the idle window) | | `context(token)` | `{ viewer, can, branchesFor, permissions }` (anonymous when the token is missing or invalid) | @@ -116,6 +131,7 @@ Also exported: - `hashPassword`, `verifyPassword`, `needsRehash`, `assertPasswordPolicy`; - `randomToken`, `hashToken`; - `jwtSigner`, `looksLikeJwt` (HS256 sign/verify on node:crypto); +- `cleanDeviceSignals` and the `DeviceSignals` type; - `PERMISSIONS`, `SYSTEM_ROLES`; - `can`, `branchesFor`, `permissionsOf`, `roleMap`. diff --git a/llms-full.txt b/llms-full.txt index 0c99e26..33c12ae 100644 --- a/llms-full.txt +++ b/llms-full.txt @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ **Authentication and permissions for the MGPL Diagnostics backend, as an internal API.** There is no HTTP server here. Your backend (GraphQL resolvers, REST handlers, jobs) calls these functions. -![tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/checks-98-14264A) ![deps](https://img.shields.io/badge/runtime%20dependencies-0-E9A23B) +![tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/checks-110-14264A) ![deps](https://img.shields.io/badge/runtime%20dependencies-0-E9A23B) ## What it does @@ -121,12 +121,27 @@ sequenceDiagram all verify. - `logout` accepts the access token (even expired), the refresh token, or an opaque session token. +### Device binding + +Clients can send security signals with `login` and `refresh` (`device: DeviceSignals`). They are cleaned +(`cleanDeviceSignals`: ids 8–128 safe characters, at most 20 short `info` values) and stored on the session. + +| Signal | What it is | On refresh | +| --- | --- | --- | +| `deviceId` | random id the client keeps per browser profile or app install | must match the login's, else (`deviceBinding: "enforce"`, default) `INVALID_TOKEN` and the session ends; `"flag"` only audits; `"off"` ignores | +| `fingerprint` | client-side hash of stable device attributes | a change is audited (`auth.fingerprint_changed`); browsers update, so it never blocks | +| `clientSessionId` | random id per tab or app run | recorded (latest) | +| `info` | platform, language, timezone, screen… | recorded (latest) | + +A session that signed in without a `deviceId` is bound by the first refresh that sends one. +`sessionsOf` returns `device`, so a "your devices" page can show it. + ## API | Call | Returns / throws | | --- | --- | -| `login({ email, password, orgCode?, ip?, userAgent? })` | `{ token, expiresAt, user }`, plus `refreshToken, refreshExpiresAt` in JWT mode (`token` is then the access JWT) · `INVALID_CREDENTIALS` `ACCOUNT_DISABLED` `INVITE_PENDING` `ORG_REQUIRED` `RATE_LIMITED` | -| `refresh({ refreshToken, ip? })` | JWT mode: `{ accessToken, accessExpiresAt, refreshToken, refreshExpiresAt, user }` · `INVALID_TOKEN` | +| `login({ email, password, orgCode?, ip?, userAgent?, device? })` | `{ token, expiresAt, user }`, plus `refreshToken, refreshExpiresAt` in JWT mode (`token` is then the access JWT) · `INVALID_CREDENTIALS` `ACCOUNT_DISABLED` `INVITE_PENDING` `ORG_REQUIRED` `RATE_LIMITED` | +| `refresh({ refreshToken, ip?, userAgent?, device? })` | JWT mode: `{ accessToken, accessExpiresAt, refreshToken, refreshExpiresAt, user }` · `INVALID_TOKEN` (also: another device) | | `verifyAccessToken(token)` | JWT mode: claims `{ sub, org, sid, iat, exp }` or null, no storage read | | `authenticate(token)` | `Viewer \| null` (slides the idle window) | | `context(token)` | `{ viewer, can, branchesFor, permissions }` (anonymous when the token is missing or invalid) | @@ -143,6 +158,7 @@ Also exported: - `hashPassword`, `verifyPassword`, `needsRehash`, `assertPasswordPolicy`; - `randomToken`, `hashToken`; - `jwtSigner`, `looksLikeJwt` (HS256 sign/verify on node:crypto); +- `cleanDeviceSignals` and the `DeviceSignals` type; - `PERMISSIONS`, `SYSTEM_ROLES`; - `can`, `branchesFor`, `permissionsOf`, `roleMap`. @@ -184,7 +200,7 @@ src/stores.ts storage interfaces (UserStore, OrgStore, RoleStore, AuditSink, src/memory.ts in-process stores (tests, single server) src/redis.ts Redis stores ("/redis" entry): sessions, single-use values, sliding-window limiter src/auth.ts createAuth(): login, refresh (JWT mode), authenticate, context, require, logout, sessions, password change/reset -scripts/test.ts 98 checks; session and JWT flows run on both memory and Redis (ioredis-mock) stores +scripts/test.ts 110 checks; session, JWT and device-binding flows run on both memory and Redis (ioredis-mock) stores ``` ## Rules @@ -198,6 +214,8 @@ scripts/test.ts 98 checks; session and JWT flows run on both memory and Redis ( 6. **JWT mode keeps rules 1 and 3.** Access JWTs carry the session id and every request still checks the session and re-reads the user; refresh tokens are opaque, single-use and stored as hashes. Never accept `alg` from the token (HS256 only), never sign with a secret under 32 characters. + Device signals from clients are untrusted: always pass them through `cleanDeviceSignals`; a refresh + from another `deviceId` ends the session unless `deviceBinding` says otherwise. 7. Error codes are a public contract (`AuthError.code`). Add new ones; never rename existing ones. ## Commands @@ -224,6 +242,7 @@ Key facts for agents: - `auth.login({ email, password, orgCode?, ip })` → `{ token, expiresAt, user }`; `auth.context(token)` → `{ viewer, can, branchesFor, permissions }`. - Errors: `AuthError` with `code` (INVALID_CREDENTIALS, ACCOUNT_DISABLED, INVITE_PENDING, ORG_REQUIRED, RATE_LIMITED, WEAK_PASSWORD, INVALID_TOKEN, UNAUTHENTICATED, FORBIDDEN) and `statusCode`. - JWT mode: `createAuth({ …, kv, jwt: { secret, issuer?, accessTtlMs? } })`; login returns `token` (access JWT) + `refreshToken`; `auth.refresh({ refreshToken })` rotates; reuse of a spent refresh token ends the session; `verifyAccessToken` checks a JWT without storage. +- Device binding: login/refresh take `device: { deviceId, fingerprint, clientSessionId, info }`; a refresh from another deviceId → INVALID_TOKEN and the session ends (`deviceBinding: "enforce" | "flag" | "off"`); a fingerprint change is audited. - Redis stores: `import { redisSessionStore, redisKeyValueStore, redisRateLimiter } from "@mgpl-diagnostics/auth-kit/redis"`. - Seed roles with `SYSTEM_ROLES`; permissions are "resource:action" with "*" wildcards. @@ -248,7 +267,7 @@ Key facts for agents: ```json { "name": "@mgpl-diagnostics/auth-kit", - "version": "1.1.0", + "version": "1.2.0", "description": "MGPL Diagnostics authentication for the backend: scrypt passwords, revocable sessions (Redis or memory), rate-limited timing-safe login, password reset, roles and branch-aware permissions. An internal API, no HTTP server.", "type": "module", "license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE", @@ -377,7 +396,7 @@ console.log(`llms-full.txt: ${ordered.length} files, ${(out.length / 1024).toFix // npm test — passwords, login, sessions (memory + Redis stores), permissions, reset flow. import RedisMock from "ioredis-mock"; import { - AuthError, createAuth, hashPassword, hashToken, memoryKeyValueStore, memoryRateLimiter, memorySessionStore, needsRehash, + AuthError, cleanDeviceSignals, createAuth, hashPassword, hashToken, memoryKeyValueStore, memoryRateLimiter, memorySessionStore, needsRehash, permissionsOf, roleMap, verifyPassword, assertPasswordPolicy, can, branchesFor, SYSTEM_ROLES, type AuditSink, type AuthUser, type KeyValueStore, type RateLimiter, type RoleStore, type SessionStore, type UserStore, } from "../src/index"; @@ -585,6 +604,27 @@ async function jwtFlows(label: string, stores: { sessions: SessionStore; kv: Key issued.push(e.refreshToken!); await sleep(1100); ok((await expiring.authenticate(e.token)) === null && (await expiring.authenticate((await expiring.refresh({ refreshToken: e.refreshToken! })).accessToken)) !== null, "expired access token refused; refresh brings a working one"); + // device binding: the refresh token works only on the device that signed in + const phone = { deviceId: "dev-phone-0001-abcdef", fingerprint: "fp-aaaaaaaaaaaa", clientSessionId: "tab-0001-xyz", info: { platform: "Android", screen: "412x915", "bad key": "x", note: "y".repeat(500) } }; + const f = await auth.login({ email: "asha@mgpl.in", password: "banyan-roots-7", device: phone as any }); + issued.push(f.refreshToken!); + const stored = (await auth.sessionsOf("j1")).find((x) => x.id === auth.verifyAccessToken(f.token)?.sid); + ok(stored?.device?.deviceId === phone.deviceId && stored.device.info?.platform === "Android" && !("bad key" in (stored.device.info ?? {})) && String(stored.device.info?.note).length === 200, "login stores the device signals on the session (cleaned, capped)"); + const f2 = await auth.refresh({ refreshToken: f.refreshToken!, device: { ...phone, fingerprint: "fp-bbbbbbbbbbbb" } }); + issued.push(f2.refreshToken); + ok(!!f2.accessToken && db.auditLog.some((x) => x.action === "auth.fingerprint_changed"), "same device, new fingerprint: refresh works, change audited"); + ok((await code(auth.refresh({ refreshToken: f2.refreshToken, device: { deviceId: "dev-laptop-9999-zzzzzz" } }))) === "INVALID_TOKEN" && (await auth.authenticate(f2.accessToken)) === null && db.auditLog.some((x) => x.action === "auth.device_mismatch"), "refresh from another device: refused, session ended, audited"); + const g = await auth.login({ email: "asha@mgpl.in", password: "banyan-roots-7", device: phone }); + issued.push(g.refreshToken!); + ok((await code(auth.refresh({ refreshToken: g.refreshToken! }))) === "INVALID_TOKEN", "refresh without the device id of a bound session: refused"); + const flagging = createAuth({ users: db.userStore, audit: db.audit, ...stores, deviceBinding: "flag", jwt: { secret: SECRET } }); + const h2 = await flagging.login({ email: "asha@mgpl.in", password: "banyan-roots-7", device: phone }); + issued.push(h2.refreshToken!); + const h3 = await flagging.refresh({ refreshToken: h2.refreshToken!, device: { deviceId: "dev-laptop-9999-zzzzzz" } }); + issued.push(h3.refreshToken); + ok(!!h3.accessToken, 'deviceBinding "flag": a refresh from another device works (and is audited)'); + ok(cleanDeviceSignals({ deviceId: "short", fingerprint: "xx" }) === undefined, "malformed device ids are dropped"); + let threw = false; try { createAuth({ users: db.userStore, sessions: stores.sessions, jwt: { secret: "short" } }); } catch { threw = true; } ok(threw, "JWT mode refuses short secrets and a missing kv"); @@ -621,7 +661,7 @@ import { jwtSigner, looksLikeJwt, type AccessClaims, type JwtOptions } from "./j import { memoryRateLimiter } from "./memory"; import { assertPasswordPolicy, hashPassword, hashToken, needsRehash, randomToken, verifyPassword, type PasswordPolicy } from "./password"; import { branchesFor, can, permissionsOf, roleMap, type Permission, type RoleAssignment, type RoleMap } from "./rbac"; -import type { AuditSink, AuthUser, KeyValueStore, OrgStore, RateLimiter, RoleStore, Session, SessionStore, UserStore } from "./stores"; +import type { AuditSink, AuthUser, DeviceSignals, KeyValueStore, OrgStore, RateLimiter, RoleStore, Session, SessionStore, UserStore } from "./stores"; export interface AuthOptions { users: UserStore; @@ -662,6 +702,12 @@ export interface AuthOptions { */ reuseGraceMs?: number; }; + /** + * What a refresh from another device does. The device is the `deviceId` the client sent at login. + * "enforce" (default): refused with INVALID_TOKEN and the session ends (audit auth.device_mismatch). + * "flag": allowed, audited. "off": not compared. A changed fingerprint is only audited (auth.fingerprint_changed). + */ + deviceBinding?: "enforce" | "flag" | "off"; } /** The signed-in user for one request. */ @@ -691,6 +737,8 @@ export interface LoginInput { orgCode?: string; ip?: string; userAgent?: string; + /** Security signals from the client (device id, fingerprint, …), stored on the session. */ + device?: DeviceSignals; } export interface LoginResult { @@ -719,6 +767,27 @@ export interface TokenPair { const publicUser = ({ passwordHash: _p, ...u }: AuthUser): PublicUser => u; const normalizeEmail = (e: string) => e.trim().toLowerCase(); +const ID_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_.:+\/=-]{8,128}$/; +/** Keeps only well-formed, size-capped device signals (clients are untrusted). */ +export function cleanDeviceSignals(d: DeviceSignals | null | undefined): DeviceSignals | undefined { + if (!d || typeof d !== "object") return undefined; + const out: DeviceSignals = {}; + for (const k of ["deviceId", "fingerprint", "clientSessionId"] as const) { + const v = d[k]; + if (typeof v === "string" && ID_RE.test(v)) out[k] = v; + } + if (d.info && typeof d.info === "object" && !Array.isArray(d.info)) { + const info: Record = {}; + for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(d.info).slice(0, 20)) { + if (!/^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]{0,31}$/.test(k)) continue; + if (typeof v === "string") info[k] = v.slice(0, 200); + else if ((typeof v === "number" && Number.isFinite(v)) || typeof v === "boolean") info[k] = v; + } + if (Object.keys(info).length) out.info = info; + } + return Object.keys(out).length ? out : undefined; +} + export type Auth = ReturnType; /** @@ -743,6 +812,7 @@ export function createAuth(o: AuthOptions) { const accessTtlMs = o.jwt?.accessTtlMs ?? 15 * 60_000; const reuseGraceMs = o.jwt?.reuseGraceMs ?? 15_000; if (jwt && !o.kv) throw new Error("createAuth: JWT mode needs `kv` (refresh tokens)"); + const deviceBinding = o.deviceBinding ?? "enforce"; const audit = async (entry: Parameters[0]) => { try { @@ -768,12 +838,12 @@ export function createAuth(o: AuthOptions) { return user ? [user] : []; } - async function startSession(user: AuthUser, ip?: string, userAgent?: string): Promise<{ token: string; session: Session }> { + async function startSession(user: AuthUser, ip?: string, userAgent?: string, device?: DeviceSignals): Promise<{ token: string; session: Session }> { const token = randomToken(); const now = Date.now(); // JWT mode: the session id is random and never handed out; the refresh token points at it through kv const id = jwt ? hashToken(randomToken()) : hashToken(token); - const session: Session = { id, userId: user.id, orgId: user.orgId, createdAt: now, lastSeenAt: now, expiresAt: now + maxAgeMs, ip, userAgent }; + const session: Session = { id, userId: user.id, orgId: user.orgId, createdAt: now, lastSeenAt: now, expiresAt: now + maxAgeMs, ip, userAgent, device: cleanDeviceSignals(device) }; await o.sessions.create(session, idleMs); if (jwt) await o.kv!.set(`refresh:${hashToken(token)}`, id, maxAgeMs); return { token, session }; @@ -861,7 +931,7 @@ export function createAuth(o: AuthOptions) { const patch: { lastLoginAt: Date; passwordHash?: string } = { lastLoginAt: new Date() }; if (needsRehash(user.passwordHash)) patch.passwordHash = await hashPassword(input.password); await o.users.update(user.id, patch); - const { token, session } = await startSession(user, input.ip, input.userAgent); + const { token, session } = await startSession(user, input.ip, input.userAgent, input.device); await audit({ orgId: user.orgId, userId: user.id, action: "auth.login", ip: input.ip }); const pub = publicUser({ ...user, lastLoginAt: patch.lastLoginAt }); if (!jwt) return { token, expiresAt: new Date(session.expiresAt), user: pub }; @@ -874,7 +944,7 @@ export function createAuth(o: AuthOptions) { * Fails with INVALID_TOKEN when the token is unknown, spent, expired, or its session or user is * gone. A spent token presented again after `reuseGraceMs` ends the whole session (it was copied). */ - async refresh(input: { refreshToken: string; ip?: string }): Promise { + async refresh(input: { refreshToken: string; ip?: string; userAgent?: string; device?: DeviceSignals }): Promise { if (!jwt) throw new Error("createAuth: refresh needs the `jwt` option"); const invalid = () => new AuthError("INVALID_TOKEN", "Sign in again"); const rt = input.refreshToken ?? ""; @@ -903,13 +973,33 @@ export function createAuth(o: AuthOptions) { await o.sessions.deleteByUser(s.userId); throw invalid(); } - await o.sessions.touch(s.id, now, idleMs); + // device binding: the refresh token only works on the device that signed in + const device = cleanDeviceSignals(input.device); + const bound = s.device?.deviceId; + let session = s; + if (deviceBinding !== "off" && bound && device?.deviceId !== bound) { + await audit({ orgId: s.orgId, userId: s.userId, action: "auth.device_mismatch", ip: input.ip, entity: "session", data: { expected: bound, got: device?.deviceId ?? null } }); + if (deviceBinding === "enforce") { + await o.sessions.delete(s.id); + throw invalid(); + } + } + if (device?.fingerprint && s.device?.fingerprint && device.fingerprint !== s.device.fingerprint) { + await audit({ orgId: s.orgId, userId: s.userId, action: "auth.fingerprint_changed", ip: input.ip, entity: "session", data: { from: s.device.fingerprint, to: device.fingerprint } }); + } + if (device && (device.fingerprint !== s.device?.fingerprint || device.clientSessionId !== s.device?.clientSessionId || input.ip !== s.ip)) { + // keep the device id from login; record the latest fingerprint, tab, info and address + session = { ...s, lastSeenAt: now, ip: input.ip ?? s.ip, userAgent: input.userAgent ?? s.userAgent, device: { ...s.device, ...device, deviceId: bound ?? device.deviceId } }; + await o.sessions.create(session, idleMs); + } else { + await o.sessions.touch(s.id, now, idleMs); + } const next = randomToken(); const ttl = Math.max(1, s.expiresAt - now); await o.kv!.set(`refresh:${hashToken(next)}`, s.id, ttl); await o.kv!.set(`refresh-used:${h}`, `${s.id}|${now}`, ttl); - const access = accessToken(s); - return { accessToken: access.token, accessExpiresAt: access.expiresAt, refreshToken: next, refreshExpiresAt: refreshExpiry(s, now), user: publicUser(user) }; + const access = accessToken(session); + return { accessToken: access.token, accessExpiresAt: access.expiresAt, refreshToken: next, refreshExpiresAt: refreshExpiry(session, now), user: publicUser(user) }; }, /** JWT mode: the claims of a valid access token, without touching storage (for workers or other services). */ @@ -1081,7 +1171,7 @@ export class AuthError extends Error { ## File: src/index.ts ```ts -export { createAuth, type Auth, type AuthContext, type AuthOptions, type LoginInput, type LoginResult, type PublicUser, type TokenPair, type Viewer } from "./auth"; +export { cleanDeviceSignals, createAuth, type Auth, type AuthContext, type AuthOptions, type LoginInput, type LoginResult, type PublicUser, type TokenPair, type Viewer } from "./auth"; export { jwtSigner, looksLikeJwt, type AccessClaims, type JwtOptions } from "./jwt"; export { AuthError, type AuthErrorCode } from "./errors"; export { assertPasswordPolicy, hashPassword, hashToken, needsRehash, randomToken, SCRYPT, verifyPassword, type PasswordPolicy } from "./password"; @@ -1090,7 +1180,7 @@ export { type Permission, type RoleAssignment, type RoleDefinition, type RoleMap, } from "./rbac"; export { memoryKeyValueStore, memoryRateLimiter, memorySessionStore } from "./memory"; -export type { AuditSink, AuthUser, KeyValueStore, OrgStore, RateLimiter, RoleStore, Session, SessionStore, UserStatus, UserStore } from "./stores"; +export type { AuditSink, AuthUser, DeviceSignals, KeyValueStore, OrgStore, RateLimiter, RoleStore, Session, SessionStore, UserStatus, UserStore } from "./stores"; ``` @@ -1626,6 +1716,23 @@ export interface Session { expiresAt: number; ip?: string; userAgent?: string; + /** What the client said about its device at login (and the latest fingerprint). See DeviceSignals. */ + device?: DeviceSignals; +} + +/** + * Security signals a client sends with login and refresh. All optional, all chosen by the client SDK; + * they are stored on the session (cleaned, size-capped) and compared on refresh. + */ +export interface DeviceSignals { + /** A random id the client created once and keeps (per browser profile or app install). Not derived from the device. */ + deviceId?: string; + /** A hash of stable device attributes, computed on the client. It changes with browser updates, so a change is only logged. */ + fingerprint?: string; + /** A random id per tab or app run. */ + clientSessionId?: string; + /** Descriptive values (platform, language, timezone, screen, …): at most 20 keys, short values. */ + info?: Record; } export interface SessionStore { diff --git a/llms.txt b/llms.txt index 66368f7..be8200b 100644 --- a/llms.txt +++ b/llms.txt @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ Key facts for agents: - `auth.login({ email, password, orgCode?, ip })` → `{ token, expiresAt, user }`; `auth.context(token)` → `{ viewer, can, branchesFor, permissions }`. - Errors: `AuthError` with `code` (INVALID_CREDENTIALS, ACCOUNT_DISABLED, INVITE_PENDING, ORG_REQUIRED, RATE_LIMITED, WEAK_PASSWORD, INVALID_TOKEN, UNAUTHENTICATED, FORBIDDEN) and `statusCode`. - JWT mode: `createAuth({ …, kv, jwt: { secret, issuer?, accessTtlMs? } })`; login returns `token` (access JWT) + `refreshToken`; `auth.refresh({ refreshToken })` rotates; reuse of a spent refresh token ends the session; `verifyAccessToken` checks a JWT without storage. +- Device binding: login/refresh take `device: { deviceId, fingerprint, clientSessionId, info }`; a refresh from another deviceId → INVALID_TOKEN and the session ends (`deviceBinding: "enforce" | "flag" | "off"`); a fingerprint change is audited. - Redis stores: `import { redisSessionStore, redisKeyValueStore, redisRateLimiter } from "@mgpl-diagnostics/auth-kit/redis"`. - Seed roles with `SYSTEM_ROLES`; permissions are "resource:action" with "*" wildcards. diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index 6f8e719..8bfd010 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "name": "@mgpl-diagnostics/auth-kit", - "version": "1.1.0", + "version": "1.2.0", "description": "MGPL Diagnostics authentication for the backend: scrypt passwords, revocable sessions (Redis or memory), rate-limited timing-safe login, password reset, roles and branch-aware permissions. An internal API, no HTTP server.", "type": "module", "license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE", diff --git a/scripts/test.ts b/scripts/test.ts index 2712ff5..dcb8395 100644 --- a/scripts/test.ts +++ b/scripts/test.ts @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ // npm test — passwords, login, sessions (memory + Redis stores), permissions, reset flow. import RedisMock from "ioredis-mock"; import { - AuthError, createAuth, hashPassword, hashToken, memoryKeyValueStore, memoryRateLimiter, memorySessionStore, needsRehash, + AuthError, cleanDeviceSignals, createAuth, hashPassword, hashToken, memoryKeyValueStore, memoryRateLimiter, memorySessionStore, needsRehash, permissionsOf, roleMap, verifyPassword, assertPasswordPolicy, can, branchesFor, SYSTEM_ROLES, type AuditSink, type AuthUser, type KeyValueStore, type RateLimiter, type RoleStore, type SessionStore, type UserStore, } from "../src/index"; @@ -209,6 +209,27 @@ async function jwtFlows(label: string, stores: { sessions: SessionStore; kv: Key issued.push(e.refreshToken!); await sleep(1100); ok((await expiring.authenticate(e.token)) === null && (await expiring.authenticate((await expiring.refresh({ refreshToken: e.refreshToken! })).accessToken)) !== null, "expired access token refused; refresh brings a working one"); + // device binding: the refresh token works only on the device that signed in + const phone = { deviceId: "dev-phone-0001-abcdef", fingerprint: "fp-aaaaaaaaaaaa", clientSessionId: "tab-0001-xyz", info: { platform: "Android", screen: "412x915", "bad key": "x", note: "y".repeat(500) } }; + const f = await auth.login({ email: "asha@mgpl.in", password: "banyan-roots-7", device: phone as any }); + issued.push(f.refreshToken!); + const stored = (await auth.sessionsOf("j1")).find((x) => x.id === auth.verifyAccessToken(f.token)?.sid); + ok(stored?.device?.deviceId === phone.deviceId && stored.device.info?.platform === "Android" && !("bad key" in (stored.device.info ?? {})) && String(stored.device.info?.note).length === 200, "login stores the device signals on the session (cleaned, capped)"); + const f2 = await auth.refresh({ refreshToken: f.refreshToken!, device: { ...phone, fingerprint: "fp-bbbbbbbbbbbb" } }); + issued.push(f2.refreshToken); + ok(!!f2.accessToken && db.auditLog.some((x) => x.action === "auth.fingerprint_changed"), "same device, new fingerprint: refresh works, change audited"); + ok((await code(auth.refresh({ refreshToken: f2.refreshToken, device: { deviceId: "dev-laptop-9999-zzzzzz" } }))) === "INVALID_TOKEN" && (await auth.authenticate(f2.accessToken)) === null && db.auditLog.some((x) => x.action === "auth.device_mismatch"), "refresh from another device: refused, session ended, audited"); + const g = await auth.login({ email: "asha@mgpl.in", password: "banyan-roots-7", device: phone }); + issued.push(g.refreshToken!); + ok((await code(auth.refresh({ refreshToken: g.refreshToken! }))) === "INVALID_TOKEN", "refresh without the device id of a bound session: refused"); + const flagging = createAuth({ users: db.userStore, audit: db.audit, ...stores, deviceBinding: "flag", jwt: { secret: SECRET } }); + const h2 = await flagging.login({ email: "asha@mgpl.in", password: "banyan-roots-7", device: phone }); + issued.push(h2.refreshToken!); + const h3 = await flagging.refresh({ refreshToken: h2.refreshToken!, device: { deviceId: "dev-laptop-9999-zzzzzz" } }); + issued.push(h3.refreshToken); + ok(!!h3.accessToken, 'deviceBinding "flag": a refresh from another device works (and is audited)'); + ok(cleanDeviceSignals({ deviceId: "short", fingerprint: "xx" }) === undefined, "malformed device ids are dropped"); + let threw = false; try { createAuth({ users: db.userStore, sessions: stores.sessions, jwt: { secret: "short" } }); } catch { threw = true; } ok(threw, "JWT mode refuses short secrets and a missing kv"); diff --git a/src/auth.ts b/src/auth.ts index d25aab0..7578dc5 100644 --- a/src/auth.ts +++ b/src/auth.ts @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { jwtSigner, looksLikeJwt, type AccessClaims, type JwtOptions } from "./j import { memoryRateLimiter } from "./memory"; import { assertPasswordPolicy, hashPassword, hashToken, needsRehash, randomToken, verifyPassword, type PasswordPolicy } from "./password"; import { branchesFor, can, permissionsOf, roleMap, type Permission, type RoleAssignment, type RoleMap } from "./rbac"; -import type { AuditSink, AuthUser, KeyValueStore, OrgStore, RateLimiter, RoleStore, Session, SessionStore, UserStore } from "./stores"; +import type { AuditSink, AuthUser, DeviceSignals, KeyValueStore, OrgStore, RateLimiter, RoleStore, Session, SessionStore, UserStore } from "./stores"; export interface AuthOptions { users: UserStore; @@ -44,6 +44,12 @@ export interface AuthOptions { */ reuseGraceMs?: number; }; + /** + * What a refresh from another device does. The device is the `deviceId` the client sent at login. + * "enforce" (default): refused with INVALID_TOKEN and the session ends (audit auth.device_mismatch). + * "flag": allowed, audited. "off": not compared. A changed fingerprint is only audited (auth.fingerprint_changed). + */ + deviceBinding?: "enforce" | "flag" | "off"; } /** The signed-in user for one request. */ @@ -73,6 +79,8 @@ export interface LoginInput { orgCode?: string; ip?: string; userAgent?: string; + /** Security signals from the client (device id, fingerprint, …), stored on the session. */ + device?: DeviceSignals; } export interface LoginResult { @@ -101,6 +109,27 @@ export interface TokenPair { const publicUser = ({ passwordHash: _p, ...u }: AuthUser): PublicUser => u; const normalizeEmail = (e: string) => e.trim().toLowerCase(); +const ID_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_.:+\/=-]{8,128}$/; +/** Keeps only well-formed, size-capped device signals (clients are untrusted). */ +export function cleanDeviceSignals(d: DeviceSignals | null | undefined): DeviceSignals | undefined { + if (!d || typeof d !== "object") return undefined; + const out: DeviceSignals = {}; + for (const k of ["deviceId", "fingerprint", "clientSessionId"] as const) { + const v = d[k]; + if (typeof v === "string" && ID_RE.test(v)) out[k] = v; + } + if (d.info && typeof d.info === "object" && !Array.isArray(d.info)) { + const info: Record = {}; + for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(d.info).slice(0, 20)) { + if (!/^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]{0,31}$/.test(k)) continue; + if (typeof v === "string") info[k] = v.slice(0, 200); + else if ((typeof v === "number" && Number.isFinite(v)) || typeof v === "boolean") info[k] = v; + } + if (Object.keys(info).length) out.info = info; + } + return Object.keys(out).length ? out : undefined; +} + export type Auth = ReturnType; /** @@ -125,6 +154,7 @@ export function createAuth(o: AuthOptions) { const accessTtlMs = o.jwt?.accessTtlMs ?? 15 * 60_000; const reuseGraceMs = o.jwt?.reuseGraceMs ?? 15_000; if (jwt && !o.kv) throw new Error("createAuth: JWT mode needs `kv` (refresh tokens)"); + const deviceBinding = o.deviceBinding ?? "enforce"; const audit = async (entry: Parameters[0]) => { try { @@ -150,12 +180,12 @@ export function createAuth(o: AuthOptions) { return user ? [user] : []; } - async function startSession(user: AuthUser, ip?: string, userAgent?: string): Promise<{ token: string; session: Session }> { + async function startSession(user: AuthUser, ip?: string, userAgent?: string, device?: DeviceSignals): Promise<{ token: string; session: Session }> { const token = randomToken(); const now = Date.now(); // JWT mode: the session id is random and never handed out; the refresh token points at it through kv const id = jwt ? hashToken(randomToken()) : hashToken(token); - const session: Session = { id, userId: user.id, orgId: user.orgId, createdAt: now, lastSeenAt: now, expiresAt: now + maxAgeMs, ip, userAgent }; + const session: Session = { id, userId: user.id, orgId: user.orgId, createdAt: now, lastSeenAt: now, expiresAt: now + maxAgeMs, ip, userAgent, device: cleanDeviceSignals(device) }; await o.sessions.create(session, idleMs); if (jwt) await o.kv!.set(`refresh:${hashToken(token)}`, id, maxAgeMs); return { token, session }; @@ -243,7 +273,7 @@ export function createAuth(o: AuthOptions) { const patch: { lastLoginAt: Date; passwordHash?: string } = { lastLoginAt: new Date() }; if (needsRehash(user.passwordHash)) patch.passwordHash = await hashPassword(input.password); await o.users.update(user.id, patch); - const { token, session } = await startSession(user, input.ip, input.userAgent); + const { token, session } = await startSession(user, input.ip, input.userAgent, input.device); await audit({ orgId: user.orgId, userId: user.id, action: "auth.login", ip: input.ip }); const pub = publicUser({ ...user, lastLoginAt: patch.lastLoginAt }); if (!jwt) return { token, expiresAt: new Date(session.expiresAt), user: pub }; @@ -256,7 +286,7 @@ export function createAuth(o: AuthOptions) { * Fails with INVALID_TOKEN when the token is unknown, spent, expired, or its session or user is * gone. A spent token presented again after `reuseGraceMs` ends the whole session (it was copied). */ - async refresh(input: { refreshToken: string; ip?: string }): Promise { + async refresh(input: { refreshToken: string; ip?: string; userAgent?: string; device?: DeviceSignals }): Promise { if (!jwt) throw new Error("createAuth: refresh needs the `jwt` option"); const invalid = () => new AuthError("INVALID_TOKEN", "Sign in again"); const rt = input.refreshToken ?? ""; @@ -285,13 +315,33 @@ export function createAuth(o: AuthOptions) { await o.sessions.deleteByUser(s.userId); throw invalid(); } - await o.sessions.touch(s.id, now, idleMs); + // device binding: the refresh token only works on the device that signed in + const device = cleanDeviceSignals(input.device); + const bound = s.device?.deviceId; + let session = s; + if (deviceBinding !== "off" && bound && device?.deviceId !== bound) { + await audit({ orgId: s.orgId, userId: s.userId, action: "auth.device_mismatch", ip: input.ip, entity: "session", data: { expected: bound, got: device?.deviceId ?? null } }); + if (deviceBinding === "enforce") { + await o.sessions.delete(s.id); + throw invalid(); + } + } + if (device?.fingerprint && s.device?.fingerprint && device.fingerprint !== s.device.fingerprint) { + await audit({ orgId: s.orgId, userId: s.userId, action: "auth.fingerprint_changed", ip: input.ip, entity: "session", data: { from: s.device.fingerprint, to: device.fingerprint } }); + } + if (device && (device.fingerprint !== s.device?.fingerprint || device.clientSessionId !== s.device?.clientSessionId || input.ip !== s.ip)) { + // keep the device id from login; record the latest fingerprint, tab, info and address + session = { ...s, lastSeenAt: now, ip: input.ip ?? s.ip, userAgent: input.userAgent ?? s.userAgent, device: { ...s.device, ...device, deviceId: bound ?? device.deviceId } }; + await o.sessions.create(session, idleMs); + } else { + await o.sessions.touch(s.id, now, idleMs); + } const next = randomToken(); const ttl = Math.max(1, s.expiresAt - now); await o.kv!.set(`refresh:${hashToken(next)}`, s.id, ttl); await o.kv!.set(`refresh-used:${h}`, `${s.id}|${now}`, ttl); - const access = accessToken(s); - return { accessToken: access.token, accessExpiresAt: access.expiresAt, refreshToken: next, refreshExpiresAt: refreshExpiry(s, now), user: publicUser(user) }; + const access = accessToken(session); + return { accessToken: access.token, accessExpiresAt: access.expiresAt, refreshToken: next, refreshExpiresAt: refreshExpiry(session, now), user: publicUser(user) }; }, /** JWT mode: the claims of a valid access token, without touching storage (for workers or other services). */ diff --git a/src/index.ts b/src/index.ts index b088876..5c8c2e7 100644 --- a/src/index.ts +++ b/src/index.ts @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -export { createAuth, type Auth, type AuthContext, type AuthOptions, type LoginInput, type LoginResult, type PublicUser, type TokenPair, type Viewer } from "./auth"; +export { cleanDeviceSignals, createAuth, type Auth, type AuthContext, type AuthOptions, type LoginInput, type LoginResult, type PublicUser, type TokenPair, type Viewer } from "./auth"; export { jwtSigner, looksLikeJwt, type AccessClaims, type JwtOptions } from "./jwt"; export { AuthError, type AuthErrorCode } from "./errors"; export { assertPasswordPolicy, hashPassword, hashToken, needsRehash, randomToken, SCRYPT, verifyPassword, type PasswordPolicy } from "./password"; @@ -7,4 +7,4 @@ export { type Permission, type RoleAssignment, type RoleDefinition, type RoleMap, } from "./rbac"; export { memoryKeyValueStore, memoryRateLimiter, memorySessionStore } from "./memory"; -export type { AuditSink, AuthUser, KeyValueStore, OrgStore, RateLimiter, RoleStore, Session, SessionStore, UserStatus, UserStore } from "./stores"; +export type { AuditSink, AuthUser, DeviceSignals, KeyValueStore, OrgStore, RateLimiter, RoleStore, Session, SessionStore, UserStatus, UserStore } from "./stores"; diff --git a/src/stores.ts b/src/stores.ts index 3ea8f36..f27f216 100644 --- a/src/stores.ts +++ b/src/stores.ts @@ -53,6 +53,23 @@ export interface Session { expiresAt: number; ip?: string; userAgent?: string; + /** What the client said about its device at login (and the latest fingerprint). See DeviceSignals. */ + device?: DeviceSignals; +} + +/** + * Security signals a client sends with login and refresh. All optional, all chosen by the client SDK; + * they are stored on the session (cleaned, size-capped) and compared on refresh. + */ +export interface DeviceSignals { + /** A random id the client created once and keeps (per browser profile or app install). Not derived from the device. */ + deviceId?: string; + /** A hash of stable device attributes, computed on the client. It changes with browser updates, so a change is only logged. */ + fingerprint?: string; + /** A random id per tab or app run. */ + clientSessionId?: string; + /** Descriptive values (platform, language, timezone, screen, …): at most 20 keys, short values. */ + info?: Record; } export interface SessionStore {