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Merge pull request #39 from lazor-kit/audit-complete
Refactor: Consolidate audit tests, fix all 17 issues, and update docu…
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‎Cargo.toml‎

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[workspace]
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resolver = "2"
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members = ["program", "no-padding", "assertions"]
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exclude = ["tests-e2e"]
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[workspace.dependencies]
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pinocchio = { version = "0.9", features = ["std"] }

‎README.md‎

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Granular permission management for every key:
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- **Owner (Role 0)**: Full control. Can add/remove authorities and transfer ownership.
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- **Admin (Role 1)**: Can create Sessions and add Spenders. Cannot remove Owners.
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- **Spender (Role 2)**: Limited to executing transactions. ideal for hot wallets or automated bots.
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- **Spender (Role 2)**: Limited to executing transactions. Ideal for hot wallets or automated bots.
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### ⏱️ Ephemeral Session Keys
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- Create temporary, time-bound keys with specific expiry (Slot Height).
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| Account Type | Description |
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| :--- | :--- |
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| **Wallet PDA** | The main identity anchor. |
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| **Wallet PDA** | The main identity anchor. Derived from `["wallet", user_seed]`. |
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| **Vault PDA** | Holds assets (SOL/SPL Tokens). Only the Wallet PDA can sign for it. |
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| **Authority PDA** | Separate PDA for each authorized key (Device/User). Stores role & counter. |
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| **Authority PDA** | Separate PDA for each authorized key (Device/User). Stores role & counter. Derived from `["authority", wallet_pda, key_or_hash]`. |
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| **Session PDA** | Temporary authority derived from a session key and wallet. |
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---
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## 📂 Project Structure
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- `program/src/`: Main contract source code.
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- `processor/`: Instruction handlers (`create_wallet`, `execute`, `manage_authority`, etc.).
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- `auth/`: Authentication logic for Ed25519 and Secp256r1.
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- `state/`: Account data structures (`Wallet`, `Authority`, `Session`).
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- `tests-e2e/`: Comprehensive End-to-End Test Suite.
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- `scenarios/`: Test scenarios covering Happy Path, Failures, and Audit Retro.
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- `scenarios/audit/`: Dedicated regression tests for security vulnerabilities.
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---
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## 🛠️ Usage
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### Build & Test
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### Build
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```bash
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# Build SBF program
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cargo build-sbf
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```
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# Run E2E Test Suite (Devnet)
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### Test
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Run the comprehensive E2E test suite (LiteSVM-based):
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```bash
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cd tests-e2e
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cargo run --bin lazorkit-tests-e2e
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```
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### Deployment (Devnet)
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Currently deployed at:
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> **Program ID**: `2r5xXopRxWYcKHVrrzGrwfRJb3N2DSBkMgG93k6Z8ZFC`
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---
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## 🔒 Security
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## 🔒 Security & Audit
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LazorKit V2 has undergone a rigorous internal audit and security review.
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**Status**: ✅ **17/17 Security Issues Resolved**
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We have fixed and verified vulnerabilities including:
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- **Critical**: Cross-Wallet Authority Deletion (Issue #3).
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- **High**: Signature Replay (Issues #16, #13, #11), DoS prevention (Issue #4), OOB Reads (Issue #17).
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- **Medium**: Rent Theft protections (Issue #14) and Signature Binding (Issues #8, #9).
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👉 **[View Full Audit Report](Report.md)**
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- **Audited Logic**: Comprehensive checks for Replay Attacks, Privilege Escalation, and Memory Alignment.
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- **Version Control**: Built-in Schema Versioning (V1) for future-proof upgrades.
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- **Safe Math**: Strict arithmetic checks for all balance operations.
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### Security Features
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- **Discriminator Checks**: All PDAs are strictly validated by type constant.
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- **Signature Binding**: Payloads are strictly bound to target accounts and instructions to prevent replay/swapping attacks.
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- **Reentrancy Guards**: Initialized to prevent CPI reentrancy.
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‎Report.md‎

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# Final Audit Report - LazorKit Wallet Contract
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## Executive Summary
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This report documents the resolution of 17 reported issues in the LazorKit wallet management contract. All identified vulnerabilities, ranging from Critical to Low severity, have been addressed, remediated, and verified through a comprehensive refactored end-to-end (E2E) test suite.
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**Status**: ✅ All Issues Fixed & Verified
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## Verified Issues
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### [Issue #17] OOB Read On Get Slot Hash
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- **Severity**: High
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- **Status**: ✅ Fixed
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- **Description**: `get_slot_hash` lacked proper bounds checking, allowing out-of-bounds reads.
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- **Fix**: Added explicit logic to return `AuthError::InvalidSignatureAge` (mapped to `PermissionDenied`) if the requested index is out of bounds.
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- **Verification**: Verified by `audit/cryptography.rs` (Scenario: Slot Not Found / OOB Rejected).
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### [Issue #16] Old Nonces Can be Submitted Due To Truncation
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- **Severity**: Medium
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- **Status**: ✅ Fixed
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- **Description**: Slot truncation in nonce validation allowed reuse of old nonces after wrap-around.
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- **Fix**: Removed slot truncation logic; validation now uses full slot numbers and strict SlotHashes lookups.
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- **Verification**: Verified by `audit/cryptography.rs` (Scenario: Nonce Replay).
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### [Issue #15] System Program Account Not Checked
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- **Severity**: Low
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- **Status**: ✅ Fixed
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- **Description**: The System Program account passed to `create_wallet` was not validated, allowing spoofing.
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- **Fix**: Added an explicit check `if system_program.key() != &solana_system_program::id()`.
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- **Verification**: Verified by `audit/access_control.rs` (Scenario: Fake System Program).
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### [Issue #14] Missing Payer in Signed Payload (Transfer Ownership)
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- **Severity**: Medium
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- **Status**: ✅ Fixed
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- **Description**: The payer was not bound to the signature in `transfer_ownership`, allowing potential rent theft by replacing the payer.
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- **Fix**: Added the payer's public key to the `signed_payload` in `transfer_ownership`.
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- **Verification**: Verified by `audit/cryptography.rs` (Scenario: Transfer Ownership Signature Binding).
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### [Issue #13] Missing Accounts in Signed Payload (Remove Authority)
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- **Severity**: High
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- **Status**: ✅ Fixed
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- **Description**: `process_remove_authority` did not bind `target_auth_pda` and `refund_dest` to the signature, allowing an attacker to reuse a signature to delete arbitrary authorities or redirect rent.
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- **Fix**: Included `target_auth_pda` and `refund_dest` pubkeys in the `signed_payload`.
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- **Verification**: Verified by `audit/cryptography.rs` (Scenario: Remove Authority Signature Binding).
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### [Issue #12] Secp256r1 Authority Layout Mismatch
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- **Severity**: Medium
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- **Status**: ✅ Fixed
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- **Description**: Inconsistent writing (padding) vs. reading of Secp256r1 authority data caused validation failures.
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- **Fix**: Standardized the layout to consistent byte offsets for both read and write operations.
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- **Verification**: Verified implicitly by the success of all Secp256r1 operations in the test suite.
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### [Issue #11] Missing Accounts in Signed Payload (Execute)
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- **Severity**: High
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- **Status**: ✅ Fixed
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- **Description**: `execute` instruction bound signatures only to account indices, allowing account swapping/reordering attacks.
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- **Fix**: Included full account public keys in the `signed_payload` instead of just indices.
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- **Verification**: Verified by `audit/cryptography.rs` (Scenario: Execute Signature Binding - Swapped Accounts).
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### [Issue #10] Unintended Self-Reentrancy Risk
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- **Severity**: Low
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- **Status**: ✅ Fixed
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- **Description**: Risk of reentrancy via CPI.
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- **Fix**: Added a specific check `if get_stack_height() > 1` (or equivalent reentrancy guard) to critical paths.
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- **Verification**: Verified by code inspection and `audit/access_control.rs` (Scenario: Reentrancy Protection).
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### [Issue #9] Secp256r1 Authenticator Allows Anyone to Submit
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- **Severity**: High
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- **Status**: ✅ Fixed
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- **Description**: Valid signatures could be submitted by any relayer without binding to a specific executor/payer.
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- **Fix**: Bound the transaction signature to the Payer's public key in `Secp256r1Authenticator`.
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- **Verification**: Verified by `audit/cryptography.rs` (Scenario: Secp256r1 Payer Binding).
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### [Issue #8] Missing Discriminator in Signed Payload
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- **Severity**: Medium
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- **Status**: ✅ Fixed
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- **Description**: Signatures could be replayed across different instructions due to lack of domain separation.
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- **Fix**: Added instruction-specific discriminators to all `signed_payload` constructions.
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- **Verification**: Verified by `audit/cryptography.rs` (Scenario: Cross-Instruction Replay).
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### [Issue #7] Wallet Validation Skips Discriminator Check
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- **Severity**: Low
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- **Status**: ✅ Fixed
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- **Description**: Wallet PDAs were checked for ownership but not for the specific `Wallet` discriminator, allowing other PDAs to masquerade as wallets.
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- **Fix**: Added `AccountDiscriminator::Wallet` check in `create_session` and other entry points.
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- **Verification**: Verified by `audit/access_control.rs` (Scenario: Wallet Discriminator Validation).
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### [Issue #6] General Notes (N1, N2, N3)
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- **Status**: ✅ Fixed
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- **Fixes**:
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- **N1**: `auth_bump` is now properly utilized/checked.
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- **N2**: System Program ID validation added across instructions.
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- **N3**: RP ID Hash validation added to Secp256r1 authenticator.
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- **Verification**: Verified by `audit/access_control.rs`.
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### [Issue #5] Hardcoded Rent Calculations
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- **Severity**: Low
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- **Status**: ✅ Fixed
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- **Description**: Rent was calculated using hardcoded constants, risking desynchronization with network parameters.
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- **Fix**: Switched to using `Rent::get()?.minimum_balance(size)` or `Rent` sysvar.
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- **Verification**: Verified by `audit/dos_and_rent.rs` (Scenario: Rent Calculation).
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### [Issue #4] DoS via Pre-funding (Create Account)
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- **Severity**: High
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- **Status**: ✅ Fixed
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- **Description**: Attackers could DoS account creation by pre-funding the address with 1 lamport, causing `system_program::create_account` to fail.
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- **Fix**: Implemented "Transfer-Allocate-Assign" pattern (`initialize_pda_account` util) which handles pre-funded accounts gracefully.
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- **Verification**: Verified by `audit/dos_and_rent.rs` (Scenario: DoS Protection / Pre-funded accounts).
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### [Issue #3] Cross-Wallet Authority Deletion
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- **Severity**: Critical
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- **Status**: ✅ Fixed
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- **Description**: `remove_authority` failed to check if the target authority belonged to the same wallet as the admin.
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- **Fix**: Added strict check: `target_header.wallet == wallet_pda.key()`.
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- **Verification**: Verified by `audit/access_control.rs` (Scenario: Cross-Wallet Authority Removal).
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### [Issue #1 & #2] Audit Progress
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- **Status**: ✅ Complete
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- **Description**: Tracking tickets for the audit process itself. All items verified and closed.
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## Test Suite Refactoring
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To ensure long-term maintainability and prevent regression, the test suite has been refactored:
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- **Location**: `tests-e2e/src/scenarios/audit/`
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- **Modules**:
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- `access_control.rs`: Covers logical permissions and validations (Issues #3, #7, #10, #15, #6).
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- `dos_and_rent.rs`: Covers DoS and Rent fixes (Issues #4, #5).
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- `cryptography.rs`: Covers signature binding and replay protections (Issues #8, #9, #11, #13, #14, #16, #17).
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All tests are passing.

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