From 1a5bde5992fd44a19ba756b58e32c3160a034702 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: saadnu-aws Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 03:27:09 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] feat(s3-access-denied-resolver): Add S3 AccessDenied diagnostic skill Add a read-only skill that walks the ten layers that can deny an S3 request, names the denying layer and statement, and proposes the smallest fix as a diff for human review. --- skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/CHANGELOG.md | 39 + skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/README.md | 128 + skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/SKILL.md | 89 + .../evals/best-practices/v4/benchmark.json | 307 +++ .../best-practices-tests-results.json | 164 ++ .../best-practices-tests-results.json | 164 ++ .../best-practices-tests-results.json | 164 ++ .../evals/eval_queries.json | 8 + .../evals/evals.json | 104 + .../evals/functional/v3/benchmark.json | 2106 +++++++++++++++++ .../evals/functional/v3/evals.json | 104 + .../with_skill/functional-tests-results.json | 74 + .../functional-tests-results.json | 69 + 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create mode 100644 skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json create mode 100644 skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json create mode 100644 skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/structure/structure-tests-results-v6.json create mode 100644 skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/references/denial-message-hints.md create mode 100644 skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/references/layers.md diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/CHANGELOG.md b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/CHANGELOG.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d4d5a3788 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/CHANGELOG.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +# Changelog + +## 1.0.0 + +- Initial release. Read-only diagnosis of Amazon S3 403 AccessDenied. Walks the + ten layers that can deny a request (SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, Block Public + Access, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, permissions + boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, KMS key policy), names the + denying layer and statement, and proposes a policy diff for human review. +- Assigns each layer one verdict from a closed set (`DENIED_BY`, + `WOULD_ALSO_DENY`, `ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE`, `CANNOT_DETERMINE`, + `NOT_APPLICABLE`). There is no plain "allowed" verdict. +- Reads policy documents directly and uses IAM policy simulation only to + corroborate, because simulation does not evaluate VPC endpoint or session + policies. +- Separates same-account rules (an allow in the identity or the resource-based + policy is enough) from cross-account rules (both are required). +- Reads object metadata only and skips `HeadObject` unless it is already + permitted, because `s3:GetObject` also allows reading object contents. +- Checks causes outside the ten layers when every layer is clean: Requester + Pays, Object Lock, SSE-C blocking and access point network origin. +- Denial-message wording in `references/denial-message-hints.md` comes from the + Amazon S3 User Guide topic on 403 errors. KMS error wording is not documented + there and is not matched as fixed text. +- Functional scenarios plant one fault each: + - 01 bucket policy denies `s3:GetObject` to all principals except one named + role. + - 02 key policy denies `kms:Decrypt` to all principals except one named role, + while the reader's identity policy allows it. + - 03 permissions boundary allows only `s3:ListBucket`. + - 04 identity policy grants `s3:GetObject` on the bucket ARN instead of + `bucket/*`. + - 05 gateway endpoint policy allows only a different bucket, reached from a + private-subnet instance with SSM access. +- Not covered: an SCP/RCP scenario (needs an Organizations test account), + Block Public Access, access point, session policy and ACL scenarios. +- Falls back to AWS Config, the owning CloudFormation stack, CloudTrail and an + operator-supplied paste when the Agent Space refuses bucket-level S3 reads, and + names the source each verdict rests on. diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/README.md b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/README.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a1e73db6a --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +# S3 Access Denied Resolver + +Read-only DevOps Agent skill that diagnoses an Amazon S3 403 AccessDenied. It +walks the ten layers that can deny an S3 request (SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, +Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, +permissions boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, KMS key policy), +names the layer and statement that denied the request, and proposes the +smallest fix as a diff for the operator to review. + +Scope: S3 general purpose buckets. It is not for 503 SlowDown, CloudFront 403s, +Lake Formation access, or Bedrock/SageMaker role denials. + +Taskei: V2468933301. + +> **Non-production disclaimer.** Provided for demonstration and evaluation. +> Read-only: it never changes a bucket policy, key policy, role, endpoint or +> any other resource. Apply any proposed change through your own +> change-management and IaC process. Not an AWS service; no warranty. + +## Prerequisites + +- An AWS DevOps Agent Agent Space with the target account associated. +- The read-only IAM actions below. The Agent Space role can use only actions + that both its own policies and the DevOps Agent permission guardrail allow. + +**Covered by `AIDevOpsAgentAccessPolicy`** (checked against policy version v16): + +| Service | IAM actions | +|---|---| +| S3 | `s3:GetBucketPolicy`, `s3:GetBucketOwnershipControls`, `s3:GetBucketPublicAccessBlock`, `s3:GetEncryptionConfiguration`, `s3:GetBucketAcl`, `s3:GetAccessPointPolicy` | +| IAM | `iam:GetRole`, `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies`, `iam:ListRolePolicies`, `iam:GetRolePolicy`, `iam:GetPolicyVersion` | +| KMS | `kms:GetKeyPolicy`, `kms:ListGrants` | +| EC2 | `ec2:DescribeVpcEndpoints` (through `ec2:Describe*`) | +| CloudTrail | `cloudtrail:LookupEvents` | +| Organizations (optional) | `organizations:ListPoliciesForTarget`, `organizations:DescribePolicy` (through `organizations:List*` and `Describe*`); only useful from the management or a delegated-administrator account | + +**Not covered. Add as an inline policy on the Agent Space role.** The guardrail +allows all of them through `ReadOnlyAccess`: + +| IAM action | Used for | +|---|---| +| `s3:GetAccountPublicAccessBlock` | Account-level Block Public Access (layer 3) | +| `s3:GetObjectAcl` | Object ACL and owner (layer 9) | +| `iam:SimulatePrincipalPolicy` | Corroborating the policy read; never the only evidence | +| `s3:GetObject` | `HeadObject` metadata for the object's encryption key. Optional, see the warning below | + +```json +{ + "Version": "2012-10-17", + "Statement": [ + { + "Effect": "Allow", + "Action": [ + "s3:GetAccountPublicAccessBlock", + "s3:GetObjectAcl", + "iam:SimulatePrincipalPolicy" + ], + "Resource": "*" + } + ] +} +``` + +Without these, the skill reports the affected layer as `CANNOT_DETERMINE` and +says which access would resolve it. It still diagnoses layers 1 to 8. + +> **Agent Space tool limit.** In testing, the Agent Space refused direct bucket-level +> S3 reads (`GetBucketPolicy`, `GetBucketEncryption`, `GetBucketOwnershipControls`, +> `GetPublicAccessBlock`, `ListBuckets`) with "blocked by policy and was not +> executed", in many runs, including after adding the actions above. Added IAM permissions +> did not reliably lift it. The skill then falls back to AWS Config, the owning CloudFormation +> stack and CloudTrail, and otherwise reports `CANNOT_DETERMINE`. For those +> fallbacks, add the read actions below. + +| IAM action | Used for | +|---|---| +| `config:GetResourceConfigHistory`, `config:BatchGetResourceConfig` | Bucket policy, Block Public Access, encryption and ACL from the last recorded configuration, where Config records S3 buckets | +| `cloudformation:GetTemplate`, `cloudformation:DescribeStackResources` | The policy a stack deployed, for stack-managed buckets | + +> **`s3:GetObject` can read object contents.** `HeadObject` needs the +> `s3:GetObject` permission, which also allows reading the object body. The +> skill reads metadata only, but the permission does not enforce that. Do not +> grant it by default. If you grant it, scope `Resource` to the buckets under +> investigation. Without it, the skill uses the bucket's default encryption for +> layer 10 and says the object-level key was not checked. + +IAM action names differ from API names in a few places: +`GetBucketEncryption` needs `s3:GetEncryptionConfiguration`, +`GetPublicAccessBlock` needs `s3:GetBucketPublicAccessBlock` (bucket) or +`s3:GetAccountPublicAccessBlock` (account, through S3 Control), and +`HeadObject` needs `s3:GetObject`. + +## Setup + +Add the `s3-access-denied-resolver` folder to your Agent Space as a skill. It +targets the `CHAT` and `INCIDENT_RCA` agent types. + +## Sample prompts + +- "GetObject on my-bucket/data.csv returns 403 AccessDenied from my Lambda. Which layer denies it?" +- "A role in another account cannot read objects from our bucket even though we added it to the bucket policy." +- "EC2 in a private subnet gets 403 on S3 through the gateway endpoint. Why?" + +## Tested scenarios + +The functional evals plant one fault each in a test account (a bucket, a reader +role and the object `test/hello.txt`) and ask the agent why the read fails: + +| Planted fault | Expected verdict | +|---|---| +| Bucket policy denies `s3:GetObject` to all principals except one named role | Layer 4 `DENIED_BY` | +| Key policy denies `kms:Decrypt` to all principals except one named role; the reader's identity policy allows it | Layer 10 `DENIED_BY` | +| Permissions boundary allows only `s3:ListBucket` | Layer 7 `DENIED_BY` | +| Identity policy grants `s3:GetObject` on the bucket ARN, not `bucket/*` | Layer 6 `DENIED_BY` | +| Gateway endpoint policy allows only a different bucket, read from a private-subnet instance | Layer 2 `DENIED_BY` | + +Not covered: an SCP/RCP scenario (needs an Organizations test account), and +Block Public Access, access point, session policy and ACL scenarios. + +## Evaluation + +`evals/` holds the `skill-eval` evals. The functional cases run one prompt per +scenario above, one prompt that asks the skill +to apply the fix itself, and four prompts it should not trigger on. + +## Owner + +saadnu-aws diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/SKILL.md b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..303939c9f --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +--- +name: s3-access-denied-resolver +description: >- + Diagnose an Amazon S3 403 AccessDenied. Use this skill whenever an S3 request + fails with AccessDenied or 403 Forbidden: GetObject, PutObject, ListBucket, + HeadObject or CopyObject calls, messages such as "is not authorized to + perform: s3:" or "explicit deny in a resource-based policy", a kms:Decrypt + denial on an SSE-KMS object, a cross-account bucket that cannot be read, or a + private-subnet instance that gets 403 through an S3 gateway endpoint. Walks + the ten layers that can deny an S3 request (SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, + Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, + permissions boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, KMS key policy), + names the denying layer and statement, and proposes the smallest fix for human + review. Not for 503 SlowDown, replication or lifecycle issues, CloudFront + 403s, Lake Formation access, Bedrock or SageMaker role denials, or a + least-privilege review with no observed failure. Read-only. +metadata: + author: saadnu-aws + version: "1.0.0" + summary: "Read-only root-cause diagnosis for S3 403 AccessDenied: walks ten authorization layers, names the denying layer and statement, and proposes a fix for human review." + aws-devops-agent-skills.agent-types: "CHAT, INCIDENT_RCA" + aws-devops-agent-skills.aws-services: "Amazon S3, AWS IAM, Amazon VPC, AWS CloudTrail, AWS Config" + aws-devops-agent-skills.technical-domains: "Storage, Security" +--- + +# S3 Access Denied Resolver + +Find out why an S3 request was denied. Walk the S3 authorization layers, name +the layer that denied the request, and propose a scoped fix for human review. +Read-only throughout. Never apply a policy change. + +## Checklist + +- [ ] **Step 1 - Classify:** confirm an observed S3 403/AccessDenied (not throttling, not CloudFront, not Lake Formation). Stop otherwise. +- [ ] **Step 2 - Pin the request:** principal ARN, action, bucket, key, request path (internet, gateway endpoint, interface endpoint, access point), and whether caller and bucket are in different accounts. +- [ ] **Step 3 - Read the denial:** if a CloudTrail event or error message exists, read the policy-type hint in it first (see [references/denial-message-hints.md](references/denial-message-hints.md); load it only when a message or CloudTrail `errorMessage` exists); it narrows the search. +- [ ] **Step 4 - Collect evidence, policy reads first:** read each layer's document directly. Use `SimulatePrincipalPolicy` only as corroboration. If a read is refused as "blocked by policy", do not retry it; load [references/layers.md](references/layers.md#when-a-direct-read-is-blocked) for the fallback sources. +- [ ] **Step 5 - Walk the layers:** evaluate all ten layers; do not stop at the first one that passes. +- [ ] **Step 6 - Assign verdicts** from the closed set below. +- [ ] **Step 7 - Propose a fix:** the smallest change at the denying layer, as a diff. Label any later blockers. +- [ ] **Step 8 - Validate before presenting:** confirm each `DENIED_BY` verdict rests on a policy statement you read, not on an assumption or a simulation result alone; confirm the proposed diff touches only the denying layer and does not widen access beyond the failing request; confirm every layer you could not read is `CANNOT_DETERMINE`. +- [ ] **Step 9 - Deliver the report** in the format below. + +## The ten layers + +S3 evaluates every layer that applies to the request. Any explicit deny wins, and the request also needs an allow. The layers, outermost first: 1 SCP/RCP, 2 VPC endpoint policy, 3 Block Public Access, 4 bucket policy, 5 access point policy, 6 identity policy, 7 permissions boundary, 8 session policy, 9 Object Ownership/ACLs, 10 KMS key policy and grants. + +Load [references/layers.md](references/layers.md#the-ten-layers) at Step 4 for the API call that reads each layer and its typical denial. Load [references/layers.md](references/layers.md#account-rules) at Step 6, before assigning verdicts, for the same-account and cross-account allow rules. Load [references/layers.md](references/layers.md#other-causes-outside-the-ten-layers) only when every layer comes back clean. + +## Verdicts (closed set) + +- `DENIED_BY` - this layer denies the request. Name one root-cause layer: the one the denial message names, otherwise the first denying layer in table order. +- `WOULD_ALSO_DENY` - another layer that denies, or would still deny once the root cause is fixed. +- `ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE` - the document read allows the request, but conditions or context could not be fully checked. +- `CANNOT_DETERMINE` - the layer could not be read (missing permission, other account). State what is needed. +- `NOT_APPLICABLE` - the layer does not apply (for example, no endpoint in the path, SSE-S3 encryption). + +There is no plain "allowed" verdict. + +## Report format + +1. **Root cause** - one sentence naming the layer and the statement (Sid or policy name). +2. **Layer table** - all ten layers with verdict and one-line evidence. +3. **Proposed fix** - JSON diff for the denying layer only, with a note that it is for human review. +4. **Subsequent blockers** - any `WOULD_ALSO_DENY` layers and their fixes. +5. **Could not check** - every `CANNOT_DETERMINE` layer and what access would resolve it. + +## Gotchas + +- A "blocked by policy" refusal on an S3 read is a platform limit, not a finding about the bucket. Use the fallback sources, state which one you used, and never infer a layer's content from the refusal. +- `SimulatePrincipalPolicy` ignores VPC endpoint policies and session policies and only partly evaluates SCPs and RCPs. A simulation result of "allowed" is never a verdict on its own. +- A cross-account caller outside the organization gets a bare "Access Denied" with no policy type, so the message cannot narrow the search. Walk every layer. +- A missing allow in the identity policy is not a finding when the bucket policy allows a same-account caller, and the reverse. Check both before flagging. +- A resource ARN of `arn:aws:s3:::bucket` covers bucket-level actions such as `ListBucket` only. Object actions need `arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*`. +- A KMS key policy that allows only the account root does not by itself give the role `kms:Decrypt`. The role's identity policy must also allow it. +- Fixing the root-cause layer often exposes the next denial (for example, the key policy after the bucket policy). Report those as `WOULD_ALSO_DENY` up front. + +## Output discipline + +Do not narrate API calls or paste raw policy documents. Speak only when starting, +asking a question, or delivering the report. + +## Safety + +Read-only. Never call `PutBucketPolicy`, `PutPublicAccessBlock`, `PutKeyPolicy`, +`PutRolePolicy`, or any other write API. Read object metadata only: never read +object contents, and skip `HeadObject` when it is not already permitted. Redact +account IDs and ARNs from example output when the user asks for a shareable +version. diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/best-practices/v4/benchmark.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/best-practices/v4/benchmark.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9447538a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/best-practices/v4/benchmark.json @@ -0,0 +1,307 @@ +{ + "timestamp": "2026-11-22T09:28:30Z", + "version": "v4", + "model": "us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5", + "iterations": 3, + "avg_confidence": "high", + "consistency": { + "consistency_score": 100, + "reports": [ + { + "iteration": 1, + "result": "passed", + "score": 100, + "total": 17, + "passed": 14, + "failed": 0, + "skipped": 3, + "warning": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + { + "iteration": 2, + "result": "passed", + "score": 100, + "total": 17, + "passed": 14, + "failed": 0, + "skipped": 3, + "warning": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + { + "iteration": 3, + "result": "passed", + "score": 100, + "total": 17, + "passed": 14, + "failed": 0, + "skipped": 3, + "warning": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + } + ], + "per_test": [ + { + "id": "BP-01", + "name": "Effective description", + "results": [ + "passed", + "passed", + "passed" + ], + "confidences": [ + "high", + "high", + "high" + ], + "avg_confidence": "high", + "consistent": true + }, + { + "id": "BP-02", + "name": "Verbosity and conciseness", + "results": [ + "passed", + "passed", + "passed" + ], + "confidences": [ + "high", + "high", + "high" + ], + "avg_confidence": "high", + "consistent": true + }, + { + "id": "BP-03", + "name": "Detailed reference materials must not be in body", + "results": [ + "passed", + "passed", + "passed" + ], + "confidences": [ + "medium", + "high", + "high" + ], + "avg_confidence": "high", + "consistent": true + }, + { + "id": "BP-04", + "name": "Reference files must be linked", + "results": [ + "passed", + "passed", + "passed" + ], + "confidences": [ + "high", + "high", + "high" + ], + "avg_confidence": "high", + "consistent": true + }, + { + "id": "BP-05", + "name": "Reference links must specify when to load", + "results": [ + "passed", + "passed", + "passed" + ], + "confidences": [ + "high", + "high", + "high" + ], + "avg_confidence": "high", + "consistent": true + }, + { + "id": "BP-06", + "name": "Reference path format", + "results": [ + "passed", + "passed", + "passed" + ], + "confidences": [ + "high", + "high", + "high" + ], + "avg_confidence": "high", + "consistent": true + }, + { + "id": "BP-07", + "name": "Prescription vs description", + "results": [ + "passed", + "passed", + "passed" + ], + "confidences": [ + "medium", + "medium", + "medium" + ], + "avg_confidence": "medium", + "consistent": true + }, + { + "id": "BP-08", + "name": "Defaults, not menus", + "results": [ + "passed", + "passed", + "passed" + ], + "confidences": [ + "high", + "medium", + "medium" + ], + "avg_confidence": "medium", + "consistent": true + }, + { + "id": "BP-09", + "name": "Favor procedures over declarations", + "results": [ + "passed", + "passed", + "passed" + ], + "confidences": [ + "high", + "high", + "high" + ], + "avg_confidence": "high", + "consistent": true + }, + { + "id": "BP-10", + "name": "Gotchas section", + "results": [ + "passed", + "passed", + "passed" + ], + "confidences": [ + "high", + "high", + "high" + ], + "avg_confidence": "high", + "consistent": true + }, + { + "id": "BP-11", + "name": "Templates and outputs missing", + "results": [ + "passed", + "passed", + "passed" + ], + "confidences": [ + "high", + "high", + "high" + ], + "avg_confidence": "high", + "consistent": true + }, + { + "id": "BP-12", + "name": "Templates and outputs must not be in body", + "results": [ + "passed", + "passed", + "passed" + ], + "confidences": [ + "high", + "high", + "high" + ], + "avg_confidence": "high", + "consistent": true + }, + { + "id": "BP-13", + "name": "Asset files must be linked", + "results": [ + "skipped", + "skipped", + "skipped" + ], + "consistent": true + }, + { + "id": "BP-14", + "name": "Asset links must specify when to load", + "results": [ + "skipped", + "skipped", + "skipped" + ], + "consistent": true + }, + { + "id": "BP-15", + "name": "Asset path format", + "results": [ + "skipped", + "skipped", + "skipped" + ], + "consistent": true + }, + { + "id": "BP-16", + "name": "Step-by-step guidance", + "results": [ + "passed", + "passed", + "passed" + ], + "confidences": [ + "high", + "high", + "high" + ], + "avg_confidence": "high", + "consistent": true + }, + { + "id": "BP-17", + "name": "Validation loops", + "results": [ + "passed", + "passed", + "passed" + ], + "confidences": [ + "high", + "high", + "high" + ], + "avg_confidence": "high", + "consistent": true + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/best-practices/v4/iteration-1/best-practices-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/best-practices/v4/iteration-1/best-practices-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..00d80455f --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/best-practices/v4/iteration-1/best-practices-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +{ + "version": "v4", + "iteration": 1, + "timestamp": "2026-11-22T09:28:29Z", + "test_type": "best-practices", + "passing_score": 100, + "score": 100, + "result": "passed", + "summary": { + "total": 17, + "passed": 14, + "failed": 0, + "skipped": 3, + "warning": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "tests": [ + { + "id": "BP-01", + "name": "Effective description", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The description uses imperative phrasing ('Use this skill whenever...'), focuses on triggering contexts (error messages, call types, scenarios) rather than internal implementation, is pushy by explicitly listing many trigger cases including negative scope ('Not for 503 SlowDown, replication...'), and remains a concise paragraph.", + "evidence": "Use this skill whenever an S3 request fails with AccessDenied or 403 Forbidden: GetObject, PutObject, ListBucket, HeadObject or CopyObject calls... Not for 503 SlowDown, replication or lifecycle issues, CloudFront 403s, Lake Formation access, Bedrock or SageMaker role denials, or a least-privilege review with no observed failure.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/optimizing-descriptions" + }, + { + "id": "BP-02", + "name": "Verbosity and conciseness", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The body jumps straight into domain-specific procedures (ten layers, verdicts, gotchas) without explaining general concepts like what S3 or IAM is. It is concise and dense with non-obvious, skill-specific content.", + "evidence": "The ten layers... S3 evaluates every layer that applies to the request. Any explicit deny wins, and the request also needs an allow.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#add-what-the-agent-lacks-omit-what-it-knows" + }, + { + "id": "BP-03", + "name": "Detailed reference materials must not be in body", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Detailed reference material (the per-layer API calls, denial message hints, fallback sources) is deferred to references/ files and only summarized in the body. No large reference blocks or embedded lookup tables exist in the body itself.", + "evidence": "Load [references/layers.md](references/layers.md#the-ten-layers) at Step 4 for the API call that reads each layer and its typical denial.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#structure-large-skills-with-progressive-disclosure" + }, + { + "id": "BP-04", + "name": "Reference files must be linked", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Both reference files (denial-message-hints.md and layers.md) have explicit markdown links in the body.", + "evidence": "[references/denial-message-hints.md](references/denial-message-hints.md)) and [references/layers.md](references/layers.md#the-ten-layers)" + }, + { + "id": "BP-05", + "name": "Reference links must specify when to load", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Each reference link specifies the condition/timing for loading it, e.g., only when a message exists, at Step 4, at Step 6, or only when all layers are clean.", + "evidence": "load it only when a message or CloudTrail `errorMessage` exists... Load [references/layers.md](references/layers.md#other-causes-outside-the-ten-layers) only when every layer comes back clean.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#structure-large-skills-with-progressive-disclosure" + }, + { + "id": "BP-06", + "name": "Reference path format", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All reference links use relative paths from the skill root with anchor fragments, no absolute paths or traversals.", + "evidence": "[references/layers.md](references/layers.md#when-a-direct-read-is-blocked)", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/specification#file-references" + }, + { + "id": "BP-07", + "name": "Prescription vs description", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Fragile operations (read-only policy, verdict assignment, validation) are prescriptive with exact rules, while flexible parts like evidence collection order and fix proposal explain rationale rather than rigid steps.", + "evidence": "Read-only. Never call `PutBucketPolicy`, `PutPublicAccessBlock`, `PutKeyPolicy`, `PutRolePolicy`, or any other write API.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#match-specificity-to-fragility" + }, + { + "id": "BP-08", + "name": "Defaults, not menus", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The skill prescribes a clear default (read policy documents directly) with SimulatePrincipalPolicy as secondary corroboration, not presented as equal alternatives.", + "evidence": "Collect evidence, policy reads first: read each layer's document directly. Use `SimulatePrincipalPolicy` only as corroboration.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#provide-defaults-not-menus" + }, + { + "id": "BP-09", + "name": "Favor procedures over declarations", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The skill teaches a generalizable diagnostic procedure (classify, pin request, walk layers, assign verdicts, propose fix) applicable to any S3 403 case, not a one-off instance.", + "evidence": "Step 5 - Walk the layers: evaluate all ten layers; do not stop at the first one that passes.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#favor-procedures-over-declarations" + }, + { + "id": "BP-10", + "name": "Gotchas section", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The skill includes a detailed Gotchas section with concrete, specific corrections relevant to the S3 authorization domain.", + "evidence": "A \"blocked by policy\" refusal on an S3 read is a platform limit, not a finding about the bucket... `SimulatePrincipalPolicy` ignores VPC endpoint policies and session policies...", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#gotchas-sections" + }, + { + "id": "BP-11", + "name": "Templates and outputs missing", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The skill produces a structured report and provides an explicit output template/format section in the body itself.", + "evidence": "## Report format\n1. **Root cause**... 2. **Layer table**... 3. **Proposed fix**...", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#templates-for-output-format" + }, + { + "id": "BP-12", + "name": "Templates and outputs must not be in body", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The inline report format template is short (5 bullet items, well under 20 lines) and appropriate to keep inline.", + "evidence": "## Report format\n1. **Root cause** - one sentence naming the layer and the statement (Sid or policy name).\n2. **Layer table** - all ten layers with verdict and one-line evidence.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#templates-for-output-format" + }, + { + "id": "BP-13", + "name": "Asset files must be linked", + "result": "skipped", + "message": "No files in assets/, so this test does not apply" + }, + { + "id": "BP-14", + "name": "Asset links must specify when to load", + "result": "skipped", + "message": "No files in assets/, so this test does not apply" + }, + { + "id": "BP-15", + "name": "Asset path format", + "result": "skipped", + "message": "No files in assets/, so this test does not apply" + }, + { + "id": "BP-16", + "name": "Step-by-step guidance", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The procedural workflow is presented as an ordered checkbox checklist with 'Step N' labels, matching the required format; no detailed sub-sections exist that fail to reference step numbers.", + "evidence": "- [ ] **Step 1 - Classify:** confirm an observed S3 403/AccessDenied... - [ ] **Step 9 - Deliver the report** in the format below.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#checklists-for-multi-step-workflows" + }, + { + "id": "BP-17", + "name": "Validation loops", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Step 8 is an explicit self-validation step requiring the agent to confirm verdicts and fixes are correct before presenting the report.", + "evidence": "Step 8 - Validate before presenting: confirm each `DENIED_BY` verdict rests on a policy statement you read, not on an assumption or a simulation result alone; confirm the proposed diff touches only the denying layer...", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#validation-loops" + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/best-practices/v4/iteration-2/best-practices-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/best-practices/v4/iteration-2/best-practices-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1298bbb21 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/best-practices/v4/iteration-2/best-practices-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +{ + "version": "v4", + "iteration": 2, + "timestamp": "2026-11-22T09:28:30Z", + "test_type": "best-practices", + "passing_score": 100, + "score": 100, + "result": "passed", + "summary": { + "total": 17, + "passed": 14, + "failed": 0, + "skipped": 3, + "warning": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "tests": [ + { + "id": "BP-01", + "name": "Effective description", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The description starts with imperative phrasing ('Diagnose an Amazon S3 403 AccessDenied... Use this skill whenever...'), lists explicit trigger contexts (specific API calls, error message patterns, cross-account cases, KMS denials), explicitly scopes out-of-domain cases (503 SlowDown, CloudFront, Lake Formation, Bedrock/SageMaker), and remains a concise paragraph despite covering a lot of ground.", + "evidence": "Diagnose an Amazon S3 403 AccessDenied. Use this skill whenever an S3 request fails with AccessDenied or 403 Forbidden: GetObject, PutObject, ListBucket, HeadObject or CopyObject calls... Not for 503 SlowDown, replication or lifecycle issues, CloudFront 403s, Lake Formation access, Bedrock or SageMaker role denials, or a least-privilege review with no observed failure.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/optimizing-descriptions" + }, + { + "id": "BP-02", + "name": "Verbosity and conciseness", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The body jumps straight into domain-specific procedure (ten layers of S3 authorization, verdicts, report format) without explaining general concepts like what S3 or IAM are. Every sentence conveys non-obvious, skill-specific information.", + "evidence": "S3 evaluates every layer that applies to the request. Any explicit deny wins, and the request also needs an allow.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#add-what-the-agent-lacks-omit-what-it-knows" + }, + { + "id": "BP-03", + "name": "Detailed reference materials must not be in body", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The body keeps detailed material (per-layer API calls, denial message hints, fallback sources) out and defers to references/ files, loaded conditionally. No large reference tables or lookup data are embedded inline.", + "evidence": "Load [references/layers.md](references/layers.md#the-ten-layers) at Step 4 for the API call that reads each layer and its typical denial.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#structure-large-skills-with-progressive-disclosure" + }, + { + "id": "BP-04", + "name": "Reference files must be linked", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Both reference files (denial-message-hints.md and layers.md) are linked via markdown links in the body.", + "evidence": "[references/denial-message-hints.md](references/denial-message-hints.md)) ... [references/layers.md](references/layers.md#when-a-direct-read-is-blocked)" + }, + { + "id": "BP-05", + "name": "Reference links must specify when to load", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Each reference link specifies the precise trigger condition for loading (e.g., only when a message/errorMessage exists, or when a read is blocked, or at Step 4/6, or only when all layers are clean).", + "evidence": "load it only when a message or CloudTrail `errorMessage` exists); it narrows the search.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#structure-large-skills-with-progressive-disclosure" + }, + { + "id": "BP-06", + "name": "Reference path format", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All reference links use relative paths from the skill root with no absolute paths or traversals.", + "evidence": "[references/layers.md](references/layers.md#account-rules)", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/specification#file-references" + }, + { + "id": "BP-07", + "name": "Prescription vs description", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Fragile/consequential steps (Step 8 validation, safety read-only rules, verdict assignment) are prescriptive with exact closed-set verdicts, while flexible steps (fix proposal, report wording) allow reasoning and judgment with rationale given (e.g., why SimulatePrincipalPolicy is insufficient).", + "evidence": "`SimulatePrincipalPolicy` ignores VPC endpoint policies and session policies and only partly evaluates SCPs and RCPs. A simulation result of \"allowed\" is never a verdict on its own.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#match-specificity-to-fragility" + }, + { + "id": "BP-08", + "name": "Defaults, not menus", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Where tool choice is discussed, a clear default/preference is stated (read policy documents first) with the alternative framed as mere corroboration, not an equal option.", + "evidence": "read each layer's document directly. Use `SimulatePrincipalPolicy` only as corroboration.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#provide-defaults-not-menus" + }, + { + "id": "BP-09", + "name": "Favor procedures over declarations", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The skill teaches a generalizable procedure (classify, pin request, walk ten layers, assign verdicts, propose fix) applicable to any S3 AccessDenied case, not a one-off instance.", + "evidence": "Step 5 - Walk the layers: evaluate all ten layers; do not stop at the first one that passes.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#favor-procedures-over-declarations" + }, + { + "id": "BP-10", + "name": "Gotchas section", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "A dedicated Gotchas section lists concrete, non-obvious environment-specific pitfalls (blocked reads, SimulatePrincipalPolicy limitations, bucket-level vs object-level ARNs, KMS root-only policy trap).", + "evidence": "A resource ARN of `[redacted ARN]` covers bucket-level actions such as `ListBucket` only. Object actions need `[redacted ARN]`.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#gotchas-sections" + }, + { + "id": "BP-11", + "name": "Templates and outputs missing", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The skill provides an explicit, sufficiently detailed report format section inline covering all needed structured output elements.", + "evidence": "## Report format\n1. **Root cause** - one sentence naming the layer and the statement (Sid or policy name).", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#templates-for-output-format" + }, + { + "id": "BP-12", + "name": "Templates and outputs must not be in body", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The inline report format template is short (5 bullet points, well under 20 lines) and appropriate to keep in the body.", + "evidence": "1. **Root cause** ... 5. **Could not check** - every `CANNOT_DETERMINE` layer and what access would resolve it.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#templates-for-output-format" + }, + { + "id": "BP-13", + "name": "Asset files must be linked", + "result": "skipped", + "message": "No files in assets/, so this test does not apply" + }, + { + "id": "BP-14", + "name": "Asset links must specify when to load", + "result": "skipped", + "message": "No files in assets/, so this test does not apply" + }, + { + "id": "BP-15", + "name": "Asset path format", + "result": "skipped", + "message": "No files in assets/, so this test does not apply" + }, + { + "id": "BP-16", + "name": "Step-by-step guidance", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The procedural workflow is presented as a checkbox checklist with Step N format, consistent with the requirement; no separate detailed sections exist that fail to reference step numbers.", + "evidence": "- [ ] **Step 1 - Classify:** confirm an observed S3 403/AccessDenied (not throttling, not CloudFront, not Lake Formation). Stop otherwise.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#checklists-for-multi-step-workflows" + }, + { + "id": "BP-17", + "name": "Validation loops", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Step 8 explicitly instructs the agent to validate its own verdicts and proposed fix before presenting the report.", + "evidence": "Step 8 - Validate before presenting: confirm each `DENIED_BY` verdict rests on a policy statement you read, not on an assumption or a simulation result alone; confirm the proposed diff touches only the denying layer...", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#validation-loops" + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/best-practices/v4/iteration-3/best-practices-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/best-practices/v4/iteration-3/best-practices-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..92c4a20e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/best-practices/v4/iteration-3/best-practices-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +{ + "version": "v4", + "iteration": 3, + "timestamp": "2026-11-22T09:28:29Z", + "test_type": "best-practices", + "passing_score": 100, + "score": 100, + "result": "passed", + "summary": { + "total": 17, + "passed": 14, + "failed": 0, + "skipped": 3, + "warning": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "tests": [ + { + "id": "BP-01", + "name": "Effective description", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The description uses imperative phrasing ('Diagnose...', 'Use this skill whenever...'), lists many explicit trigger contexts (specific API calls, error message substrings, cross-account scenarios, VPC endpoint scenarios), explicitly excludes out-of-scope cases (503 SlowDown, CloudFront, Lake Formation, Bedrock/SageMaker), and is concise within a single paragraph.", + "evidence": "Use this skill whenever an S3 request fails with AccessDenied or 403 Forbidden: GetObject, PutObject, ListBucket, HeadObject or CopyObject calls, messages such as \"is not authorized to perform: s3:\"...Not for 503 SlowDown, replication or lifecycle issues, CloudFront 403s, Lake Formation access, Bedrock or SageMaker role denials, or a least-privilege review with no observed failure.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/optimizing-descriptions" + }, + { + "id": "BP-02", + "name": "Verbosity and conciseness", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The body jumps directly into domain-specific procedures (ten authorization layers, verdict taxonomy, API calls) without explaining general AWS/S3 concepts the agent already knows. It is concise and specific.", + "evidence": "S3 evaluates every layer that applies to the request. Any explicit deny wins, and the request also needs an allow. The layers, outermost first: 1 SCP/RCP, 2 VPC endpoint policy...", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#add-what-the-agent-lacks-omit-what-it-knows" + }, + { + "id": "BP-03", + "name": "Detailed reference materials must not be in body", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Detailed reference tables (per-layer API calls, denial message hints, fallback sources) are deferred to references/layers.md and references/denial-message-hints.md, which are loaded conditionally rather than embedded in the body.", + "evidence": "Load [references/layers.md](references/layers.md#the-ten-layers) at Step 4 for the API call that reads each layer and its typical denial.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#structure-large-skills-with-progressive-disclosure" + }, + { + "id": "BP-04", + "name": "Reference files must be linked", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Both reference files (denial-message-hints.md and layers.md) are linked via markdown link syntax in the body.", + "evidence": "[references/denial-message-hints.md](references/denial-message-hints.md); load [references/layers.md](references/layers.md#when-a-direct-read-is-blocked)" + }, + { + "id": "BP-05", + "name": "Reference links must specify when to load", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Each reference link specifies the exact trigger condition for loading (e.g., only when a message exists, only when a read is blocked, only when all layers are clean).", + "evidence": "load it only when a message or CloudTrail `errorMessage` exists; ... load [references/layers.md](references/layers.md#when-a-direct-read-is-blocked) for the fallback sources.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#structure-large-skills-with-progressive-disclosure" + }, + { + "id": "BP-06", + "name": "Reference path format", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All reference links use relative paths from the skill root with no absolute paths or traversal.", + "evidence": "[references/layers.md](references/layers.md#the-ten-layers)", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/specification#file-references" + }, + { + "id": "BP-07", + "name": "Prescription vs description", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Fragile/consequential steps (verdict assignment, fix proposal, safety constraints) are prescriptive and exact, while investigative steps like evidence collection allow flexibility while explaining why (e.g., policy reads first, simulation as corroboration only).", + "evidence": "Use `SimulatePrincipalPolicy` only as corroboration. ... Never call `PutBucketPolicy`, `PutPublicAccessBlock`, `PutKeyPolicy`, `PutRolePolicy`, or any other write API.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#match-specificity-to-fragility" + }, + { + "id": "BP-08", + "name": "Defaults, not menus", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Where multiple evidence sources exist, the skill establishes a clear default order (direct policy reads first, simulation as corroboration only, fallback sources only when blocked).", + "evidence": "Collect evidence, policy reads first: read each layer's document directly. Use `SimulatePrincipalPolicy` only as corroboration.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#provide-defaults-not-menus" + }, + { + "id": "BP-09", + "name": "Favor procedures over declarations", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The skill teaches a generalizable diagnostic procedure (classify, pin request, walk layers, assign verdicts, propose fix) applicable to any S3 AccessDenied case, not a one-off instance.", + "evidence": "Step 5 - Walk the layers: evaluate all ten layers; do not stop at the first one that passes.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#favor-procedures-over-declarations" + }, + { + "id": "BP-10", + "name": "Gotchas section", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The skill includes a detailed Gotchas section with concrete, non-obvious corrections specific to this domain (e.g., simulation limitations, ARN wildcard scope, KMS root-policy nuance).", + "evidence": "`SimulatePrincipalPolicy` ignores VPC endpoint policies and session policies and only partly evaluates SCPs and RCPs. A simulation result of \"allowed\" is never a verdict on its own.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#gotchas-sections" + }, + { + "id": "BP-11", + "name": "Templates and outputs missing", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The skill produces structured output and provides an explicit report format template inline covering all needed sections.", + "evidence": "## Report format\n1. **Root cause** - one sentence naming the layer and the statement (Sid or policy name).\n2. **Layer table** - all ten layers with verdict and one-line evidence.", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#templates-for-output-format" + }, + { + "id": "BP-12", + "name": "Templates and outputs must not be in body", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The inline report format template is short (5 bullet items, well under 20 lines) and is appropriate to keep inline.", + "evidence": "## Report format\n1. **Root cause** ...\n2. **Layer table** ...\n3. **Proposed fix** ...\n4. **Subsequent blockers** ...\n5. **Could not check** ...", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#templates-for-output-format" + }, + { + "id": "BP-13", + "name": "Asset files must be linked", + "result": "skipped", + "message": "No files in assets/, so this test does not apply" + }, + { + "id": "BP-14", + "name": "Asset links must specify when to load", + "result": "skipped", + "message": "No files in assets/, so this test does not apply" + }, + { + "id": "BP-15", + "name": "Asset path format", + "result": "skipped", + "message": "No files in assets/, so this test does not apply" + }, + { + "id": "BP-16", + "name": "Step-by-step guidance", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "The procedural workflow is presented as an ordered checkbox checklist with 'Step N' format, and no separate detailed sections exist that fail to reference these step numbers.", + "evidence": "- [ ] **Step 1 - Classify:** confirm an observed S3 403/AccessDenied... \n- [ ] **Step 2 - Pin the request:** ...", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#checklists-for-multi-step-workflows" + }, + { + "id": "BP-17", + "name": "Validation loops", + "result": "passed", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Step 8 is an explicit self-validation instruction requiring the agent to check its verdicts and proposed fix against evidence before presenting the report.", + "evidence": "Step 8 - Validate before presenting: confirm each `DENIED_BY` verdict rests on a policy statement you read, not on an assumption or a simulation result alone; confirm the proposed diff touches only the denying layer...", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/skill-creation/best-practices#validation-loops" + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/eval_queries.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/eval_queries.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ec85f4d41 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/eval_queries.json @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +[ + "GetObject on my bucket returns 403 AccessDenied from my Lambda function.", + "User arn:aws:sts::111122223333:assumed-role/app/s is not authorized to perform s3:PutObject with an explicit deny in a resource-based policy.", + "Our partner account cannot read objects from our bucket even though we added them to the bucket policy.", + "S3 download fails with a kms:Decrypt AccessDenied on an encrypted object.", + "EC2 in a private subnet gets 403 on S3 through the gateway endpoint but the same call works from my laptop.", + "Why does my role get Access Denied on s3:GetObject when its policy allows it?" +] diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/evals.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/evals.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e41970aab --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/evals.json @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +{ + "skill_name": "s3-access-denied-resolver", + "evals": [ + { + "id": "bucket-policy-explicit-deny", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "The role nebula-demo-s3-01-reader gets AccessDenied on s3api get-object for test/hello.txt in the bucket whose name starts with nebula-demo-s3-01-. Find which policy denies it and give me the fix. Do not ask clarifying questions or open a tracked investigation. Run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer in this response; do not start a background diagnosis or say you will report later.", + "should_trigger": true, + "expected_output": "The agent reads the bucket policy and finds the BucketAccessRule statement, an explicit Deny on s3:GetObject for every principal except one named role (an aws:PrincipalArn condition). It confirms the reader role's identity policy allows the read, so the bucket policy is the root cause, names layer 4 DENIED_BY, and proposes a policy diff for human review without applying it.", + "assertions": [ + "The output names the bucket policy and the BucketAccessRule statement as the denying layer, and labels it DENIED_BY", + "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "The output lists a verdict for every one of the ten layers, and marks any layer it could not read as CANNOT_DETERMINE with what access is needed", + "The output proposes a policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the bucket policy itself" + ] + }, + { + "id": "kms-key-policy-deny", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "The role nebula-demo-s3-02-reader gets AccessDenied on s3api get-object for test/hello.txt in the bucket whose name starts with nebula-demo-s3-02-. The bucket policy and the role's S3 permissions look fine. Find the cause and give me the fix. Do not ask clarifying questions or open a tracked investigation. Run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer in this response; do not start a background diagnosis or say you will report later.", + "should_trigger": true, + "expected_output": "The agent finds the bucket uses SSE-KMS with a customer managed key, reads the key policy, and finds the KeyUsageRule statement, an explicit Deny on kms:Decrypt for every principal except one named role, even though the reader role's identity policy allows kms:Decrypt. It names layer 10 DENIED_BY and proposes a key policy diff for human review without applying it.", + "assertions": [ + "The output identifies SSE-KMS with a customer managed key on the bucket and names the KMS key policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "The proposed key policy diff adds only the reader role (or its ARN) to what the denying statement exempts, without opening the key to all principals, and says it is for human review and not applied" + ] + }, + { + "id": "permissions-boundary-deny", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "The role nebula-demo-s3-03-reader has a policy that allows s3:GetObject, but s3api get-object on test/hello.txt in the bucket whose name starts with nebula-demo-s3-03- returns AccessDenied. Find the cause and give me the fix. Do not ask clarifying questions or open a tracked investigation. Run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer in this response; do not start a background diagnosis or say you will report later.", + "should_trigger": true, + "expected_output": "The agent reads the role, finds a permissions boundary that allows only s3:ListBucket, and concludes the boundary denies s3:GetObject even though the identity policy allows it. It names layer 7 DENIED_BY and proposes a boundary diff for human review without applying it.", + "assertions": [ + "The output names the permissions boundary as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "The proposed boundary diff adds only s3:GetObject on the bucket's objects to the boundary, not s3:* or a wildcard resource, and says it is for human review and not applied" + ] + }, + { + "id": "identity-policy-wrong-arn", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "The role nebula-demo-s3-04-reader gets AccessDenied on s3api get-object for test/hello.txt in the bucket whose name starts with nebula-demo-s3-04-. Find the cause and give me the corrected policy. Do not ask clarifying questions or open a tracked investigation. Run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer in this response; do not start a background diagnosis or say you will report later.", + "should_trigger": true, + "expected_output": "The agent reads the role's inline policy and finds s3:GetObject granted on the bucket ARN instead of the object ARN (bucket/*). No allow matches the object resource, so the identity policy is the root cause. It names layer 6 DENIED_BY and proposes the corrected Resource for human review without applying it.", + "assertions": [ + "The output names the identity policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "The corrected Resource is an object-level ARN under the bucket (either arn:aws:s3:::/* or the specific object key), not the bare bucket ARN, the action list is not widened to s3:*, and the output says the change is for the operator to review and apply" + ] + }, + { + "id": "vpc-endpoint-policy-deny", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "An EC2 instance in the private subnet of the nebula-demo-s3-05 stack gets AccessDenied on s3api get-object for test/hello.txt in the bucket whose name starts with nebula-demo-s3-05-. It reaches S3 through the gateway endpoint and its role allows the read. Find the cause and give me the fix. Do not ask clarifying questions or open a tracked investigation. Run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer in this response; do not start a background diagnosis or say you will report later.", + "should_trigger": true, + "expected_output": "The agent finds the request path goes through an S3 gateway endpoint, reads the endpoint policy, and finds it allows only a different bucket. It confirms the instance role allows the read, reports what it found for the bucket policy or marks that layer CANNOT_DETERMINE with the access needed, names layer 2 DENIED_BY, and proposes an endpoint policy diff for human review without applying it.", + "assertions": [ + "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "The output identifies the request path as the S3 gateway endpoint before assigning verdicts, and states that the endpoint policy allows a different bucket and not the bucket being read", + "The output shows it read the endpoint policy directly, and if it mentions IAM policy simulation it states that simulation does not evaluate endpoint policies instead of treating a simulated 'allowed' as a verdict", + "The output proposes an endpoint policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the endpoint itself" + ] + }, + { + "id": "read-only-fix", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "The role nebula-demo-s3-04-reader gets AccessDenied reading test/hello.txt from the bucket whose name starts with nebula-demo-s3-04-. Fix it for me now: update the policy so the read works. Do not ask clarifying questions or open a tracked investigation. Run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer in this response; do not start a background diagnosis or say you will report later.", + "should_trigger": true, + "expected_output": "The agent diagnoses the identity policy resource mismatch, proposes the corrected policy, and states that it is read-only: it does not call any write API and leaves the change for the operator to review and apply.", + "assertions": [ + "The output declines to apply the change, does not call or claim to call any write API such as PutRolePolicy, and says the operator must apply it", + "The output completes the diagnosis by naming the denying layer with a verdict table before giving the corrected policy as a diff for review" + ] + }, + { + "id": "unrelated-slowdown", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "S3 is returning 503 SlowDown during our nightly batch job. What should we change?", + "should_trigger": false + }, + { + "id": "unrelated-cloudfront", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "CloudFront returns 403 for my S3 website origin. What is wrong?", + "should_trigger": false + }, + { + "id": "unrelated-bedrock", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "Bedrock InvokeModel returns AccessDeniedException for my application role. Why?", + "should_trigger": false + }, + { + "id": "unrelated-least-privilege", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "Review my bucket policies for least privilege and tell me what to tighten.", + "should_trigger": false + } + ] +} diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/benchmark.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/benchmark.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c037dc0da --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/benchmark.json @@ -0,0 +1,2106 @@ +{ + "summary": "\nOf 10 evals, 4 were marked should_trigger:false and fully skipped (trigger still fired 3/3 for each, but no expected-output, assertion, quality, or consistency data was collected for them \u2014 these are absent data, not a performance signal). The remaining 6 evals (all chat task type, S3/IAM/KMS/VPC access-denial diagnosis scenarios) have full comparative data between without_skill and with_skill.\n\nTrigger firing was 100% (3/3) for every eval for both variants, so the behavior under test reliably activates regardless of variant.\n\nExpected-output match and assertion pass rates consistently favored with_skill across the 6 scored evals:\n- bucket-policy-explicit-deny: with_skill 3/3 expected-output / 11/12 assertions, without_skill 0/3 / 0/12 \u2014 a stark gap, with without_skill failing every assertion in this eval (high confidence on both sides).\n- kms-key-policy-deny: with_skill 3/3 / 11/12, without_skill 2/3 / 9/12 (without_skill's confidence here was medium, a weaker signal).\n- permissions-boundary-deny: with_skill 3/3 / 12/12, without_skill 3/3 / 8/12 (expected-output tied, but assertions diverged).\n- identity-policy-wrong-arn: with_skill 3/3 / 9/9, without_skill 3/3 / 6/9 (expected-output tied, assertions diverged).\n- vpc-endpoint-policy-deny: with_skill 3/3 / 12/12, without_skill 3/3 / 8/12 (expected-output tied, assertions diverged).\n- read-only-fix: with_skill 3/3 / 6/6, without_skill 3/3 / 3/6 (expected-output tied, assertions diverged).\n\nLooking at individual assertions, a recurring pattern across nearly every eval is a specific assertion requiring verdict labels (DENIED_BY/WOULD_ALSO_DENY/etc., no plain \"allowed\"/\"pass\") that with_skill passes 100% of the time and without_skill fails 100% of the time (\"with_skill_passes_without_skill_fails\") \u2014 this is the single most consistent and largest driver of the assertion-rate gap, appearing in 5 of 6 scored evals. Other assertions (e.g., \"declines to apply the change,\" \"proposes a diff for review,\" \"has a later-blockers section\") pass for both variants (\"always_passes\"), meaning they don't differentiate the two. A few assertions were flaky (passing 2/3 for one variant) rather than deterministic, such as naming the denying layer in kms/permissions-boundary evals.\n\nQuality comparisons (LLM-judged pairwise, medium-to-high confidence, with some pairs skipped due to low expected-output confidence or other exclusions) favored with_skill more often than without_skill across completeness and, to a lesser extent, accuracy; actionability was more mixed, with without_skill favored or tied in several evals (e.g., kms, read-only-fix). Sample sizes for these pairwise comparisons are small (2-3 pairs per eval), so these should be read as directional rather than definitive.\n\nRuntime and cost consistently favored without_skill: across all 6 scored evals, without_skill ran faster (roughly 13-26s vs. with_skill's 27-41s) and cost less (~$0.12-$0.22 vs. ~$0.22-$0.35). One run in identity-policy-wrong-arn exceeded the 30s runtime threshold. Context window utilization was low and similar for both (under ~6%) with no compaction events.\n\nOutput consistency across repeated runs was \"mostly_consistent\" to \"consistent\" for both variants in every eval, with scores close to each other (differences of a few tenths on a 3-point scale); neither variant showed outputs varying wildly run-to-run, though with_skill scored marginally higher or equal in most evals and strictly higher in vpc-endpoint-policy-deny (3.0 \"consistent\" vs. 2.67).\n\nOverall, the pattern across this data is a tradeoff: with_skill more reliably meets expected output and passes assertions (especially the verdict-labeling requirement) and tends to be judged higher on quality/completeness, while without_skill is consistently faster and cheaper. Confidence in the assertion-level and expected-output findings is generally high; the quality-comparison and some expected-output findings rest on smaller sample sizes or medium confidence, so those differences should be weighed with some caution. The four should_trigger:false evals contribute no comparative evidence either way.\n", + "timestamp": "2026-11-22T09:16:55Z", + "version": "v3", + "model": "us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5", + "iterations": 3, + "total_evals": 10, + "total_iterations_run": 48, + "total_failed": 0, + "cleanup_skipped": false, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": { + "enabled": false, + "found": 0, + "timed_out": 0, + "errored": 0, + "not_waited": 48 + }, + "evals": { + "bucket-policy-explicit-deny": { + "summary": "This evaluation covers a single chat task where the agent was asked to diagnose which access-control layer was denying S3 access and propose a policy fix. The triggering behavior fired in all 3 runs (100%), so the scenario was properly exercised for both variants.\n\nOn the primary outcome measure (meeting the expected output), there is a stark and consistent split: with_skill met the expected output in 3/3 runs (100%, high confidence), while without_skill met it in 0/3 runs (0%, high confidence). Confidence in this judgment is high on both sides, meaning this is not a weak or borderline measurement.\n\nThis pattern carries through the detailed assertions. Across 12 total assertion checks, with_skill passed 11/12 (92%) and without_skill passed 0/12 (0%). Looking at the individual assertions:\n- Three assertions (correctly identifying the bucket policy as the denying layer, using only the specified verdict labels, and proposing a policy diff without directly modifying the bucket policy) show a clean pattern: with_skill passed all 3 runs and without_skill failed all 3 runs.\n- One assertion (listing a verdict for every layer, marking unreadable layers as CANNOT_DETERMINE) was flaky for with_skill (2/3 passing) and failed for without_skill (0/3), indicating this specific requirement is not fully reliable even for the variant that otherwise performed well, and is a clear gap for without_skill.\n\nNo assertion passed for both variants, and none failed for both \u2014 every assertion in this run differentiates the two variants, with with_skill passing consistently and without_skill failing consistently across the board.\n\nOn efficiency metrics, without_skill was somewhat faster (26s vs 31s) and slightly cheaper ($0.22 vs $0.26), with marginally lower context utilization (4.9% vs 5.7%). Neither variant triggered any context compaction. These differences are small in absolute terms and are overshadowed by the large gap in whether the task was actually completed correctly.\n\nQuality comparison data is not available: all 3 pairs were skipped, so no direct quality judgment could be made between the two variants' outputs beyond the assertion-level checks.\n\nOutput consistency (run-to-run stability) was rated \"mostly_consistent\" for both variants, with with_skill scoring slightly higher (2.67, high confidence) than without_skill (2.33, medium confidence). This suggests both variants were reasonably stable across repeated runs, though without_skill's consistency rating rests on medium rather than high confidence, making it a somewhat weaker measurement.\n\nOverall, the state of the evidence is that with_skill reliably satisfied the task's expected output and nearly all assertions, while without_skill did not satisfy the expected output or any assertion in this run, despite running slightly faster and cheaper. The one partially flaky assertion (per-layer verdict completeness) indicates a residual gap even for the variant that otherwise passed consistently. The absence of quality-comparison pairs means some nuance in output quality beyond pass/fail assertions could not be directly compared.", + "task_type": "chat", + "trigger": { + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100 + }, + "without_skill": null + }, + "expected_output": { + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "0/3", + "percentage": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + } + }, + "assertions": { + "per_assertion": [ + { + "index": 0, + "text": "The output names the bucket policy and the BucketAccessRule statement as the denying layer, and labels it DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "0/3", + "percentage": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "skill_uplift" + }, + { + "index": 1, + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "0/3", + "percentage": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "skill_uplift" + }, + { + "index": 2, + "text": "The output lists a verdict for every one of the ten layers, and marks any layer it could not read as CANNOT_DETERMINE with what access is needed", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "2/3", + "percentage": 67, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "0/3", + "percentage": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "flaky" + }, + { + "index": 3, + "text": "The output proposes a policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the bucket policy itself", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "0/3", + "percentage": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "skill_uplift" + } + ], + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "11/12", + "percentage": 92 + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "0/12", + "percentage": 0 + } + }, + "metrics": { + "with_skill": { + "runtime_avg": "31s", + "cost_avg": "$0.26", + "context_window_avg": { + "utilization": "5.7%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + }, + "without_skill": { + "runtime_avg": "26s", + "cost_avg": "$0.22", + "context_window_avg": { + "utilization": "4.9%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } + }, + "comparison": { + "quality": { + "pairs_evaluated": 0, + "pairs_skipped": 3, + "skip_reasons": [ + "without_skill expected_output test failed" + ], + "overall": { + "with_skill_wins": 0, + "without_skill_wins": 0, + "equivalent": 0, + "winner": "equivalent", + "summary": "Equivalent overall (0 vs 0 criterion wins out of 0 judgments)." + }, + "per_criterion": {}, + "iterations": [ + { + "iteration": 1, + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "without_skill expected_output test failed" + }, + { + "iteration": 2, + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "without_skill expected_output test failed" + }, + { + "iteration": 3, + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "without_skill expected_output test failed" + } + ] + } + }, + "output_consistency": { + "comparison": { + "more_consistent": "with_skill", + "with_skill_wins": 1, + "without_skill_wins": 0, + "equivalent": 2, + "summary": "with_skill is more consistent: it won 1 dimension(s), without_skill 0, 2 equivalent of 3." + }, + "with_skill": { + "outputs_compared": 3, + "iterations_included": [ + 1, + 2, + 3 + ], + "overall": "mostly_consistent", + "overall_score": 2.67, + "dimension_counts": { + "consistent": 2, + "mostly_consistent": 1 + }, + "avg_confidence": "high", + "per_dimension": { + "answer_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three outputs identify the same root cause: the bucket policy statement 'BucketAccessRule' on nebula-demo-s3-01-111122223333_1-us-east-1 explicitly denies s3:GetObject for all principals except role/nebula-demo-s3-01-app, via a StringNotEquals aws:PrincipalArn condition, and that this explicit deny overrides the reader's own allow policy (inline policy read-test-object). All three also confirm the identity policy itself is fine and would work absent the deny.", + "evidence": "Iteration 1: 'the bucket policy statement BucketAccessRule ... explicitly denies s3:GetObject. It denies every principal except role/nebula-demo-s3-01-app.' Iteration 2: 'the bucket policy statement BucketAccessRule denies s3:GetObject to every principal except nebula-demo-s3-01-app.' Iteration 3: 'The statement is BucketAccessRule. It is an explicit Deny of s3:GetObject on bucket/* for every principal, with this condition... Only the -app role is exempt.'" + }, + "recommendation_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three recommend the same primary fix: add the reader role ARN to the StringNotEquals condition exemption list in the BucketAccessRule deny statement, framed as a proposed diff not yet applied. However, they differ in the mechanism/wording of applying it and in additional caveats: iteration 1 says use put-bucket-policy directly since there's only one statement; iteration 2 insists the change must be made in the CloudFormation template (not a manual edit) because the stack owns the policy, and also notes the fix removes protection from all other principals including admins; iteration 3 says apply via put-bucket-policy but adds a caveat suggesting the deny may be intentional and recommends confirming with the user or having the reader assume the -app role instead as an alternative. These are additional/alternative steps beyond the core fix, making this mostly consistent rather than fully consistent.", + "evidence": "Iteration 1: 'The policy has only this one statement, so put-bucket-policy with the edited document replaces it cleanly.' Iteration 2: 'Make the change in the CloudFormation template, in the BucketPolicy resource. The stack owns this policy, so a manual edit would drift from the template.' Iteration 3: 'Apply it with aws s3api put-bucket-policy... The deny may be intentional... If so, have the reader assume the -app role instead, or confirm that widening access is acceptable before applying the diff.'", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 2, + 3 + ] + }, + "format_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three outputs follow the same overall structure: a Root cause section, a 10-row layer verdict table with identical columns (#, Layer, Verdict, Evidence) and the same 10 layers in the same order, a Proposed fix section with a diff code block, a Subsequent blockers section, and a Could not check section listing unresolved items. The presentation choices (prose + table + diff) are consistent across all three.", + "evidence": "All three have headers like 'Root cause', a table with columns '# | Layer | Verdict | Evidence' listing SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, Block Public Access, Bucket policy, Access point policy, Identity policy, Permissions boundary, Session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, KMS, followed by 'Proposed fix', 'Subsequent blockers', and 'Could not check' sections." + } + } + }, + "without_skill": { + "outputs_compared": 3, + "iterations_included": [ + 1, + 2, + 3 + ], + "overall": "mostly_consistent", + "overall_score": 2.33, + "dimension_counts": { + "consistent": 1, + "mostly_consistent": 2 + }, + "avg_confidence": "medium", + "per_dimension": { + "answer_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "All three outputs fail to definitively identify the denying policy, state the role's own inline policy is not the cause, and list the same set of hypotheses (bucket policy explicit Deny, KMS SSE-KMS missing kms:Decrypt, SCP/VPC endpoint). However, they diverge on key supporting facts: iteration 1 lists SCP/VPC endpoint policy as a live hypothesis without ruling it out, iteration 2 explicitly rules out SCPs by checking the org structure (FullAWSAccess only) and also checks the trust policy, while iteration 3 rules out SCPs entirely because the account is claimed to be the Organizations management account (a different and contradictory justification from iteration 2, which says the account sits under the org root with FullAWSAccess policies, implying it's a member account). Iteration 3 also introduces a third hypothesis (missing key / missing s3:ListBucket) not mentioned in 1 or 2. These are material factual differences about the account's position in the org and which hypotheses are live.", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 1, + 2, + 3 + ] + }, + "recommendation_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "All three recommend running read-only diagnostic commands (get-bucket-policy, head-object) and then fixing based on findings: either editing/removing the bucket policy Deny statement (with a PrincipalArn condition exception) or adding kms:Decrypt permission with the correct key ARN. All offer to produce the exact fix if the user pastes the bucket policy/head-object output. Differences: iteration 1 includes iam simulate-principal-policy as a diagnostic command while iterations 2 and 3 do not; iteration 3 adds get-public-access-block and a third remediation path (upload the missing object or grant s3:ListBucket) not present in 1 or 2; iteration 2 gives a concrete JSON condition example differing slightly from iteration 3's ArnNotEquals vs StringNotEquals. These are additional/different specifics rather than conflicting core recommendations, fitting mostly_consistent.", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 1, + 3 + ] + }, + "format_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three responses use the same overall structure: an opening statement that the denial could not be identified, bolded subsection headers (what was checked/confirmed, what was blocked, likely causes as a numbered list, commands in a code block, fix by cause as a bulleted list), and a closing offer to produce the exact fix if the user pastes output. The shape, use of code blocks, bold headers, and numbered/bulleted lists are consistent across all three." + } + } + } + } + }, + "kms-key-policy-deny": { + "summary": "This eval tested a chat task around diagnosing S3/KMS access-denial layers and proposing a key-policy fix. The trigger condition fired in all 3 runs for both variants, so the behavior under test was consistently exercised.\n\nExpected output: with_skill met the expected output in all 3 runs (100%, high confidence), while without_skill met it in 2 of 3 runs (67%, medium confidence). Confidence in without_skill's measurement is only medium, so this gap, while real, rests on a somewhat less certain judgment than with_skill's.\n\nAssertions (12 total, 4 distinct checks x 3 runs): with_skill passed 11/12 (92%) vs without_skill 9/12 (75%). Breaking this down shows a more nuanced picture than the aggregate suggests:\n- One assertion (verdict section for later blockers/unchecked layers) passed 100% for both variants \u2014 not a differentiator.\n- One assertion (key-policy diff scoped only to the reader role, marked for human review) also passed 100% for both \u2014 again, not differentiating.\n- One assertion (correctly identifying SSE-KMS/customer-managed-key denial layer) was flaky for with_skill (2/3) but passed fully for without_skill (3/3) \u2014 here without_skill did better.\n- One assertion (using only the specified verdict labels across all ten layers, avoiding plain 'allowed/pass') passed 3/3 for with_skill but failed completely (0/3) for without_skill \u2014 a clear, consistent gap in the other direction. This looks like the most meaningful and reliable differentiator, since both variants' results on it were consistent (not flaky) across their 3 runs.\n\nSo of the two differentiating assertions, each variant leads on one; the other two assertions are uninformative since both variants handled them equally well.\n\nQuality comparison: only 2 of 3 pairs could be evaluated (1 skipped). Across these limited pairs, with_skill was favored more often overall (4 vs 2 favorable criterion-level marks, with 1 comparable), with confidence rated medium. By criterion, with_skill was favored on completeness (2-0) and split with without_skill on accuracy (2-1 favoring with_skill); without_skill was favored on actionability (1-0, with 1 comparable). Given only 2 pairs were assessed, these quality signals should be treated as indicative rather than robust.\n\nRuntime and cost: without_skill ran faster (~26s vs ~39s, about 13s less) and cost less (~$0.22 vs ~$0.33). No runs exceeded the runtime threshold for either variant. Context window utilization was low for both (under 7%), with no compaction needed.\n\nOutput consistency: both variants were rated \"mostly_consistent\" overall across repeated runs. without_skill scored slightly higher on the consistency scale (2.67 vs 2.33) and with higher confidence (high vs medium), and had more dimensions rated fully \"consistent\" (2 vs 1). This suggests without_skill's outputs varied a bit less run-to-run, though both were in the same qualitative consistency band.\n\nOverall picture: with_skill showed stronger and more consistent adherence to the expected output and to one specific formatting/labeling assertion (fully consistent 3/3 vs 0/3 for without_skill), and was favored more often in the (limited) quality comparison, particularly on completeness. without_skill ran faster and cheaper, had slightly higher run-to-run consistency, and did better on correctly identifying the SSE-KMS denial layer and on actionability. Two of the four assertions showed no difference at all between variants. These are tradeoffs across different dimensions rather than a one-sided result, and some of the comparative findings (quality, expected-output confidence for without_skill) rest on a small number of evaluated pairs or medium confidence, so they should be read as suggestive rather than definitive.", + "task_type": "chat", + "trigger": { + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100 + }, + "without_skill": null + }, + "expected_output": { + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "2/3", + "percentage": 67, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "medium" + } + }, + "assertions": { + "per_assertion": [ + { + "index": 0, + "text": "The output identifies SSE-KMS with a customer managed key on the bucket and names the KMS key policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "2/3", + "percentage": 67, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "flaky" + }, + { + "index": 1, + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "0/3", + "percentage": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "skill_uplift" + }, + { + "index": 2, + "text": "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "medium" + }, + "classification": "always_passes" + }, + { + "index": 3, + "text": "The proposed key policy diff adds only the reader role (or its ARN) to what the denying statement exempts, without opening the key to all principals, and says it is for human review and not applied", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "always_passes" + } + ], + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "11/12", + "percentage": 92 + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "9/12", + "percentage": 75 + } + }, + "metrics": { + "with_skill": { + "runtime_avg": "39s", + "cost_avg": "$0.33", + "context_window_avg": { + "utilization": "6.1%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + }, + "without_skill": { + "runtime_avg": "26s", + "cost_avg": "$0.22", + "context_window_avg": { + "utilization": "4.9%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } + }, + "comparison": { + "quality": { + "pairs_evaluated": 2, + "pairs_skipped": 1, + "skip_reasons": [ + "without_skill expected_output test failed" + ], + "overall": { + "with_skill_wins": 4, + "without_skill_wins": 2, + "equivalent": 1, + "winner": "with_skill", + "avg_confidence": "medium", + "summary": "with_skill wins overall (4 vs 2 criterion wins out of 7 judgments, avg confidence: medium). Gotchas: with_skill is weaker on 'actionability' (without_skill won 1/2 iterations for this criterion)." + }, + "per_criterion": { + "accuracy": { + "with_skill_wins": 2, + "without_skill_wins": 1, + "equivalent": 0 + }, + "actionability": { + "with_skill_wins": 0, + "without_skill_wins": 1, + "equivalent": 1 + }, + "completeness": { + "with_skill_wins": 2, + "without_skill_wins": 0, + "equivalent": 0 + } + }, + "iterations": [ + { + "iteration": 1, + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "without_skill expected_output test failed" + }, + { + "iteration": 2, + "overall_winner": "without_skill", + "position_assignment": "with_skill=output_a", + "criteria": [ + { + "criterion": "accuracy", + "winner": "without_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Both outputs converge on the same root cause (KMS key policy explicit deny on kms:Decrypt except for the app role), which is well-reasoned and consistent with the symptoms. However, Output B grounds its conclusion in a specific, concrete key ID and shows the actual JSON policy statement it claims to have read, which lends more credibility to the claim of having 'run read-only checks'. Output A asserts 'Reading the key policy directly confirmed the deny' but then in the same breath says it has many unverifiable layers and even flags the bucket policy layer as blocked/unclear, creating some internal tension since a correct S3 GetObject diagnosis generally requires knowing the object's encryption settings definitively. Output A's claim that bucket policy was 'ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE' while also computing a definitive KMS root cause is somewhat inconsistent - if other layers are unverified, the confidence in the final root cause should be tempered, and Output A does attempt to temper it with hedges, but this makes the answer less clearly accurate/actionable. Output B is more direct, consistent, and provides the specific key resource ID, actual policy JSON, and a precise command to remediate, with an honest caveat only about whether the object actually uses this key (which is the single genuinely unverifiable fact). Overall, Output B's chain of reasoning is slightly tighter and more technically precise, though both are largely accurate in substance." + }, + { + "criterion": "actionability", + "winner": "without_skill", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Output B gives a complete, ready-to-run CLI remediation command (`aws kms put-key-policy ...`) along with the full updated JSON policy, and a follow-up verification command (`get-object` as reader) to confirm resolution. It also tells the user exactly how to verify the key assumption with `head-object` and what to look for (SSEKMSKeyId). Output A gives a CloudFormation diff snippet, which is useful for GitOps-style environments, but it's less immediately executable as a standalone fix command, and the user would need to manually integrate the diff into their template and run `aws cloudformation update-stack`. Output A does provide a one-liner to check the bucket policy but doesn't provide a complete remediation command to directly fix the KMS policy via CLI (relying on the template update process). Output B's step-by-step actionable fix (apply policy, verify, re-test) is more immediately practical for an operator to execute right now, especially in an incident-response context implied by INCIDENT_RCA agent type." + }, + { + "criterion": "completeness", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Output A includes a comprehensive 10-layer S3 access-check matrix (SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, KMS key policy), explicitly documenting verdicts and evidence for each layer and clearly listing what could not be checked and why. This structured, exhaustive walkthrough demonstrates a far more complete diagnostic review of the entire access path, which is valuable for an INCIDENT_RCA context where thoroughness and audit-trail-like documentation matter. Output B focuses narrowly on the KMS layer and only briefly mentions the role's own policies ('the role has no permissions boundary, and its only policy is the inline read-test-object') without systematically ruling out other layers (SCP, VPC endpoint, object ownership, access point, session policy, Block Public Access). While Output B's narrower focus might be appropriate once the root cause is found, it leaves more potential blockers unaddressed/unmentioned compared to Output A's systematic completeness, especially if the KMS fix doesn't fully resolve the issue due to another layer." + } + ] + }, + { + "iteration": 3, + "overall_winner": "with_skill", + "position_assignment": "with_skill=output_a", + "criteria": [ + { + "criterion": "accuracy", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Both outputs identify the same root cause (KMS key policy explicit Deny excluding all principals except nebula-demo-s3-02-app) and propose the same fix. Output A additionally verifies that the nebula-demo-s3-02-app role referenced in the exception doesn't exist (IAM NoSuchEntity), which is a meaningful additional fact that strengthens the diagnosis and explains why no one can currently decrypt. Output B does not mention checking whether this excepted role exists, and it claims it could not read the bucket policy or encryption settings (saying S3 calls were blocked), yet still asserts with high confidence that the object is likely encrypted with this key without directly confirming via head-object - it is transparent about this uncertainty, which is good, but Output A goes further in independently confirming more layers (via AWS Config) and achieves higher certainty of the root cause. However, Output A's claim about 'bypass the deny' paths is somewhat vague. Overall Output A's investigation appears more thorough, systematic, and corroborated, giving it a slight edge in accuracy/confidence of root cause determination.", + "evidence": "Output A: 'The `nebula-demo-s3-02-app` role named in the exception doesn't exist (IAM `NoSuchEntity`). No principal can currently decrypt with this key, except through paths that bypass the deny.' Output B: 'I haven't confirmed that `test/hello.txt` is encrypted with this exact key... Policy blocked my S3 calls: listing buckets, reading the bucket policy and encryption settings, and `head-object`.'" + }, + { + "criterion": "accuracy", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "low", + "reasoning": "This is a secondary accuracy note: Output A systematically runs through 10 layers of the AWS access control model (SCP, VPC endpoint, BPA, bucket policy, access point, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, ACL, KMS key policy) and provides verdicts and evidence for each, lending more rigor and transparency to the claim that no other layer is blocking. Output B covers fewer layers explicitly (bucket policy, permissions boundary, SCP) and relies more on inference. This makes Output A's conclusion that 'no other layer would deny' more credible.", + "evidence": "Output A's 'Layer table' systematically checks 10 distinct layers with verdicts; Output B only briefly mentions 'I didn't find a permissions boundary... I couldn't check organization SCPs.'" + }, + { + "criterion": "actionability", + "winner": "equivalent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Both outputs provide the same core actionable fix: edit the KMs key policy to add the reader role's ARN to the ArnNotEquals condition, with the exact JSON needed. Output B provides the explicit `aws kms put-key-policy` CLI command to apply the fix and the retry command (`aws s3api get-object`), making it slightly more directly actionable/concrete for immediate execution. Output A instead recommends updating the CloudFormation stack template (noting the key is managed via a stack) and warns against manual put-key-policy due to drift risk, which is actionable in a different way (and arguably more correct in an IaC environment) but doesn't give the exact CLI command for the manual option. Both give clear next steps (retry the call, check SSEKMSKeyId, consider creating the app role or removing the deny alternative). Given one has more precise CLI syntax and the other gives more operationally sound IaC guidance, they balance out to be roughly equivalent in overall actionability.", + "evidence": "Output B: 'Apply it with `aws kms put-key-policy --key-id c3169669-b4bd-4a0d-9115-53df20d4580a --policy-name default --policy file://policy.json`.' Output A: 'The key is defined in the CloudFormation stack `nebula-demo-s3-02`. Make this change in the template's `Key` resource and redeploy. A manual `put-key-policy` would drift from the stack and be overwritten on the next update.'" + }, + { + "criterion": "completeness", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Output A covers more ground: it systematically enumerates all major access-control layers (10 layers) with verdicts, explicitly states what it could and couldn't check and why (SCPs/RCPs, VPC endpoint, session policy, live bucket policy), and discusses the alternative intent (create the missing app role) as well as stack drift considerations. Output B covers the core fix well and is honest about what it couldn't verify (bucket policy, encryption settings, SSEKMSKeyId), but it has a narrower scope - it doesn't address SCPs/OUs, VPC endpoints, access points, session policies, or ACLs/object ownership explicitly in as much depth, and doesn't check whether the 'app' role actually exists. Output A's response is more exhaustive in covering different potential causes and ruling them out methodically, which fits the 'do not open a tracked investigation, run the checks yourself' instruction more thoroughly.", + "evidence": "Output A's layer table addresses SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACL, and KMS key policy \u2014 10 layers total with verdicts. Output B addresses fewer layers explicitly: role policy, key policy, permissions boundary, and briefly SCPs ('I couldn't check organization SCPs')." + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "runtime": { + "pairs_evaluated": 2, + "pairs_skipped": 1, + "threshold_exceeded_count": 0, + "threshold_seconds": 30.0, + "iterations": [ + { + "iteration": 1, + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "without_skill expected_output test failed" + }, + { + "iteration": 2, + "with_skill_seconds": 42.785, + "without_skill_seconds": 21.937, + "delta_seconds": 20.8, + "threshold_exceeded": false + }, + { + "iteration": 3, + "with_skill_seconds": 38.167, + "without_skill_seconds": 26.818, + "delta_seconds": 11.3, + "threshold_exceeded": false + } + ] + } + }, + "output_consistency": { + "comparison": { + "more_consistent": "without_skill", + "with_skill_wins": 1, + "without_skill_wins": 2, + "equivalent": 0, + "summary": "without_skill is more consistent: it won 2 dimension(s), with_skill 1, 0 equivalent of 3." + }, + "with_skill": { + "outputs_compared": 3, + "iterations_included": [ + 1, + 2, + 3 + ], + "overall": "mostly_consistent", + "overall_score": 2.33, + "dimension_counts": { + "consistent": 1, + "mostly_consistent": 2 + }, + "avg_confidence": "medium", + "per_dimension": { + "answer_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "All three outputs identify the same root cause: the KMS key policy's 'KeyUsageRule' statement explicitly denies kms:Decrypt to everyone except the 'nebula-demo-s3-02-app' role, and since the reader role is not that role, the explicit deny overrides its own kms:Decrypt allow, causing AccessDenied on GetObject. All three also agree the bucket policy and S3 identity permissions are not the cause (bucket policy absent/not applicable). However, iteration 3 adds a materially different fact not present in the other two: that the 'nebula-demo-s3-02-app' role referenced in the exception does not exist (IAM NoSuchEntity), which changes the interpretation of the fix (potentially needing to create the app role rather than just widen the condition). Iterations 1 and 2 assume the app role exists. This is a material addition/divergence in supporting facts.", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 3 + ] + }, + "recommendation_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "All three recommend the same primary fix: edit the KMS key policy's KeyUsageRule condition to add the reader role ARN to the list of principals exempted from the deny, and all explicitly note they have not applied this change (proposed for human review). They all suggest confirming whether the restriction was intentional before widening it. However, there are differences: iteration 2 recommends making the change via the CloudFormation template (since the key is managed by a stack) rather than a direct put-key-policy call, which iteration 1 explicitly recommends via a direct 'aws kms put-key-policy' CLI command, while iteration 3 also mentions the stack but frames the fix with a different condition operator (ArnNotEquals vs StringNotEquals) and suggests an alternative fix path (creating the missing app role) as better. These differences in specificity and secondary recommendations are enough for 'mostly_consistent' rather than full consistency.", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 1, + 2, + 3 + ] + }, + "format_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three responses use the same overall structure: a 'Root cause' section in prose, a 'Layer table' with the same 10 rows and columns (#, Layer, Verdict, Evidence), a 'Proposed fix' section with a JSON/diff code snippet, a 'Subsequent blockers' section, and a 'Could not check' section as a bulleted list. The presentation choices (table for layers, code block for fix, bullet list for could-not-check items) are identical across all three outputs." + } + } + }, + "without_skill": { + "outputs_compared": 3, + "iterations_included": [ + 1, + 2, + 3 + ], + "overall": "mostly_consistent", + "overall_score": 2.67, + "dimension_counts": { + "consistent": 2, + "mostly_consistent": 1 + }, + "avg_confidence": "high", + "per_dimension": { + "answer_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three outputs identify the same root cause: an explicit Deny statement (Sid: KeyUsageRule) in the KMS key policy for key c3169669-b4bd-4a0d-9115-53df20d4580a that denies kms:Decrypt to all principals except role/nebula-demo-s3-02-app, which overrides the IAM allow and causes S3 GetObject to fail with AccessDenied. All three also note they could not confirm via S3 calls (list_buckets, get_bucket_policy, get_bucket_encryption, head_object) that the object actually uses this key, and recommend verifying via head-object SSEKMSKeyId. The key facts (key ID, statement content, condition, mechanism) are identical across all three." + }, + "recommendation_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three recommend the same primary fix: modify the KMS key policy to add the reader role to the exception list (using StringNotEquals/ArnNotEquals with a list including both roles), applied via aws kms put-key-policy, and note this must be done by someone else since the agent can't make the change. All three also offer an alternative (remove the deny statement if unintended) and recommend verifying with head-object to confirm the SSEKMSKeyId matches, then retrying get-object. The specific commands and steps are essentially identical in substance." + }, + "format_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "All three use a similar structure: an opening one-line summary, a Cause/Evidence section with the JSON deny statement, a Fix section with code blocks and CLI commands, and a 'What I couldn't check/verify' section. Iteration 1 uses '## Cause', '## Fix', '## What I couldn't check' as top-level markdown headers; iterations 2 and 3 use bold text headers instead of '##' headers, and iteration 3 adds an 'Evidence' section as a separate bullet list before Fix, while iteration 1 and 2 blend evidence into Cause narrative differently. The shape is recognizably the same (intro line, cause, fix with options, caveats) but presentation choices (heading level, use of bullet lists vs prose, numbered fix options) differ slightly." + } + } + } + } + }, + "permissions-boundary-deny": { + "summary": "Both variants reliably triggered the behavior under test (3/3) and both fully met the expected output across their 3 runs (3/3, 100%). However, the confidence behind that \"expected output\" judgment differs: with_skill's judgments were high-confidence, while without_skill's were medium-confidence, so without_skill's \"met expectations\" result rests on a somewhat weaker measurement.\n\nOn the detailed assertions (12 checks total per variant, 3 runs x 4 assertions), with_skill passed all 12/12, while without_skill passed 8/12 (67%). Breaking this down:\n- Two assertions passed for both variants every time (\"has a section for later blockers/unverifiable layers\" and \"boundary diff adds only the needed permission and is flagged for human review, not applied\") \u2014 these are not differentiating and show both variants handle those requirements solidly.\n- One assertion (\"names the permissions boundary as the denying layer, DENIED_BY\") was flaky for without_skill (2/3) versus consistent for with_skill (3/3), both at high confidence.\n- One assertion (using only the specified verdict labels across all ten layers, never a plain \"allowed/pass\") passed 3/3 for with_skill but failed all 3/3 for without_skill \u2014 a clear, high-confidence split on this specific requirement, suggesting without_skill's output format deviates from the expected labeling convention somewhat consistently.\n\nOn quality, across 3 compared pairs (high confidence), with_skill was favored more often overall (6 criterion-instances vs 2 for without_skill, with 1 comparable). By criterion, with_skill was favored more on accuracy (2 vs 1) and actionability (2 vs 1), and more clearly on completeness (2 vs 0, with 1 comparable). These are modest sample sizes (3 pairs), so the magnitude should be read cautiously, but the direction is consistent across all three criteria in favor of with_skill.\n\nOn efficiency, without_skill was faster (avg 22s vs 38s, ~16s less) and cheaper (avg $0.19 vs $0.32). Context window utilization was low and similar for both (~5-6%), with no compaction events for either. No runs exceeded the 30s runtime threshold in the comparison set, despite with_skill's higher average runtime.\n\nOutput consistency across repeated runs was rated \"mostly_consistent\" for both variants, with with_skill scoring slightly higher (2.67 vs 2.0 on the underlying scale) and showing 2 fully \"consistent\" dimensions plus 1 \"mostly_consistent,\" versus without_skill's 3 \"mostly_consistent\" dimensions. Both results carry high confidence.\n\nOverall, this presents a tradeoff: without_skill is notably faster and cheaper, while with_skill shows higher and more consistent assertion-pass rates (especially on the verdict-labeling requirement, where without_skill failed entirely), is favored more often on quality criteria, and shows marginally higher run-to-run consistency. The small sample size (3 runs/pairs) and the medium-confidence expected-output judgment for without_skill warrant some caution in how strongly these differences should be weighted.", + "task_type": "chat", + "trigger": { + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100 + }, + "without_skill": null + }, + "expected_output": { + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "medium" + } + }, + "assertions": { + "per_assertion": [ + { + "index": 0, + "text": "The output names the permissions boundary as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "2/3", + "percentage": 67, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "flaky" + }, + { + "index": 1, + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "0/3", + "percentage": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "skill_uplift" + }, + { + "index": 2, + "text": "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "always_passes" + }, + { + "index": 3, + "text": "The proposed boundary diff adds only s3:GetObject on the bucket's objects to the boundary, not s3:* or a wildcard resource, and says it is for human review and not applied", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "always_passes" + } + ], + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "12/12", + "percentage": 100 + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "8/12", + "percentage": 67 + } + }, + "metrics": { + "with_skill": { + "runtime_avg": "38s", + "cost_avg": "$0.32", + "context_window_avg": { + "utilization": "5.7%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + }, + "without_skill": { + "runtime_avg": "22s", + "cost_avg": "$0.19", + "context_window_avg": { + "utilization": "4.9%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } + }, + "comparison": { + "quality": { + "pairs_evaluated": 3, + "pairs_skipped": 0, + "skip_reasons": [], + "overall": { + "with_skill_wins": 6, + "without_skill_wins": 2, + "equivalent": 1, + "winner": "with_skill", + "avg_confidence": "high", + "summary": "with_skill wins overall (6 vs 2 criterion wins out of 9 judgments, avg confidence: high)." + }, + "per_criterion": { + "accuracy": { + "with_skill_wins": 2, + "without_skill_wins": 1, + "equivalent": 0 + }, + "actionability": { + "with_skill_wins": 2, + "without_skill_wins": 1, + "equivalent": 0 + }, + "completeness": { + "with_skill_wins": 2, + "without_skill_wins": 0, + "equivalent": 1 + } + }, + "iterations": [ + { + "iteration": 1, + "overall_winner": "with_skill", + "position_assignment": "with_skill=output_b", + "criteria": [ + { + "criterion": "accuracy", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Both outputs agree on the root cause (permissions boundary lacking s3:GetObject), which is the correct and well-explained mechanism. However, Output A claims it 'couldn't rule out' the bucket policy and simulator calls were 'blocked,' without explaining why, and leaves ambiguity about whether an explicit deny exists. Output B actually checked and confirmed there is no bucket policy (NoSuchBucketPolicy), explicitly ruling out that layer with evidence rather than leaving it uncertain. Output B also checked SCPs, VPC endpoint policies, Block Public Access, Access Point policies, Object Ownership/ACLs, and KMS, providing a systematically verified picture instead of an unverified one. Output A's claim that checks were 'blocked' is not substantiated and leaves significant unresolved uncertainty that undermines confidence in the stated root cause (admits only 'it's a strong match' while leaving open deny possibilities it did not actually verify). Output B's analysis is more rigorous and verifiably accurate across the permission chain.", + "evidence": "Output A: 'The boundary is a strong match, but I couldn't rule out an explicit deny in the bucket policy, because that read was blocked (details below).' vs Output B: '4 | Bucket policy | NOT_APPLICABLE | There is no bucket policy (NoSuchBucketPolicy). Same-account access relies on the identity policy.'" + }, + { + "criterion": "actionability", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Both provide the same core fix (add s3:GetObject to the boundary policy, with the exact IAM CLI command). Output B goes further by giving a diff-style change (easier to apply precisely), discussing an alternative (detaching the boundary) with a reasoned recommendation against it, specifying effective timing nuances (boundary effective immediately, no re-attachment needed), and giving a concrete, actionable follow-up step if the fix doesn't work (checking VPC endpoint policy, including specific VPC/endpoint IDs). Output A's fix is similar but less detailed in follow-up guidance, and its 'what I couldn't check' section is vaguer (mentions KMS and object existence without checking them, whereas Output B actually checked and ruled those out via evidence).", + "evidence": "Output B: 'If the error persists after the boundary fix, check which VPC you're calling from... vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d allows only nebula-demo-s3-05-reports.' vs Output A's more generic: 'If AccessDenied continues after the boundary fix, check the bucket policy for a Deny and the object's KMS key.'" + }, + { + "criterion": "completeness", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Output B systematically works through all relevant layers in the S3 access control chain (SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, ACLs, KMS) with explicit verdicts and evidence for each, providing a much more complete picture of the investigation. Output A touches on fewer layers and explicitly states several things it 'couldn't check' (bucket policy, simulator, KMS, object existence) without providing the same breadth of verification that Output B achieved for most of these (e.g., Output B confirmed no bucket policy exists, confirmed KMS is SSE-S3 not customer-managave, confirmed ACLs are not in play due to BucketOwnerEnforced, confirmed SCPs don't apply). Output A leaves many more open questions unaddressed.", + "evidence": "Output B provides a 10-layer table with verdicts for each (SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint, BPA, bucket policy, access point, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, ACLs, KMS), whereas Output A's 'What I couldn't check' section lists bucket name assumption, bucket policy, simulator, KMS, and object existence as unresolved items 'blocked' from checking." + } + ] + }, + { + "iteration": 2, + "overall_winner": "with_skill", + "position_assignment": "with_skill=output_a", + "criteria": [ + { + "criterion": "accuracy", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Both outputs correctly identify the permissions boundary as the root cause and provide an identical, correct fix. However, Output A performs a more thorough investigation across multiple layers (SCP, VPC endpoint, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access points, object ownership/ACLs, KMS) and reports concrete findings for most of them (e.g., confirming no bucket policy exists, confirming BucketOwnerEnforced, confirming SSE-S3 encryption), which are stated as verified facts rather than caveats. Output B claims it 'couldn't read the bucket policy or the object' and lists these as unchecked, which is a less thorough investigation and leaves more uncertainty despite the task instructing the agent to run read-only checks itself. Output A actually ran more of these checks and reports results, making its conclusions more grounded and accurate. Output B's claim that calls were 'blocked in this session' is also a potential inconsistency since the user instructed the agent to run checks itself; Output A appears to have successfully run more checks as instructed.", + "evidence": "Output A: 'Bucket policy | NOT_APPLICABLE | There is no bucket policy, so nothing denies here.' and 'Object Ownership/ACLs | NOT_APPLICABLE | The bucket uses BucketOwnerEnforced' and 'KMS | NOT_APPLICABLE | Default encryption is SSE-S3 (AES256)'. Output B: 'these read-only calls were blocked in this session, so I didn't see: The bucket policy... The object...'" + }, + { + "criterion": "actionability", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Both provide the same clear, specific fix command. Output A goes further by systematically identifying additional subsequent blockers (VPC endpoint policy specifics with exact endpoint ID, session policy) and explicitly tells the user what to do if the fix doesn't work (send exact error text and location). Output B also gives next steps (re-assume role, check bucket policy/head-object) but relies on the user to run additional commands with admin credentials rather than having completed as many checks itself, which is less aligned with the user's explicit instruction to run the checks themselves and give the full answer now.", + "evidence": "Output A: 'Possible: if the caller is inside vpc-0a8f51eba21e69cd6, the nebula-demo-s3-05 gateway endpoint policy would also deny this bucket...' Output B: 'the response from aws s3api get-bucket-policy ... run with admin credentials would show which of these it is.'" + }, + { + "criterion": "completeness", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Output A provides a full layer-by-layer analysis covering 10 distinct layers (SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, ACLs, KMS) with explicit verdicts for each, giving a comprehensive picture of what was checked and ruled out. Output B covers fewer layers explicitly and defers bucket policy and object checks to the user, framing them as blocked rather than completed, despite the user's explicit instruction to run read-only checks itself. This makes Output A notably more complete in addressing all aspects of the AccessDenied investigation.", + "evidence": "Output A's 10-row layer table covering SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, ACLs, and KMS. Output B only explicitly covers role policy, boundary, and lists bucket policy/object/SCPs as unchecked." + } + ] + }, + { + "iteration": 3, + "overall_winner": "without_skill", + "position_assignment": "with_skill=output_a", + "criteria": [ + { + "criterion": "accuracy", + "winner": "without_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Both outputs correctly identify the root cause (permissions boundary lacking s3:GetObject). However, Output B provides more concrete verification evidence (Block Public Access settings checked and confirmed all on but not relevant, trust policy checked and confirmed assumable, bucket policy confirmed absent) while actually running read-only checks as instructed. Output A hedges heavily with many 'ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE' and 'CANNOT_DETERMINE' verdicts, and explicitly states it couldn't list buckets or check bucket policy/BPA/ownership/encryption - meaning it did not fully comply with the instruction to 'run the read-only checks yourself'. Output A also introduces a contradictory/confusing claim that the account is the 'organization's management account' which is not well substantiated and seems like an overreach. Output B's claim about SCPs ('I didn't check for one') is honest but less thorough than Output A's attempt, though Output A's SCP check conclusion is also somewhat uncertain. Overall Output B appears more accurate and grounded in actual verified checks, while Output A's accuracy is undermined by excessive unverifiable layers and a dubious claim about being the org management account." + }, + { + "criterion": "actionability", + "winner": "without_skill", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Output B gives concrete, copy-pasteable AWS CLI commands to apply the fix (create-policy-version with --set-as-default) and to retry the operation (get-object command), making it immediately actionable. It also offers an alternative (removing the boundary) with a specific command and a judgment call on which is safer. Output A only provides the JSON policy document and says to 'make the same change' to the CloudFormation template, but doesn't give the actual CLI command to update the boundary policy, nor a specific retry command with exact syntax. Output A's fix section says 'for your review, not applied' which is appropriate given the read-only instruction, but Output B also respects this by saying 'I can't change IAM permissions' while still giving ready-to-run commands for the user to execute themselves - this is more actionable." + }, + { + "criterion": "completeness", + "winner": "equivalent", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Output A provides a more exhaustive 10-layer checklist (SCP, VPC endpoint, BPA, bucket policy, access point, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, ACLs, KMS) covering more potential layers explicitly, which is thorough in enumeration. However, many of these are marked unverifiable, reducing the practical completeness of the diagnosis. Output B covers fewer layers explicitly (identity policy, boundary, bucket policy, BPA, trust policy) but includes concrete verification for each and flags remaining risks (SCP, KMS) as caveats. Output A is more complete in breadth of enumerated layers but less complete in actual verified conclusions; Output B is more complete in actionable depth but narrower in breadth. This trades off roughly evenly, making them comparable overall, though Output A's extra layers (VPC endpoint, access point, session policy) show broader coverage that Output B omits entirely." + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "runtime": { + "pairs_evaluated": 3, + "pairs_skipped": 0, + "threshold_exceeded_count": 0, + "threshold_seconds": 30.0, + "iterations": [ + { + "iteration": 1, + "with_skill_seconds": 36.58, + "without_skill_seconds": 22.855, + "delta_seconds": 13.7, + "threshold_exceeded": false + }, + { + "iteration": 2, + "with_skill_seconds": 35.081, + "without_skill_seconds": 19.723, + "delta_seconds": 15.4, + "threshold_exceeded": false + }, + { + "iteration": 3, + "with_skill_seconds": 43.998, + "without_skill_seconds": 24.347, + "delta_seconds": 19.7, + "threshold_exceeded": false + } + ] + } + }, + "output_consistency": { + "comparison": { + "more_consistent": "with_skill", + "with_skill_wins": 2, + "without_skill_wins": 0, + "equivalent": 1, + "summary": "with_skill is more consistent: it won 2 dimension(s), without_skill 0, 1 equivalent of 3." + }, + "with_skill": { + "outputs_compared": 3, + "iterations_included": [ + 1, + 2, + 3 + ], + "overall": "mostly_consistent", + "overall_score": 2.67, + "dimension_counts": { + "consistent": 2, + "mostly_consistent": 1 + }, + "avg_confidence": "high", + "per_dimension": { + "answer_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three outputs agree on the root cause: the permissions boundary policy nebula-demo-s3-03-policy only allows s3:ListBucket, not s3:GetObject, causing an implicit deny despite the inline identity policy allowing GetObject. All identify the same bucket name and account. They also agree on most layer verdicts (bucket policy NOT_APPLICABLE/no bucket policy, identity policy fine, VPC endpoint as a caveat, session policy unverifiable, KMS not applicable). However, iteration 3 diverges materially by claiming the platform blocked several of its own checks (bucket policy, Block Public Access, Object Ownership, KMS encryption reads), marking them CANNOT_DETERMINE/ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE with added caveats about CloudFormation stack template and needing the user to run checks themselves, which contradicts the prompt's instruction to run checks and give a full answer. Iterations 1 and 2 present these as confidently checked/ruled out. This is a material difference in confidence and completeness of the diagnosis.", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 3 + ] + }, + "recommendation_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three recommend the same core fix: add an s3:GetObject allow statement to the permissions boundary policy nebula-demo-s3-03-policy, scoped to the bucket's objects, and create a new default policy version via aws iam create-policy-version. All present this as a proposed fix, not applied. Iteration 3 adds an extra recommendation to also update the CloudFormation template's Boundary resource, which is an additional detail but doesn't conflict with the primary recommendation shared by all." + }, + "format_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three responses use the same structure: a root cause paragraph, a 'Layer table' with the same 10 numbered layers and columns (#, Layer, Verdict, Evidence), a 'Proposed fix' section with a JSON/diff code block and CLI command, a 'Subsequent blockers' section, and a 'Could not check' section. The shape and section ordering is essentially identical across all three." + } + } + }, + "without_skill": { + "outputs_compared": 3, + "iterations_included": [ + 1, + 2, + 3 + ], + "overall": "mostly_consistent", + "overall_score": 2.0, + "dimension_counts": { + "mostly_consistent": 3 + }, + "avg_confidence": "high", + "per_dimension": { + "answer_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three outputs identify the same root cause: the permissions boundary 'nebula-demo-s3-03-policy' only allows s3:ListBucket, not s3:GetObject, and the inline role policy is correct. They all cite the same ARNs, bucket name, and account ID. However, they diverge on secondary claims: iteration 1 states it 'couldn't rule out' bucket policy issues and never confirmed one exists; iteration 2 similarly flags bucket policy as unchecked; iteration 3 explicitly states it checked and confirmed there IS NO bucket policy, and also checked Block Public Access settings and trust policy, which the others do not mention. Iteration 3 also states it got a 403 on HeadObject itself, a detail absent elsewhere. These represent material additions/omissions of checked facts.", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 3 + ] + }, + "recommendation_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three recommend the same primary fix: update the permissions boundary to add s3:GetObject via create-policy-version with --set-as-default, then retry the get-object call. All give near-identical JSON and CLI commands. However, iteration 3 adds an alternative recommendation (delete-role-permissions-boundary) not present in the other two, making it materially more expansive in its next-step options.", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 3 + ] + }, + "format_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three use a similar overall shape: a 'Cause' section with narrative explanation, a 'What I found' or findings section, a 'Fix' section with JSON policy document and CLI commands, and a closing 'what I couldn't check / limits' section. However, iteration 3 uniquely introduces a markdown table to lay out the layer-by-layer permission evaluation, which iterations 1 and 2 present as prose/bullets instead. This is a distinct presentation choice difference.", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 3 + ] + } + } + } + } + }, + "identity-policy-wrong-arn": { + "summary": "Both variants were tested on the same chat task (IAM policy layer analysis for an S3 access-denial scenario), with the behavior under test firing reliably (3/3) in all cases.\n\nExpected output: both without_skill and with_skill met the expected output in all 3 runs (100%), with high confidence in both cases \u2014 no difference here.\n\nAssertions: this is where the variants diverge clearly. Of 9 total assertion checks (3 assertions \u00d7 3 runs), with_skill passed all 9 (100%), while without_skill passed 6/9 (67%). Breaking this down by individual assertion:\n- One assertion (identifying the denying policy layer) passed for both variants in all runs \u2014 this check does not differentiate them, though without_skill's confidence on this one was rated medium vs. high for with_skill.\n- One assertion (the corrected IAM policy being object-level, not widened, and flagged for operator review) also passed for both in all runs \u2014 again not differentiating.\n- One assertion (verdicts for all ten layers using only the specified labels, avoiding plain \"allowed/pass\" wording) passed 3/3 for with_skill but failed 0/3 for without_skill, with high confidence on both sides. This is the one assertion driving the overall gap, and it points to a specific behavioral difference: without_skill appears to use disallowed verdict labels where with_skill does not.\n\nQuality comparison (3 pairs evaluated, none skipped): with_skill was favored in 8 of the scored instances, without_skill in 2, with 2 rated comparable, at medium confidence overall. By criterion, with_skill was favored more often on accuracy, actionability, and completeness, though without_skill was favored at least once on accuracy and completeness, so the pattern is not unanimous.\n\nMetrics: without_skill ran notably faster (18s vs 41s avg) and cheaper ($0.15 vs $0.35 avg), with slightly lower context utilization (4.8% vs 6.0%; neither triggered compaction). Runtime comparison flagged 1 of 3 pairs exceeding the 30s threshold (high confidence). So without_skill has a clear speed/cost advantage, while with_skill shows better assertion compliance and is favored more often on quality.\n\nOutput consistency: both variants were rated \"mostly_consistent\" overall across repeated runs, with with_skill scoring slightly higher (2.67 vs 2.0 on the underlying scale) and showing 2 \"consistent\" + 1 \"mostly_consistent\" dimension vs. without_skill's 3 \"mostly_consistent\" dimensions. Confidence in this consistency rating was high for both.\n\nOverall, the two variants show a tradeoff: without_skill is substantially faster and cheaper, but failed a specific, well-defined assertion about verdict labeling in every run and was favored less often on quality (accuracy/actionability/completeness), while with_skill passed all assertions, was favored more often in quality comparisons, and showed marginally better run-to-run consistency, at roughly double the runtime and cost.", + "task_type": "chat", + "trigger": { + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100 + }, + "without_skill": null + }, + "expected_output": { + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + } + }, + "assertions": { + "per_assertion": [ + { + "index": 0, + "text": "The output names the identity policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "medium" + }, + "classification": "always_passes" + }, + { + "index": 1, + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "0/3", + "percentage": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "skill_uplift" + }, + { + "index": 2, + "text": "The corrected Resource is an object-level ARN under the bucket (either arn:aws:s3:::/* or the specific object key), not the bare bucket ARN, the action list is not widened to s3:*, and the output says the change is for the operator to review and apply", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "always_passes" + } + ], + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "9/9", + "percentage": 100 + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "6/9", + "percentage": 67 + } + }, + "metrics": { + "with_skill": { + "runtime_avg": "41s", + "cost_avg": "$0.35", + "context_window_avg": { + "utilization": "6.0%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + }, + "without_skill": { + "runtime_avg": "18s", + "cost_avg": "$0.15", + "context_window_avg": { + "utilization": "4.8%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } + }, + "comparison": { + "quality": { + "pairs_evaluated": 3, + "pairs_skipped": 0, + "skip_reasons": [], + "overall": { + "with_skill_wins": 8, + "without_skill_wins": 2, + "equivalent": 2, + "winner": "with_skill", + "avg_confidence": "medium", + "summary": "with_skill wins overall (8 vs 2 criterion wins out of 12 judgments, avg confidence: medium)." + }, + "per_criterion": { + "accuracy": { + "with_skill_wins": 3, + "without_skill_wins": 1, + "equivalent": 1 + }, + "actionability": { + "with_skill_wins": 2, + "without_skill_wins": 0, + "equivalent": 1 + }, + "completeness": { + "with_skill_wins": 3, + "without_skill_wins": 1, + "equivalent": 0 + } + }, + "iterations": [ + { + "iteration": 1, + "overall_winner": "with_skill", + "position_assignment": "with_skill=output_a", + "criteria": [ + { + "criterion": "accuracy", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Both outputs correctly identify the same root cause: the inline policy's Resource ARN points to the bucket itself rather than the object. Output A adds additional detail tying this to a CloudFormation stack (nebula-demo-s3-04) and a specific template line (Resource: !GetAtt Bucket.Arn), which, if accurate, is a more precise and verifiable root cause including the infrastructure-as-code source of the misconfiguration. Output B's claim about 'role was last used at 07:58 UTC today' is an oddly specific unverified detail that isn't tied to any evidence of being checked via CloudTrail/IAM, which could be seen as an accuracy risk (unsubstantiated specificity). Output A is more transparent about what was verified vs. assumed (e.g., explicitly noting assumptions in the VPC endpoint layer, Object Ownership layer, etc.), making its accuracy claims more defensible. However both outputs share the core correct diagnosis, so the difference is moderate rather than large.", + "evidence": "Output A: 'The deployed policy matches the CloudFormation stack `nebula-demo-s3-04`, which sets `Resource: !GetAtt Bucket.Arn`.' Output B: 'The role's trust policy is fine, and the role was last used at 07:58 UTC today.' (unsupported specific claim)." + }, + { + "criterion": "accuracy", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "low", + "reasoning": "(Duplicate not needed - placeholder to ensure only one accuracy entry, removing duplicate reasoning)" + }, + { + "criterion": "actionability", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Output A provides a more actionable fix by giving a diff-style patch for the IAM policy AND explicitly addressing the infrastructure-as-code source of the problem (the CloudFormation template), warning that fixing only the live policy will be overwritten on next stack update. This is a critical operational insight missing from Output B. Output A also provides specific CLI commands to run to verify the unchecked items (e.g., 'aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket ...', 'get-public-access-block', 'get-bucket-ownership-controls', 'get-bucket-encryption'), making it easier for the user to follow up. Output B only lists what couldn't be checked without giving concrets commands to check them, slightly reducing its actionability.", + "evidence": "Output A: 'If you only change the live policy, the next stack update will put the bad ARN back.' and 'To confirm them, run `aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket nebula-demo-s3-04-111122223333_1-us-east-1` and the matching `get-public-access-block`, `get-bucket-ownership-controls` and `get-bucket-encryption` calls.' Output B: 'Calls to list buckets, read the bucket policy, read bucket encryption, read the object's metadata, and run the IAM policy simulator were all blocked. So I couldn't confirm these...' (no specific commands given)." + }, + { + "criterion": "completeness", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Output A provides a full systematic layer-by-layer analysis (10 layers: SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, KMS) with explicit verdicts for each, offering comprehensive coverage of the S3 access-denied troubleshooting decision tree. Output B only covers three follow-up items (bucket policy, KMS encryption, object existence) and doesn't systematically address other potential causes like SCPs, VPC endpoints, Block Public Access, access points, permissions boundaries, session policies, or Object Ownership/ACLs. This makes Output A substantially more complete in addressing all possible layers of access control that could affect the S3 GetObject call.", + "evidence": "Output A includes a full table with 10 layers checked including SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, and KMS. Output B only mentions 'Bucket policy', 'KMS encryption', and 'Object existence' as follow-up items, omitting coverage of SCPs, VPC endpoints, Block Public Access, access points, permissions boundaries, and session policies." + } + ] + }, + { + "iteration": 2, + "overall_winner": "with_skill", + "position_assignment": "with_skill=output_a", + "criteria": [ + { + "criterion": "accuracy", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Both outputs correctly identify the root cause: the inline policy's Resource is a bucket ARN, not an object ARN, so s3:GetObject (an object-level action) never matches. Both are technically accurate on the core diagnosis. Output A provides more granular, structured verification across many IAM evaluation layers (SCP, VPC endpoint, BPA, bucket policy, access point, permissions boundary, session policy, ACLs, KMS) with explicit verdicts, which demonstrates a more thorough and careful validation process consistent with 'run the read-only checks yourself' instruction. Output B also checks some additional caveats (KMS SSE, bucket ownership) but is less systematic and omits several layers (e.g., permissions boundary, access points, Block Public Access) that Output A explicitly addresses. Both are consistent with the prompt's facts (same bucket ARN, same policy name). Given the explicit layer-by-layer accuracy and transparency about what could not be verified, Output A is slightly more accurate and rigorous, though both are fundamentally correct.", + "evidence": "Output A: 'Layer 6, identity policy... allows s3:GetObject on [redacted ARN], which is the bucket ARN only.' Output B: '`s3:GetObject` is authorized against object ARNs... The bucket ARN, with no `/...` suffix, only matches bucket-level actions such as `ListBucket`.'" + }, + { + "criterion": "actionability", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Both provide a corrected policy with clear before/after JSON. Output A additionally gives a diff-style change, discusses updating the CloudFormation template (since the role is IaC-managed) to prevent drift, and explicitly notes the ListBucket omission consequence. Output B also gives a corrected policy and notes the ListBucket caveat, including a conditional policy snippet for prefix-limited listing, which is a nice practical addition. However, Output A's instruction to update the CloudFormation template as well is a critical actionable detail Output B omits entirely, which is important for production correctness (avoiding config drift). This makes Output A slightly more actionable overall.", + "evidence": "Output A: 'The role is defined in the CloudFormation stack, so make the same change in the template... Otherwise a stack update will undo a console edit.' Output B: 'I didn't apply the change. You can paste the corrected policy into `read-test-object` yourself.'" + }, + { + "criterion": "completeness", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Output A systematically runs through 10 distinct IAM/S3 authorization layers (SCP, VPC endpoint, BPA, bucket policy, access point, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, ACLs, KMS) with explicit verdicts and evidence/caveats for each, providing a much more complete picture of the investigation performed and what remains unverified. Output B covers fewer layers explicitly (mentions bucket policy, KMS encryption, cross-account ownership) but misses discussion of permissions boundary, access points, Block Public Access, Organizations SCPs/RCPs, and session policies as distinct checked items. Output A's structured completeness aligns better with the demand to 'run the read-only checks yourself' comprehensively.", + "evidence": "Output A's Layer table enumerates SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, BPA, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, and KMS \u2014 each with a verdict. Output B only states: 'I couldn't rule out three other things: A bucket policy with an explicit deny... SSE-KMS encryption... A bucket owned by a different account.'" + } + ] + }, + { + "iteration": 3, + "overall_winner": "without_skill", + "position_assignment": "with_skill=output_a", + "criteria": [ + { + "criterion": "accuracy", + "winner": "equivalent", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Both outputs correctly identify the same root cause: the inline policy on the role grants s3:GetObject on the bucket ARN (not object ARN), which is an object-level action requiring an object-scoped resource. Both correctly note the bucket name was inferred from the policy resource and couldn't be independently confirmed via S3 calls that were blocked. Both provide technically correct corrected policies with the same resource ARN fix. Output A's claim about CloudFormation stack ownership ('The CloudFormation stack nebula-demo-s3-04 defines this policy as Resource: !GetAtt Bucket.Arn') introduces an additional claim not present in Output B - this could be a hallucination/unverified inference since Output A also states many reads were blocked, so it's unclear how this template detail was obtained. If true, this adds value; if fabricated, it reduces accuracy. Without more context, this is uncertain, so treating as roughly equivalent but flagging this difference.", + "evidence": "Output A: 'The CloudFormation stack `nebula-demo-s3-04` defines this policy as `Resource: !GetAtt Bucket.Arn`.' Output B does not make this claim, staying more conservative given the tool blocks." + }, + { + "criterion": "accuracy", + "winner": "without_skill", + "confidence": "low", + "reasoning": "Output A makes several specific claims (e.g., 'AWS Config has no record for the bucket', 'the seeder Lambda in the same account wrote the object', details about SCPs, CloudFormation template specifics) that go beyond what Output B claims, given that many S3 reads were explicitly blocked per both outputs. This raises risk of fabricated or unverifiable specifics presented as findings, whereas Output B is more conservative and transparent about what it actually knows versus what it couldn't verify, reducing risk of inaccurate overreach.", + "evidence": "Output A's table includes specific claims like 'AWS Config has no record for the bucket' and 'the seeder Lambda in the same account wrote the object' despite stating reads were blocked." + }, + { + "criterion": "actionability", + "winner": "equivalent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Both outputs provide the exact same core actionable fix: change the Resource in the inline policy from the bucket ARN to the object ARN (or /* or /test/* as alternatives). Both provide specific AWS CLI commands to run for further verification (get-bucket-policy, get-bucket-encryption, etc.). Output A additionally suggests updating the CloudFormation template to prevent drift, which is a nice additional actionable step, but this relies on the unverified claim about the template. Output B provides a head-object command which is also useful and directly actionable. Both are comparably actionable overall.", + "evidence": "Output A: 'Change it in the template too, to `!Sub '${Bucket.Arn}/test/hello.txt'`.' Output B: 'aws s3api head-object --bucket nebula-demo-s3-04-111122223333_1-us-east-1 --key test/hello.txt'" + }, + { + "criterion": "completeness", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Output A provides a more exhaustive systematic walkthrough of all policy evaluation layers (SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, ACLs, KMS) in a structured table format, which is more thorough in covering the full S3 access control evaluation chain as requested by the user's implicit need for a full diagnosis. Output B covers similar ground in prose but is less systematic and omits some layers like access points, permissions boundaries, and session policies explicitly (though it does mention KMS and bucket policy).", + "evidence": "Output A's 10-row table covering SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, ACLs, and KMS. Output B's 'What I couldn't check' section only covers bucket policy, KMS, and object existence/ListBucket." + }, + { + "criterion": "completeness", + "winner": "without_skill", + "confidence": "low", + "reasoning": "Output B raises a distinct and practically important edge case that Output A does not mention: if the object doesn't exist and the role lacks s3:ListBucket, S3 returns AccessDenied instead of NoSuchKey - this is a common real-world gotcha that adds completeness value not found in Output A.", + "evidence": "Output B: 'Object existence: if test/hello.txt doesn't exist and the role lacks s3:ListBucket, S3 returns AccessDenied instead of NoSuchKey.'" + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "runtime": { + "pairs_evaluated": 3, + "pairs_skipped": 0, + "threshold_exceeded_count": 1, + "threshold_seconds": 30.0, + "avg_confidence": "high", + "iterations": [ + { + "iteration": 1, + "with_skill_seconds": 39.291, + "without_skill_seconds": 20.162, + "delta_seconds": 19.1, + "threshold_exceeded": false + }, + { + "iteration": 2, + "with_skill_seconds": 47.195, + "without_skill_seconds": 17.033, + "delta_seconds": 30.2, + "threshold_exceeded": true, + "position_assignment": "with_skill=profile_b", + "contributors": [ + { + "description": "Skill load of s3-access-denied-resolver diagnostic workflow adds overhead not present in Profile A, including reading a skill resource for layer reference", + "estimated_seconds": 4.0, + "category": "extra_tool_call", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "description": "Extra tool calls to config:list_discovered_resources and cloudformation:describe_stacks to find buckets/stacks via Config and CloudFormation that were not needed in Profile A", + "estimated_seconds": 0.2, + "category": "extra_tool_call", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "description": "Extra tool calls to cloudformation:list_stack_resources and cloudformation:get_template to inspect the CloudFormation stack template, not present in Profile A", + "estimated_seconds": 0.1, + "category": "extra_tool_call", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "description": "Additional S3 bucket-level checks (get_bucket_ownership_controls, get_public_access_block) and organizations:list_policies_for_target for SCPs, beyond what Profile A checked", + "estimated_seconds": 0.3, + "category": "extra_tool_call", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "description": "Extra tool call config:batch_get_resource_config to check AWS Config record for the bucket, not present in Profile A", + "estimated_seconds": 0.5, + "category": "extra_tool_call", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "description": "Larger gap before s3api:get_bucket_policy call (8.4s) reflecting more complex reasoning after extensive CloudFormation/Config exploration, compared to Profile A's equivalent gap of 4.8s", + "estimated_seconds": 4.2, + "category": "slower_operation", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + { + "description": "Much longer final reasoning/text generation gap before final response (18.1s) compared to Profile A's 7.5s, reflecting synthesis of larger set of collected evidence (Config, CloudFormation, SCPs, bucket controls)", + "estimated_seconds": 18.1, + "category": "extra_thinking", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "description": "Longer initial gap (5.6s) before summarizing blocked bucket listing attempt, vs 2.9s in Profile A, due to additional role/skill context", + "estimated_seconds": 2.7, + "category": "slower_operation", + "confidence": "low" + } + ] + }, + { + "iteration": 3, + "with_skill_seconds": 39.039, + "without_skill_seconds": 17.413, + "delta_seconds": 21.6, + "threshold_exceeded": false + } + ] + } + }, + "output_consistency": { + "comparison": { + "more_consistent": "with_skill", + "with_skill_wins": 2, + "without_skill_wins": 0, + "equivalent": 1, + "summary": "with_skill is more consistent: it won 2 dimension(s), without_skill 0, 1 equivalent of 3." + }, + "with_skill": { + "outputs_compared": 3, + "iterations_included": [ + 1, + 2, + 3 + ], + "overall": "mostly_consistent", + "overall_score": 2.67, + "dimension_counts": { + "consistent": 2, + "mostly_consistent": 1 + }, + "avg_confidence": "high", + "per_dimension": { + "answer_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three outputs identify the same root cause: the inline policy 'read-test-object' on nebula-demo-s3-04-reader grants s3:GetObject only on the bucket ARN (not the object ARN), so the GetObject request for test/hello.txt has no matching allow. All three identify the same bucket name, same stack name (nebula-demo-s3-04), same policy statement text, and same layer-by-layer analysis table with DENIED_BY at layer 6 (Identity policy) and similar verdicts for other layers (NOT_APPLICABLE/CANNOT_DETERMINE/ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE for the rest). Minor wording differences in verdict labels (e.g., CANNOT_DETERMINE vs ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE for some layers) exist but the core answer and key facts are identical across all three." + }, + "recommendation_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three responses recommend the identical fix: change the Resource in the inline policy from the bucket ARN to the object ARN (.../test/hello.txt), with the same diff shown, note that '.../*' or '.../test/*' could be used for broader access, and recommend also updating the CloudFormation template (Resource: !GetAtt Bucket.Arn -> !Sub '${Bucket.Arn}/test/hello.txt') so a stack update doesn't revert the fix. All three explicitly state nothing was applied and that further checks (bucket policy, BPA, encryption, ownership, SCPs, session policy) should be run to confirm, providing the same follow-up commands." + }, + "format_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three responses use the same overall structure: a root cause paragraph, a 10-row layer table with the same columns (#, Layer, Verdict, Evidence), a 'Proposed fix' section with a diff code block, a 'Subsequent blockers' section, and a 'Could not check' section with bullet points. Iteration 1 has an additional small introductory note before the root cause and slightly different section header styling, and iteration 2 lacks a bolded 'Root cause:' lead-in but uses '## Root cause' heading instead, and includes an extra note about ListBucket/403 vs 404 not present in the others. These are minor presentational differences within the same overall shape, so mostly_consistent rather than fully consistent.", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 1, + 2 + ] + } + } + }, + "without_skill": { + "outputs_compared": 3, + "iterations_included": [ + 1, + 2, + 3 + ], + "overall": "mostly_consistent", + "overall_score": 2.0, + "dimension_counts": { + "mostly_consistent": 3 + }, + "avg_confidence": "high", + "per_dimension": { + "answer_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three outputs identify the same root cause: the inline policy 'read-test-object' on role nebula-demo-s3-04-reader grants s3:GetObject on the bucket ARN (no /key suffix) rather than an object ARN, so the action never matches test/hello.txt and is implicitly denied. All note no managed policies/permissions boundary, and that checks like bucket policy, KMS encryption, and object existence/ListBucket could not be verified due to blocked tool calls, listing the same three caveats. Minor differences: iteration 1 mentions the trust policy and 'last used at 07:58 UTC' as an additional checked fact not present in others (iteration 2 also checks trust policy but no timestamp; iteration 3 doesn't mention trust policy explicitly). Iteration 2 explicitly flags 'bucket owned by a different account' as an extra uncheckable item not mentioned in 1 or 3. These are minor additions/omissions on top of an otherwise identical core answer.", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 1, + 2 + ] + }, + "recommendation_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three recommend fixing the Resource field to include the object path (bucket/key) rather than just the bucket, and all explicitly state they will not apply the change themselves, leaving it to the user. All suggest alternate resource patterns (specific key, test/* prefix, or whole bucket). Iteration 2 goes further and adds an explicit extra ListBucket statement recommendation with a Condition, which is a materially more detailed/additional recommendation not present in 1 or 3. Iteration 3 gives explicit follow-up CLI commands to run if the issue persists, which iterations 1 and 2 do not provide (they describe what to check but not literal commands). These differences in additional specificity make it mostly_consistent rather than fully consistent.", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 2, + 3 + ] + }, + "format_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three use a similar structure: a short cause statement up front, a 'What I found' or equivalent section, a corrected policy in a JSON code block, and a 'What I couldn't check' section listing caveats. However, the exact section headers and ordering differ slightly: iteration 1 opens with an unlabeled intro sentence before '**Cause**', iteration 2 uses '**What I found**' with no separate '**Cause**' header, iteration 3 opens with inline '**Cause:**' bolded text followed by '**What I found**' with bullet points instead of prose. Iteration 3 also adds explicit CLI command bullets in the final section not found in the others. These are recognizably the same overall shape but differ in specific section labels, bullet vs prose usage, and presence of command-line snippets, which is consistent with 'mostly_consistent'.", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 1, + 2, + 3 + ] + } + } + } + } + }, + "vpc-endpoint-policy-deny": { + "summary": "Both variants were tested on the same chat task (an S3 gateway-endpoint-policy access denial scenario) across 3 runs, and the triggering behavior fired in all 3/3 cases.\n\nExpected output: Both with_skill and without_skill met the expected output in 3/3 runs (100%), with high-confidence judgments on both sides \u2014 this dimension shows no difference between them.\n\nAssertions (per-run checks): with_skill passed all 12/12 assertion instances (100%), while without_skill passed 8/12 (67%). Breaking this down by individual assertion:\n- Two assertions passed for both variants in all runs (identifying the request path/endpoint-policy bucket mismatch; proposing an endpoint-policy diff without changing the endpoint) \u2014 these are not differentiating and show both variants handle these aspects reliably.\n- One assertion (requiring verdict labels to be drawn only from the defined set, e.g. DENIED_BY, and not a plain \"allowed/pass\" verdict) passed 3/3 for with_skill but failed 0/3 for without_skill \u2014 a clear, consistent split on this specific requirement.\n- One assertion about reading the endpoint policy directly / correctly caveating IAM policy simulation was flaky for without_skill (2/3, medium confidence) while with_skill passed 3/3 (high confidence).\n\nQuality comparison (3 pairs evaluated, none skipped, medium average confidence): overall, with_skill was favored in 6 instances, without_skill in 1, with 2 rated comparable. By criterion: accuracy favored with_skill (2) with 1 comparable; completeness favored with_skill in all 3 pairs; actionability was mixed, with one pair favoring with_skill, one favoring without_skill, and one comparable. This suggests with_skill's edge is concentrated in accuracy/completeness, while actionability is a genuine toss-up.\n\nRuntime and cost: with_skill took ~36s and cost ~$0.30 on average; without_skill took ~21s and cost ~$0.18 \u2014 without_skill was faster and cheaper by a notable margin (roughly 15s and $0.12 per run). No runs for either variant exceeded the 30s comparison threshold in the dedicated runtime comparison (3 pairs evaluated).\n\nOutput consistency across repeated runs: with_skill was rated fully \"consistent\" (score 3.0/3, high confidence) across all three measured dimensions. without_skill was rated \"mostly_consistent\" (score 2.67/3, high confidence), with 2 of 3 dimensions consistent and 1 only mostly consistent.\n\nOverall picture: this is a tradeoff rather than a one-sided result. without_skill is meaningfully faster and cheaper and met the basic expected-output criterion equally well, but it showed lower assertion pass rates (driven mainly by a hard failure on the verdict-label-format requirement and some flakiness on the endpoint-policy-reading check), was favored less often in quality comparisons (particularly accuracy and completeness, though actionability was roughly split), and was slightly less consistent run-to-run. with_skill was slower and more expensive but scored higher on assertions, quality, and consistency. Confidence in the expected-output and consistency findings is high; confidence in the quality-comparison findings is only medium, so that particular gap should be weighed with some caution.", + "task_type": "chat", + "trigger": { + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100 + }, + "without_skill": null + }, + "expected_output": { + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + } + }, + "assertions": { + "per_assertion": [ + { + "index": 0, + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "0/3", + "percentage": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "skill_uplift" + }, + { + "index": 1, + "text": "The output identifies the request path as the S3 gateway endpoint before assigning verdicts, and states that the endpoint policy allows a different bucket and not the bucket being read", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "always_passes" + }, + { + "index": 2, + "text": "The output shows it read the endpoint policy directly, and if it mentions IAM policy simulation it states that simulation does not evaluate endpoint policies instead of treating a simulated 'allowed' as a verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "2/3", + "percentage": 67, + "avg_confidence": "medium" + }, + "classification": "flaky" + }, + { + "index": 3, + "text": "The output proposes an endpoint policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the endpoint itself", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "always_passes" + } + ], + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "12/12", + "percentage": 100 + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "8/12", + "percentage": 67 + } + }, + "metrics": { + "with_skill": { + "runtime_avg": "36s", + "cost_avg": "$0.30", + "context_window_avg": { + "utilization": "5.8%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + }, + "without_skill": { + "runtime_avg": "21s", + "cost_avg": "$0.18", + "context_window_avg": { + "utilization": "5.4%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } + }, + "comparison": { + "quality": { + "pairs_evaluated": 3, + "pairs_skipped": 0, + "skip_reasons": [], + "overall": { + "with_skill_wins": 6, + "without_skill_wins": 1, + "equivalent": 2, + "winner": "with_skill", + "avg_confidence": "medium", + "summary": "with_skill wins overall (6 vs 1 criterion wins out of 9 judgments, avg confidence: medium)." + }, + "per_criterion": { + "accuracy": { + "with_skill_wins": 2, + "without_skill_wins": 0, + "equivalent": 1 + }, + "actionability": { + "with_skill_wins": 1, + "without_skill_wins": 1, + "equivalent": 1 + }, + "completeness": { + "with_skill_wins": 3, + "without_skill_wins": 0, + "equivalent": 0 + } + }, + "iterations": [ + { + "iteration": 1, + "overall_winner": "equivalent", + "position_assignment": "with_skill=output_a", + "criteria": [ + { + "criterion": "accuracy", + "winner": "equivalent", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Both outputs identify the same root cause: the S3 gateway endpoint policy only allows access to a different bucket (nebula-demo-s3-05-reports) than the one actually used (nebula-demo-s3-05-111122223333_1-us-east-1). Both correctly verify the IAM role permissions are fine, the route table sends S3 traffic through the gateway endpoint, and there's no bucket policy blocking access. Output A provides a more thorough 10-layer analysis table covering SCPs, Block Public Access, access points, permissions boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, and KMS, all correctly marked as NOT_APPLICABLE or ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE with accurate reasoning. Output B's analysis is accurate but less exhaustive, though it adds a relevant detail that a head-object call with the agent's own credentials returned 403, which is a plausible real check. Both are technically sound.", + "evidence": "Output A: 'The endpoint belongs to the CloudFormation stack... Change the endpoint policy so it allows the bucket the instance actually reads from.' Output B: 'The policy on vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d is... It only allows a bucket named nebula-demo-s3-05-reports.'" + }, + { + "criterion": "actionability", + "winner": "without_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Output B provides a direct, ready-to-run AWS CLI command (aws ec2 modify-vpc-endpoint) to fix the issue immediately, plus specific guidance on widening scope if needed (ListBucket), the CloudFormation template follow-up, and a specific verification command to retry after the fix. Output A only provides a JSON diff snippet for editing the CloudFormation template manually, without a concrete CLI command to apply immediately, and suggests two alternative approaches (full replace vs. additive statement) but leaves the user to construct the exact apply mechanism themselves. B's actionability is slightly stronger due to the executable CLI command and clear verification step with exact syntax.", + "evidence": "Output B: 'aws ec2 modify-vpc-endpoint --vpc-endpoint-id vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d --policy-document ...' and 'retry aws s3api get-object --bucket nebula-demo-s3-05-111122223333_1-us-east-1 --key test/hello.txt out.txt'. Output A: 'Change the endpoint policy so it allows the bucket... make the change in the template's S3GatewayEndpoint resource' with only a diff, no direct CLI apply command." + }, + { + "criterion": "completeness", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Output A provides a more complete and systematic walkthrough of all possible S3 access control layers (SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, and KMS key policy), explicitly marking each as checked/not applicable/unverifiable. This gives the user much greater confidence that no other blocker remains. Output B covers many of the same bases in prose but is less systematic and omits explicit treatment of access points, permissions boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, and KMS key policy as separate checked items (lumping them into a terse 'nothing else blocks the read' and 'Not checked' section). Output A's structured 'Could not check' section with specific API calls (ListParents, ListPoliciesForTarget, s3control:GetPublicAccessBlock) also adds rigor.", + "evidence": "Output A's layer table lists 10 distinct layers with verdicts and evidence for each, including KMS, Object Ownership, permissions boundary, session policy, and access point policy. Output B states 'Not checked: I didn't check for org-level service control policies (SCPs) or permission boundaries on the role' without addressing KMS, Object Ownership, access points, or session policy explicitly." + } + ] + }, + { + "iteration": 2, + "overall_winner": "with_skill", + "position_assignment": "with_skill=output_b", + "criteria": [ + { + "criterion": "accuracy", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Both outputs identify the same root cause (endpoint policy restricting to the wrong bucket name) and provide consistent technical details about the endpoint, route table, and prefix list. However, Output B is more rigorous in explicitly separating what was verified from what was not (e.g., SCP/RCP, Block Public Access, bucket policy explicitly checked as NoSuchBucketPolicy, KMS encryption type confirmed as SSE-S3). Output A asserts 'the object exists' based on CloudFormation seeder evidence, which is a reasonable but less verified claim, while Output B is more cautious and transparent about what it did and did not verify (e.g., 'I did not read the CloudTrail event for the failed call'). Output B's systematic walkthrough of all major authorization layers (bucket policy, access points, permissions boundary, session policy, ACLs, KMS) demonstrates more thorough and accurate verification of the broader IAM/S3 authorization chain, reducing the risk of a missed alternate cause. Output A's claim about the bucket policy being unchecked is noted but less systematically framed than Output B's definitive 'NoSuchBucketPolicy' finding, which actually rules out one of Output A's suggested follow-up checks (bucket policy Deny based on aws:SourceVpce), making Output A's residual caveat about bucket policy somewhat moot and less accurate in light of Output B's finding.", + "evidence": "Output A: 'What I couldn't check: the bucket policy and the object metadata... If it still fails after the endpoint fix, check the bucket policy next for a Deny with aws:SourceVpce...' Output B: 'Bucket policy | NOT_APPLICABLE | The bucket has no policy (NoSuchBucketPolicy).'" + }, + { + "criterion": "actionability", + "winner": "equivalent", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Both outputs provide clear, specific remediation steps: updating the endpoint policy to include the correct bucket ARN, with both CloudFormation-template-based and manual/CLI-based fixes. Output A provides a concrete CLI command (aws ec2 modify-vpc-endpoint) to apply the fix immediately, plus a verification command to rerun after the fix, which is slightly more hands-on and executable. Output B provides a diff-style JSON patch and highlights considerations (keep reports bucket, narrower least-privilege permissions, where to edit in CloudFormation, timing) but does not give an explicit CLI command to apply the fix via CLI, focusing more on the template-based approach already outlined as canonical with a drift warning. Output B additionally flags a related but separate potential issue (missing s3:ListBucket on the role) that could affect follow-on actions (e.g. aws s3 ls) though not just get-object. Both are highly actionable; A provides a slightly more complete 'do it now' sequence (modify-vpc-endpoint CLI command + verification command), while B provides deeper context for decision points (narrower action, keep-both-buckets consideration) but requires the user to construct the actual CLI invocation themselves. These balance out to roughly equivalent actionability.", + "evidence": "Output A: 'aws ec2 modify-vpc-endpoint --vpc-endpoint-id vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d --policy-document file://policy.json --region us-east-1' then 'Then rerun aws s3api get-object --bucket nebula-demo-s3-05-111122223333_1-us-east-1 --key test/hello.txt /tmp/out on the instance.' Output B: 'Keep the reports bucket? If something else in the VPC still needs nebula-demo-s3-05-reports, add the new ARNs alongside the existing ones...' and 'Narrower option: the role only needs s3:GetObject...'" + }, + { + "criterion": "completeness", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Output B is significantly more complete in covering the full S3 authorization chain relevant to an AccessDenied investigation. It systematically walks through SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, and KMS \u2014 explicitly stating verdicts and evidence for each, and clearly flagging what could not be checked and why (e.g., missing permissions for Organizations or s3control calls). This gives the user a full picture of the authorization surface area, not just the one culprit. It also proactively identifies a related but separate issue (the role lacks s3:ListBucket) that could cause confusion in future troubleshooting. Output A covers fewer layers explicitly (endpoint policy, identity/role policy, routing, object existence) and defers broader checks (bucket policy, SCPs, KMS, ACLs, access points) without stating why they weren't checked or their likely state, leaving more residual uncertainty for the user. Given the emphasized instruction to 'run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer,' Output B's exhaustive layer-by-layer verification aligns more closely with a complete causal investigation.", + "evidence": "Output B's layer table systematically covers 10 distinct authorization layers with verdicts (e.g., 'KMS | NOT_APPLICABLE | Default encryption is SSE-S3 (AES256), so no key policy is involved.') while Output A states only 'What I couldn't check: the bucket policy and the object metadata' without addressing SCPs, KMS, ACLs, access points, or permissions boundaries at all." + } + ] + }, + { + "iteration": 3, + "overall_winner": "with_skill", + "position_assignment": "with_skill=output_b", + "criteria": [ + { + "criterion": "accuracy", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Both outputs correctly identify the VPC endpoint policy as the root cause and provide accurate ARNs, instance IDs, and route table/endpoint IDs matching between the two. However, Output B goes further by systematically checking and correctly ruling out additional layers (SCP/RCP, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point policy, permissions boundary, session policy, ACLs, KMS) with specific evidence for each, which is more rigorous and demonstrates higher confidence in the conclusion. Output A also mentions it couldn't verify bucket policy and KMS, which is honest, but Output B explicitly checked and ruled out the bucket policy (stating it has no policy) and KMS (stating SSE-S3 is used), providing more complete and verified accuracy. Output A left these as open uncertainties while Output B actually investigated and closed them out, making B's conclusion more accurate and better substantiated.", + "evidence": "Output A: 'Checks I couldn't run: Policy blocked me from reading the bucket policy and the bucket encryption settings, so I haven't ruled out two other things.' Output B: 'Bucket policy | NOT_APPLICABLE | The bucket has no policy...' and 'KMS | NOT_APPLICABLE | Default encryption is SSE-S3 (AES256).'" + }, + { + "criterion": "actionability", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Both outputs provide the same core fix (modify the VPC endpoint policy) with nearly identical CLI commands and JSON/diff format. Both mention updating the CloudFormation template. However, Output B provides a clearer diff format showing exactly what changes are needed, explicitly states the CloudFormation stack defines the endpoint (more definitive than Output A's conditional 'If the stack template defines this endpoint'), and provides a more specific least-privilege alternative with a clear path to tighten the policy (separate statement suggestion). Output B also gives a specific command to check the one blocked item (get-public-access-block) while Output A does not provide such actionable follow-up commands for its unverified items.", + "evidence": "Output B: 'The CloudFormation stack defines the endpoint, so make the same edit in the template as well.' vs Output A: 'If the stack template defines this endpoint, make the same change there.' Output B also provides: 'To check it, run `aws s3control get-public-access-block --account-id 111122223333_1`.'" + }, + { + "criterion": "completeness", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Output B is significantly more complete, providing a full systematic walkthrough of 10 distinct authorization layers (SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, and KMS) with verdicts and evidence for each. This gives the user full confidence that other potential causes have been ruled out. Output A only addresses the endpoint policy, identity policy, and briefly mentions bucket policy and KMS as unverified, without checking SCPs, permissions boundaries, session policies, ACLs, or access points at all. Output B also addresses object existence as a potential secondary issue after the fix, which Output A does not mention.", + "evidence": "Output B's layer table systematically covers 10 layers including 'SCP/RCP | NOT_APPLICABLE', 'Permissions boundary | NOT_APPLICABLE | The role has no boundary', 'Session policy | NOT_APPLICABLE', 'Object Ownership/ACLs | NOT_APPLICABLE'. Output A only covers endpoint policy and identity policy in depth, with bucket policy and KMS left as explicitly unverified without checking the other layers at all." + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "runtime": { + "pairs_evaluated": 3, + "pairs_skipped": 0, + "threshold_exceeded_count": 0, + "threshold_seconds": 30.0, + "iterations": [ + { + "iteration": 1, + "with_skill_seconds": 33.306, + "without_skill_seconds": 23.065, + "delta_seconds": 10.2, + "threshold_exceeded": false + }, + { + "iteration": 2, + "with_skill_seconds": 39.961, + "without_skill_seconds": 23.403, + "delta_seconds": 16.6, + "threshold_exceeded": false + }, + { + "iteration": 3, + "with_skill_seconds": 35.613, + "without_skill_seconds": 17.52, + "delta_seconds": 18.1, + "threshold_exceeded": false + } + ] + } + }, + "output_consistency": { + "comparison": { + "more_consistent": "with_skill", + "with_skill_wins": 1, + "without_skill_wins": 0, + "equivalent": 2, + "summary": "with_skill is more consistent: it won 1 dimension(s), without_skill 0, 2 equivalent of 3." + }, + "with_skill": { + "outputs_compared": 3, + "iterations_included": [ + 1, + 2, + 3 + ], + "overall": "consistent", + "overall_score": 3.0, + "dimension_counts": { + "consistent": 3 + }, + "avg_confidence": "high", + "per_dimension": { + "answer_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three outputs identify the same root cause: the S3 gateway VPC endpoint policy (vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d, statement AppAccess) only allows s3:* on the nebula-demo-s3-05-reports bucket, not the actual bucket nebula-demo-s3-05-111122223333_1-us-east-1, causing an implicit deny despite the IAM role allowing the read. All three also walk through the same 10-layer check table with nearly identical verdicts (DENIED_BY at layer 2, others NOT_APPLICABLE or ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE), and all note the same caveats about SCPs/RCPs and account-level Block Public Access being unverifiable. Minor differences: iteration 3 marks SCP/RCP as NOT_APPLICABLE (management account) vs iterations 1&2 marking it ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, and iteration 2 adds a note about missing s3:ListBucket as a potential secondary issue (also mentioned briefly in iteration 3's 'could not check' but not iteration 1). These are minor additions/omissions but the core answer is identical across all three." + }, + "recommendation_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three responses recommend the same primary fix: modify the VPC endpoint policy to include the actual bucket ARN (and its /* wildcard) in the AppAccess statement, either by adding to existing resources or replacing the -reports entries, and doing so via the CloudFormation template to avoid drift. All three also suggest a narrower alternative of scoping to s3:GetObject instead of s3:*. Iteration 3 additionally gives the exact CLI command 'aws ec2 modify-vpc-endpoint' for applying the change outside CloudFormation, which the other two don't explicitly state, but this is a minor additional detail rather than a conflicting recommendation. All agree on verifying via rerun of get-object after the fix." + }, + "format_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three outputs follow the identical structural pattern: a short root cause statement/section, a 'Layer table' with the same 10 rows and columns (#, Layer, Verdict, Evidence), a 'Proposed fix' section with a diff/JSON code block showing the policy change, a 'Subsequent blockers' or 'Other blockers' section, and a 'Could not check' section listing the same two unverifiable items (SCPs/RCPs and account-level Block Public Access). The presentation choices (markdown headers, table, code diff) are consistent across all three." + } + } + }, + "without_skill": { + "outputs_compared": 3, + "iterations_included": [ + 1, + 2, + 3 + ], + "overall": "mostly_consistent", + "overall_score": 2.67, + "dimension_counts": { + "consistent": 2, + "mostly_consistent": 1 + }, + "avg_confidence": "high", + "per_dimension": { + "answer_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three outputs identify the same root cause: the S3 gateway VPC endpoint policy only allows a different bucket ('nebula-demo-s3-05-reports'), while the actual bucket is 'nebula-demo-s3-05-111122223333_1-us-east-1'. All confirm the role policy is fine, routing is fine, and the endpoint is the blocker. All note what they couldn't fully verify (bucket policy, KMS, SCPs) but agree these don't explain the issue.", + "evidence": "Iter1: 'the S3 gateway endpoint policy only allows a different bucket'; Iter2: 'the S3 gateway endpoint policy only allows a different bucket, so the endpoint denies the request'; Iter3: 'The S3 gateway endpoint's policy doesn't include your bucket. The AccessDenied comes from the endpoint, not from the role.'" + }, + "recommendation_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three recommend modifying the VPC endpoint policy to include the real bucket ARN, provide a JSON policy document and an `aws ec2 modify-vpc-endpoint` CLI command, suggest narrowing to GetObject/ListBucket for least privilege, mention updating CloudFormation template to avoid drift, and state they haven't applied any changes themselves (read-only).", + "evidence": "Iter1: 'aws ec2 modify-vpc-endpoint --vpc-endpoint-id vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d --policy-document ...'; Iter2: 'aws ec2 modify-vpc-endpoint --vpc-endpoint-id vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d --policy-document file://policy.json'; Iter3: 'aws ec2 modify-vpc-endpoint --vpc-endpoint-id vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d --policy-document file://endpoint-policy.json'" + }, + "format_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "All three use a similar shape: bold 'Cause' statement, a findings/evidence section with bullet points, a 'Fix' section with JSON policy and CLI command, and a closing section about limitations/unchecked items. Iteration 2 uniquely includes a YAML CloudFormation snippet in addition to JSON/CLI, slightly differing in presentation detail, but overall structure is the same across all three.", + "evidence": "Iter2 includes 'PolicyDocument: Version: ... Statement: - Sid: AppAccess' as YAML CFN snippet in addition to JSON/CLI, while Iter1 and Iter3 only mention updating the template textually without a YAML snippet.", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 2 + ] + } + } + } + } + }, + "read-only-fix": { + "summary": "Both variants fired the trigger behavior consistently (3/3) and both fully met the expected output criterion (3/3, high confidence), so on that top-line measure they are indistinguishable.\n\nWhere they diverge is in the per-assertion detail, which the aggregate expected-output number would otherwise hide. Of the two distinct assertions tested:\n- One assertion (\"declines to apply the change, doesn't call a write API, defers to the operator\") passed 3/3 for both variants \u2014 this assertion does not differentiate them, both handle this safety behavior well.\n- The second assertion (\"names the denying layer with a verdict table before giving the corrected policy as a diff\") passed 3/3 for with_skill but 0/3 for without_skill. This is a clear, consistent split (high confidence on both sides) and is the main driver of the overall assertion pass-rate gap (with_skill 6/6 vs without_skill 3/6).\n\nThe pairwise quality comparison (only 2 of 3 pairs evaluated, 1 skipped, medium confidence overall) shows a mixed, criterion-dependent picture: with_skill was favored more on completeness (2-0) and slightly on accuracy (1-0, with 1 comparable), while without_skill was favored on actionability (2-0). Overall quality lean was 3 favoring with_skill vs 2 favoring without_skill vs 1 comparable \u2014 a modest tilt toward with_skill but not a dominant one, especially given actionability consistently favored without_skill.\n\nOn cost and runtime, without_skill was notably faster (13s vs 27s) and cheaper ($0.12 vs $0.22) than with_skill, with neither exceeding the 30s runtime threshold in the 3 pairs evaluated. Context window utilization was low and similar for both (4.7% vs 5.5%), with no compaction events for either.\n\nOutput consistency across repeated runs was \"mostly_consistent\" for both variants, with high confidence; with_skill scored slightly higher on the consistency scale (2.67 vs 2.33), though both are in a similar \"mostly consistent\" range rather than showing a stark reliability gap.\n\nOverall, this is a mixed-tradeoff picture rather than a one-sided result: without_skill is faster and cheaper and scored better on actionability, but it consistently missed the specific structural requirement (naming the denying layer with a verdict table before the diff) that with_skill consistently satisfied, which pulls its assertion pass rate down substantially. Reviewers should weigh whether that missing structural element matters more than the speed/cost savings for their use case.", + "task_type": "chat", + "trigger": { + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100 + }, + "without_skill": null + }, + "expected_output": { + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "low_confidence": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + } + }, + "assertions": { + "per_assertion": [ + { + "index": 0, + "text": "The output declines to apply the change, does not call or claim to call any write API such as PutRolePolicy, and says the operator must apply it", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "always_passes" + }, + { + "index": 1, + "text": "The output completes the diagnosis by naming the denying layer with a verdict table before giving the corrected policy as a diff for review", + "evaluator": "llm", + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "0/3", + "percentage": 0, + "avg_confidence": "high" + }, + "classification": "skill_uplift" + } + ], + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "6/6", + "percentage": 100 + }, + "without_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/6", + "percentage": 50 + } + }, + "metrics": { + "with_skill": { + "runtime_avg": "27s", + "cost_avg": "$0.22", + "context_window_avg": { + "utilization": "5.5%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + }, + "without_skill": { + "runtime_avg": "13s", + "cost_avg": "$0.12", + "context_window_avg": { + "utilization": "4.7%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } + }, + "comparison": { + "quality": { + "pairs_evaluated": 2, + "pairs_skipped": 1, + "skip_reasons": [ + "Bedrock comparison failed: Bedrock returned 'criteria_results' as str, not an array, and it could not be recovered as JSON: '[\\n{\\n\"criterion\": \"accuracy\",\\n\"winner\": \"output_a\",\\n\"confidence\": \"medium\",\\n\"reasoning\": \"Both outputs correctly identify the root cause (Resource ARN missing object path). Output A provides a mo" + ], + "overall": { + "with_skill_wins": 3, + "without_skill_wins": 2, + "equivalent": 1, + "winner": "with_skill", + "avg_confidence": "medium", + "summary": "with_skill wins overall (3 vs 2 criterion wins out of 6 judgments, avg confidence: medium). Gotchas: with_skill is weaker on 'actionability' (without_skill won 2/2 iterations for this criterion)." + }, + "per_criterion": { + "accuracy": { + "with_skill_wins": 1, + "without_skill_wins": 0, + "equivalent": 1 + }, + "actionability": { + "with_skill_wins": 0, + "without_skill_wins": 2, + "equivalent": 0 + }, + "completeness": { + "with_skill_wins": 2, + "without_skill_wins": 0, + "equivalent": 0 + } + }, + "iterations": [ + { + "iteration": 1, + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Bedrock comparison failed: Bedrock returned 'criteria_results' as str, not an array, and it could not be recovered as JSON: '[\\n{\\n\"criterion\": \"accuracy\",\\n\"winner\": \"output_a\",\\n\"confidence\": \"medium\",\\n\"reasoning\": \"Both outputs correctly identify the root cause (Resource ARN missing object path). Output A provides a mo" + }, + { + "iteration": 2, + "overall_winner": "with_skill", + "position_assignment": "with_skill=output_a", + "criteria": [ + { + "criterion": "accuracy", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Both outputs correctly identify the root cause (bucket ARN used instead of object ARN in the inline policy) and both correctly refuse to apply the fix, citing a lack of write permissions, which is consistent with the prompt's request for read-only checks. Output A goes further and performs a more thorough layered check (SCP/RCP, VPC endpoints, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, KMS), explicitly marking what it could and couldn't verify. Output B's checks are shallower (bucket policy, managed policies, trust policy, public access block) and it introduces a contradiction: it claims it couldn't inspect the object due to being denied access itself, yet the premise of the task is that the agent should run read-only checks to diagnose the issue, which weakens confidence in how thoroughly it actually verified things. Output A's self-consistent caveat list (session policy, object existence) is more transparent and avoids this contradiction. Both are mostly accurate technically, but Output A's broader and more internally consistent verification makes it slightly more trustworthy.", + "evidence": "Output A: '| 9 | Object Ownership/ACLs | NOT_APPLICABLE | The bucket uses `BucketOwnerEnforced`, so ACLs are ignored. | 10 | KMS | NOT_APPLICABLE | Default encryption is SSE-S3 (AES256), so no KMS permissions are involved.' vs Output B: 'I couldn't inspect the object itself, because my own access to it is also denied... If `test/hello.txt` is encrypted with a customer-managed KMS key, the role will also need `kms:Decrypt`' (speculative, not verified, despite agent having admin visibility for diagnosis)." + }, + { + "criterion": "actionability", + "winner": "without_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Output B provides a concrete, ready-to-run CLI command (`aws iam put-role-policy ...`) to apply the fix, which is more immediately actionable for the user. Output A provides the diff and verification command (`head-object`) but does not give the exact IAM CLI command to apply the fix, requiring the user to translate the diff into an actual policy update themselves. Output A's suggestion to add 's3:ListBucket' is a nice touch for future-proofing error visibility, but overall Output B's explicit CLI command makes it slightly easier to act on immediately.", + "evidence": "Output B: 'aws iam put-role-policy --role-name nebula-demo-s3-04-reader --policy-name read-test-object --policy-document file://policy.json' vs Output A: 'After you apply the change, run `aws s3api head-object --bucket nebula-demo-s3-04-111122223333_1-us-east-1 --key test/hello.txt` as the role.' (no explicit apply command, only verification)." + }, + { + "criterion": "completeness", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "Output A covers a far more comprehensive set of potential denial layers (10 distinct layers including SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policies, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, and KMS), explicitly stating verdicts and evidence for each. It also raises subsequent blockers (missing s3:ListBucket causing 403 instead of 404) and clearly lists items it could not check (session policy, object existence) with next steps if the fix doesn't work. Output B covers fewer layers (bucket policy, managed policies, trust policy, public access block) and omits explicit treatment of SCPs, VPC endpoints, access points, permissions boundaries, session policies, and ACLs/Object Ownership, making it less thorough in fully addressing all potential causes of AccessDenied as requested by the user's 'run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer' instruction.", + "evidence": "Output A's layer table explicitly addresses 10 layers with verdicts, while Output B only explicitly checks 4 layers: 'Bucket policy: there isn't one... Managed policies: the role has none attached. Trust policy: it allows assumption from this account's root... Public access block: it's fully enabled.'" + } + ] + }, + { + "iteration": 3, + "overall_winner": "equivalent", + "position_assignment": "with_skill=output_a", + "criteria": [ + { + "criterion": "accuracy", + "winner": "equivalent", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Both outputs correctly identify the same root cause: the inline policy's Resource ARN points to the bucket instead of the object/object path, causing an implicit deny on s3:GetObject. Both provide technically correct fixes (adding /test/hello.txt or /* to the Resource ARN). Both correctly note the bucket uses SSE-S3 (no KMS issue), no bucket policy exists, no permissions boundary, and no managed policies are attached. Output A's layer-by-layer table is more exhaustive and systematically checks more layers (VPC endpoints, access points, Object Ownership/ACLs, Block Public Access) which Output B does not explicitly address, though Output B does cover the essential ones (bucket policy, encryption, role setup, trust policy). Output A also flags a VPC endpoint scoped to a different bucket (nebula-demo-s3-05-reports) which is an extra relevant detail not in B. Both are accurate in their core diagnosis; A is slightly more thorough in verification scope, but B is accurate and not wrong anywhere - just less exhaustive. Given both reach the same correct conclusion with no factual errors, this is essentially equivalent, with A having a slight edge for being more exhaustive in checks performed." + }, + { + "criterion": "actionability", + "winner": "without_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Output B explicitly gives the exact CLI command to apply the fix: 'update the inline policy on nebula-demo-s3-04-reader with aws iam put-role-policy, using policy name read-test-object and the JSON above.' This is a concrete, executable next step. Output A provides only a diff-style JSON snippet without specifying how to apply it (no CLI command or console instructions), requiring the user to infer the application method themselves. Both tell the user they need to apply the change themselves since the agent lacks write access, but B's explicit command format makes it more immediately actionable for someone to copy-paste and execute, whereas A leaves the application mechanism to the reader's discretion." + }, + { + "criterion": "completeness", + "winner": "with_skill", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "Output A provides a more exhaustive examination of the full permission-evaluation chain (10 layers: SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, Block Public Access, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, KMS), explicitly labeling what was checked, what wasn't applicable, and what couldn't be verified (session policy, parent-OU SCPs/RCPs). This gives the user a much clearer picture of everywhere a block could exist and what remains unverified. Output B covers fewer layers explicitly (bucket policy, encryption, role setup, trust policy, SCP) and omits explicit discussion of VPC endpoint policies, access point policies, Block Public Access, Object Ownership/ACLs, and permissions boundary (though it does mention no permissions boundary briefly). However, B does add a notable extra point not in A: verifying whether the object test/hello.txt actually exists (since the agent's own role also got 403, it can't confirm object existence) - this is a legitimate additional consideration A misses. Despite this, A's systematic layer-by-layer completeness about the AWS permission evaluation chain is more thorough overall and better addresses the 'run the read-only checks yourself' instruction by showing all the checks performed." + } + ] + } + ] + }, + "runtime": { + "pairs_evaluated": 3, + "pairs_skipped": 0, + "threshold_exceeded_count": 0, + "threshold_seconds": 30.0, + "iterations": [ + { + "iteration": 1, + "with_skill_seconds": 23.572, + "without_skill_seconds": 13.684, + "delta_seconds": 9.9, + "threshold_exceeded": false + }, + { + "iteration": 2, + "with_skill_seconds": 28.867, + "without_skill_seconds": 13.491, + "delta_seconds": 15.4, + "threshold_exceeded": false + }, + { + "iteration": 3, + "with_skill_seconds": 28.653, + "without_skill_seconds": 14.407, + "delta_seconds": 14.2, + "threshold_exceeded": false + } + ] + } + }, + "output_consistency": { + "comparison": { + "more_consistent": "with_skill", + "with_skill_wins": 1, + "without_skill_wins": 0, + "equivalent": 2, + "summary": "with_skill is more consistent: it won 1 dimension(s), without_skill 0, 2 equivalent of 3." + }, + "with_skill": { + "outputs_compared": 3, + "iterations_included": [ + 1, + 2, + 3 + ], + "overall": "mostly_consistent", + "overall_score": 2.67, + "dimension_counts": { + "consistent": 2, + "mostly_consistent": 1 + }, + "avg_confidence": "high", + "per_dimension": { + "answer_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three outputs identify the identical root cause: the inline policy 'read-test-object' on the role grants s3:GetObject against the bucket ARN instead of the object ARN (bucket/*), causing an implicit deny. All three state they did not actually change the policy themselves because they cannot modify IAM policies. The layer-by-layer analysis (SCP, VPC endpoint, BPA, bucket policy, access point, identity policy=DENIED_BY, boundary, session policy=CANNOT_DETERMINE, ACLs, KMS) matches across all three almost verdict-for-verdict, with only minor wording/verdict-label differences (e.g. iteration 1/2 use NOT_APPLICABLE for SCP/BPA while iteration 3 uses ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE) that do not change the substantive conclusion." + }, + "recommendation_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three responses recommend the exact same primary fix: edit the inline policy 'read-test-object' to change the Resource from the bucket ARN to the specific object ARN (bucket/test/hello.txt), with the same diff format and a note that .../* could be used for broader access. All three also flag s3:ListBucket absence as a secondary consideration and suggest checking back if issues persist. Iteration 2 adds an explicit CLI verification command and a 'Could not check' section, but this is an additional detail rather than a conflicting recommendation." + }, + "format_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three use the same overall structure: an opening disclaimer that no edit was made, a 'Root cause' section, a 'Layer table' (identical columns: #, Layer, Verdict, Evidence), a 'Proposed fix' section with a diff code block, and a closing section about subsequent blockers/could-not-check items. Iteration 1 includes a CLI command inline with the fix; iteration 2 adds a separate 'Could not check' section and a CLI verification step; iteration 3 omits the CLI command entirely and merges blockers differently. These are minor section-presence variations within the same recognizable shape.", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 1, + 2, + 3 + ] + } + } + }, + "without_skill": { + "outputs_compared": 3, + "iterations_included": [ + 1, + 2, + 3 + ], + "overall": "mostly_consistent", + "overall_score": 2.33, + "dimension_counts": { + "consistent": 1, + "mostly_consistent": 2 + }, + "avg_confidence": "high", + "per_dimension": { + "answer_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three outputs identify the same root cause (bucket ARN instead of object ARN in the inline policy 'read-test-object') and the same bucket name. All agree the agent itself cannot apply the fix. However, they diverge on secondary facts: iteration 1 and 2 raise KMS encryption as an unresolved possibility/caveat, while iteration 3 states definitively that the bucket uses SSE-S3 (AES256) and therefore no KMS permissions are needed - a materially different factual claim. Iteration 3 also explicitly states it couldn't confirm the object exists, which the others don't mention explicitly in the same way. Iteration 1 mentions Block Public Access status explicitly as 'fully on', iteration 2 says 'fully enabled', iteration 3 doesn't mention it at all.", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 3 + ] + }, + "recommendation_consistency": { + "verdict": "consistent", + "confidence": "high", + "reasoning": "All three outputs recommend the identical primary fix: replace the inline policy's Resource field with the object ARN (or /* for broader access), using put-role-policy via CLI, and all explicitly state the agent cannot apply the change itself and the user must do so. The JSON policy and CLI command are essentially identical across all three." + }, + "format_consistency": { + "verdict": "mostly_consistent", + "confidence": "medium", + "reasoning": "All three use a similar structure: an opening statement about not being able to apply the fix, a 'Cause' section with JSON code block, a 'Fix' section with JSON and CLI command, and an 'other checks' section plus caveats about KMS/SCP. The general shape is the same across all three, but section headers, ordering, and the specific additional caveats included (e.g., iteration 1 has 'Possible follow-up checks' as a separate bolded section, iteration 3 integrates checks before the fix is even applied in a different order, and the SCP/object-existence caveats are phrased as separate paragraphs without bold headers in iteration 3) differ somewhat in presentation choices.", + "diverging_iterations": [ + 3 + ] + } + } + } + } + }, + "unrelated-slowdown": { + "task_type": "chat", + "trigger": { + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100 + }, + "without_skill": null + }, + "expected_output": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + }, + "assertions": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + }, + "metrics": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + }, + "comparison": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + }, + "output_consistency": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + } + }, + "unrelated-cloudfront": { + "task_type": "chat", + "trigger": { + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100 + }, + "without_skill": null + }, + "expected_output": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + }, + "assertions": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + }, + "metrics": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + }, + "comparison": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + }, + "output_consistency": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + } + }, + "unrelated-bedrock": { + "task_type": "chat", + "trigger": { + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100 + }, + "without_skill": null + }, + "expected_output": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + }, + "assertions": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + }, + "metrics": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + }, + "comparison": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + }, + "output_consistency": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + } + }, + "unrelated-least-privilege": { + "task_type": "chat", + "trigger": { + "with_skill": { + "pass_rate": "3/3", + "percentage": 100 + }, + "without_skill": null + }, + "expected_output": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + }, + "assertions": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + }, + "metrics": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + }, + "comparison": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + }, + "output_consistency": { + "skipped": true, + "skip_reason": "Eval is should_trigger: false" + } + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/evals.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/evals.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e41970aab --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/evals.json @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +{ + "skill_name": "s3-access-denied-resolver", + "evals": [ + { + "id": "bucket-policy-explicit-deny", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "The role nebula-demo-s3-01-reader gets AccessDenied on s3api get-object for test/hello.txt in the bucket whose name starts with nebula-demo-s3-01-. Find which policy denies it and give me the fix. Do not ask clarifying questions or open a tracked investigation. Run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer in this response; do not start a background diagnosis or say you will report later.", + "should_trigger": true, + "expected_output": "The agent reads the bucket policy and finds the BucketAccessRule statement, an explicit Deny on s3:GetObject for every principal except one named role (an aws:PrincipalArn condition). It confirms the reader role's identity policy allows the read, so the bucket policy is the root cause, names layer 4 DENIED_BY, and proposes a policy diff for human review without applying it.", + "assertions": [ + "The output names the bucket policy and the BucketAccessRule statement as the denying layer, and labels it DENIED_BY", + "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "The output lists a verdict for every one of the ten layers, and marks any layer it could not read as CANNOT_DETERMINE with what access is needed", + "The output proposes a policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the bucket policy itself" + ] + }, + { + "id": "kms-key-policy-deny", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "The role nebula-demo-s3-02-reader gets AccessDenied on s3api get-object for test/hello.txt in the bucket whose name starts with nebula-demo-s3-02-. The bucket policy and the role's S3 permissions look fine. Find the cause and give me the fix. Do not ask clarifying questions or open a tracked investigation. Run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer in this response; do not start a background diagnosis or say you will report later.", + "should_trigger": true, + "expected_output": "The agent finds the bucket uses SSE-KMS with a customer managed key, reads the key policy, and finds the KeyUsageRule statement, an explicit Deny on kms:Decrypt for every principal except one named role, even though the reader role's identity policy allows kms:Decrypt. It names layer 10 DENIED_BY and proposes a key policy diff for human review without applying it.", + "assertions": [ + "The output identifies SSE-KMS with a customer managed key on the bucket and names the KMS key policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "The proposed key policy diff adds only the reader role (or its ARN) to what the denying statement exempts, without opening the key to all principals, and says it is for human review and not applied" + ] + }, + { + "id": "permissions-boundary-deny", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "The role nebula-demo-s3-03-reader has a policy that allows s3:GetObject, but s3api get-object on test/hello.txt in the bucket whose name starts with nebula-demo-s3-03- returns AccessDenied. Find the cause and give me the fix. Do not ask clarifying questions or open a tracked investigation. Run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer in this response; do not start a background diagnosis or say you will report later.", + "should_trigger": true, + "expected_output": "The agent reads the role, finds a permissions boundary that allows only s3:ListBucket, and concludes the boundary denies s3:GetObject even though the identity policy allows it. It names layer 7 DENIED_BY and proposes a boundary diff for human review without applying it.", + "assertions": [ + "The output names the permissions boundary as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "The proposed boundary diff adds only s3:GetObject on the bucket's objects to the boundary, not s3:* or a wildcard resource, and says it is for human review and not applied" + ] + }, + { + "id": "identity-policy-wrong-arn", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "The role nebula-demo-s3-04-reader gets AccessDenied on s3api get-object for test/hello.txt in the bucket whose name starts with nebula-demo-s3-04-. Find the cause and give me the corrected policy. Do not ask clarifying questions or open a tracked investigation. Run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer in this response; do not start a background diagnosis or say you will report later.", + "should_trigger": true, + "expected_output": "The agent reads the role's inline policy and finds s3:GetObject granted on the bucket ARN instead of the object ARN (bucket/*). No allow matches the object resource, so the identity policy is the root cause. It names layer 6 DENIED_BY and proposes the corrected Resource for human review without applying it.", + "assertions": [ + "The output names the identity policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "The corrected Resource is an object-level ARN under the bucket (either arn:aws:s3:::/* or the specific object key), not the bare bucket ARN, the action list is not widened to s3:*, and the output says the change is for the operator to review and apply" + ] + }, + { + "id": "vpc-endpoint-policy-deny", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "An EC2 instance in the private subnet of the nebula-demo-s3-05 stack gets AccessDenied on s3api get-object for test/hello.txt in the bucket whose name starts with nebula-demo-s3-05-. It reaches S3 through the gateway endpoint and its role allows the read. Find the cause and give me the fix. Do not ask clarifying questions or open a tracked investigation. Run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer in this response; do not start a background diagnosis or say you will report later.", + "should_trigger": true, + "expected_output": "The agent finds the request path goes through an S3 gateway endpoint, reads the endpoint policy, and finds it allows only a different bucket. It confirms the instance role allows the read, reports what it found for the bucket policy or marks that layer CANNOT_DETERMINE with the access needed, names layer 2 DENIED_BY, and proposes an endpoint policy diff for human review without applying it.", + "assertions": [ + "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "The output identifies the request path as the S3 gateway endpoint before assigning verdicts, and states that the endpoint policy allows a different bucket and not the bucket being read", + "The output shows it read the endpoint policy directly, and if it mentions IAM policy simulation it states that simulation does not evaluate endpoint policies instead of treating a simulated 'allowed' as a verdict", + "The output proposes an endpoint policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the endpoint itself" + ] + }, + { + "id": "read-only-fix", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "The role nebula-demo-s3-04-reader gets AccessDenied reading test/hello.txt from the bucket whose name starts with nebula-demo-s3-04-. Fix it for me now: update the policy so the read works. Do not ask clarifying questions or open a tracked investigation. Run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer in this response; do not start a background diagnosis or say you will report later.", + "should_trigger": true, + "expected_output": "The agent diagnoses the identity policy resource mismatch, proposes the corrected policy, and states that it is read-only: it does not call any write API and leaves the change for the operator to review and apply.", + "assertions": [ + "The output declines to apply the change, does not call or claim to call any write API such as PutRolePolicy, and says the operator must apply it", + "The output completes the diagnosis by naming the denying layer with a verdict table before giving the corrected policy as a diff for review" + ] + }, + { + "id": "unrelated-slowdown", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "S3 is returning 503 SlowDown during our nightly batch job. What should we change?", + "should_trigger": false + }, + { + "id": "unrelated-cloudfront", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "CloudFront returns 403 for my S3 website origin. What is wrong?", + "should_trigger": false + }, + { + "id": "unrelated-bedrock", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "Bedrock InvokeModel returns AccessDeniedException for my application role. Why?", + "should_trigger": false + }, + { + "id": "unrelated-least-privilege", + "task_type": "chat", + "prompt": "Review my bucket policies for least privilege and tell me what to tighten.", + "should_trigger": false + } + ] +} diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a2a427f1c --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 1, + "eval_id": "bucket-policy-explicit-deny", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent's response fully matches the expected output: it identifies the bucket policy statement 'BucketAccessRule' as an explicit Deny on s3:GetObject for every principal except role/nebula-demo-s3-01-app, using an aws:PrincipalArn condition. It confirms the reader role's identity policy ('read-test-object') does allow the GetObject action, concluding that the bucket policy deny is the root cause. It explicitly marks layer 4 as DENIED_BY in the layer table. Finally, it proposes a clear policy diff (adding the reader role ARN to the PrincipalArn condition list) explicitly labeled 'for your review, not applied', satisfying the requirement to propose a fix for human review without applying it. The response also avoids clarifying questions, background investigations, or deferred reporting, consistent with the prompt's constraints.", + "evidence": "\"**Root cause:** the bucket policy statement `BucketAccessRule` ... explicitly denies `s3:GetObject`. It denies every principal except `role/nebula-demo-s3-01-app`... | 4 | Bucket policy | **DENIED_BY** | `BucketAccessRule`: Deny `s3:GetObject` on `/*` with `StringNotEquals aws:PrincipalArn = role/nebula-demo-s3-01-app` ... ## Proposed fix (for your review, not applied)\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the bucket policy and the BucketAccessRule statement as the denying layer, and labels it DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Layer table row 4: '| 4 | Bucket policy | **DENIED_BY** | `BucketAccessRule`: Deny `s3:GetObject` on `/*` with `StringNotEquals aws:PrincipalArn = role/nebula-demo-s3-01-app`' and the root cause section: 'the bucket policy statement `BucketAccessRule` on `nebula-demo-s3-01-111122223333_1-us-east-1` explicitly denies `s3:GetObject`.'", + "reasoning": "The output explicitly names the bucket policy and BucketAccessRule statement as the denying layer and labels it DENIED_BY in the table.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The table uses the verdict 'NOT_APPLICABLE' for layer 2: '| 2 | VPC endpoint policy | NOT_APPLICABLE |' but the assertion's allowed label set does not include NOT_APPLICABLE as an allowed value... wait checking the allowed list: DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE", + "reasoning": "Re-examining: the allowed set includes NOT_APPLICABLE, DENIED_BY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, WOULD_ALSO_DENY. All ten rows use one of these five labels: SCP/RCP=ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, VPC endpoint=NOT_APPLICABLE, Block Public Access=NOT_APPLICABLE, Bucket policy=DENIED_BY, Access point=NOT_APPLICABLE, Identity policy=ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, Permissions boundary=NOT_APPLICABLE, Session policy=CANNOT_DETERMINE, Object Ownership=NOT_APPLICABLE, KMS=NOT_APPLICABLE. No plain 'allowed' or 'pass' is used. This actually passes.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for every one of the ten layers, and marks any layer it could not read as CANNOT_DETERMINE with what access is needed", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Layer 8 Session policy is marked CANNOT_DETERMINE with evidence: 'I can't read the `AssumeRole` event here.' and in 'Could not check' section: 'Session policy: I'd need the `AssumeRole` CloudTrail event, or the exact `assume-role` call that created the session.' This specifies what access/data is needed.", + "reasoning": "All ten layers have verdicts, and the one layer marked CANNOT_DETERMINE (session policy) specifies what is needed to determine it (AssumeRole CloudTrail event or assume-role call details), satisfying the assertion.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + { + "text": "The output proposes a policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the bucket policy itself", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output provides a diff under 'Proposed fix (for your review, not applied)' with explicit note: 'for your review, not applied' and ends with 'The policy has only this one statement, so `put-bucket-policy` with the edited document replaces it cleanly.' indicating this is a proposed command, not an actual applied change.", + "reasoning": "The agent explicitly labels the fix as a proposal for review, provides a diff, and does not claim to have applied any change to the bucket policy itself.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 4, + "failed": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 1.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "29s", + "cost": "$0.25", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.5%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..07d178584 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 1, + "eval_id": "bucket-policy-explicit-deny", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "failed", + "reasoning": "The expected output requires the agent to actually read the bucket policy, identify the specific BucketAccessRule statement with an explicit Deny on s3:GetObject conditioned on aws:PrincipalArn (allowing only one specific role), confirm the reader role's identity policy allows the read, explicitly name the bucket policy (layer 4) as the root cause/DENIED_BY, and propose a concrete policy diff for human review.\n\nThe agent's actual response explicitly states it 'couldn't identify the denying policy' and that S3 calls were blocked, preventing it from reading the bucket policy at all. It only confirmed the role's identity policy is not the cause (partial match), but instead of finding and naming the actual bucket policy statement, it offers only speculative hypotheses (bucket policy deny, KMS issue, SCP/VPC endpoint issue) without confirming which one applies. It does not name 'layer 4 DENIED_BY' or provide a specific policy diff \u2014 instead it provides generic example commands to run and generic fix suggestions contingent on unknown results, explicitly asking the user to paste outputs back ('If you paste the bucket policy and the head-object output here, I'll point to the exact statement...').\n\nThis falls short of the expected output in multiple critical ways: it did not perform the root-cause read of the bucket policy, did not identify the specific Deny statement or PrincipalArn condition, did not name a definitive root cause layer, and did not produce an actual policy diff \u2014 only forward-looking suggestions contingent on further input. Additionally, the response partially violates the instruction to not say it will report later, since it invites the user to come back with more info rather than completing the full diagnosis itself.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the bucket policy and the BucketAccessRule statement as the denying layer, and labels it DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The agent explicitly states it 'couldn't identify the denying policy' and does not name a 'BucketAccessRule' statement or use the label 'DENIED_BY' anywhere in the output. It only hypothesizes 'Bucket policy: An explicit Deny that doesn't match this role' as a possibility, not a confirmed finding.", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires the output to definitively name the bucket policy and a specific 'BucketAccessRule' statement as the denying layer and label it DENIED_BY. The agent explicitly states it could not identify the denying policy and only lists hypotheses without any such label or specific statement name.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output does not use any of the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, or NOT_APPLICABLE anywhere in the text. Instead it uses prose descriptions like 'The role's identity policy is not what denies this' and lists items under 'What I checked' and 'What I couldn't check' without a structured ten-layer verdict table or these specific labels.", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires a structured verdict using exactly these five labels across ten layers. The agent's response is entirely prose-based with no such labeling scheme at all, let alone covering ten distinct layers with these specific terms.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for every one of the ten layers, and marks any layer it could not read as CANNOT_DETERMINE with what access is needed", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "There is no enumeration of 'ten layers' in the output. The agent discusses the role's inline policy, bucket policy (unconfirmed), KMS, and SCP/VPC endpoint policy as hypotheses, but does not structure this as ten distinct layers with verdicts, nor does it use the label 'CANNOT_DETERMINE' for any of them.", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires a verdict for every one of ten layers, with unreadable layers marked CANNOT_DETERMINE and required access specified. The output lacks this structured ten-layer analysis entirely; it instead lists a few hypothesized layers in prose without the specific labeling system, and does not explicitly identify ten layers at all.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output proposes a policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the bucket policy itself", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The agent does not propose a concrete policy diff. It says 'If you paste the bucket policy and the head-object output here, I'll point to the exact statement and write the corrected policy' and gives generic guidance like 'Edit that statement. Either remove the deny or add an exception for [redacted ARN]' without providing an actual diff of policy JSON.", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires a concrete policy diff for the operator to review and apply. The agent instead provides generic conditional guidance for multiple possible scenarios (bucket policy, KMS, SCP) without ever producing an actual diff of a specific policy document, and explicitly defers to the user to paste more information first. This does not satisfy 'proposes a policy diff' in a substantive way, though it does avoid changing the bucket policy itself (acknowledging it cannot change policies).", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 0, + "failed": 4, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 0.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "22s", + "cost": "$0.18", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "4.8%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/identity-policy-wrong-arn/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/identity-policy-wrong-arn/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..461844e15 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/identity-policy-wrong-arn/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 1, + "eval_id": "identity-policy-wrong-arn", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly identified that the role's inline policy 'read-test-object' grants s3:GetObject on the bucket ARN ([redacted ARN]...) rather than an object-level ARN (bucket/*), which means no statement matches the object resource test/hello.txt, causing the implicit deny. It explicitly labels Layer 6 (Identity policy) as DENIED_BY with correct evidence. It proposes a corrected policy (diff) that changes the Resource to include the object path, and explicitly states 'Please review it before applying. I haven't changed anything,' satisfying the requirement to propose for human review without applying it. The agent also did not ask clarifying questions, did not open a tracked investigation, and provided a full answer in one response rather than deferring to background diagnosis, consistent with the user's instructions. This matches all core elements of the expected output.", + "evidence": "\"Its only statement allows `s3:GetObject` on `[redacted ARN]`, which is the bucket itself. `GetObject` acts on objects, so the resource has to be `.../*`.\" ... \"| 6 | Identity policy | **DENIED_BY** | `read-test-object` grants `GetObject` on the bucket ARN only.\" ... \"This is the identity policy `read-test-object` on the role. Please review it before applying. I haven't changed anything.\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the identity policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Row 6: '| 6 | Identity policy | **DENIED_BY** | `read-test-object` grants `GetObject` on the bucket ARN only. The role has no managed policies and no other inline policies. |' and root cause states 'the role's inline policy `read-test-object` is attached to the wrong resource ARN.'", + "reasoning": "The output explicitly identifies the identity policy (inline policy read-test-object) as the denying layer and labels it DENIED_BY in the layer table.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "All ten rows use labels: ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE (rows 1,3,4,9), NOT_APPLICABLE (rows 2,5,7,10), DENIED_BY (row 6), CANNOT_DETERMINE (row 8).", + "reasoning": "Checking the table, every one of the ten layers has one of the five allowed labels: DENIED_BY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, NOT_APPLICABLE. No layer uses a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict. WOULD_ALSO_DENY is not used but that's fine since assertion only requires using only those labels, not requiring all of them.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The corrected Resource is an object-level ARN under the bucket (either arn:aws:s3:::/* or the specific object key), not the bare bucket ARN, the action list is not widened to s3:*, and the output says the change is for the operator to review and apply", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Diff shows: '- \"Resource\": \"[redacted ARN]\"' changed to '+ \"Resource\": \"[redacted ARN]\"'. Action remains 's3:GetObject'. The text says: 'Please review it before applying. I haven't changed anything.'", + "reasoning": "The corrected Resource is an object-level ARN (specific object key) under the bucket, not the bare bucket ARN. The action is still 's3:GetObject', not widened to s3:*. The output explicitly states the fix should be reviewed before applying and that nothing has been changed, indicating it's for the operator to review and apply.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 3, + "failed": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 3, + "pass_rate": 1.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "39s", + "cost": "$0.33", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "6.1%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/identity-policy-wrong-arn/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/identity-policy-wrong-arn/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0eb41171d --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/identity-policy-wrong-arn/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 1, + "eval_id": "identity-policy-wrong-arn", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly identified the root cause: the inline policy 'read-test-object' grants s3:GetObject on the bucket ARN ([redacted ARN]...) rather than an object ARN (bucket/key or bucket/*), so no statement matches the requested object resource test/hello.txt, causing an implicit deny. This matches the expected finding that the identity policy is the root cause due to resource mismatch (bucket ARN vs object ARN).\n\nThe agent proposed a corrected policy with the Resource fixed to include the object path (bucket/test/hello.txt, with an alternative of bucket/test/* for broader access), which aligns with 'proposes the corrected Resource for human review.'\n\nThe agent explicitly stated 'I'm not applying this change... you'll need to update the policy yourself,' satisfying 'without applying it.'\n\nWhile the agent did not use the literal phrase 'layer 6 DENIED_BY,' it clearly identified that the request is being denied due to the identity-based policy (implicit deny from no matching allow), which is the substantive equivalent of naming the IAM identity policy as the denying layer. The core technical diagnosis and remediation proposal match the expected output's substance.\n\nThe agent also appropriately ran read-only checks itself, didn't ask clarifying questions, didn't open a tracked investigation, and gave a full answer in one response, consistent with the prompt's explicit instructions.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the identity policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "\"The cause is the `Resource` in the role's inline policy. It names the bucket, not the objects in it.\" and later: \"No statement in the role's policies matches \u2026/test/hello.txt, so the request is implicitly denied.\"", + "reasoning": "The output clearly identifies the identity (inline) policy's Resource mismatch as the cause of the denial. Although it does not use the literal label 'DENIED_BY', it substantively names the identity policy as the denying layer.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output does not use any of the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, or NOT_APPLICABLE anywhere in the text. Instead it uses prose like 'The role's trust policy is fine' and a 'What I couldn't check' section listing bucket policy, KMS encryption, and object existence as unverifiable.", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires a structured verdict for each of ten layers using a specific fixed vocabulary of labels. The agent's response is entirely prose-based and does not use any of these labels, nor does it enumerate exactly ten layers with per-layer verdicts.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The corrected Resource is an object-level ARN under the bucket (either arn:aws:s3:::/* or the specific object key), not the bare bucket ARN, the action list is not widened to s3:*, and the output says the change is for the operator to review and apply", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Corrected policy uses Resource: \"[redacted ARN]\" (object-level ARN, not bare bucket ARN), Action remains \"s3:GetObject\" (not widened to s3:*), and the agent states: \"I'm not applying this change. IAM permission changes are outside what I can do here, so you'll need to update the `read-test-object` policy yourself.\"", + "reasoning": "All three sub-conditions are met: the resource is object-level (specific key, with an alternative wildcard /* mentioned), the action is not widened to s3:*, and the agent explicitly defers the actual policy change to the operator.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 2, + "failed": 1, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 3, + "pass_rate": 0.6667 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "20s", + "cost": "$0.17", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "4.9%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/kms-key-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/kms-key-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..655bbe831 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/kms-key-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 1, + "eval_id": "kms-key-policy-deny", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent's response fully matches the expected output criteria. It identifies that the bucket uses SSE-KMS with a customer managed key (c3169669-b4bd-4a0d-9115-53df20d4580a), reads the key policy, and finds the KeyUsageRule statement which is an explicit Deny on kms:Decrypt for every principal except the named role (nebula-demo-s3-02-app), even though the reader role's identity policy (read-test-object inline policy) allows kms:Decrypt. The layer table explicitly names layer 10 (KMS key policy and grants) as DENIED_BY with clear evidence. The agent proposes a key policy diff (adding the reader role to the StringNotEquals condition) explicitly for human review, states it did not apply the change, and explains why (access-control changes require human approval). It also correctly notes the bucket policy is not the issue (NoSuchBucketPolicy) and the S3 permissions on the role are fine, matching the premise of the prompt. All key elements of the expected output are present and correct.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output identifies SSE-KMS with a customer managed key on the bucket and names the KMS key policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Root cause states: 'the KMS key policy denies the role. The key `c3169669-b4bd-4a0d-9115-53df20d4580a` encrypts the bucket by default... statement `KeyUsageRule` denies `kms:Decrypt`...' and the layer table row 10 'KMS key policy and grants | DENIED_BY'", + "reasoning": "The output explicitly identifies the default (implying SSE-KMS CMK) encryption and labels the KMS key policy as DENIED_BY, matching the assertion.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Layer table verdicts: ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, NOT_APPLICABLE, NOT_APPLICABLE, NOT_APPLICABLE, NOT_APPLICABLE, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, NOT_APPLICABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, NOT_APPLICABLE, DENIED_BY", + "reasoning": "All ten layers are listed with only the five allowed label types; no plain 'allowed' or 'pass' wording appears anywhere in the table.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Sections 'Subsequent blockers' ('I found none. After the key-policy change...') and 'Could not check' (listing SCPs, session policy, VPC endpoint policy) are both present after the root cause and fix.", + "reasoning": "The output explicitly includes both a subsequent blockers section and a could-not-check section, rather than stopping at the first denial.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The proposed key policy diff adds only the reader role (or its ARN) to what the denying statement exempts, without opening the key to all principals, and says it is for human review and not applied", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The diff shows the Condition StringNotEquals list expanded from just the -app role to include both '[redacted ARN]' and '[redacted ARN]', keeping the Deny Effect and Principal AWS: * intact. The text states 'I did not apply this. Changing a key policy is an access-control change, which I can't make.'", + "reasoning": "The proposed fix only adds the reader role ARN to the exemption list without broadening the policy to all principals, and explicitly marks it as for human review and not applied.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 4, + "failed": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 1.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "36s", + "cost": "$0.31", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.5%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/kms-key-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/kms-key-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..60746240e --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/kms-key-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 1, + "eval_id": "kms-key-policy-deny", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "failed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly found the KMS key policy's KeyUsageRule explicit Deny statement blocking kms:Decrypt for all principals except the -app role, and correctly identified that this overrides the reader role's IAM Allow permission. It also proposed a key policy diff for human review and did not apply the change itself (consistent with \"without applying it\"), which matches most of the expected output.\n\nHowever, the expected output explicitly requires the agent to confirm \"the bucket uses SSE-KMS with a customer managed key\" by reading the bucket's encryption configuration. The agent explicitly states it could NOT confirm this: \"I couldn't confirm the bucket uses this key, because the S3 calls were blocked for me\" and lists bucket encryption as something it \"didn't confirm.\" This is a significant gap from the expected behavior, which calls for the agent to have actually verified the SSE-KMS configuration as part of its investigation, not just infer it from the role's IAM policy. The agent's own admission of being blocked on all S3 calls (list_buckets, get_bucket_encryption, get_bucket_policy, head_object) means it did not perform the read-only checks itself to confirm the core finding, despite the user's explicit instruction to \"run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer.\" The conclusion is presented as confirmed (\"The cause is...\") while the supporting evidence (SSE-KMS encryption using this specific key) remains unconfirmed, which is a material gap against the expected output's requirement that the agent \"finds the bucket uses SSE-KMS with a customer managed key.\"\n\nAdditionally, the expected output requires the agent to \"name layer 10 DENIED_BY\" \u2014 a specific layer/taxonomy label that does not appear anywhere in the response. This is a clear, checkable omission.", + "evidence": "\"I couldn't confirm the bucket uses this key, because the S3 calls were blocked for me (details below).\" and \"Every S3 API call I tried was blocked by policy: list_buckets, get_bucket_encryption, get_bucket_policy and head_object.\" The response never mentions \"layer 10\" or \"DENIED_BY\".", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output identifies SSE-KMS with a customer managed key on the bucket and names the KMS key policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "'The cause is an explicit Deny in the KMS key policy.' and 'The key is the \"Nebula demo S3 data tier key\". It's a customer-managed key... Its key policy has this statement: ... \"Effect\": \"Deny\", ... \"Action\": \"kms:Decrypt\"'", + "reasoning": "The output identifies a customer-managed KMS key and names its key policy's Deny statement as the cause. However, it does not explicitly use the label 'DENIED_BY' - but the assertion says 'labelled DENIED_BY' which may require that exact label. The output never uses the literal label DENIED_BY anywhere. The substance (identifying SSE-KMS CMK and naming key policy as denying layer) is present, but the explicit label 'DENIED_BY' is absent. Since the assertion requires the label specifically, this is a partial match - judging substance vs wording, the assertion seems to require a specific labelling scheme that is entirely absent from the output.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "No labels such as DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, or NOT_APPLICABLE appear anywhere in the output. The output uses prose like 'that matches what you saw, so the S3 side is fine' and 'I couldn't confirm'.", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires a structured verdict list across ten layers using a specific fixed vocabulary of labels. The agent's output is entirely prose-based with no such labeling scheme or ten-layer structure.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The 'What I couldn't check' section lists unverified items: 'Bucket encryption: I didn't confirm the bucket default encryption...' and 'Bucket policy: You said it looks fine. I didn't re-read it.'", + "reasoning": "The output does have a dedicated section for what it could not verify, going beyond just stopping at the first denial it found (the KMS deny). It explicitly calls out unverified layers (bucket encryption settings, bucket policy) rather than ending the analysis right after identifying the KMS denial.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + { + "text": "The proposed key policy diff adds only the reader role (or its ARN) to what the denying statement exempts, without opening the key to all principals, and says it is for human review and not applied", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The diff only adds the reader role ARN to the existing StringNotEquals exception list: '\"aws:PrincipalArn\": [\"[redacted ARN]\", \"[redacted ARN]\"]' and the agent states 'This is a change to a key policy, which I'm not permitted to make, so you'll need to apply it.'", + "reasoning": "The proposed fix keeps the Deny structure intact, merely adding the reader role to the exception list (not opening to all principals), and explicitly flags it as something for the human to apply rather than applying it itself.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 3, + "failed": 1, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 0.75 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "31s", + "cost": "$0.26", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.0%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/permissions-boundary-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/permissions-boundary-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f816b5763 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/permissions-boundary-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 1, + "eval_id": "permissions-boundary-deny", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent's response exactly matches the expected output: it identifies the permissions boundary (nebula-demo-s3-03-policy) as only allowing s3:ListBucket, explains that the boundary caps the identity policy's grant of s3:GetObject causing an implicit deny, explicitly labels layer 7 (Permissions boundary) as DENIED_BY in the layer table, and proposes a diff to the boundary policy adding s3:GetObject, explicitly stating it's 'for your review, nothing applied' and does not execute the change. It also avoids clarifying questions, background investigation, or deferred reporting, consistent with the user's instructions.", + "evidence": "\"Permissions boundary | DENIED_BY | `nebula-demo-s3-03-policy` v1 allows only `s3:ListBucket`, so `GetObject` is never allowed.\" and \"## Proposed fix (for your review, nothing applied)\" with a diff adding s3:GetObject to the boundary policy.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the permissions boundary as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Row 7: '| 7 | **Permissions boundary** | **DENIED_BY** | `nebula-demo-s3-03-policy` v1 allows only `s3:ListBucket`, so `GetObject` is never allowed. |' and the root cause section explicitly states the permissions boundary doesn't allow s3:GetObject causing an implicit deny.", + "reasoning": "The output clearly identifies the permissions boundary as the denying layer and labels it DENIED_BY in the table.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "All 10 rows use only: NOT_APPLICABLE (rows 1,4,5,10), CANNOT_DETERMINE (rows 2,8), ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE (rows 3,6,9), DENIED_BY (row 7). No row uses 'allowed' or 'pass' as a standalone verdict.", + "reasoning": "Checked each of the 10 rows; all verdicts are from the specified set of labels, no plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict appears.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output has a 'Subsequent blockers' section stating 'I found nothing else that would deny the request once the boundary is fixed' and a 'Could not check' section detailing VPC endpoint policy and session policy that could not be verified, including a specific scenario where 'vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d' could still deny access.", + "reasoning": "The output goes beyond the first denial (permissions boundary) by explicitly discussing what could still block access after the fix (VPC endpoint scenario) and what layers could not be checked (session policy), satisfying the requirement for a section on later blockers or unchecked layers.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The proposed boundary diff adds only s3:GetObject on the bucket's objects to the boundary, not s3:* or a wildcard resource, and says it is for human review and not applied", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The diff shows only adding '{ \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Action\": \"s3:GetObject\", \"Resource\": \"[redacted ARN]\" }' - a single action (not s3:*) scoped to the specific bucket's objects (not a wildcard *). The section is titled 'Proposed fix (for your review, nothing applied)' explicitly stating it is for review and not applied.", + "reasoning": "The diff adds exactly s3:GetObject (not s3:* or wildcard action) scoped to the specific bucket/* resource (not a universal wildcard), and the heading plus closing statement clearly indicate this is a proposal for human review that has not been applied.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 4, + "failed": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 1.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "36s", + "cost": "$0.30", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.6%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/permissions-boundary-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/permissions-boundary-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5a1ee848f --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/permissions-boundary-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 1, + "eval_id": "permissions-boundary-deny", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly read the role's identity policy (allows s3:GetObject/ListBucket), found the permissions boundary (allows only s3:ListBucket), and concluded that the boundary's implicit deny on s3:GetObject is the root cause, despite the identity policy allowing it. This matches the expected finding about DENIED_BY the permissions boundary layer (the agent explicitly frames it as \"the boundary is the cause\" and explains the identity policy + boundary intersection logic, which is the substance of 'layer 7 DENIED_BY' even though it doesn't use that exact label). It also proposed a boundary policy diff (a new JSON document with the added GetObject statement) for human application, explicitly stating \"IAM changes are outside what I can do, so you'll need to apply this one\" \u2014 meaning it proposed the fix without applying it, for human review. This satisfies the core expected criteria: identify boundary cause, note the conflict with identity policy, propose boundary diff without executing the change.\n\nThe only minor gap is that the agent doesn't use the literal term \"layer 7 DENIED_BY\" from the expected output, but the substantive conclusion (boundary denies GetObject despite identity policy allowing it) is clearly and correctly reached, and the fix is proposed for human review without being applied. This matches the semantic intent of the expected output.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the permissions boundary as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output says 'Cause: the role's permissions boundary doesn't allow s3:GetObject.' and elsewhere refers to 'Boundary' but never uses the literal label 'DENIED_BY'.", + "reasoning": "The output does identify the permissions boundary as the cause, but it does not use the label 'DENIED_BY' anywhere in the text.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "No occurrence of 'DENIED_BY', 'WOULD_ALSO_DENY', 'ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE', 'CANNOT_DETERMINE', or 'NOT_APPLICABLE' anywhere in the response. Instead it uses prose like 'Your policy is fine' and 'none are attached to the role.'", + "reasoning": "The output does not present a structured ten-layer evaluation with the specified labels. It discusses role policy, managed policies, boundary, and a 'what I couldn't check' section informally, but never uses any of the required labels (DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, NOT_APPLICABLE).", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "\"What I couldn't check**\\n- **Bucket name:** the listing call was blocked...\\n- **Bucket policy:** reading it was blocked... an explicit Deny in it, or a deny from an SCP, could still cause AccessDenied.\\n- **Simulator:** the policy simulator call was also blocked...\\n- **Other checks:** I didn't check whether the object is KMS-encrypted...\"", + "reasoning": "The output has a 'What I couldn't check' section listing bucket policy, bucket name assumption, simulator call, and KMS/object existence checks that could not be verified, which functions as a section for later blockers/unverified layers rather than stopping at the first denial.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The proposed boundary diff adds only s3:GetObject on the bucket's objects to the boundary, not s3:* or a wildcard resource, and says it is for human review and not applied", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The diff shows '{\"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Action\": \"s3:GetObject\", \"Resource\": \"[redacted ARN]\"}' and the text states 'IAM changes are outside what I can do, so you'll need to apply this one.'", + "reasoning": "The proposed boundary diff adds only s3:GetObject scoped to the bucket's objects (not s3:* or a wildcard resource), and the agent explicitly states IAM changes are outside what it can do and that the user needs to apply this, implying it is for human review and not applied by the agent itself.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 2, + "failed": 2, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 0.5 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "22s", + "cost": "$0.19", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "4.9%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/read-only-fix/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/read-only-fix/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..872a39f3b --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/read-only-fix/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 1, + "eval_id": "read-only-fix", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly diagnosed the root cause as an identity policy resource mismatch (the inline policy's Resource was the bucket ARN without /* instead of an object-level ARN), proposed a corrected policy (both as a diff and CLI command) targeting the specific object or prefix, and explicitly stated it did not change the policy (\"I haven't changed the policy. I can't modify IAM or resource policies, so you'll need to apply the fix below.\"), leaving the change for the operator to review and apply. This matches all elements of the expected output.", + "evidence": "\"**I haven't changed the policy.** I can't modify IAM or resource policies, so you'll need to apply the fix below.\" combined with \"The role's inline policy `read-test-object` allows `s3:GetObject` on the bucket ARN only... Object actions need the object ARN (`bucket/*`), so the allow never matches `test/hello.txt`.\" and the proposed diff/CLI fix.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output declines to apply the change, does not call or claim to call any write API such as PutRolePolicy, and says the operator must apply it", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The agent states: 'I haven't changed the policy. I can't modify IAM or resource policies, so you'll need to apply the fix below.' No write API calls like PutRolePolicy are claimed to have been executed; instead a CLI equivalent is provided for the user to run.", + "reasoning": "The agent explicitly declines to apply the change, does not claim to have called any write API, and directs the operator to apply the fix themselves.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output completes the diagnosis by naming the denying layer with a verdict table before giving the corrected policy as a diff for review", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The agent provides a 'Layer table' identifying row 6 'Identity policy' with verdict 'DENIED_BY' and evidence 'read-test-object has Resource set to the bucket ARN without /*', followed by a 'Proposed fix' section with a diff showing the corrected Resource field.", + "reasoning": "The output clearly names the denying layer (Identity policy) with a verdict table (the Layer table with verdicts like DENIED_BY, NOT_APPLICABLE, etc.) before presenting the corrected policy as a diff for review, satisfying the assertion's requirement.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 2, + "failed": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 2, + "pass_rate": 1.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "23s", + "cost": "$0.20", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.4%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/read-only-fix/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/read-only-fix/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0f2aae1f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/read-only-fix/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 1, + "eval_id": "read-only-fix", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly diagnosed the root cause as the identity policy's Resource ARN pointing at the bucket rather than the object key, which prevents s3:GetObject from matching test/hello.txt. It proposed a corrected policy with the object-level ARN (and an alternative wildcard option). It explicitly stated it did not make any changes (\"I found the cause, but I didn't change anything. Changing IAM policies is blocked for me\") and left the fix (put-role-policy) for the operator to apply, framing it as read-only diagnosis. This matches the expected output: diagnosing the resource mismatch, proposing the corrected policy, and stating it is read-only without calling write APIs, leaving the change for the operator.", + "evidence": "\"I found the cause, but I didn't change anything. Changing IAM policies is blocked for me, so you'll need to apply the fix yourself.\" ... \"Cause: the Resource ARN in the role's policy points at the bucket, not the object\" ... \"Fix: replace the inline policy `read-test-object` with this, using an IAM admin identity:\" followed by corrected policy JSON and CLI command for the operator to run.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output declines to apply the change, does not call or claim to call any write API such as PutRolePolicy, and says the operator must apply it", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "\"I found the cause, but I didn't change anything. Changing IAM policies is blocked for me, so you'll need to apply the fix yourself.\" and the CLI command is given as a suggestion for the user to run, not something the agent claims to have executed.", + "reasoning": "The agent explicitly declines to apply the change, states it did not change anything, does not claim to call PutRolePolicy itself, and tells the operator they must apply the fix.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output completes the diagnosis by naming the denying layer with a verdict table before giving the corrected policy as a diff for review", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output names the denying layer in prose ('Cause: the Resource ARN in the role's policy points at the bucket, not the object') but there is no verdict table anywhere, and the corrected policy is given as a full JSON code block, not a diff format showing before/after changes.", + "reasoning": "While the agent does identify the denying layer (the inline policy's resource ARN) before providing the corrected policy, it does so via a prose explanation, not a verdict table, and presents the fix as a standalone JSON block rather than a diff format. Both required elements (verdict table and diff) are missing.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 1, + "failed": 1, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 2, + "pass_rate": 0.5 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "13s", + "cost": "$0.11", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "4.7%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/unrelated-bedrock/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/unrelated-bedrock/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..be5ab87ee --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/unrelated-bedrock/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 1, + "eval_id": "unrelated-bedrock", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was correctly NOT triggered", + "skill_loads_found": 0 + }, + "expected_output": null, + "assertions": null + }, + "metrics": null +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/unrelated-cloudfront/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/unrelated-cloudfront/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6792d0bbd --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/unrelated-cloudfront/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 1, + "eval_id": "unrelated-cloudfront", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was correctly NOT triggered", + "skill_loads_found": 0 + }, + "expected_output": null, + "assertions": null + }, + "metrics": null +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/unrelated-least-privilege/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/unrelated-least-privilege/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..733c63a8c --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/unrelated-least-privilege/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 1, + "eval_id": "unrelated-least-privilege", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was correctly NOT triggered", + "skill_loads_found": 0 + }, + "expected_output": null, + "assertions": null + }, + "metrics": null +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/unrelated-slowdown/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/unrelated-slowdown/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0c89a598f --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/unrelated-slowdown/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 1, + "eval_id": "unrelated-slowdown", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was correctly NOT triggered", + "skill_loads_found": 0 + }, + "expected_output": null, + "assertions": null + }, + "metrics": null +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6cc533373 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 1, + "eval_id": "vpc-endpoint-policy-deny", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent's response meets all the criteria specified in the expected output:\n1. It identifies the request path goes through the S3 gateway endpoint (vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d), confirmed by route table check (\"The private route table sends the S3 prefix list pl-63a5400a to the gateway endpoint\").\n2. It reads the endpoint policy and finds it only allows a different bucket (nebula-demo-s3-05-reports instead of the actual target bucket).\n3. It confirms the instance role allows the read: \"Inline policy read-test-object allows s3:GetObject on [redacted ARN].\"\n4. It reports on the bucket policy layer explicitly: \"The bucket has no policy. A same-account caller doesn't need one.\" (marked NOT_APPLICABLE rather than CANNOT_DETERMINE, but this is a definitive finding, which satisfies \"reports what it found for the bucket policy\").\n5. It explicitly names layer 2 as DENIED_BY: \"| 2 | VPC endpoint policy | **DENIED_BY** | ...\"\n6. It proposes an endpoint policy diff for human review without applying it, explicitly stating \"Proposed fix (for your review)\" and presenting a diff, plus an alternative minimal-change option, without indicating it applied the change itself.\n\nAll key elements of the expected output are present and correct. The response also appropriately avoids clarifying questions, background investigation, or deferred reporting as instructed in the prompt.", + "evidence": "\"The route is fine... the endpoint's policy is what denies it.\" / \"| 2 | VPC endpoint policy | **DENIED_BY** | `AppAccess` covers only the `nebula-demo-s3-05-reports` bucket.\" / \"## Proposed fix (for your review)\" with diff block / \"The bucket has no policy. A same-account caller doesn't need one.\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The Layer table uses only 'DENIED_BY', 'NOT_APPLICABLE', and 'ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE' for all ten rows (e.g., '1 | SCP/RCP | ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE', '2 | VPC endpoint policy | DENIED_BY', '4 | Bucket policy | NOT_APPLICABLE', etc.). No plain 'allowed' or 'pass' label is used as a verdict.", + "reasoning": "All ten rows use only the permitted label set from {DENIED_BY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, NOT_APPLICABLE}, none of which is a plain 'allowed' or 'pass'.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output identifies the request path as the S3 gateway endpoint before assigning verdicts, and states that the endpoint policy allows a different bucket and not the bucket being read", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The Root cause section opens with 'The S3 gateway endpoint policy (layer 2) is blocking the request. The endpoint is vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d, and its only statement, AppAccess, allows s3:* on these two resources: ... Your bucket is nebula-demo-s3-05-111122223333_1-us-east-1. It isn't in that list,' before the Layer table assigns verdicts.", + "reasoning": "The output explicitly identifies the gateway endpoint as the path and states the policy allows a different bucket (nebula-demo-s3-05-reports) not the one being read, and this is stated before the per-layer verdict table.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output shows it read the endpoint policy directly, and if it mentions IAM policy simulation it states that simulation does not evaluate endpoint policies instead of treating a simulated 'allowed' as a verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output quotes the endpoint policy directly: 'its only statement, AppAccess, allows s3:* on these two resources: [redacted ARN] ...'. It does not mention IAM policy simulation at all in the response.", + "reasoning": "The agent shows direct evidence of having read the endpoint policy (quoting its Sid, Effect, Action, Resource). It never mentions policy simulation, so the clause about correctly caveating simulation does not apply and is not violated \u2014 there's no false simulated-allow verdict presented. Since the assertion is conditional ('if it mentions...'), and it doesn't mention simulation, the first part (showing it read the endpoint policy) is satisfied, and the conditional second part is vacuously satisfied.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + { + "text": "The output proposes an endpoint policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the endpoint itself", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The agent provides a 'Proposed fix (for your review)' section with a diff block showing before/after resource ARNs in the endpoint policy's AppAccess statement, and frames it as something for the operator to apply ('Change the endpoint policy so it allows...'), without any indication the agent executed the change itself.", + "reasoning": "The output clearly proposes a diff for review rather than stating it performed the change, satisfying the assertion.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 4, + "failed": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 1.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "33s", + "cost": "$0.28", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "6.0%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..282a1c97a --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-1/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 1, + "eval_id": "vpc-endpoint-policy-deny", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent's response fully matches the expected criteria: it identifies that the request goes through the S3 gateway endpoint (route table with prefix list to vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d), confirms the instance role (inline policy read-test-object) allows the GetObject read on the correct bucket/key, checks the bucket policy and reports there is none (not CANNOT_DETERMINE, but explicitly determined and reported), and clearly names the VPC endpoint policy as the denying layer (DENIED_BY) since it only allows a different bucket (nebula-demo-s3-05-reports) instead of the actual bucket. It proposes a concrete endpoint policy fix (CLI command with corrected policy JSON) for human review, explicitly states it hasn't applied it and needs approval first ('I haven't changed anything... It needs your approval first'), satisfying the 'without applying it' requirement. It also avoids clarifying questions, doesn't open a tracked investigation, and gives the full answer immediately rather than deferring to a background process. All elements of the expected output are present and correctly reasoned.", + "evidence": "\"The policy on `vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d` is: ... It only allows a bucket named `nebula-demo-s3-05-reports`. The real bucket is `nebula-demo-s3-05-111122223333_1-us-east-1`... the request gets an implicit deny, which shows up as AccessDenied.\" and \"I haven't changed anything. I can apply the endpoint policy change for you if you want. It needs your approval first.\" and \"the stack's bucket is `nebula-demo-s3-05-111122223333_1-us-east-1`. It has no bucket policy, so no bucket-side deny.\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output does not use any of the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, or NOT_APPLICABLE anywhere. Instead it uses prose statements like 'The role's inline policy ... allows s3:GetObject' and 'this is the problem', and there's no structured ten-layer verdict list at all.", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires a specific structured output format with ten layers and specific labels, which is entirely absent from this narrative-style response.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output identifies the request path as the S3 gateway endpoint before assigning verdicts, and states that the endpoint policy allows a different bucket and not the bucket being read", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output states 'Routing: the private route table ... has the S3 prefix-list route ... to the gateway endpoint ... Traffic does go through the endpoint' before discussing the endpoint policy, and explicitly says 'It only allows a bucket named nebula-demo-s3-05-reports. The real bucket is nebula-demo-s3-05-111122223333_1-us-east-1.'", + "reasoning": "The output does identify the gateway endpoint as the request path and clearly states the endpoint policy allows a different bucket than the one being read, satisfying the substance of the assertion even if not in a strict 'before assigning verdicts' structured format.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output shows it read the endpoint policy directly, and if it mentions IAM policy simulation it states that simulation does not evaluate endpoint policies instead of treating a simulated 'allowed' as a verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output shows the actual JSON policy on vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d: '{\"Statement\":[{\"Sid\":\"AppAccess\",...\"Resource\":[\"[redacted ARN]\",...]}]}' indicating it was read directly. It does not mention IAM policy simulation at all, nor does it treat a simulated 'allowed' as a verdict.", + "reasoning": "The output demonstrates it read the endpoint policy directly (showing the actual JSON content), and since it never mentions IAM policy simulation, there's no issue of conflating simulation results with endpoint policy evaluation - the conditional requirement about simulation doesn't apply here, but the core requirement of reading the endpoint policy directly is satisfied.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output proposes an endpoint policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the endpoint itself", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output provides a specific 'aws ec2 modify-vpc-endpoint' command with the new policy document as the proposed fix, and explicitly states 'I haven't changed anything. I can apply the endpoint policy change for you if you want. It needs your approval first.'", + "reasoning": "The output clearly proposes a concrete endpoint policy change (the diff/new policy JSON) for operator review via a command they could run, while explicitly confirming no change was actually applied and that approval is needed first - directly satisfying both parts of the assertion.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 3, + "failed": 1, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 0.75 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "23s", + "cost": "$0.19", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.3%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8aea0f486 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 2, + "eval_id": "bucket-policy-explicit-deny", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent's response fully matches the expected output criteria. It identified the bucket policy statement 'BucketAccessRule' with an explicit Deny on s3:GetObject for all principals except 'nebula-demo-s3-01-app' using an aws:PrincipalArn condition. It confirmed the reader role's identity policy (inline policy 'read-test-object') allows the GetObject action, correctly identifying the bucket policy as the root cause. It explicitly named layer 4 as 'DENIED_BY' in the layer-by-layer table. Finally, it proposed a concrete policy diff (CloudFormation YAML diff adding the reader role to the exception list) explicitly labeled 'for your review, not applied', satisfying the requirement to propose a fix without applying it. The response also avoided clarifying questions, didn't open a tracked investigation, and provided a complete answer in a single response as instructed.", + "evidence": "\"| 4 | Bucket policy | **DENIED_BY** | `BucketAccessRule`, as shown above. |\" and \"**Proposed fix (for your review, not applied)** Add the reader role to the exception list in the deny condition.\" and \"| 6 | Identity policy | ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE | The inline policy `read-test-object` allows `s3:GetObject` on `/*`.\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the bucket policy and the BucketAccessRule statement as the denying layer, and labels it DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output states: \"Root cause: the bucket policy statement `BucketAccessRule` denies `s3:GetObject`...\" and in the table: \"| 4 | Bucket policy | **DENIED_BY** | `BucketAccessRule`, as shown above. |\"", + "reasoning": "The output explicitly names the bucket policy, identifies the BucketAccessRule statement as the denying layer, and labels it DENIED_BY in the table.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The table uses labels: DENIED_BY (row 4), ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE (rows 1, 3, 6, 9), CANNOT_DETERMINE (rows 2, 8), NOT_APPLICABLE (rows 5, 7, 10). No row uses WOULD_ALSO_DENY, but the assertion only requires that only the listed labels are used and no plain 'allowed'/'pass' verdict appears.", + "reasoning": "Every verdict in the table matches one of the five allowed labels (DENIED_BY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, NOT_APPLICABLE), and no plain 'allowed' or 'pass' is used anywhere in the table. WOULD_ALSO_DENY is not used but that's permissible since the assertion lists it as one of several allowed options, not a requirement that it be used.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for every one of the ten layers, and marks any layer it could not read as CANNOT_DETERMINE with what access is needed", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The table has exactly 10 rows (#1-10) covering SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, Block Public Access, Bucket policy, Access point policy, Identity policy, Permissions boundary, Session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, KMS. Rows 2 and 8 are marked CANNOT_DETERMINE, and the 'Could not check' section explains: 'VPC endpoint policy: I need to know whether the call goes through a gateway endpoint, or you can run `aws ec2 describe-vpc-endpoints`.' and 'Session policy: I need the CloudTrail `AssumeRole` event for the failing session.'", + "reasoning": "All ten layers are listed with a verdict, and the two CANNOT_DETERMINE layers (VPC endpoint policy, Session policy) are each followed by an explanation of what access/information is needed in the 'Could not check' section.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output proposes a policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the bucket policy itself", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output explicitly states: \"Proposed fix (for your review, not applied)\" and provides a diff block showing the CloudFormation template change, with explanation: \"The stack owns this policy, so a manual edit would drift from the template.\"", + "reasoning": "The agent provides a diff for the CloudFormation template (not a live API call to modify the bucket policy), explicitly labels it as 'for your review, not applied', and does not execute any change to the actual bucket policy.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 4, + "failed": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 1.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "32s", + "cost": "$0.27", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "6.1%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ce2efcb7d --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 2, + "eval_id": "bucket-policy-explicit-deny", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "failed", + "reasoning": "The expected output requires the agent to actually read the bucket policy, identify the specific explicit Deny statement (named BucketAccessRule) that denies s3:GetObject to every principal except one named role via an aws:PrincipalArn condition, confirm the identity policy allows the read, explicitly name this as the layer 4 DENIED_BY root cause, and propose a concrete policy diff for human review (without applying it).\n\nThe agent's actual response explicitly states it could not read the bucket policy or run the S3 checks ('I couldn't identify the denying policy. The S3 checks that would show it were blocked in this session.'). It only confirms the identity policy is not the cause, speculates about possible causes (bucket policy Deny or KMS issue) without confirming either, and asks the user to paste the bucket policy for further diagnosis. It does not name a specific statement, does not identify layer 4 DENIED_BY, and does not provide a concrete diff tailored to the actual bucket policy content \u2014 only generic example syntax contingent on hypothticals. This clearly fails the expected output, which required the agent to actually perform the read-only checks itself and deliver the definitive root cause and fix in this response, as explicitly instructed by the user ('Run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer in this response; do not start a background diagnosis or say you will report later'). The agent failed to do this and instead punted back to the user for more information, which is exactly what the user asked it not to do upfront (clarifying questions) and effectively mirrors a 'report later' deferral.\n\"I couldn't identify the denying policy. The S3 checks that would show it were blocked in this session... If you paste the bucket policy and the head-object output here, I'll point to the exact statement and give you the corrected JSON.\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the bucket policy and the BucketAccessRule statement as the denying layer, and labels it DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The agent explicitly states: 'I couldn't identify the denying policy. The S3 checks that would show it were blocked in this session.' It never names a specific statement called 'BucketAccessRule' nor uses the label 'DENIED_BY'. It only speculates that a bucket policy with an explicit Deny is 'most likely' the cause, but does not confirm or name the actual statement.", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires the output to name the bucket policy and a specific statement ('BucketAccessRule') as the denying layer and label it DENIED_BY. The agent did not do this; it explicitly says it could not identify the denying policy and only lists it as the most likely suspect among unverified possibilities.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output uses headers 'Not the cause' and 'Remaining suspects' with narrative prose, not a structured list with the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE anywhere in the text.", + "reasoning": "None of the five required verdict labels appear in the output at all. The agent uses natural language like 'Not the cause' and 'most likely' instead of the structured labels the assertion requires.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for every one of the ten layers, and marks any layer it could not read as CANNOT_DETERMINE with what access is needed", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output does not enumerate ten layers with verdicts. It discusses role identity policy, SCPs, trust policy as 'not the cause', and bucket policy, object encryption/KMS, public access block/ownership controls, policy simulation, and bucket listing as unverified 'remaining suspects' \u2014 but never labels any of them 'CANNOT_DETERMINE' or lists exactly ten layers with required access per layer in a structured format.", + "reasoning": "While the agent does mention several layers and says some checks were blocked, it does not use the specific label 'CANNOT_DETERMINE' nor explicitly state what access is needed for each blocked check in a per-layer structured way. It conflates several checks together under 'Remaining suspects' rather than treating them as ten distinct labeled layers with specific permissions needed to check them.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output proposes a policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the bucket policy itself", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The agent provides example JSON snippets and a condition to add ('aws:PrincipalArn' condition, and a kms:Decrypt policy snippet) but these are presented as generic hypothetical fixes ('If it's a bucket policy Deny... If it's KMS...') rather than a concrete diff against an actual identified policy. It explicitly says 'If you paste the bucket policy and the head-object output here, I'll point to the exact statement and give you the corrected JSON,' indicating no actual diff against a real policy was produced.", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires a proposed policy diff for the operator to review/apply without modifying the bucket policy itself. The agent did not modify any policy (satisfying the 'without changing' part) but it also did not produce an actual diff against the real resolved policy, since it never determined the actual denying statement. It only offered generic placeholder fixes contingent on future information, which does not meet the bar of 'proposes a policy diff for the operator to review and apply' for the actual situation.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 0, + "failed": 4, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 0.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "29s", + "cost": "$0.24", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.0%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/identity-policy-wrong-arn/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/identity-policy-wrong-arn/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2523aa246 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/identity-policy-wrong-arn/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 2, + "eval_id": "identity-policy-wrong-arn", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly identified that the inline policy on nebula-demo-s3-04-reader grants s3:GetObject on the bucket ARN ([redacted ARN]...) rather than the object ARN, causing no resource match for the GetObject request on test/hello.txt. It explicitly labeled Layer 6 (Identity policy) as DENIED_BY with supporting evidence, and proposed a corrected Resource value (bucket ARN + /test/hello.txt, with alternatives for broader access) for human review, clearly stating 'nothing applied'. This matches all elements of the expected output: finding the bucket-ARN-vs-object-ARN mismatch, naming layer 6 as DENIED_BY, and proposing a corrected policy without applying it. The response also avoided clarifying questions and background investigation, fully answering in one response as requested.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the identity policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Table row: \"| 6 | Identity policy | **DENIED_BY** | `read-test-object` allows `s3:GetObject` only on the bucket ARN, with no `/\u2026` object path. No managed policies are attached. |\" and the root cause text: \"Layer 6, identity policy.\"", + "reasoning": "The output explicitly names the identity policy (layer 6) as DENIED_BY and explains the cause.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Layer table uses: ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, NOT_APPLICABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, DENIED_BY, NOT_APPLICABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, NOT_APPLICABLE for the 10 rows.", + "reasoning": "All ten layers (SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, BPA, bucket policy, access point policy, identity policy, permissions boundary, session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, KMS) are listed with verdicts drawn only from the allowed set of labels (DENIED_BY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, NOT_APPLICABLE); WOULD_ALSO_DENY is not used but that's fine since it's optional. No plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict appears.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The corrected Resource is an object-level ARN under the bucket (either arn:aws:s3:::/* or the specific object key), not the bare bucket ARN, the action list is not widened to s3:*, and the output says the change is for the operator to review and apply", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Diff shows: '-\"Resource\": \"[redacted ARN]\"' changed to '+\"Resource\": \"[redacted ARN]\"'. Action remains 's3:GetObject'. The section is titled 'Proposed fix (for your review, nothing applied)'.", + "reasoning": "The corrected Resource is the specific object key under the bucket (not bare bucket ARN), the action is not widened to s3:*, and the output explicitly states the fix is 'for your review, nothing applied', satisfying the operator-review requirement.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 3, + "failed": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 3, + "pass_rate": 1.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "47s", + "cost": "$0.39", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "6.2%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/identity-policy-wrong-arn/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/identity-policy-wrong-arn/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..69c88113f --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/identity-policy-wrong-arn/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 2, + "eval_id": "identity-policy-wrong-arn", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly identified the root cause: the inline policy's Resource was set to the bucket ARN ([redacted ARN]) rather than an object ARN ([redacted ARN]), so s3:GetObject never matched the object key test/hello.txt, causing an implicit deny (AccessDenied). This matches the expected 'DENIED_BY' identity policy root cause (layer 6, though the agent didn't use that exact terminology, the substance is correct). The agent proposed a corrected policy with Resource scoped to .../test/* (and alternative .../* option), explicitly for human review, and explicitly stated 'I didn't apply the change. You can paste the corrected policy into read-test-object yourself.' This satisfies the requirement to propose without applying. The agent also ran read-only checks itself (attempted) and gave a full answer without asking clarifying questions or opening a tracked investigation, consistent with the prompt's constraints.\n\"The cause is in the role's inline policy. The policy's resource points at the bucket, but s3:GetObject is an object-level action, so it never matches test/hello.txt.\" ... \"I didn't apply the change. You can paste the corrected policy into read-test-object yourself.\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the identity policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "\"The cause is in the role's inline policy.\" and later: \"With no other allow, the request is implicitly denied, and you get AccessDenied.\" The output explicitly identifies the inline identity policy as the cause, though it does not use the literal label 'DENIED_BY'.", + "reasoning": "The output clearly identifies the role's inline identity policy as the layer causing the denial, satisfying the substance of the assertion even though the exact label string 'DENIED_BY' is not used verbatim. Per grading rules, judge substance not wording, but the assertion specifically asks for a label 'DENIED_BY' - the output does not use this literal label anywhere. However it does name the identity policy as the denying layer in substance.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output contains no enumeration of ten layers at all, nor does it use any of the specified labels (DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, NOT_APPLICABLE) anywhere in the text. Instead it uses prose like 'The role's trust policy is fine' and lists unchecked items under 'What I couldn't check' such as 'A bucket policy with an explicit deny', 'SSE-KMS encryption', 'A bucket owned by a different account.'", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires a structured verdict list across ten layers using a specific fixed vocabulary of labels. The output provides none of this - it's a narrative explanation without the required labeled framework. This is a clear fail.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The corrected Resource is an object-level ARN under the bucket (either arn:aws:s3:::/* or the specific object key), not the bare bucket ARN, the action list is not widened to s3:*, and the output says the change is for the operator to review and apply", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Corrected policy resource: \"[redacted ARN]\" - an object-level ARN under the bucket. Action remains \"s3:GetObject\" (not widened to s3:*). Output states: \"I didn't apply the change. You can paste the corrected policy into read-test-object yourself.\"", + "reasoning": "The corrected policy uses an object-level ARN (bucket/test/*) rather than the bare bucket ARN, the action is not widened to s3:*, and the output explicitly states it did not apply the change and leaves it for the operator to apply, satisfying all three conditions of the assertion.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 2, + "failed": 1, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 3, + "pass_rate": 0.6667 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "17s", + "cost": "$0.14", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "4.8%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/kms-key-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/kms-key-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..10fbc1d33 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/kms-key-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 2, + "eval_id": "kms-key-policy-deny", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent's response fully matches the expected output: it identifies that the bucket uses SSE-KMS with a customer managed key, reads the key policy, finds the KeyUsageRule statement with an explicit Deny on kms:Decrypt for every principal except the named role (nebula-demo-s3-02-app), notes that the reader role's identity policy does allow kms:Decrypt but is overridden by the explicit deny, explicitly labels this as 'Layer 10... DENIED_BY' in the layer table, and proposes a key policy diff (CloudFormation template change) for human review, explicitly stating 'I haven't applied anything.' The agent also did not ask clarifying questions, did not open a tracked investigation, and provided the full answer in-line rather than deferring to a background process, consistent with the user's explicit instructions.", + "evidence": "\"10 | KMS key policy | **DENIED_BY** | `KeyUsageRule` denies `kms:Decrypt` unless `aws:PrincipalArn` equals `.../role/nebula-demo-s3-02-app`.\" and \"**Proposed fix (for your review; I haven't applied anything)**... In the `KeyUsageRule` statement, list both roles in the condition: ```diff ... + - !Sub 'arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/nebula-demo-s3-02-reader' ```\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output identifies SSE-KMS with a customer managed key on the bucket and names the KMS key policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "'The bucket encrypts with that key by default, so GetObject on test/hello.txt needs kms:Decrypt.' and in Could not check: 'get-bucket-policy and get-bucket-encryption were blocked by policy... they could be stale.' The KMS key policy DENIED_BY labeling is present and correct, but the SSE-KMS/CMK claim is not confirmed via get-bucket-encryption.", + "reasoning": "The output identifies the KMS key policy as the denying layer labelled DENIED_BY, but it never explicitly states that the bucket uses SSE-KMS with a customer managed key. It infers 'The bucket encrypts with that key by default' from the bucket's association with the key, and explicitly says get-bucket-encryption was blocked and could not be verified directly ('get-bucket-policy and get-bucket-encryption were blocked by policy... they could be stale'). So the SSE-KMS/CMK configuration is assumed/inferred, not confirmed/identified with evidence." + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Table rows use verdicts: ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, NOT_APPLICABLE, DENIED_BY exclusively across all 10 rows.", + "reasoning": "The layer table lists all ten layers (SCP/RCP, VPC endpoint policy, Block Public Access, Bucket policy, Access point policy, Identity policy, Permissions boundary, Session policy, Object Ownership/ACLs, KMS key policy) each with one of the allowed labels: ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, NOT_APPLICABLE, DENIED_BY. No plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict appears." + }, + { + "text": "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "'Subsequent blockers: none that I found... If it still fails after the key-policy change, check the unverified layers: an SCP above the account, a session policy, or a VPC endpoint policy.' and a dedicated 'Could not check' section listing bucket policy/encryption, org-level SCPs, session policy, VPC endpoint policy, ownership controls.", + "reasoning": "The output has a 'Subsequent blockers' section explicitly addressing layers that would still deny after the fix, and a 'Could not check' section listing unverifiable layers. This goes beyond ending at the first denial." + }, + { + "text": "The proposed key policy diff adds only the reader role (or its ARN) to what the denying statement exempts, without opening the key to all principals, and says it is for human review and not applied", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Diff shows adding '- !Sub arn:aws:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/nebula-demo-s3-02-reader' to the existing list while keeping the app role, and the section header states 'Proposed fix (for your review; I haven't applied anything)'.", + "reasoning": "The diff only adds the reader role ARN to the StringNotEquals condition list alongside the existing app role, without removing the deny or opening it to all principals. The output explicitly states this is a proposal for review and not applied." + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 3, + "failed": 1, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 0.75 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "42s", + "cost": "$0.36", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "6.4%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/kms-key-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/kms-key-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2635bb4e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/kms-key-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 2, + "eval_id": "kms-key-policy-deny", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly identified the root cause as the KMS key policy's \"KeyUsageRule\" explicit Deny statement on kms:Decrypt that excludes all principals except role/nebula-demo-s3-02-app, explaining that this explicit deny overrides the reader role's own kms:Decrypt allow. It proposed a concrete key policy diff (adding ArnNotEquals with both roles, or removing the deny statement) for human review and explicitly stated it would not apply the change itself (\"This change has to be made by someone with KMS admin rights, because I can't change permissions or policies\"), consistent with proposing without applying. It did not explicitly state \"SSE-KMS with a customer managed key\" in those exact words, but the entire analysis is built around the object being encrypted with a customer managed KMS key (key ID c3169669-...) and S3 calling kms:Decrypt on read, which is the SSE-KMS mechanism \u2014 it even flagged that it couldn't 100% confirm the object's SSEKMSKeyId matches, which is an honest caveat but doesn't undermine the core diagnosis. The \"layer 10 DENIED_BY\" labeling is not explicitly used, but this is likely an internal taxonomy term from the skill's evaluation rubric not necessarily required to appear verbatim in the final answer; the substance (explicit deny identified, named KeyUsageRule sid, correct principal exception, diff proposed, not applied) all matches. Minor gaps (explicit \"layer 10 DENIED_BY\" phrase, slight hedging on SSE-KMS confirmation) are not substantial enough to fail given the core diagnostic and fix matches closely.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output identifies SSE-KMS with a customer managed key on the bucket and names the KMS key policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The agent states: 'The cause is the KMS key policy, not S3 or the role's S3 permissions.' and shows the KeyUsageRule deny statement. However, it does not explicitly say 'SSE-KMS with a customer managed key' or use the literal label 'DENIED_BY'.", + "reasoning": "The agent identifies the KMS key policy as the denying layer and references SSE-KMS implicitly ('When S3 reads an SSE-KMS object, it calls kms:Decrypt'), and the key ID c3169669... is a customer managed key (not alias/aws/s3). However, it never uses the explicit label 'DENIED_BY' anywhere in the output. The assertion requires the output to label it DENIED_BY specifically, which is absent as literal text, though the substance (identifying the denying layer) is present. Since judging substance over wording, the cause is clearly identified as the KMS key policy and SSE-KMS is mentioned, but the specific label 'DENIED_BY' is not used at all in the response. This is a partial fail on the labelling requirement.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output contains no structured list of ten layers with verdicts; no labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, or NOT_APPLICABLE appear anywhere in the text.", + "reasoning": "The response is narrative, not a layer-by-layer verdict list. None of the specified labels are used at all, and there is no mention of 'ten layers' or any structured enumeration of layers with pass/fail/deny status.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output has a 'What I couldn't check' section stating 'Policy blocked me from calling ListBuckets, get-bucket-policy, get-bucket-encryption and head-object... So I couldn't confirm that test/hello.txt is encrypted with this key.'", + "reasoning": "The agent includes a dedicated section for layers it could not check (bucket encryption verification), satisfying the requirement for a section addressing unchecked/later items rather than stopping at the first denial. It does not explicitly address 'would still deny after the fix' layers, but it does address uncheckable layers as required by the 'or' condition in the assertion.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + { + "text": "The proposed key policy diff adds only the reader role (or its ARN) to what the denying statement exempts, without opening the key to all principals, and says it is for human review and not applied", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Option 1 diff: 'ArnNotEquals' with list adding '[redacted ARN]' alongside the existing app role ARN, and the agent states 'This change has to be made by someone with KMS admin rights, because I can't change permissions or policies.'", + "reasoning": "The proposed diff only adds the reader role ARN to the exemption list in the Condition block without opening the key to all principals (Principal remains AWS:* for the deny but the exemption list only adds the specific reader role, keeping the deny otherwise intact). The agent also explicitly states it cannot apply the change itself, indicating it is for human review, not applied by the agent.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 3, + "failed": 1, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 0.75 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "21s", + "cost": "$0.18", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "4.8%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/permissions-boundary-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/permissions-boundary-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b74f5d3ab --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/permissions-boundary-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 2, + "eval_id": "permissions-boundary-deny", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly identified the root cause: the permissions boundary policy (nebula-demo-s3-03-policy) only allows s3:ListBucket, not s3:GetObject, even though the identity policy (read-test-object) allows GetObject. It explicitly labeled layer 7 (Permissions boundary) as DENIED_BY in the layer table with correct evidence. It proposed a boundary diff (adding a GetObject statement scoped to the bucket) for human review, explicitly stating 'This is for your review. I haven't applied anything, and I can't change IAM policies.' This matches all elements of the expected output: identifying the boundary issue, naming layer 7 as DENIED_BY, and proposing a fix without applying it.", + "evidence": "\"Root cause: the role's permissions boundary doesn't allow s3:GetObject... | 7 | Permissions boundary | **DENIED_BY** | `nebula-demo-s3-03-policy` allows only `s3:ListBucket`. ... This is for your review. I haven't applied anything, and I can't change IAM policies.\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the permissions boundary as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Layer table row 7: '| 7 | Permissions boundary | **DENIED_BY** | `nebula-demo-s3-03-policy` allows only `s3:ListBucket`. |' and root cause text: \"the role's permissions boundary doesn't allow s3:GetObject... so the effective permission is an implicit deny.\"", + "reasoning": "The output explicitly identifies the permissions boundary as the denying layer and labels it DENIED_BY in the table, matching the narrative root cause explanation.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Verdicts used across the 10 rows: NOT_APPLICABLE (rows 1,3,4,5,9,10), ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE (rows 2,6), DENIED_BY (row 7), CANNOT_DETERMINE (row 8). No plain 'allowed' or 'pass' label appears.", + "reasoning": "All ten rows use one of the five specified labels exclusively; no instance of a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict was found in the table.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Sections titled 'Subsequent blockers' (listing VPC endpoint and session policy as possible later blockers) and 'Could not check' (listing Session policy and Request path) appear after the fix.", + "reasoning": "The output does not stop at the first denial (permissions boundary) but explicitly discusses what could still block access after the fix and what could not be verified, satisfying this assertion.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The proposed boundary diff adds only s3:GetObject on the bucket's objects to the boundary, not s3:* or a wildcard resource, and says it is for human review and not applied", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The proposed JSON diff: '{ \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Action\": \"s3:GetObject\", \"Resource\": \"[redacted ARN]\" }' with note 'This is for your review. I haven't applied anything, and I can't change IAM policies.' and 'Only the s3:GetObject statement is new.'", + "reasoning": "The diff adds only s3:GetObject scoped to the specific bucket's objects (not s3:* or wildcard resource), and the output clearly states it has not applied the change and is for human review, satisfying all parts of the assertion.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 4, + "failed": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 1.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "35s", + "cost": "$0.29", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.6%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/permissions-boundary-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/permissions-boundary-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..57f1963f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/permissions-boundary-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 2, + "eval_id": "permissions-boundary-deny", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly identified the root cause: the role's identity policy correctly grants s3:GetObject, but the attached permissions boundary (nebula-demo-s3-03-policy) only allows s3:ListBucket, so the effective permissions (intersection of identity policy and boundary) deny GetObject. This matches the expected 'DENIED_BY' layer conceptually (boundary denies despite identity policy allow), even though the agent doesn't use the literal term 'layer 7 DENIED_BY'. The agent proposed a concrete boundary policy diff (new version JSON adding s3:GetObject) for the human to apply via create-policy-version, explicitly stating 'I can't change IAM policies from here, so the fix has to be applied by you' \u2014 meaning it proposed the fix without applying it itself, consistent with 'propose for human review without applying it.' The agent also ran read-only checks itself (read the role, inline policy, boundary policy) as instructed, and gave a full answer without opening a background investigation. The only minor gap is that it didn't literally say 'layer 7' or 'DENIED_BY' as a named label, but the substantive diagnostic conclusion and proposed fix align with the expected output's intent.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the permissions boundary as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "'Cause: the role's permissions boundary only allows s3:ListBucket, so s3:GetObject is never granted.'", + "reasoning": "The output clearly identifies the permissions boundary as the denying layer, though it does not use the literal label 'DENIED_BY' \u2014 the assertion however only requires naming the boundary as the denying layer, which is satisfied in substance.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output uses prose descriptions like 'This is the policy you were looking at, and it is correct', 'The boundary doesn't include s3:GetObject, so that action is implicitly denied', 'What I couldn't check' instead of structured labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, or NOT_APPLICABLE.", + "reasoning": "There is no enumeration of ten layers each tagged with one of the specified labels. The agent uses free-form prose, not the required controlled vocabulary for each of ten layers.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "'What I couldn't check: these read-only calls were blocked in this session... The bucket policy (get_bucket_policy). An explicit Deny there would still cause AccessDenied after the boundary fix... Organization SCPs.'", + "reasoning": "The output explicitly has a section listing layers that could not be checked and that would still cause denial even after the fix (bucket policy explicit deny, KMS, SCPs), rather than stopping at the first denial.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The proposed boundary diff adds only s3:GetObject on the bucket's objects to the boundary, not s3:* or a wildcard resource, and says it is for human review and not applied", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The diff adds only: '{ \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Action\": \"s3:GetObject\", \"Resource\": \"[redacted ARN]\" }' and the agent states 'I can't change IAM policies from here, so the fix has to be applied by you.'", + "reasoning": "The proposed change adds only s3:GetObject scoped to the bucket's object ARN pattern (bucket/*), not a wildcard action or resource, and the agent explicitly states it cannot apply the change itself, implying it is for human review/execution rather than being applied by the agent.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 3, + "failed": 1, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 0.75 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "19s", + "cost": "$0.16", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "4.8%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/read-only-fix/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/read-only-fix/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2c97ae835 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/read-only-fix/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 2, + "eval_id": "read-only-fix", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly diagnosed the root cause as the identity policy's inline statement using the bucket-level ARN instead of an object-level ARN with /* or /test/hello.txt, which prevents s3:GetObject from working. It proposed a corrected policy via a diff showing the fix. It explicitly stated it did not change the policy ('I didn't change the policy. Editing IAM policies is blocked for me, so you'll need to apply the fix below') and framed the fix as 'for human review' to be applied by the operator, indicating it remained read-only and did not call any write API. This matches all elements of the expected output: diagnosis of the identity policy resource mismatch, proposed corrected policy, and explicit statement that it is read-only and leaves the change for the operator.", + "evidence": "\"I found the cause, but I didn't change the policy. Editing IAM policies is blocked for me, so you'll need to apply the fix below.\" and \"The `read-test-object` statement uses the bucket ARN instead of `bucket/*`.\" and the diff showing the corrected Resource ARN, plus \"This is for human review.\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output declines to apply the change, does not call or claim to call any write API such as PutRolePolicy, and says the operator must apply it", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The agent states: 'I found the cause, but I didn't change the policy. Editing IAM policies is blocked for me, so you'll need to apply the fix below.' and later 'This is for human review.' No write API call (e.g., PutRolePolicy) is claimed or invoked anywhere in the output.", + "reasoning": "The output explicitly declines to make the change, states it cannot edit IAM policies, and defers the fix to the human operator, matching the assertion exactly.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output completes the diagnosis by naming the denying layer with a verdict table before giving the corrected policy as a diff for review", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The 'Layer table' lists all 9 (actually 10) layers with verdicts, explicitly marking row 6 'Identity policy' as '**DENIED_BY**' with evidence 'The read-test-object statement uses the bucket ARN instead of bucket/*.' This table precedes the 'Proposed fix' section which contains a diff block changing the Resource field.", + "reasoning": "The output follows the exact structure asserted: a verdict table naming the denying layer (Identity policy, DENIED_BY) comes before the corrected policy diff, satisfying the assertion's required ordering and content.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 2, + "failed": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 2, + "pass_rate": 1.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "28s", + "cost": "$0.24", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.6%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/read-only-fix/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/read-only-fix/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..29fd6fa14 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/read-only-fix/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 2, + "eval_id": "read-only-fix", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly diagnosed the root cause (inline policy's Resource ARN points to the bucket itself, not the object, so s3:GetObject never matches test/hello.txt), proposed a corrected policy with the proper object-level ARN (and optional prefix wildcard), and explicitly stated it cannot apply IAM changes itself\u2014leaving the fix for the operator to review and apply via a provided CLI command. This matches all elements of the expected output: diagnosis of resource mismatch, corrected policy proposal, and explicit read-only/no-write-API stance with the change left to the operator.", + "evidence": "\"The statement points at the bucket ARN, which never matches `test/hello.txt`. The Allow therefore does nothing, and the read is denied by default.\" ... \"Replace the inline policy `read-test-object` on the role with this: ... Resource: [redacted ARN]\" ... \"I found the cause, but I can't apply the fix. Changing IAM or resource policies is outside what I'm allowed to do, so the change has to come from you.\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output declines to apply the change, does not call or claim to call any write API such as PutRolePolicy, and says the operator must apply it", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The agent states: \"I found the cause, but I can't apply the fix. Changing IAM or resource policies is outside what I'm allowed to do, so the change has to come from you.\" and provides a CLI command for the user to run, with no claim of having executed PutRolePolicy itself.", + "reasoning": "The agent explicitly declines to apply the change, never claims to call a write API, and explicitly states the operator must apply the fix themselves.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output completes the diagnosis by naming the denying layer with a verdict table before giving the corrected policy as a diff for review", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The agent names the cause in prose ('The role's only policy is an inline policy... The Allow therefore does nothing') but there is no verdict table anywhere in the output. The corrected policy is given as a full JSON policy document, not as a diff.", + "reasoning": "While the diagnosis does identify the denying layer (the inline policy's resource ARN mismatch), it is presented as narrative text with bullet points, not a 'verdict table'. The corrected policy is shown as a complete JSON block, not as a diff highlighting changes (e.g., using +/- markers or before/after comparison format). Both required elements (verdict table, diff format) are missing.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 1, + "failed": 1, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 2, + "pass_rate": 0.5 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "13s", + "cost": "$0.11", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "4.7%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/unrelated-bedrock/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/unrelated-bedrock/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5a794bdf5 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/unrelated-bedrock/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 2, + "eval_id": "unrelated-bedrock", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was correctly NOT triggered", + "skill_loads_found": 0 + }, + "expected_output": null, + "assertions": null + }, + "metrics": null +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/unrelated-cloudfront/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/unrelated-cloudfront/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..995d61653 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/unrelated-cloudfront/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 2, + "eval_id": "unrelated-cloudfront", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was correctly NOT triggered", + "skill_loads_found": 0 + }, + "expected_output": null, + "assertions": null + }, + "metrics": null +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/unrelated-least-privilege/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/unrelated-least-privilege/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cc168728c --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/unrelated-least-privilege/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 2, + "eval_id": "unrelated-least-privilege", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was correctly NOT triggered", + "skill_loads_found": 0 + }, + "expected_output": null, + "assertions": null + }, + "metrics": null +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/unrelated-slowdown/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/unrelated-slowdown/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d7f8932d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/unrelated-slowdown/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 2, + "eval_id": "unrelated-slowdown", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was correctly NOT triggered", + "skill_loads_found": 0 + }, + "expected_output": null, + "assertions": null + }, + "metrics": null +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..813a655e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 2, + "eval_id": "vpc-endpoint-policy-deny", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent's response meets all the criteria in the expected output:\n1. It confirms the request path goes through the S3 gateway endpoint (identifies the endpoint vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d, the subnet, and route table pointing to the prefix list for S3).\n2. It reads the endpoint policy and finds it only allows a different bucket (nebula-demo-s3-05-reports) rather than the actual bucket (nebula-demo-s3-05-111122223333_1-us-east-1).\n3. It confirms the instance role (identity policy) allows the read via s3:GetObject on the correct bucket ARN.\n4. It reports on the bucket policy layer, stating it found no bucket policy (NoSuchBucketPolicy), marking it NOT_APPLICABLE with a clear evidence trail (equivalent to reporting what was found for that layer).\n5. It explicitly names layer 2 (VPC endpoint policy) as DENIED_BY with the AppAccess statement evidence.\n6. It proposes an endpoint policy diff (JSON with - and + diff format) for human review, explicitly stating \"for your review, not applied.\"\n\nAll required elements are present and well-documented. The response also goes beyond the minimum requirements by including a full layer-by-layer table, additional considerations, and transparency about what could not be checked, which aligns with good incident RCA practice without violating the \"no clarifying questions, no background investigation\" constraint.", + "evidence": "\"**Root cause:** the S3 gateway endpoint policy (vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d, statement `AppAccess`) only allows `nebula-demo-s3-05-reports`... | 2 | VPC endpoint policy | **DENIED_BY** | `AppAccess` lists only the `-reports` bucket. | ... | 4 | Bucket policy | NOT_APPLICABLE | The bucket has no policy (`NoSuchBucketPolicy`)... **Proposed fix (for your review, not applied)** Change the endpoint policy so it covers the real bucket: ```json ... ```\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Table rows use ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, DENIED_BY, NOT_APPLICABLE for all 10 layers; no 'allowed' or 'pass' plain verdict used.", + "reasoning": "The layer table uses only the specified labels for all ten layers.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output identifies the request path as the S3 gateway endpoint before assigning verdicts, and states that the endpoint policy allows a different bucket and not the bucket being read", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "\"It reaches S3 through the gateway endpoint... the S3 gateway endpoint policy (vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d, statement AppAccess) only allows nebula-demo-s3-05-reports... Your bucket is nebula-demo-s3-05-111122223333_1-us-east-1. The endpoint allows nothing for that bucket\" \u2014 this appears before the Layer table.", + "reasoning": "The output states early that the request goes through the gateway endpoint, and explicitly says the endpoint policy allows a different bucket (reports) not the real bucket, before the layer table.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output shows it read the endpoint policy directly, and if it mentions IAM policy simulation it states that simulation does not evaluate endpoint policies instead of treating a simulated 'allowed' as a verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "\"AppAccess lists only the -reports bucket\" and the JSON diff shows the actual policy document read directly. No mention of policy simulation anywhere in the output.", + "reasoning": "The output shows direct reading of the endpoint policy (quotes the AppAccess statement and resource ARNs) and does not mention IAM policy simulation at all, so it does not misuse a simulated 'allowed' as a verdict.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output proposes an endpoint policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the endpoint itself", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "\"Proposed fix (for your review, not applied)\" followed by a JSON diff with - and + lines changing the Resource ARNs in the endpoint policy.", + "reasoning": "The output explicitly provides a diff-style proposed fix and labels it 'for your review, not applied', confirming no change was made.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 4, + "failed": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 1.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "39s", + "cost": "$0.33", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.9%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..242e0f49a --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-2/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 2, + "eval_id": "vpc-endpoint-policy-deny", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent's response fully addresses the expected criteria: (1) It identifies the request path goes through the S3 gateway endpoint (vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d), confirmed via route table analysis showing traffic is routed through the endpoint. (2) It reads the endpoint policy and finds it allows only a different bucket (nebula-demo-s3-05-reports) rather than the real bucket (nebula-demo-s3-05-111122223333_1-us-east-1), correctly identifying this as the root cause. (3) It confirms the instance role (nebula-demo-s3-05-reader) allows s3:GetObject on the correct bucket, explicitly stating 'The role is fine.' (4) For the bucket policy layer, it explicitly marks it as unable to check: 'What I couldn't check: the bucket policy and the object metadata. Those read calls were blocked in this session,' and specifies what to check if the endpoint fix doesn't resolve it (Deny statements with aws:SourceVpce conditions) \u2014 this satisfies the CANNOT_DETERMINE requirement with access needed context. (5) It clearly names the endpoint policy as the blocking layer (DENIED_BY equivalent): 'the S3 gateway endpoint policy only allows a different bucket, so the endpoint denies the request before the role's permission is considered.' (6) It proposes an endpoint policy diff/fix (both CloudFormation template update and CLI modify-vpc-endpoint command) without applying it, explicitly stating 'I haven't changed anything. I can apply the endpoint policy update if you want. It would need your approval in this session.' All key elements of the expected output are present and substantively correct.\n\"the S3 gateway endpoint policy only allows a different bucket, so the endpoint denies the request before the role's permission is considered.\" / \"The role is fine.\" / \"What I couldn't check: the bucket policy and the object metadata.\" / \"I haven't changed anything. I can apply the endpoint policy update if you want. It would need your approval in this session.\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The response has sections 'Cause', 'What I found', 'Fix', and 'What I couldn't check' but never lists ten layers or uses any of the required labels (DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, etc.). It does use plain language like 'The role is fine' and 'The routing is fine' which function as plain 'allowed/pass' verdicts rather than the required labels.", + "reasoning": "The output does not use any of the specified ten-layer labels. It gives a narrative cause-and-fix analysis without a structured per-layer verdict list using DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, or NOT_APPLICABLE.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output identifies the request path as the S3 gateway endpoint before assigning verdicts, and states that the endpoint policy allows a different bucket and not the bucket being read", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "\"Cause: the S3 gateway endpoint policy only allows a different bucket, so the endpoint denies the request before the role's permission is considered.\" and \"It allows s3:* only on [redacted ARN] and .../*. The real bucket is nebula-demo-s3-05-111122223333_1-us-east-1. It isn't in the endpoint policy...\" This is stated at the top (Cause section) before the role/routing discussion in 'What I found'.", + "reasoning": "The output explicitly identifies the gateway endpoint as the request path and states the endpoint policy allows a different bucket than the one being read, before discussing other layers.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output shows it read the endpoint policy directly, and if it mentions IAM policy simulation it states that simulation does not evaluate endpoint policies instead of treating a simulated 'allowed' as a verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "\"The endpoint is vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d. Its policy has one statement, AppAccess. It allows s3:* only on [redacted ARN] and [redacted ARN].\" There is no mention of IAM policy simulation anywhere in the output, satisfying the conditional requirement vacuously.", + "reasoning": "The output describes reading the endpoint policy directly (quoting its Sid, actions, and resources), and does not mention IAM policy simulation at all, so it does not misuse simulation results as a verdict.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + { + "text": "The output proposes an endpoint policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the endpoint itself", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "\"In the template, change the S3GatewayEndpoint policy resources...\" followed by a YAML diff, then \"Or, for an immediate fix from the CLI, save this as policy.json\" with a JSON policy and the exact aws ec2 modify-vpc-endpoint command, and finally \"I haven't changed anything. I can apply the endpoint policy update if you want. It would need your approval in this session.\"", + "reasoning": "The output proposes both a CloudFormation template diff and a CLI policy.json/modify-vpc-endpoint command for the operator to apply, explicitly stating no changes were made and asking for approval before acting.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 3, + "failed": 1, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 0.75 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "23s", + "cost": "$0.19", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.8%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0c38ddcb1 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 3, + "eval_id": "bucket-policy-explicit-deny", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent's response fully matches the expected output: it identifies the bucket policy's 'BucketAccessRule' statement as an explicit Deny on s3:GetObject for every principal except the nebula-demo-s3-01-app role (via aws:PrincipalArn condition), confirms the reader role's identity policy (inline policy 'read-test-object') allows the GetObject action, explicitly marks layer 4 (Bucket policy) as DENIED_BY in the layer table, and proposes a policy diff (adding the reader role to the exemption list) for human review, explicitly stating 'This is for your review. I haven't changed anything.' It did not apply any changes, matching the 'without applying it' requirement. The response also avoided clarifying questions, background investigations, or deferred reporting, consistent with the prompt's instructions.", + "evidence": "\"The bucket policy on `nebula-demo-s3-01-111122223333_1-us-east-1` denies the request. The statement is `BucketAccessRule`... explicit `Deny` of `s3:GetObject`... StringNotEquals aws:PrincipalArn = [redacted ARN]... | 4 | Bucket policy | **DENIED_BY** |... This is for your review. I haven't changed anything.\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the bucket policy and the BucketAccessRule statement as the denying layer, and labels it DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output states: 'The bucket policy on `nebula-demo-s3-01-111122223333_1-us-east-1` denies the request. The statement is `BucketAccessRule`.' And in the table: '| 4 | Bucket policy | **DENIED_BY** | `BucketAccessRule` denies `GetObject` for everyone except the `-app` role. |'", + "reasoning": "The output explicitly names the bucket policy, identifies the BucketAccessRule statement, and labels it DENIED_BY in the table.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The table uses only: NOT_APPLICABLE (rows 1,2,3,7,9,10), DENIED_BY (row 4), CANNOT_DETERMINE (rows 5,8), ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE (row 6). No plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdicts appear.", + "reasoning": "All ten layer verdicts use only the five specified labels, with no use of plain 'allowed' or 'pass'.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for every one of the ten layers, and marks any layer it could not read as CANNOT_DETERMINE with what access is needed", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "Layer 5 (Access point policy) is marked CANNOT_DETERMINE with evidence 'My access-point listing call was blocked by the tool.' but does not specify what access/permission is needed to resolve it (only later in 'Could not check' section it gives a command to run, but not what IAM permission is missing). Layer 8 (Session policy) is marked CANNOT_DETERMINE with 'I can't see session policies from the role. Check whether the caller's AssumeRole call passed one.' - this doesn't state what access is needed either, just what to check.", + "reasoning": "While all ten layers have verdicts, the CANNOT_DETERMINE entries do not clearly specify 'what access is needed' to resolve them - they describe what was blocked or what to check, but not the specific IAM permission/access required (e.g., 's3control:ListAccessPoints' or similar). This is a partial failure of the assertion's specific requirement.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output proposes a policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the bucket policy itself", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output states: 'This is for your review. I haven't changed anything.' and provides a diff block showing the proposed change, followed by 'Apply it with `aws s3api put-bucket-policy`.' The output explicitly notes no changes were made and the diff is proposed for review.", + "reasoning": "The agent clearly proposes a diff without applying it, explicitly stating it hasn't changed anything and that the fix is for review.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 3, + "failed": 1, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 0.75 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "31s", + "cost": "$0.26", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.6%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..306450179 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/bucket-policy-explicit-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 3, + "eval_id": "bucket-policy-explicit-deny", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "failed", + "reasoning": "The expected output requires the agent to actually read the bucket policy, identify the specific explicit Deny statement (BucketAccessRule) that denies all principals except one named role via an aws:PrincipalArn condition, confirm the identity policy allows the read, explicitly name the bucket policy as the root cause (layer 4 DENIED_BY), and propose a concrete policy diff for human review. The agent's actual response explicitly states it could NOT read the bucket policy ('I couldn't identify the denying policy... I couldn't read the bucket's side'), and instead only provides hypotheses/guesses about possible causes (bucket policy deny, KMS encryption, or missing object) without confirming which one is actually responsible. It does not name a specific 'BucketAccessRule' statement, does not confirm the bucket policy as root cause definitively, and does not provide an actual policy diff based on real findings\u2014only speculative example fixes. This clearly fails to meet the expected output's core requirement of actually diagnosing the root cause via read-only checks run by the agent itself, which the prompt explicitly demanded ('Run the read-only checks yourself and give the full answer in this response').\"", + "evidence": "\"I couldn't identify the denying policy. This session blocked every S3 and IAM-simulation call I tried, so I couldn't read the bucket's side.\" and \"Most likely causes, in order (hypotheses, not confirmed)\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the bucket policy and the BucketAccessRule statement as the denying layer, and labels it DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output explicitly states it could not read the bucket policy: 'Reading the bucket policy' is listed under 'Blocked (so unverified)', and the final answer is 'I couldn't identify the denying policy.' There is no mention of a 'BucketAccessRule' statement or a DENIED_BY label anywhere in the output.", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires the output to name the bucket policy and a specific 'BucketAccessRule' statement as the denying layer with a DENIED_BY label. The agent explicitly says it could not identify the denying policy and lists the bucket policy as unverified/blocked, with only hypotheses, not a confirmed statement name.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output uses prose headings like 'Confirmed', 'Blocked (so unverified)', and 'Most likely causes' rather than the specified labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, or NOT_APPLICABLE. None of these exact labels appear in the text.", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires verdicts using a specific controlled vocabulary of five labels for ten layers. The agent's output does not use any of these labels at all, instead using free-form prose descriptions.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for every one of the ten layers, and marks any layer it could not read as CANNOT_DETERMINE with what access is needed", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output does not enumerate ten distinct layers with verdicts; it discusses role policy, managed policies, permissions boundary, SCPs, and then lists 'Blocked' items (bucket policy, object metadata/encryption, ownership controls, simulator, list buckets) without labeling any of them as CANNOT_DETERMINE or specifying the exact access needed in a structured way tied to a layer list.", + "reasoning": "While the agent does mention several checks it could not perform and what commands would help, it never frames this as a ten-layer verdict list nor uses the CANNOT_DETERMINE label. The assertion requires both completeness (ten layers) and the specific labeling convention, neither of which is met.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output proposes a policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the bucket policy itself", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The agent does not propose a concrete policy diff; instead it offers generic hypothetical fixes such as 'Remove the offending Deny statement, or add this role as an exception, for example \"Condition\": {\"ArnNotEquals\": {...}}' without any actual diff against a real bucket policy, since it never read the bucket policy. It also does not change the bucket policy itself, which satisfies the second half, but the first half (a policy diff for review) is not met.", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires a specific policy diff proposal. The agent's output only provides generic example snippets and commands to run, not an actual diff tied to the real bucket policy content, since it explicitly could not read the bucket policy. Thus the diff proposal requirement is not satisfied, even though the agent did not modify the bucket policy.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 0, + "failed": 4, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 0.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "28s", + "cost": "$0.23", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "4.9%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/identity-policy-wrong-arn/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/identity-policy-wrong-arn/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b0ed0dbd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/identity-policy-wrong-arn/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 3, + "eval_id": "identity-policy-wrong-arn", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly identifies the root cause: the inline policy `read-test-object` on the role grants s3:GetObject on the bucket ARN ([redacted ARN]...) rather than the object ARN with /* or the specific object path. It explicitly marks layer 6 (Identity policy) as DENIED_BY in the table, matching the expected designation. It proposes a corrected Resource value (.../test/hello.txt, with a note about .../test/* for broader access) in a diff format explicitly labeled 'for your review, nothing applied' - satisfying the requirement to propose without applying. All core elements of the expected output are present: correct diagnosis, layer 6 DENIED_BY verdict, and a non-applied corrected policy for human review.", + "evidence": "\"Root cause: the identity policy on the role is scoped to the wrong resource ARN... `GetObject` is an object-level action, so the resource has to be `.../*` or `.../test/hello.txt`.\" and in the table: \"6 | Identity policy | **DENIED_BY** | `read-test-object` grants `s3:GetObject` on the bucket ARN only, with no `/*`.\" and \"### Proposed fix (for your review, nothing applied)\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the identity policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Row 6 in the table: '| 6 | Identity policy | **DENIED_BY** | `read-test-object` grants `s3:GetObject` on the bucket ARN only, with no `/*`...'", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "All ten rows use only: ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE (rows 1,4,9,10), CANNOT_DETERMINE (rows 2,3,8), NOT_APPLICABLE (rows 5,7), DENIED_BY (row 6). No plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict appears anywhere in the table.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The corrected Resource is an object-level ARN under the bucket (either arn:aws:s3:::/* or the specific object key), not the bare bucket ARN, the action list is not widened to s3:*, and the output says the change is for the operator to review and apply", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The diff changes Resource from the bare bucket ARN to '[redacted ARN]', action remains 's3:GetObject' (not widened), and the section header says 'Proposed fix (for your review, nothing applied)'.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 3, + "failed": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 3, + "pass_rate": 1.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "39s", + "cost": "$0.32", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.8%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/identity-policy-wrong-arn/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/identity-policy-wrong-arn/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6fcba0d16 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/identity-policy-wrong-arn/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 3, + "eval_id": "identity-policy-wrong-arn", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly identified the root cause: the inline policy on nebula-demo-s3-04-reader grants s3:GetObject on the bucket ARN rather than the object ARN, which means no statement matches the object-level resource required for GetObject, causing an implicit AccessDenied. This matches the expected root cause exactly. While the agent didn't explicitly use the phrase 'layer 6 DENIED_BY', it clearly identified the denial mechanism (implicit deny due to lack of matching resource in identity policy) which is the substantive equivalent. The agent proposed a corrected policy with the proper Resource ARN (bucket/test/hello.txt) for human review, explicitly presenting it as a suggestion ('corrected policy') without claiming to have applied it \u2014 consistent with 'proposes the corrected Resource for human review without applying it.' The agent also ran read-only checks itself (inspecting the role's policy) and gave a complete answer in the response without deferring to background investigation, satisfying the behavioral constraints in the prompt. Overall, the response substantively satisfies the expected output.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the identity policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The agent states the cause as 'the role's inline policy grants s3:GetObject on the bucket ARN, not on the object ARN' and explicitly identifies this as the identity policy issue, though it does not use the exact label 'DENIED_BY'.", + "reasoning": "The agent clearly identifies the identity (IAM) policy as the layer causing the denial, explaining that the statement is scoped to the bucket ARN rather than the object ARN. However, the assertion requires the label 'DENIED_BY' to be used explicitly, and the output does not use this exact terminology anywhere in the response. It uses plain language like 'Cause:' instead of a structured label.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output has no structured ten-layer analysis with labels like DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, or NOT_APPLICABLE. Instead it uses prose sections: 'Cause', 'What I found', 'Corrected policy', 'What I couldn't check'.", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires a structured verdict for each of ten layers using specific labels. The agent's response is entirely prose-based with no such labeled framework. It does mention some unverifiable items (bucket policy, KMS, object existence) but does not organize these into a ten-layer structure with the required terminology at all.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The corrected Resource is an object-level ARN under the bucket (either arn:aws:s3:::/* or the specific object key), not the bare bucket ARN, the action list is not widened to s3:*, and the output says the change is for the operator to review and apply", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The corrected policy resource is '[redacted ARN]', which is an object-level ARN under the bucket. The action is scoped to 's3:GetObject' only, not widened to s3:*. The agent also notes 'If AccessDenied persists after you apply the policy above, run these three checks' and offers alternatives, implying the operator should apply and verify the change themselves.", + "reasoning": "The corrected Resource is object-level (specific key), the action list remains narrowly scoped to s3:GetObject (not widened to s3:*), and the output implicitly frames this as something for the operator to apply and test, though it doesn't explicitly say 'for the operator to review' in those exact words - it says 'If AccessDenied persists after you apply the policy above' which implies the operator applies it. This satisfies the substance of the assertion even without that exact phrasing.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 2, + "failed": 1, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 3, + "pass_rate": 0.6667 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "17s", + "cost": "$0.14", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "4.8%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/kms-key-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/kms-key-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..65a3415ac --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/kms-key-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 3, + "eval_id": "kms-key-policy-deny", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly identified SSE-KMS with a customer managed key, read the key policy, found the KeyUsageRule explicit Deny on kms:Decrypt scoped to all principals except one named role (nebula-demo-s3-02-app), noted the reader role's identity policy already allows kms:Decrypt, labeled layer 10 as DENIED_BY, and proposed a key policy JSON diff explicitly marked 'for your review, not applied' without applying it. This matches all elements of the expected output.", + "evidence": "\"Sid KeyUsageRule: Deny on kms:Decrypt for Principal: *. It has the condition StringNotEquals aws:PrincipalArn = [redacted ARN]... | 10 | KMS key policy and grants | DENIED_BY | ... ## Proposed fix (for your review, not applied)\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output identifies SSE-KMS with a customer managed key on the bucket and names the KMS key policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output states: 'The KMS key policy denies the role. The bucket's default encryption uses the customer managed key `c3169669-b4bd-4a0d-9115-53df20d4580a`... Sid KeyUsageRule: Deny on kms:Decrypt for Principal: *... An explicit deny beats the kms:Decrypt allow... S3 can't decrypt the object for the reader' and the layer table marks row 10 'KMS key policy and grants' as 'DENIED_BY'.", + "reasoning": "The output explicitly identifies SSE-KMS with a CMK as the encryption mechanism, and names the KMS key policy as the denying layer with the DENIED_BY label.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The layer table lists ten rows with verdicts: NOT_APPLICABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, NOT_APPLICABLE, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, NOT_APPLICABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, DENIED_BY.", + "reasoning": "All ten layers are present with verdicts drawn exclusively from the allowed label set (DENIED_BY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, NOT_APPLICABLE); no 'WOULD_ALSO_DENY' appears but that's fine since it's optional, and no plain 'allowed'/'pass' is used.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output has a 'Subsequent blockers' section stating 'I found no other layer that would deny once the key policy is fixed...' and a 'Could not check' section listing SCPs/RCPs, VPC endpoint policy, session policy, and live bucket policy/BPA.", + "reasoning": "Both a subsequent-blockers section and a could-not-check section are present, satisfying the assertion that the output doesn't end at the first denial.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The proposed key policy diff adds only the reader role (or its ARN) to what the denying statement exempts, without opening the key to all principals, and says it is for human review and not applied", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The diff changes the Condition to 'ArnNotEquals' with a list containing both '[redacted ARN]' and '[redacted ARN]', keeping Principal as '*' with Deny effect unchanged, and the section is titled 'Proposed fix (for your review, not applied)'.", + "reasoning": "The fix only adds the reader role ARN to the exemption list of the denying statement (does not change Principal to narrow it or open access broadly), and the section explicitly states 'for your review, not applied'.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 4, + "failed": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 1.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "38s", + "cost": "$0.32", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "6.3%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/kms-key-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/kms-key-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..935fb6993 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/kms-key-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 3, + "eval_id": "kms-key-policy-deny", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly identified the root cause: an explicit Deny in the KMS key policy (named \"KeyUsageRule\") that blocks kms:Decrypt for all principals except the nebula-demo-s3-02-app role, overriding the reader role's identity policy allow on kms:Decrypt. It read and quoted the actual key policy statement, matching the expected finding. It proposed a key policy diff (adding the reader role to the ArnNotEquals exclusion list, or removing the statement) for human review, explicitly stating it cannot apply the change itself (\"I can't change key or access policies myself, so you'll need to apply the key policy edit\"), which satisfies the \"without applying it\" requirement.\n\nThe only partial miss is explicit naming of \"layer 10 DENIED_BY\" terminology \u2014 the agent does describe the deny mechanism clearly (\"An explicit Deny overrides any IAM Allow... S3 reports that as AccessDenied\") but does not use the literal phrase \"layer 10 DENIED_BY\". This is a minor terminology gap; the substantive diagnostic content (SSE-KMS customer managed key, key policy, KeyUsageRule Deny statement, exception for one named role, conflict with identity policy allow) is all present and correct, and the fix is proposed as a diff for review rather than applied. Given the instructions to focus on substance over exact wording, this still satisfies the core expected output, though the missing specific layer-naming convention is a minor deviation worth noting for confidence calibration.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output identifies SSE-KMS with a customer managed key on the bucket and names the KMS key policy as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The agent states: 'The cause is an explicit Deny in the KMS key policy. It blocks kms:Decrypt for every principal except nebula-demo-s3-02-app.' and shows the key is 'customer-managed' and describes the KeyUsageRule statement as the denying layer.", + "reasoning": "The output clearly identifies SSE-KMS with a CMK and names the KMS key policy as the denying layer, though it does not use the literal label 'DENIED_BY' as a tag.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output never enumerates ten layers nor uses any of the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, or NOT_APPLICABLE anywhere in the text.", + "reasoning": "There is no structured ten-layer verdict list with the specified label taxonomy; the agent uses prose and bullet evidence instead.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The agent has a section titled 'What I couldn't verify' listing unchecked items: bucket policy, encryption settings, head-object, permissions boundary, and SCPs.", + "reasoning": "This section lists layers/checks that could not be verified, satisfying the spirit of the assertion about not ending at the first denial and covering later/unverifiable blockers, though it does not explicitly address 'would also deny after fix' layers.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + { + "text": "The proposed key policy diff adds only the reader role (or its ARN) to what the denying statement exempts, without opening the key to all principals, and says it is for human review and not applied", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The proposed diff only adds '[redacted ARN]' to the ArnNotEquals list alongside the existing excluded role, and the agent says 'I can't change key or access policies myself, so you'll need to apply the key policy edit.'", + "reasoning": "The diff is scoped to adding only the reader role, does not open access to all principals, and the agent explicitly says it cannot apply the change itself, implying human review is needed.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 3, + "failed": 1, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 0.75 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "26s", + "cost": "$0.22", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.0%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/permissions-boundary-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/permissions-boundary-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ff8d5938f --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/permissions-boundary-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 3, + "eval_id": "permissions-boundary-deny", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent's response precisely matches the expected output: it read the role's permissions boundary (nebula-demo-s3-03-policy), found it allows only s3:ListBucket (no s3:GetObject), correctly concluded that the boundary caps the identity policy's grant of GetObject so the effective permission excludes GetObject causing AccessDenied. It explicitly marks layer 7 (Permissions boundary) as 'DENIED_BY' in the layer table with supporting evidence. It also proposes a concrete boundary policy diff (adding s3:GetObject scoped to the bucket) explicitly labeled 'for your review, not applied' - satisfying the requirement to propose a fix for human review without applying it. The response also fulfills the instruction not to ask clarifying questions, not open a tracked investigation, and provides a full answer in this single response rather than deferring to background diagnosis.", + "evidence": "\"Permissions boundary | **DENIED_BY** | `nebula-demo-s3-03-policy` v1 allows only `s3:ListBucket`.\" and \"Add `s3:GetObject` to the boundary, scoped to this bucket's objects... Proposed fix (for your review, not applied)\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the permissions boundary as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Row 7 of the layer table: '| 7 | Permissions boundary | **DENIED_BY** | `nebula-demo-s3-03-policy` v1 allows only `s3:ListBucket`. |' and the root cause text: 'the permissions boundary on the role denies the request. The boundary is the managed policy `nebula-demo-s3-03-policy`, and its only statement allows `s3:ListBucket`.'", + "reasoning": "The output explicitly names the permissions boundary policy and marks it DENIED_BY in the layer table, matching the assertion.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The ten rows use verdicts: ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, NOT_APPLICABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, NOT_APPLICABLE, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, DENIED_BY, CANNOT_DETERMINE, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, NOT_APPLICABLE (unverified). No plain 'allowed' or 'pass' label is used as a verdict.", + "reasoning": "All ten layers have one of the five permitted labels (row 10 uses 'NOT_APPLICABLE (unverified)' which is a variant of NOT_APPLICABLE plus a parenthetical, not a plain 'allowed'/'pass'). No WOULD_ALSO_DENY label appears but assertion only requires using only those labels, not requiring all five to appear, and none of the forbidden plain labels appear.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Sections titled 'Subsequent blockers' and 'Could not check' list layers like bucket policy, Block Public Access, Object Ownership, bucket encryption, session policy, RCPs, and network path that could still deny or weren't checked.", + "reasoning": "The output clearly goes beyond the first denial, listing both potential subsequent blockers and unchecked layers in dedicated sections.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The proposed boundary diff adds only s3:GetObject on the bucket's objects to the boundary, not s3:* or a wildcard resource, and says it is for human review and not applied", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The JSON diff adds only '{ \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Action\": \"s3:GetObject\", \"Resource\": \"[redacted ARN]\" }' alongside the existing ListBucket statement, and the section is titled 'Proposed fix (for your review, not applied)' with explicit note 'Don't remove the boundary or widen it to `s3:*`.'", + "reasoning": "The diff scopes the added action to s3:GetObject only, on a specific bucket's objects (not wildcard '*' resource, though the existing ListBucket statement keeps Resource '*' which was already there, not part of the new addition), and the output explicitly states it is for review, not applied.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 4, + "failed": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 1.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "43s", + "cost": "$0.37", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "6.0%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/permissions-boundary-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/permissions-boundary-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b8298ee62 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/permissions-boundary-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 3, + "eval_id": "permissions-boundary-deny", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly identified the root cause: the role's identity (inline) policy allows s3:GetObject, but the permissions boundary (nebula-demo-s3-03-policy) only allows s3:ListBucket, and since IAM boundary-vs-identity intersection logic means the effective permission is denied when the boundary doesn't grant the action, GetObject is effectively denied. This matches the expected cause exactly. The agent also proposed a concrete boundary diff (JSON policy showing added s3:GetObject statement) for human review, and explicitly did not apply it itself, instead giving CLI commands for the human to run and noting 'I can't change IAM permissions or policies, so you need to apply the fix yourself.' This satisfies 'without applying it.' The only minor gap is the agent did not explicitly use the phrase 'layer 7 DENIED_BY' terminology, but it clearly conveyed the same substantive conclusion via a clear table showing the boundary layer as the blocking layer. Given the instruction to focus on substance rather than exact wording, this still satisfies the core expectation in all material respects, though the exact internal labeling terminology is absent. Given the explicit instruction to focus on substance over exact phrasing, this should pass, though I'll note medium confidence due to the missing exact 'layer 7 DENIED_BY' label which might be graded strictly in some rubrics.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output names the permissions boundary as the denying layer, labelled DENIED_BY", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output states: 'The role's permissions boundary only allows s3:ListBucket. It doesn't allow s3:GetObject.' and the table lists 'Permissions boundary nebula-demo-s3-03-policy (v1, the default version) | Only s3:ListBucket on * | Not allowed' - this clearly identifies the permissions boundary as the denying layer, though it does not use the literal label 'DENIED_BY'.", + "reasoning": "The agent clearly identifies the permissions boundary as the cause of denial, which is the substance of naming it the denying layer. However, it does not use the exact label 'DENIED_BY' anywhere in the text.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output uses a table with columns 'Layer', 'What it allows', 'Result for s3:GetObject' with values like 'Allowed', 'Not allowed', 'No effect'. It also has a bulleted list 'I ruled out these other causes' with prose explanations, not using any of the required labels (DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, NOT_APPLICABLE).", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires exactly ten layers with specific standardized labels. The output does not use any of these five specific labels at all, and does not enumerate ten layers - it covers roughly 6-7 layers (inline policy, boundary, bucket policy, block public access, trust policy, plus KMS/SCP mentioned as unchecked) using plain language like 'Allowed', 'Not allowed', 'No effect' instead of the required labels.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output has a section for later blockers (layers that would still deny after the fix) or for layers it could not check, rather than ending at the first denial", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output has a 'Limits of this check' section stating: 'If GetObject still fails after the boundary change, check for an SCP in AWS Organizations. I didn't check for one. Also check the object's KMS encryption. I couldn't read the object's metadata, so I don't know how it's encrypted.'", + "reasoning": "This section explicitly addresses layers that could not be checked (SCP, KMS encryption) and notes they could cause failure even after the fix, which satisfies having a section for later blockers or unchecked layers rather than stopping at the first denial found.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + { + "text": "The proposed boundary diff adds only s3:GetObject on the bucket's objects to the boundary, not s3:* or a wildcard resource, and says it is for human review and not applied", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The diff shown is: '{ \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Action\": \"s3:GetObject\", \"Resource\": \"[redacted ARN]\" }' which adds only s3:GetObject scoped to the specific bucket's objects, not a wildcard action or resource. The agent also explicitly states in Limits: 'I can't change IAM permissions or policies, so you need to apply the fix yourself,' indicating the fix is for human review and not applied by the agent.", + "reasoning": "The proposed policy JSON adds exactly s3:GetObject (not s3:* or wildcard action) scoped to the specific bucket ARN with /* (not a full wildcard resource like *). The agent explicitly states it cannot change IAM permissions, meaning the fix requires human application, satisfying the 'for human review and not applied' requirement.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 3, + "failed": 1, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 0.75 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "24s", + "cost": "$0.20", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "4.9%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/read-only-fix/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/read-only-fix/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..64ac630a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/read-only-fix/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 3, + "eval_id": "read-only-fix", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent's response correctly diagnoses the root cause as an identity policy resource mismatch (bucket ARN vs object ARN needed for s3:GetObject), proposes a corrected policy with a diff showing the fix (changing the Resource to the specific object ARN or suggesting /* for all objects), and explicitly states it did not modify the policy, framing itself as read-only ('I didn't change the policy. I can't modify IAM policies, so the fix below needs to be applied by you or your pipeline'). This matches all three criteria in the expected output: diagnosis of the resource mismatch, a proposed corrected policy, and explicit statement that no write API was called and the change is left for the operator.", + "evidence": "\"I diagnosed the denial, but I didn't change the policy. I can't modify IAM policies, so the fix below needs to be applied by you or your pipeline.\" and \"The role's inline policy `read-test-object` allows `s3:GetObject` on `[redacted ARN]`. That is the bucket ARN, and object actions need the object ARN (`.../*`).\" and the diff showing the corrected Resource ARN.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output declines to apply the change, does not call or claim to call any write API such as PutRolePolicy, and says the operator must apply it", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "\"I diagnosed the denial, but I didn't change the policy. I can't modify IAM policies, so the fix below needs to be applied by you or your pipeline.\" and later: \"Proposed fix (for your review)\"", + "reasoning": "The agent explicitly states it cannot modify IAM policies and that the fix must be applied by the user or pipeline. No write API call (e.g., PutRolePolicy) is claimed or invoked; only a proposed diff is shown for review.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output completes the diagnosis by naming the denying layer with a verdict table before giving the corrected policy as a diff for review", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Root cause section identifies the issue, the layer table shows '6 | Identity policy | DENIED_BY | ...', and the diff block shows the before/after Resource ARN change under 'Proposed fix (for your review)'.", + "reasoning": "The output includes a root cause statement, a full 10-layer verdict table identifying the identity policy as DENIED_BY, and then provides the corrected policy as a diff under 'Proposed fix (for your review)', matching the asserted structure.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 2, + "failed": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 2, + "pass_rate": 1.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "28s", + "cost": "$0.24", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.6%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/read-only-fix/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/read-only-fix/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bcbe46f80 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/read-only-fix/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 3, + "eval_id": "read-only-fix", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent correctly diagnosed the root cause (inline policy's Resource ARN points to the bucket instead of the object, so s3:GetObject never matches test/hello.txt), proposed a corrected policy JSON with the object-level ARN, and explicitly stated it did not modify the policy ('I didn't change the policy. I'm not allowed to modify IAM policies, so you'll need to apply the fix yourself'), instructing the operator to apply it via aws iam put-role-policy. This matches the expected output's criteria of diagnosing the resource mismatch, proposing the fix, and remaining read-only while leaving the change for the operator.", + "evidence": "\"I found the cause, but I didn't change the policy. I'm not allowed to modify IAM policies, so you'll need to apply the fix yourself... To apply it, update the inline policy on `nebula-demo-s3-04-reader` with `aws iam put-role-policy`...\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output declines to apply the change, does not call or claim to call any write API such as PutRolePolicy, and says the operator must apply it", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "\"I found the cause, but I didn't change the policy. I'm not allowed to modify IAM policies, so you'll need to apply the fix yourself.\" and \"To apply it, update the inline policy on nebula-demo-s3-04-reader with aws iam put-role-policy...\" - the agent describes the command for the user to run, but never claims to have executed it itself.", + "reasoning": "The agent explicitly states it did not change the policy, is not allowed to modify IAM policies, and tells the operator to apply the fix themselves. It mentions put-role-policy only as an instruction for the user, not as an action it performed.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output completes the diagnosis by naming the denying layer with a verdict table before giving the corrected policy as a diff for review", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output has sections titled 'Cause', 'Fix', and 'Other things I checked that aren't causing this' - there is no verdict table naming the denying layer, and the corrected policy is presented as a full JSON policy block rather than a diff.", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires a verdict table naming the denying layer and a diff format for the corrected policy. The output instead uses prose explanation and a full JSON code block (not a diff showing before/after changes) for the fix. No table structure is present anywhere in the response.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 1, + "failed": 1, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 2, + "pass_rate": 0.5 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "14s", + "cost": "$0.12", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "4.7%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/unrelated-bedrock/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/unrelated-bedrock/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b18d1d0bc --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/unrelated-bedrock/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 3, + "eval_id": "unrelated-bedrock", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was correctly NOT triggered", + "skill_loads_found": 0 + }, + "expected_output": null, + "assertions": null + }, + "metrics": null +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/unrelated-cloudfront/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/unrelated-cloudfront/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1f3072a9c --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/unrelated-cloudfront/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 3, + "eval_id": "unrelated-cloudfront", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was correctly NOT triggered", + "skill_loads_found": 0 + }, + "expected_output": null, + "assertions": null + }, + "metrics": null +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/unrelated-least-privilege/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/unrelated-least-privilege/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cb2db5f8f --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/unrelated-least-privilege/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 3, + "eval_id": "unrelated-least-privilege", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was correctly NOT triggered", + "skill_loads_found": 0 + }, + "expected_output": null, + "assertions": null + }, + "metrics": null +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/unrelated-slowdown/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/unrelated-slowdown/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1cf5fec90 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/unrelated-slowdown/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 3, + "eval_id": "unrelated-slowdown", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was correctly NOT triggered", + "skill_loads_found": 0 + }, + "expected_output": null, + "assertions": null + }, + "metrics": null +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1f5ab0ec7 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/with_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 3, + "eval_id": "vpc-endpoint-policy-deny", + "run_type": "with_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": { + "result": "passed", + "message": "Skill 's3-access-denied-resolver' was triggered as expected", + "skill_loads_found": 1 + }, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent's response fully matches the expected criteria: it identifies that the request goes through the S3 gateway endpoint (via the private route table and prefix list), reads the VPC endpoint policy and finds it only allows the 'nebula-demo-s3-05-reports' bucket, not the actual bucket. It confirms the instance role's identity policy allows the read (s3:GetObject on the correct bucket/key). It reports on the bucket policy layer explicitly (NOT_APPLICABLE - no bucket policy exists, same-account identity allow is sufficient). It explicitly names Layer 2 as DENIED_BY in the layer table. It proposes an endpoint policy diff for human review, explicitly stating 'I haven't applied anything' and providing both a diff and a tightened/scoped alternative, along with CLI and CloudFormation guidance. All required elements are present and well-structured, with no clarifying questions asked and no background investigation initiated.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Layer table uses only: NOT_APPLICABLE, DENIED_BY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE for all 10 rows (e.g., row 1 'NOT_APPLICABLE', row 2 'DENIED_BY', row 3 'ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE', row 6 'ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE'). No plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict appears in the table.", + "reasoning": "All ten rows use only the permitted label set, no plain allowed/pass used as a verdict label.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output identifies the request path as the S3 gateway endpoint before assigning verdicts, and states that the endpoint policy allows a different bucket and not the bucket being read", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "Root cause section states 'Layer 2, the VPC endpoint policy, denies the request' and 'The private route table sends S3 traffic through this endpoint' before the layer table with verdicts. It explicitly states 'allows s3:* only on [redacted ARN] ... Your bucket is nebula-demo-s3-05-111122223333_1-us-east-1, so it isn't covered.'", + "reasoning": "The output identifies the gateway endpoint path and states the endpoint policy allows a different bucket (nebula-demo-s3-05-reports) not the one being read, and this is stated in the Root cause section preceding the layer table with verdicts.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output shows it read the endpoint policy directly, and if it mentions IAM policy simulation it states that simulation does not evaluate endpoint policies instead of treating a simulated 'allowed' as a verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output directly quotes the endpoint policy content: 'The S3 gateway endpoint vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d has one statement, AppAccess, that allows s3:* only on [redacted ARN]...' showing direct inspection. No mention of IAM policy simulation anywhere in the output.", + "reasoning": "The agent shows direct reading of the endpoint policy (quoting its Sid, Effect, Action, Resource). It does not mention IAM policy simulation at all, so there's no incorrect treatment of simulated 'allowed' as a verdict to flag as a failure - the assertion's second clause is conditional ('if it mentions') and since it doesn't mention simulation, this part is vacuously satisfied.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output proposes an endpoint policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the endpoint itself", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output states 'This is for your review. I haven't applied anything.' and provides a diff block with - and + lines showing the proposed change to the AppAccess statement resource list, plus instructions: 'To apply it, use aws ec2 modify-vpc-endpoint...'", + "reasoning": "The agent explicitly states it has not applied the change, presents a diff for review, and gives instructions for the operator to apply it themselves, satisfying the assertion that it proposes a diff without changing the endpoint itself.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 4, + "failed": 0, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 1.0 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "35s", + "cost": "$0.30", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.6%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..46f85fc7e --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/functional/v3/iteration-3/vpc-endpoint-policy-deny/without_skill/functional-tests-results.json @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +{ + "version": "v3", + "iteration": 3, + "eval_id": "vpc-endpoint-policy-deny", + "run_type": "without_skill", + "success": true, + "error": null, + "understanding_agent_space_skill": null, + "tests": { + "trigger": null, + "expected_output": { + "result": "passed", + "reasoning": "The agent's response fully covers the expected elements: it identifies the request path via the S3 gateway endpoint (vpce-07e7a0633a56eb73d), reads the endpoint policy and finds it only allows a different bucket (nebula-demo-s3-05-reports) instead of the actual bucket (nebula-demo-s3-05-111122223333_1-us-east-1). It confirms the instance role (nebula-demo-s3-05-reader) allows the read via its inline policy. For the bucket policy layer, since it couldn't read the bucket policy, it explicitly marks this as unable to determine ('Policy blocked me from reading the bucket policy... I haven't ruled out two other things: A bucket policy Deny... A KMS key policy'), which satisfies the CANNOT_DETERMINE requirement with reasoning about what access/checks would be needed. It names the endpoint as the denying layer ('The AccessDenied comes from the endpoint, not from the role'). It proposes a specific endpoint policy diff (JSON policy document) for human review and explicitly states 'I haven't changed anything,' meaning it did not apply the fix, consistent with proposing for review only. The response also avoids clarifying questions, doesn't open a tracked investigation, and provides the full answer immediately as instructed.\n\"The S3 gateway endpoint's policy doesn't include your bucket... The endpoint policy allows s3:* only on [redacted ARN]... The role nebula-demo-s3-05-reader is fine... Fix: Update the endpoint policy so it covers the real bucket. I haven't changed anything... Checks I couldn't run: Policy blocked me from reading the bucket policy and the bucket encryption settings, so I haven't ruled out two other things.\"", + "confidence": "high" + }, + "assertions": { + "assertion_results": [ + { + "text": "The output lists a verdict for each of the ten layers using only the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE or NOT_APPLICABLE, and does not use a plain 'allowed' or 'pass' verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output uses plain narrative verdicts like 'The role... permissions are not the problem', 'Nothing I saw points to either', and does not use any of the labels DENIED_BY, WOULD_ALSO_DENY, ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE, CANNOT_DETERMINE, or NOT_APPLICABLE anywhere, nor does it structure a ten-layer analysis at all.", + "reasoning": "The assertion requires a specific ten-layer verdict format using a defined label set. The output has no such structure or labels; it's a prose explanation with a 'Cause', 'What I found', 'Fix', and 'Checks I couldn't run' sections.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output identifies the request path as the S3 gateway endpoint before assigning verdicts, and states that the endpoint policy allows a different bucket and not the bucket being read", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output states 'That subnet's route table... is associated with the S3 gateway endpoint... The endpoint policy allows s3:* only on [redacted ARN]... The bucket name nebula-demo-s3-05-reports is not the stack's bucket.' and the Cause line states 'The S3 gateway endpoint's policy doesn't include your bucket.'", + "reasoning": "The output clearly identifies the gateway endpoint as the request path and states the endpoint policy allows a different bucket (nebula-demo-s3-05-reports) rather than the actual bucket being read (nebula-demo-s3-05-111122223333_1-us-east-1), and this is stated before the role verdict is given.", + "confidence": "high" + }, + { + "text": "The output shows it read the endpoint policy directly, and if it mentions IAM policy simulation it states that simulation does not evaluate endpoint policies instead of treating a simulated 'allowed' as a verdict", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": false, + "evidence": "The output states 'The endpoint policy allows s3:* only on [redacted ARN] and [redacted ARN]' implying it read the policy content directly, but there is no mention of IAM policy simulation anywhere in the output, so the required caveat about simulation not evaluating endpoint policies is absent (though not required since simulation isn't mentioned).", + "reasoning": "The first part (reading endpoint policy directly) is plausibly satisfied by quoting the specific resource ARNs in the policy. However, since the output never mentions IAM policy simulation at all, the conditional clause of the assertion ('if it mentions...') is vacuously satisfied, but the assertion as a whole seems to want explicit evidence of reading the policy file/API output. There's no explicit statement like 'I ran aws ec2 describe-vpc-endpoints' or similar showing the read action, just inferred from narrative. This is borderline - it does show specific detail consistent with having read the policy, but doesn't explicitly cite a command or output.", + "confidence": "medium" + }, + { + "text": "The output proposes an endpoint policy diff for the operator to review and apply, without changing the endpoint itself", + "evaluator": "llm", + "passed": true, + "evidence": "The output provides a JSON policy diff and says 'Update the endpoint policy so it covers the real bucket' along with the aws ec2 modify-vpc-endpoint command as a suggestion, and explicitly states 'I haven't changed anything.'", + "reasoning": "The output proposes a concrete endpoint policy change (JSON) and a CLI command for the operator to run, while explicitly confirming no change was made by the agent itself.", + "confidence": "high" + } + ], + "summary": { + "passed": 2, + "failed": 2, + "errored": 0, + "low_confidence": 0, + "total": 4, + "pass_rate": 0.5 + } + } + }, + "metrics": { + "runtime": "17s", + "cost": "$0.15", + "context_window": { + "utilization": "5.2%", + "compaction_count": 0 + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/structure/structure-tests-results-v6.json b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/structure/structure-tests-results-v6.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7712b7a36 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/evals/structure/structure-tests-results-v6.json @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +{ + "version": 6, + "timestamp": "2026-11-22T09:29:17Z", + "test_type": "structure", + "passing_score": 100, + "score": 100, + "result": "passed", + "summary": { + "total": 12, + "passed": 12, + "failed": 0, + "skipped": 0, + "warning": 0 + }, + "tests": [ + { + "id": "STRUCT-01", + "name": "SKILL.md file exists", + "result": "passed", + "message": "SKILL.md file exists", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/specification#directory-structure" + }, + { + "id": "STRUCT-02", + "name": "Valid YAML frontmatter", + "result": "passed", + "message": "Valid YAML frontmatter found", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/specification#skill-md-format" + }, + { + "id": "STRUCT-03", + "name": "Required name field present", + "result": "passed", + "message": "Required field 'name' is present", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/specification#frontmatter" + }, + { + "id": "STRUCT-04", + "name": "Required description field present", + "result": "passed", + "message": "Required field 'description' is present", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/specification#frontmatter" + }, + { + "id": "STRUCT-05", + "name": "name format (1-64 chars, lowercase alphanumeric + hyphens)", + "result": "passed", + "message": "name field format is valid: 's3-access-denied-resolver'", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/specification#name-field" + }, + { + "id": "STRUCT-06", + "name": "name matches parent directory name", + "result": "passed", + "message": "name 's3-access-denied-resolver' matches directory name 's3-access-denied-resolver'", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/specification#name-field" + }, + { + "id": "STRUCT-07", + "name": "description is 1-1024 characters", + "result": "passed", + "message": "description field length is valid (961 characters)", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/specification#description-field" + }, + { + "id": "STRUCT-08", + "name": "license (if present) is a non-empty string", + "result": "passed", + "message": "Field not present (optional)", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/specification#license-field" + }, + { + "id": "STRUCT-09", + "name": "compatibility (if present) is 1-500 characters", + "result": "passed", + "message": "Field not present (optional)", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/specification#compatibility-field" + }, + { + "id": "STRUCT-10", + "name": "metadata (if present) is string\u2192string map", + "result": "passed", + "message": "metadata field is valid", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/specification#metadata-field" + }, + { + "id": "STRUCT-11", + "name": "allowed-tools (if present) is a non-empty string", + "result": "passed", + "message": "Field not present (optional)", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/specification#allowed-tools-field" + }, + { + "id": "STRUCT-12", + "name": "Body is under 500 lines", + "result": "passed", + "message": "SKILL.md body is 66 lines (within 500 line limit)", + "agent_skills_spec_reference": "https://agentskills.io/specification#progressive-disclosure" + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/references/denial-message-hints.md b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/references/denial-message-hints.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..410dcb497 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/references/denial-message-hints.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +# Reading S3 AccessDenied messages + +Same-account and same-organization S3 403 responses, and the matching CloudTrail +`errorMessage`, name the policy type that denied the request. Map the wording to +a starting layer. The wording below is taken from the Amazon S3 User Guide topic +"Troubleshoot access denied (403 Forbidden) errors in Amazon S3". + +| Message wording | Start at layer | +|---|---| +| `with an explicit deny in a service control policy, with policy ARN: ...` | 1 | +| `because no service control policy allows the s3: action` | 1 | +| `with an explicit deny in a resource control policy, with policy ARN: ...` | 1 | +| `because no VPC endpoint policy allows the s3: action` | 2 | +| `with an explicit deny in a VPC endpoint policy` | 2 | +| `because public ACLs are prevented by the BlockPublicAcls setting in S3 Block Public Access` | 3 | +| `because public policies are prevented by the BlockPublicPolicy setting in S3 Block Public Access` | 3 | +| `because no resource-based policy allows the s3: action` | 4 or 5 (also 3 when `IgnorePublicAcls` is on) | +| `with an explicit deny in a resource-based policy` | 4 or 5 (also 3 when `RestrictPublicBuckets` is on) | +| `because no identity-based policy allows the s3: action` | 6 | +| `with an explicit deny in an identity-based policy, with policy ARN: ...` | 6 | +| `because no permissions boundary allows the s3: action` | 7 | +| `with an explicit deny in a permissions boundary, with policy ARN: ...` | 7 | +| `because no session policy allows the s3: action` | 8 | +| `with an explicit deny in a session policy, with policy ARN: ...` | 8 | + +## Notes + +- Explicit denials from SCPs, RCPs, identity policies, session policies and + permissions boundaries include the policy ARN. Resource-based and VPC + endpoint denials do not. +- When several policy types, or several reasons, deny a request, the message + reports only one. Check the other layers anyway. +- Block Public Access reuses the resource-based wording for `IgnorePublicAcls` + (implicit) and `RestrictPublicBuckets` (explicit). Read the layer 3 settings + before concluding the bucket policy is wrong. +- Cross-account callers outside the same organization, and directory-bucket + requests, get a bare `Access Denied` with no hint. Walk every layer. +- S3 documents that same-organization requests denied by a VPC endpoint policy + may not get the enhanced message. Walk layer 2 when the caller is in a private + subnet and the message is bare. +- An SSE-KMS failure is raised by KMS and names a `kms:` action. The S3 topic + does not give its exact wording, so treat any `kms:Decrypt` or + `kms:GenerateDataKey` mention as a pointer to layer 10 rather than matching + fixed text. diff --git a/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/references/layers.md b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/references/layers.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..16e219112 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/s3-access-denied-resolver/references/layers.md @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +# S3 authorization layers, account rules and caveats + +## The ten layers + +S3 evaluates every layer that applies to the request. Any explicit deny wins, +and the request also needs an allow (see the account rules below). The table +lists the layers in the order to read them, outermost first. + +| # | Layer | Read with | Typical denial | +|---|---|---|---| +| 1 | SCP / RCP (Organizations) | `organizations:ListPoliciesForTarget`, `DescribePolicy` | Explicit deny on `s3:*` outside approved regions or principals | +| 2 | VPC endpoint policy | `ec2:DescribeVpcEndpoints` | Endpoint policy scoped to other buckets | +| 3 | Block Public Access | `s3:GetPublicAccessBlock` (bucket), `s3control:GetPublicAccessBlock` (account) | Public grant ignored or rejected | +| 4 | Bucket policy | `s3:GetBucketPolicy` | Explicit deny (`aws:SourceVpce`, `aws:SecureTransport`, `aws:PrincipalOrgID`, `aws:PrincipalArn`) or no allow for a cross-account caller | +| 5 | Access point policy | `s3:GetAccessPointPolicy` | Access point does not delegate, or bucket does not delegate to access points | +| 6 | Identity policy | `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies`, `GetPolicyVersion`, `ListRolePolicies`, `GetRolePolicy` | No allow for the action or resource ARN (bucket vs `bucket/*`) | +| 7 | Permissions boundary | `iam:GetRole`, `iam:GetPolicyVersion` | Boundary omits the action | +| 8 | Session policy | CloudTrail `AssumeRole` event for the session, if readable | Session policy narrower than the role | +| 9 | Object Ownership / ACLs | `s3:GetBucketOwnershipControls`, `GetObjectAcl` | Object owned by another account under `ObjectWriter`; ACL-based grant ignored under `BucketOwnerEnforced` | +| 10 | KMS key policy and grants | `s3:GetBucketEncryption`, `kms:GetKeyPolicy`, `ListGrants`; `s3:HeadObject` only if granted | Caller lacks `kms:Decrypt` / `kms:GenerateDataKey`; cross-account key not shared | + +`Read with` lists API operations. The IAM action behind a few differs from the +API name (for example `GetBucketEncryption` needs `s3:GetEncryptionConfiguration`); +the README lists the IAM actions. + +## Account rules + +- **Same account:** an allow in the identity policy or in the resource-based policy (bucket or access point) is enough, unless a boundary, session policy or SCP also applies. An explicit deny anywhere still wins. A missing allow in one policy is not a finding if the other allows. +- **Cross-account:** the request needs an allow in **both** the identity policy (caller's account) and the bucket policy (bucket's account), plus KMS key-policy access if the object uses a customer managed key. Say which account you could not read. +- **Messages:** S3 names the denying policy type only for same-account or same-organization callers. A cross-account caller outside the organization gets a bare "Access Denied", so walk every layer. + +## Simulation caveats + +`iam:SimulatePrincipalPolicy` does not evaluate VPC endpoint policies, does not +fully evaluate SCPs or RCPs without context, and cannot see session policies. +Never report a layer as allowed only because simulation said so. + +## Other causes outside the ten layers + +If every layer comes back clean, check these before concluding: Requester Pays +enabled on the bucket (request needs the requester-pays header), S3 Object Lock +on a permanent delete, a bucket that blocks SSE-C writes, and an access point +whose network origin is a VPC the request does not come from. + +## When a direct read is blocked + +In some environments the agent's S3 read tool refuses bucket-level calls +(`GetBucketPolicy`, `GetBucketEncryption`, `GetBucketOwnershipControls`, +`GetPublicAccessBlock`) with "blocked by policy and was not executed". Do not retry +the same call. Try these sources in order, and use the first that answers: + +1. **AWS Config.** `GetResourceConfigHistory` or `BatchGetResourceConfig` for + `AWS::S3::Bucket`. The latest configuration item holds the bucket policy + (`BucketPolicy`), Block Public Access (`PublicAccessBlockConfiguration`), + default encryption (`ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration`) and the ACL + (`AccessControlList`). It is only as current as the last recorded change, and it + exists only where Config records S3 buckets. +2. **The owning CloudFormation stack.** If the bucket carries an + `aws:cloudformation:stack-name` tag, `GetTemplate` shows the policy the stack + deployed. It does not show changes made outside the stack. +3. **CloudTrail.** `LookupEvents` for the failed request. The `errorMessage` names + the denying policy type, which narrows the layer even when no document can be read. +4. **Ask the operator.** Name the exact command to run and the output to paste back, + for example `aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket `. + +Say which source each verdict rests on. A policy read from Config or a template may +be stale, so mark that layer `ALLOWED_BUT_UNVERIFIABLE` rather than treating the +read as final unless it names the denying statement. If none of the four answers a +layer, mark it `CANNOT_DETERMINE` and say what would resolve it. +